One could scarcely imagine any modern thinker whose writings have occasioned as much scrutiny as Marx's. This applies especially to the arcane philosophical writings of the early Marx, although not without qualification. Some of the most important of these writings, such as the Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts (1844) and the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1843) were written solely for self-edification and did not appear in print until almost ninety years after they were penned and almost fifty years after their author's death. Others that were published in Marx's lifetime, most notably “On the Jewish Question” (1843–1844), went largely unnoticed by all but a handful of Marx's closest collaborators. However, when these early writings resurfaced a century later, their impact was immediate, for they provided a new generation of neo-Hegelian humanist Marxists with the ammunition they believed would demolish the dominant, orthodox interpretation of Marx's writings, commonly referred to as “scientific socialism.” Their political value in these internecine battles over the heart and soul of Marxism would only increase during the Cold War, and this fact would pose a formidable obstacle to their being properly understood. As a result, a number of dominant interpretations of these writings gradually took hold—interpretations which the author of the book currently under review, David Leopold, hopes to correct.
Accepted opinion has it that these early writings evince a hostile attitude toward the modern state and its corresponding basis in human, civil, and political rights. Corresponding to this negative assessment of the modern state and its political (rights-based) form, Marx is said to embrace a conception of human emancipation that is distinctly anarchic, anti-statist, anti-institutional, and even apolitical. And then there is Marx's alleged anti-Semitism and hostility to utopian socialism.
In the course of correcting these misinterpretations, David Leopold also rebuts the exaggerated claims made on behalf of those who find the early Marx to be an unoriginal thinker, wholly beholden to the ideas of Feuerbach or (less plausibly) Rousseau. His method for correcting these and other misconceptions combines historical interpretation of the leading intellectual influences on Marx's thought, close textual exegesis of Marx's own writings (especially of passages that are all too frequently ignored or misunderstood), and analysis of the overall coherence of Marx's theory of the modern state and its capacity to actualize human nature.
By his own admission, Leopold's aim in this book is quite modest. He ventures no overarching thesis about how the early writings stack up in comparison to the later writings. Although he himself thinks there is considerable continuity between the early and the later writings—for instance, he does not think that Marx's critique of Feuerbach in the Theses on Feuerbach (1845) and The German Ideology (1845) signals a radical, historicist rejection of a roughly Feuerbachian conception of human nature as a communal, non-egoistic species-being (Gattungswesen)—he generally does not venture an opinion about the extent of the similarities (or differences) between the young Marx and the mature Marx on the issues under discussion. That said, he does believe that these early writings—especially the Critique—represent the most complete discussion of the modern state found in Marx's oeuvre. They mark a brief moment in Marx's life when his attention shifted from the purely political concerns addressed in his journal articles on the latest censorship instructions in Prussia, on wood thefts, and other material interests published in the Rheinische Zeitung to purely philosophical concerns.
This turn to philosophy—Hegelian philosophy at that—seems counterintuitive for one who so fervently espoused a Feuerbachian disdain for the anti-empirical, speculative machinations of the Concept. But as Leopold notes, Marx shared the view held by Heinrich Heine and many others of his own generation that the Traumgeschichte (dream history) of Germany as expounded in the most advanced German philosophy (in this case Hegelian philosophy) would reveal the ideal limits and possibilities of the most advanced and modern state (a state but poorly mirrored in the assorted cities and territories dotting the German landscape at the time yet more or less realized in the states of North America and, to a lesser degree, in France). In short, Hegel's philosophy was presumed to reflect in ideal terms (abstractly and in distorted form) real dialectical tensions underlying any process of political modernization, here understood as a radical separating out of state and civil society and along with it, the emergence of a sphere of private property whose corresponding proprietary interests signaled a radical form of “alienated,” atomistic individualism.
Leopold discusses Marx's treatment of this decisive break with premodern social forms by successively addressing the three major texts mentioned above. Focusing on the Critique, chapter 2 lays out the basic contours of this rupture. After showing how Heinrich Heine's characterization of German philosophy as Traumgeschichte enabled Marx to find in Hegelian philosophy the true but distorted representation of real modern society, the chapter proceeds to lay out a clear and concise summary of the major contours of Hegelian thought (its reception by left-wing, center, and right-wing Hegelian schools—a taxonomy first introduced by left-Hegelian David Strauss—is discussed in the following chapter). As a commentary on Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1821), the Critique effectively demonstrates the arbitrariness of Hegel's own speculative method (which draws upon the a priori dialectical categories and transitions of Hegel's metaphysics, as contained in the Logik (1812), in order to establish certain trends or aspects of the modern state as “necessary” or “developed” in relation to other contingent and less-developed [untrue] aspects). Leopold does a masterful job of disentangling this strand of Marx's critique from his criticism of Hegel's understanding of empirical reality, some aspects of which Marx shared. While rejecting Hegel's speculative claim that the contradiction between state and civil society, and therewith the alienation of private persons from public citizens, will be overcome through the establishment of mediating institutions (corporations, impartial bureaucracies, etc.), Marx is depicted as retaining most of the Hegelian insights regarding the nature of this contradiction.
In chapter 3 Leopold turns to Marx's Zur Judenfrage to clarify Marx's attitude toward modern citizenship based on individual rights. Marx's critique of political emancipation (the extension of civil and political rights within the context of a state/civil society split) is framed as a response to Bruno Bauer's argument that genuine political emancipation would require each citizen to transcend his or her parochial identifications and particular interests completely in deference to the universal human identity (and common interest) they all share. Against Bauer's argument that Jews have a more difficult time than Christians in transcending their “exclusivity” and “egoism” because of their religion—for Bauer, Christianity's presumption of being a religion of universal brotherly love at least moves it closer to transcending itself toward pure humanism—Marx argues that Christians no less than Jews have fallen sway to egoism and exclusion. More trenchantly, he argues that these features are themselves an essential aspect of a civil society sundered from the communal aspirations of the modern state. Thus, while Bauer denies that Jews qua Jews can acquire the “rights of man” and the “rights of citizenship” (including fully equal civil and political rights), Marx holds that it is precisely because of their particularism and egoism—which they share with everyone, Christian or Jew, theist or atheist—that they merit them.
Leopold's extended discussion of Bauer's idiosyncratic views provides a necessary context for understanding Marx's own difference from Bauer. Also notable is Leopold's convincing argument that Marx endorsed something like a Kantian conception of the individual dignity of persons as ends in themselves and, therefore, as worthy of respect as holders of moral rights. In general, Leopold's position offers a balanced view of Marx's attitude toward political, civil, and human rights that allows that Marx endorsed such rights as an advance over their premodern equivalents while insisting on their inherent moral limitations within the context of a civil society/state split. In a position further developed in the following chapter, Leopold argues—again against the grain of contemporary scholarship—that Marx should be understood as supporting some notion of civil and political rights even within a fully (humanly) emancipated society, so that human emancipation does not merely negate political emancipation but preserves and elevates [aufhebt] this distinctly modern form of freedom. Finally, Leopold convincingly dispatches the commonly held view (which gained widespread currency during the Cold War) that Marx was anti-Semitic or suffered from Jewish self-hatred. He nonetheless observes that Marx's acceptance of a common (Gentile-based) derogatory depiction of the Jewish religion and of Jewish culture—shared by Heine, Hess, and many other assimilated Jews of his generation—marked a serious, practical oversight on his part.
Chapter 4 examines Marx's conception of human flourishing and human nature as it is mainly developed in the Manuscripts. After surveying Marx's critique of alienated labor, Leopold proceeds to show that Marx's perfectionist conception of human flourishing, while owing much to Feuerbach's own communal conception, contains several surprising aspects that refer back to Aristotle and other sources. These include basic needs for recreation, culture, intellectual stimulation, artistic expression, emotional satisfaction, aesthetic pleasure, and—most importantly—participation in political life. Most striking is Leopold's argument based on passages of the Critique that, despite his endorsement of Rousseau's critique of representative democracy, Marx did not reject indirect forms of democratic participation but affirmed forms of delegated authority that were less alienated from popular control than current forms of representation. Likewise, Leopold makes quick work of the commonplace view that Marx's critique of an alienated form of bureaucracy somehow implies that he subscribed to the strange idea that a humanly emancipated society could do without any form of state administration or political life. Furthermore, despite these and other civic and republican elements in Marx's thought, Leopold shows that common estimates of the impact of Rousseau on his thought are greatly exaggerated (especially since Rousseau endorsed limited forms of suffrage and hierarchical—indeed, class-based—forms of aristocratic governance).
Leopold concludes his book with an explanation for Marx's alleged hostility to utopian socialism. Here he argues that Marx was broadly sympathetic to the first wave of utopian socialists (Saint-Simon, Fourier, et al.) with regard to their criticisms of the status quo and forgave them their penchant for designing futuristic societies and morally exhorting their contemporaries. This tone changes when Marx addresses the second wave of utopian socialists, who, living within more historically developed and revolutionary social contexts, should have seen that history itself contains the solution to its own riddles, thereby rendering utopian thinking and moral exhortation superfluous. In one of the few places where he tenders an opinion on Marx's position, Leopold regrets Marx's disdain for utopian blueprints, since, contrary to Marx's optimism, we today know that history does not invariably produce progressive revolutionary solutions to its riddles.
In sum, whether or not one accepts its interpretation of the dominant strands of Marx scholarship, Leopold's book largely succeeds in reopening debate about Marx's views about the modern state, its foundation in rights, and its role and status within a fully emancipated society. Of course, there are connections that he might have chosen to pursue but did not. One is the likely impact—stressed by Herbert Marcuse and Philip Kain, among others—that Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind (1795) had on Hegel's and Marx's critique of alienation (to his credit, however, Leopold cites Schiller as an original source for the dialectical concept of “sublation” [Aufhebung] and the idea of a German Traumgeschichte). Another is the connection between Marx's communal conception of human nature and a kind of universal (humanistic) communitarian, democratic politics that, in a manner similar to Bauer's own radical humanism, does not broach political differences. Leopold never clarifies whether Marx's conception of human emancipation would ultimately require transcending all parochial cultural identifications—a prospect which might impoverish rather than enrich the self-actualization of human beings. This concern, oddly enough, is only magnified when we juxtapose this possible tendency in Marx's early thought toward abstract universalism and individualism to his more developed (Aristotelian) remarks, in the German Ideology, about the flourishing of complex individuality in communist society.
