Thanks to the many different senses attributed to the word ‘philosophy’, which is no longer understood as pure theoretical speculation, Cicero's philosophy has been revalued and rehabilitated in recent decades after being underrated, if not forgotten, in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries. This important trend of recent scholarship is faithfully reflected and effectively set out in this Companion, which guides Cicero's works into the twenty-first century, offering the possibility of reading or re-reading them in the light of the latest research. The eighteen contributions from an interdisciplinary team of scholars share the conviction that Cicero is not a mere eclectic populariser, but a thinker who not only transmits doctrines of the Hellenistic philosophical schools that would otherwise have been lost, but discusses them with great expertise; he verifies and reworks them as part of his programme of educating the Roman ruling class; his sceptical method enables himself and his readers to choose, with informed judgement, quid sit in quaque re maxime probabile (Tusc. 4.7). The variety of approaches does not prejudice the volume's unity, which is sharply brought out in Bénatouïl's introduction and the mutual references among the authors.
The first four chapters deal with the social contexts of Cicero's philosophical oeuvre. Since Cicero is not interested in theoretical elaboration, but rather exploits philosophy in the late Roman Republic to change its culture and politics (C. Moatti), the stages of his project are traced not only in the philosophical works but also in the letters (which document the experimental dimension of his thought: S. Aubert-Baillot) and the speeches (rooted in philosophical culture, though they do not display it out of consideration for his audience: C. Steel). The core of this intellectual revolution is the pedagogic aim that C. Brittain and P. Osorio identify in the ‘Academic dialogues’ of 45–44 bce, but also trace in nuce in the ‘Platonic dialogues’ of the 50s: Cicero does not write to communicate his position, but systematically implements the methods of the sceptical Academy (disputatio in utramque partem and suspension of assent) in order to stimulate the reader's judgement; therefore, the two scholars conclude persuasively, the appropriate terrain for judging the dialogues ‘is Academic pedagogy, rather than skeptical epistemology’ (p. 28).
An indispensable premise of this pedagogic programme is Cicero's appropriation and transformation of Greek philosophy, to which Chapters 5–7 are devoted. The creation of a Latin philosophical vocabulary is subtly treated by C. Lévy, who regards it as ‘both a nationalistic endeavor and a matter of liberty and generosity’ (p. 86). Lévy guides readers into Cicero's translation laboratory, following the history of words through the works, chronologically treated. Convinced that in philosophy, as in literature, Latin confers cultural hegemony and confident of its expressive possibilities, Cicero plays the role both of a bilingual interpres and of a tutor of the texts, with an attitude of respect as well as power, which Lévy notes by means of significant examples: the introduction of the philosophical concepts of verisimile (a bridge between Academic aporetism and Platonic dogmatism) and voluntas (expression of the autonomy of the will against Epicurean atomism and Stoic determinism); the translation of οἰκείωσις not with the calque domesticatio, but with conciliatio and commendatio (belonging to the language of social relations in the Roman world); and the use of se diligere for τηρεῖν, that is, the entry into the philosophy of self-love.
Like Lévy, M. Schofield approaches Cicero with empathic φιλία (significantly, the volume is dedicated to the two scholars who for years have devoted heart and soul to Ciceronian philosophy). His aim is not to describe ‘Cicero's treatment of “Platonism” as a System’, compared with the differing views of his masters Philo and Antiochus, but to explore ‘what Plato himself meant to Cicero’ (p. 88). Schofield therefore retraces Plato's presence not only as inspiring the idea of philosophy as a subject of conversation and a philosophical and literary model in the dialogues of the 50s (De orat., Rep., Leg.), but also as an example of political behaviour in the letters (in Att. 9.10.2 and 9.13.4 the relation between Plato and the tyrant Dionysius is a touchstone for the relation between Cicero and Caesar). And, appropriately, he draws attention to Plato's almost total disappearance from the letters of the 40s and the fading of his image in the theoretical writings of the same period, when Cicero, marginalised from political activity, turns to philosophy as ‘to a new encyclopedic agenda needing presentation in a different style’ (p. 101). Only in Brut. and Orat. does Plato remain a significant presence, while in the other writings the Academic strain is dominant.
A combative article by T. Reinhardt is devoted to Cicero's scepticism. To the question ‘Whose Academic skepticism?’, he responds by distinguishing four varyingly sceptical figures: Cicero as man, author, speaker and character. Using this distinction, he carries out a sharp examination of the texts (from Inv. in the mid 80s to Acad. and other dialogues of the mid 40s), to conclude: ‘Cicero was a radical skeptic whose skepticism accommodated many of the features which others would associate with mitigated skepticism, like the use of argument in utramque partem in search of the truth and in the hope that a verisimile might emerge’ (p. 117). Quite apart from this judgement, which not everyone shares (cf. S. Maso, Cicero's Philosophy [2022]), it is important to underline with Reinhardt that the living practice of Academic scepticism presupposes a friendly environment and some common ground of values for speakers open to critical doubt and willing to be refuted because they are genuinely seeking the truth. The ‘civility of conversation’ in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, we may note, would start from this Academic sceptical stance.
The technique of Neo-Academic discussion characterises many works discussed in Chapters 8–15, which deal with how Cicero sees and uses philosophy within his Roman context. Arranged thematically and each of them focusing on one or two works important for the theme, the contributions explore the following questions: ‘Cosmology, Theology, and Religion’ (C. Auvray-Assayas): in Nat. D., with a historical and anthropological rather than theological approach, Cicero examines the views of philosophers on the gods in order to give a rational explanation for religious practices decisive for the city.
‘Determinism, Fate, and Responsibility’ (E. Begemann): in Div. and Fat., while justifying divination as part of the decision-making process of a community, Cicero wants, above all, to safeguard, with Carneades, the free voluntas of the subject against any form of fatalism (S. Timpanaro spoke of Neo-Academic Enlightenment in his introduction to Div. [1988]).
‘Cicero on the Emotions and the Soul’ (S. McConnell): in Tusc. Cicero expresses his intellectual preference for Plato's views on the immortality of the soul and the Stoic position on the emotions, but wants above all to show the practical utility of philosophy, displaying sincerely his aegritudo and testing on himself the practicality of the therapy of grief theorised by the Hellenistic schools.
‘Ethical Theory and the Good Life’ (R. Woolf): in Fin., with its open ending that ‘Cicero's Socrates would … have approved’ (p. 182), Cicero examines the leading ethical theories that, on the basis of οἰκείωσις, deduce the highest good from the instinctive choices of the living being at the moment of birth, and considers their credibility in relation to traditional Roman values: the voluptas of the Epicureans, which places individual pleasure before the common good, is contrary to Roman ethics; the virtus of the Stoics, regarded as the only good and conceived as not admitting of degrees, cannot be publicly proclaimed because of its rigidity; the complexity of human values seems better respected by the Academic-Peripatetic theory expounded by Piso (a pupil of Antiochus), for whom virtue is sufficient for happiness, but there are also bodily goods that will render the subject happiest; yet, Cicero objects, quid minus probandum quam esse aliquem beatum nec satis beatum? (Fin. 5.81).
‘Nature and Social Ethics’ (G. Reydams-Schils): without exhausting the complex problems of Off., the author provides a convincing interpretation: Cicero founds with Panaetius his social ethics in the Stoic notion of the cosmopolis, but emphasises the importance of sociability (communitas), which he regards as intrinsic to the notion of sapientia: the true exercise of wisdom is in the duties arising from communitas, superior to the duties arising from cognitio contemplatioque; on the communitas the traditional virtues are adjusted (for example, temperantia is replaced with decorum, manifested on the basis of the four roles, or personae, that each of us plays in society).
In Chapters 13–15 one is positively struck by the ‘militant’ approach to Cicero's political philosophy, whose originality and influence on later thinkers is underlined, and its continuing usefulness for understanding strength and weakness in present-day democratic republics. G. Remer (‘Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Politics’, on De orat.) brings out the overlap between an ideal orator and an ideal statesman (both described as rector, princeps, procurator and tutor), and the need for their eloquentia, whose power of persuasion might damage the community, to be rooted in sapientia. W. Nicgorski (‘Cicero's Republicanism’, on Rep.) begins by claiming ‘Before Cicero, the idea of a republican government or a tradition of republicanism did not exist’ (p. 215); he gives a masterly account of the theory that Cicero's model of the best constitution does not look wholly to the past, but is a political community properly constituted; he explains the basic principles of Cicero's republicanism (to be free as a person and as a community; a dynamism towards equality; leaders and citizens marked by wisdom and virtue; the separation of the major functions of government). Atkins (‘Empire, Just Wars, and Cosmopolitanism’, on Rep., Leg. and Off.) brings out the importance, for scholars of international relations, of Cicero's reflections on the justice or injustice of empire, the morality or immorality of war, and the integration of the res publica into cosmopolitan thought: ‘Cicero's integration of the republican and natural-law-cosmopolitan traditions is far more coherent and successful than is often recognized’ (p. 232), because his model of res publica, which balances love of self with love of others, ‘is the political form best equipped to promote human society … In this sense Cicero's project may be said to anticipate what some have called “rooted” or “patriotic” cosmopolitanism’ (p. 249).
Chapters 16–18 focus on how Cicero's writings have been useful for later philosophers, who remained in lively contact with his thought. A.-I. Bouton-Touboulic speaks of ‘Augustine's “appropriation” of Cicero’ (p. 266), starting from the transformative experience of reading Hort., which exhorts us to seek wisdom itself and not a particular sect. D.J. Kapust describes the conversation of eighteenth-century thinkers with Cicero on ethics, eloquence, civil religion, law and the active life. M.C. Nussbaum focuses on three topics – cosmopolitanism (Off.), aging (Senect.) and friendship (Amic.) – and demonstrates their urgency for twenty-first-century political philosophy.
Nussbaum's words on Cicero's ‘flawed and passionate humanity’ (p. 299) conclude a volume that is attractively written, stimulating in its presentation of the problems, based on accurate translations and Latin quotations that, though rare, are an incentive to tackle the texts directly, hearing Cicero's own wise, sophisticated voice.
