In Plutarch's Convivium septem sapientium (CSS) a narration of the banquet proper is preceded by an account of the walk to the banquet of three of the participants: Thales, Diocles and Niloxenus, a messenger of the Egyptian pharaoh Amasis. Upon learning that Niloxenus brings a letter from Amasis to Bias, Thales says with laughter: εἴ τι κακὸν αὖθις εἰς Πριήνην· διαλύσει γὰρ Βίας, ὡς διέλυσεν αὐτὸς τὸ πρῶτον (CSS 146E–F: ‘if it is something bad – to Priene again! For Bias will solve it, just as he solved the first one’). Scholars have noticed that Thales’ words echo a Greek proverb, transmitted in Zenobius’ collection: εἴ τι κακὸν εἰς Πύρραν, ‘if it is something bad – to Pyrrha’.Footnote ¹ However, the purpose of Plutarch's reference to this particular proverb has thus far remained unclear. The aim of this contribution is to shed light on Thales’ words by examining the meaning of the Pyrrha proverb and suggesting an interpretation which explains the function of Plutarch's allusion to it.

According to editors and commentators of the CSS, the meaning of Thales’ words bears no resemblance to that of the proverb. J. Defradas in his commentary explains: ‘Pyrrha était une ville de Lesbos sur laquelle s’étaient abattues de nombreuses catastrophes: le proverbe avait donc un sens légèrement different de celui que lui donne Thalès.’Footnote ² Defradas is followed by F. Lo Cascio, who states that the sense of the phrase in Plutarch differs from that of the saying and explains the meaning of the proverb: ‘le sventure capitano sempre agli sventurati. Pirra … era infatti una città tristamente nota per aver subito reiterate catastrofi.’Footnote ³ However, these explanations of the proverb's meaning seem to be wrong. Zenobius, the paroemiographer to whom we owe our knowledge of the proverb, says: φασὶν ὅτι οἱ Πυρραῖοι πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους πάντας ἀπεχθῶς εἶχον. ἐκεῖνοι οὖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα αὐτοῖς κακὰ ἀποτροπιαζόμενοι, καὶ ἐκβάλλοντες εἰς τὴν Πυρραίων χώραν, ἐπεφώνουν εἴ τι κακὸν εἰς Πύρραν (‘they say that the inhabitants of Pyrrha were in hostile relations with all their neighbours, who therefore averted their misfortunes and threw them on to Pyrrha, saying “If it is something bad – to Pyrrha”’). There is no mention, in Zenobius’ explanation of the proverb, of Pyrrha plagued by catastrophes; according to Zenobius, the proverb has an apotropaic character: its aim is to avert misfortunes and turn them upon enemies.Footnote ⁴

With Zenobius in mind we shall turn to Plutarch. What is the connection between Plutarch's passage and the apotropaic meaning of the proverb? It apparently made little sense to G.L. Huxley, who in an article on Greek proverbs relates Zenobius’ remarks about Pyrrha and its relations with its neighbours, and then suggests that Plutarch's εἴ τι κακὸν αὖθις εἰς Πριήνην is an independent proverb the meaning of which is contrary to that of the Pyrrha one: ‘Priene in Ionia was famous for its sound laws … It means that troubles can be set right at Priene, because justice can be found there.’Footnote ⁵ But there is no indication that Plutarch's line functioned as an independent proverb; in fact, αὖθις (‘again’) connects Thales’ expression with the particular circumstances, in which Bias receives a request from Amasis for the second time (cf. 146e: πρὸς Βίαντα πάλιν ἀπεσταλμένος, ‘sent to Bias again’, and πρόβλημα δεύτερον, ‘a second problem’).

It may be worthwhile to look at the Adagia of Erasmus, where under number 2101 we find the proverb in Latin form: si quid mali in Pyrrham.Footnote ⁶ Erasmus explains the meaning of the proverb (ad hunc modum malum, si quod timeretur, deprecabantur abominantes et in hostium caput imprecantes) and relates Zenobius’ account of its origin. Then he notes Plutarch's reference to the proverb in the CSS and comments: mihi videtur loci nomen data opera mutatum, quod Bias esset Prienaeus; ita ioco Pyrrha mutata est in Prienen (‘it seems to me that the place name was changed on purpose, for Bias was from Priene; thus Pyrrha in jest was changed to Priene’). Erasmus believes that Plutarch deliberately made Thales echo the proverb, and jokingly changed the place name. This, however, would make little sense if Plutarch completely disregarded the meaning of the proverb. Where, then, is the joke?

Let us examine Thales’ words. As we read the sentence with attention focussed on the structure of the underlying proverb, Thales’ words acquire a new meaning: putting himself in the position parallel to that of Pyrrha's neighbours, Thales identifies Amasis’ request as a potential trouble, τι κακόν, and hopes that it is Bias, not he, who will remain the recipient of the pharaoh's requests (Bias’ Priene is substituted for Pyrrha, and we may notice that Priene was, in fact, a neighbouring city of Thales’ Miletus, both cities being located on opposite shores of a gulf, about 20 km apart). This fits Plutarch's characterization of Thales who, as Niloxenus says, in contrast to Bias has a reputation of being a μισοβασιλεύς (CSS 147A). Thales is a free speaker, and his unbridled tongue leads to his unpopularity with Amasis; his anti-tyrannical sentiments are signalled in 147B, where Thales’ offensive remarks concerning despots are quoted, and in 152A, where Thales states that he thinks that a ruler is happy if he manages to live till old age and dies a natural death.

The allusion to the Pyrrha proverb, therefore, draws a distinction between Thales and Bias and their respective relations with political power. The theme of the relationship between a wise man and a ruler is a recurrent one in the CSS, though its seriousness is repeatedly toned down by an admixture of humour; there is also much playfulness in Thales’ rendition of the Pyrrha proverb. The playful tone is signalled by the fact that Thales says his words with laughter (γελάσας). The humour of the passage derives from the fact that the κακόν, which in the Pyrrha proverb denoted a real misfortune threatening the city and its inhabitants, becomes now a πρόβλημα, an intellectual challenge, as we learn from Thales’ description of the first problem sent by Amasis to Bias in 146F: the sage was sent a sacrificial animal and ordered to send back the worst and the best portion of the meat. In response, Bias cut out the tongue and sent it to the pharaoh, which made him highly esteemed at the Egyptian court. The current problem also will pose no difficulty for Bias (151D); moreover, despite Thales’ proclaimed unwillingness to become a recipient of Amasis’ requests, he will, eventually, also take part in solving the king's problems (153A–D).

By identifying Bias with the inhabitants of Pyrrha and himself with their hostile neighbours, Thales enters into the spirit of sympotic bantering and teasing with its characteristic pretence of antagonism between interlocutors.Footnote ⁷ In fact, a little later, in his first face-to-face encounter with Bias in the CSS (150B–C), Thales will not fail to tease Bias on account of the pharaoh's request and will advise the sage to solve it while he is still sober and of clear mind (νήφων καὶ προσέχων ἑαυτῷ), to which Bias reacts with pretended indignation: ‘This man has been trying for a long time to frighten me with such advice’ (ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μέν πάλαι δεδίττεται ταῦτα παρακελευόμενος). The allusion to the Pyrrha proverb, therefore, announces the mood of the sympotic gathering to come.

Finally, Plutarch imbues the passage with playfulness by the very fact of employing an intertextual allusion. As has been observed by scholars, there is something ludic in the nature of allusion, which expects the reader to ‘fill in the missing pieces of a puzzle.’Footnote ⁸ Plutarch activates his readers by presenting them with their own intellectual challenge as they try to figure out not only the nature of the κακόν which Thales wishes to deflect on to Bias but also the relationship between the proverb's protagonists (Pyrrha's inhabitants and neighbours) and Plutarch's characters (Thales and Bias).