The 9/11 attacks of 2001 had a profound influence on various domains of American policy, academia, and culture. Terrorism, which until the late 1990s was considered a marginal security threat, and attracted limited attention from policymakers, academics, and security practitioners, became the most acute security concern after 9/11 in the eyes of many. The traumatic impact of the attacks led not only to unprecedented reforms in the structure of the American government, intelligence community, and the security establishment at large. It also facilitated a dramatic increase in the resources that were set aside by the American government and private-sector entities to support research on terrorism, and to develop measures to counter it. Thus, if until the late 1990s only a handful of academics studied terrorism, the last 16 years have witnessed a significant number of researchers from different disciplines attempting to explain the various facets of modern terrorism. Similarly, most components of the American security establishment became what can be described as “counterterrorism-centric.”
A response to this dramatic shift in attention and resources toward countering and studying terrorism was almost inevitable. Indeed, since the mid-2000s a growing corpus of literature has adopted a critical approach toward the growth of the “terrorism industry,” while aiming to reevaluate and expose misconceptions regarding the terrorist threat, and the justifications for the significant investments in containing it.
Chasing Ghosts represents an important effort in this context, as it strives to provide a critical evaluation of U.S. counterterrorism policies. It questions if such efforts are justifiable considering the actual level of the threat, the potential damage it can generate, and the related economic and moral consequences associated with the attempt to control terrorism, especially in terms of the erosion of liberal-democratic norms, values, and practices.
The book is divided thematically into two major segments. The first discusses what can be described as the consequences of the mental state of the U.S. government and populace following 9/11. The psychological impact of the attacks created a strong sense of vulnerability, guilt, paranoia, and anxiety, which led to the adoption of a series of policy decisions and approaches that were eventually counterproductive in assessing the actual threat and shaping the appropriate response. In this context, John Mueller and Mark Stewart begin by critically evaluating the “Threat Matrix,” the collection of potential threats that was envisioned by counterterrorism professionals after 9/11. They point out the overestimations of the number of homegrown Jihadists, the way in which terrorism was framed as an existential threat, and overstatements about the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist groups, as well as the potential damage of terrorist plots. Subsequently, the authors illustrate how misreading the Threat Matrix, on some level, served the organizational interests of various entities within the American security establishment. All of this reflects the success of Jihadists in elevating anxiety and fear regarding the threat they represent, and the perception that the United States is dealing with a competent global movement.
The second section of the book focuses more specifically on the rationale and effectiveness of American counterterrorism efforts by using different analytical approaches, which are mainly focused on various risk assessments and cost–benefit estimations. These cost–benefit analyses are based mainly on determining the extent to which counterterrorism policies have led to a reduction in the number of fatalities and in actual damage to property. The authors’ main argument is that considering the limited potential damage of terrorism, the costs of the counterterrorism policies that were implemented (in terms of both material assets and the erosion of democratic political culture) dramatically outweighed the benefits. Their cost–benefit estimates focus on specific elements of the American counterterrorism intelligence and law-enforcement community, including the FBI, CIA, National Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security, and airport protection forces.
As someone who has studied terrorism and political violence for more than 15 years, I found myself conflicted by many of the conceptual and methodological tools that were used in this book. I assume that some of my colleagues will feel the same way. Specifically, many terrorism experts will agree that for the most part, terrorism is not an existential threat to strong democracies, that in many cases, extreme counterterrorism measures provide limited benefits in comparison to their various costs, and that many of the new threats associated with terrorism (especially of WMD and cyber-terrorism) are exaggerated and contradict the basic operational rationale of terrorism (and thus will be used rarely by terrorist groups).
However, the analytical approach adopted in this book for evaluating the potential harm from terrorism, or more accurately its narrow implementation, exposes a lack of understanding of some of the fundamental characteristics of the terrorist threat. Terrorism is an unconventional method of warfare, not because of its asymmetrical nature or its usage by substate groups, but rather because its effectiveness is dependent mainly on its ability to generate a psychological impact on targeted audiences and, in this way, shape the discourse regarding specific political issues. Consequently, terrorism is not just about how many people are being killed or injured; it is a method of warfare whereby groups with limited resources and capabilities are utilizing violence to formulate a political message in order to monopolize the public discourse.
Thus, the National Liberation Front (FLN) succeeded in achieving its political objectives despite the fact that it was defeated on the battlefield because it was able to change the discourse concerning the French rule in Algeria, both in France and within the broader international community. Similarly, the Palestinians’ ability to promote their political aspirations since the early 1990s (such as the formation of the National Palestinian Authority) is not a result of military success by the various militant Palestinian groups against the Israeli military, but instead reflects their ability to use violent struggle to change the discourse concerning the Israel–Palestinian conflict. Additionally, terrorism is different from many other policy problems in the sense that it seeks to undermine via its psychological impact the legitimacy of the sociopolitical order. Hence, it represents a significant threat to the political culture of the targeted state and its civic norms, and not just to the lives of its people or their property.
Therefore, analysis of the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies based on calculations or assessments of how many lives they saved (or attacks they prevented), while an important part of the discussion, cannot be the only indicator of their effectiveness. Any evaluation needs to take into consideration the psychological/political warfare that is part of the struggle against terrorist groups, and in many cases determines the end result of a conflict. By way of analogy, while traffic accidents probably cause more deaths than terrorism, they do not represent a direct attack against many of the fundamental aspects of the state’s political culture, norms, and practices, and do not aim to delegitimize political institutions.
To conclude, Chasing Ghosts provides an important and valuable contribution to our understanding of the American response to the terrorist threat. Mueller and Stewart highlight important misconceptions and biased perspectives regarding this threat. They also provide ample data and analyses to explain various aspects of the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures that have been employed by the American government. Nonetheless, their limited attention to the intangible aspects of the threat, and its political nature, highlights the degree to which such an assessment is partial, at best, and needs to be complemented by other perspectives and assessment tools.
