Graeme Nicholson’s Justifying Our Existence: An Essay in Applied Phenomenology is an ambitious project that contributes to the University of Toronto Press series New Studies in Phenomenology and Hermeneutics. Through a rich exploration of Heidegger’s concept of die Sorge [care], Nicholson sheds new light on fundamental questions raised in Being and Time while developing critical questions that apply to the current age. Nicholson offers a concise but critical treatment of Heidegger’s phenomenological notion of Da-sein as a projecting ontic/ontological entity. He pays special attention to the unique feature of projection in Da-sein because, for Heidegger, central to the concept of care is Da-sein’s concern over future possibilities moving toward the present.
The text is rightly distinguished as a work in applied phenomenology because Nicholson moves the disclosure of phenomenon from the abstract to the tangible human experience as an individual and as a participant in religion, nation, and community. Throughout the text, Nicholson maintains the integrity of Heidegger’s phenomenological method while accomplishing the end goal of an applied phenomenology.
Nicholson argues that care is expressed through the individual’s drive toward the magnification of being through personal success. He refers to accounts from the Lee Iacocca autobiography as examples of professional success leading to celebrity status which express a direct magnification of the self. He points out that, conversely, the confrontation with the success of our contemporaries generates a powerful phenomenon of status anxiety which diminishes our own possibility of self-magnification. In contrast to the Iacocca narrative, Nicholson uses examples from former New York Times journalist Jayson Blair’s autobiography Burning Down My Master’s House, which catalogues his deceptive reporting and fabrication of facts to express that failure, like success, is not an end goal but a way of being. Through failure, the self lives in a kind of temporality where possibilities disappear. Nicholson argues that success does not merely magnify the self but magnifies the individual’s way of being in the same way that failure diminishes hope for future possibilities. However, for all that success contributes to the magnification of being it is impotent in its ability to justify being.
In order to establish that care over the justification of being lies in the domain of moralism rather than success, Nicholson relies, in part, on Kant’s doctrine of virtue. Moral righteousness justifies the self in the same way that personal success magnifies the self and like self-magnification, self-justification extends to community. Nicholson introduces the problem of nationalism by pointing out that while “Iacocca’s drive was to magnify his being so as then to justify it, we see that in national contentions the effort of justification is undertaken as a means to self-magnify” (p. 119). Here Nicholson uses some brilliant examples to support his claim by citing passages from John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev that are representative of the language of national justification. In addition, he includes a few paragraphs on Heidegger’s own nationalism and a compelling section on how militant religious extremism does the work of community magnification. It seems that Nicholson’s thesis might have benefited from a more detailed treatment of such a germane example of nationalism, especially because Heidegger’s affiliation with the National Socialist Party is such a layered and provocative problem for so many of his readers.
The book closes with a chapter on spiritual existence through Kierkegaard’s theological expression of spirit found in Sickness unto Death and The Concept of Anxiety, along with some brief summary remarks on Heidegger’s question concerning the meaning of being. Early in the text, the concept of anxiety over being is expressed as a function of the despair over the drive for self-magnification and self-justification. The text returns to this theme of anxiety as despair through Kierkegaard’s consideration of how spirit qua self is grounded. According to Nicholson, “spirit is either self-grounded or grounded in God” (p. 158). There is no consideration for a natural process because nature cannot account for the singular “I” which is in question here. For Kierkegaard, the self stands before God and adopts God as the criterion for the self. This relationship with God sets the self free from despair. Once the self and God are intertwined there is a dramatic magnification of the self through being in relation to God. The self is subsequently no longer in despair over magnification or justification; rather, the self is in despair over the falling away from God. Like the singular self is realized in community, so too is the spiritual self realized in spiritual community.
Nicholson clarifies that his intention is to expose the link between existence and the deep desire for justification, which raises the question of whether a spiritual community is possible within religious and national communities. The most pressing question Nicholson poses in the text is whether spirituality can be confined within one historical community. His conclusion is that Kierkegaard has shown us that a spiritual existence has a double possibility: an autonomous self-grounding or a devout relationship with God. It is the latter case, according to Nicholson, in which the self is able to hope for a divine and authentic justification of its being, whereby despair is surmounted: “This gives us hope that the grinding opposition of militant religions and nations – for they are the despair of humanity itself – may be overcome in a spiritual community” (p. 171).
Nicholson’s Justifying Our Existence is a meaningful work in applied phenomenology because it offers new insights on how to think about real existential problems that face humanity without compromising serious scholarship. As mentioned earlier, Nicholson’s thesis rests primarily on Heidegger’s notion of die Sorge [care] through which he introduces the concept of Da-sein as self rather than the more literal translation. In order for the overall project to work, this reconciliation between the self and Da-sein is essential. Nicholson recognizes this tension and rightly points to Being and Time for the allowance, arguing that “a formal expression like ‘self’ permits phenomenology to recognize the indexical reference of each personal pronoun while still speaking generally. This is not just a question of method: it is central to the account of Da-sein” (p. 35). While some may take issue with this treatment of Da-sein, Nicholson’s project is an essay in applied phenomenology and the use of self rather than Da-sein or a closer translation does not hurt the overall project. The result of Nicholson’s inquiry into applied phenomenology via Heidegger is an original philosophical work with the promise of a wide readership. The text is a reminder that phenomenology is pervasive in our daily existence. It is accessible enough for students with a basic background in existentialism and phenomenology while offering the seasoned scholar new perspectives on the applications of Heidegger’s and Kierkegaard’s works.
