Introduction
Research undertaken in various private and public economic and political archives shows that European countries began to develop an interest in Socialist China from the 1950s onwards. The People's Republic of China (PRC) was keen to develop economic and political relations with Western countries as well. Because of the Cold War, these European initiatives had to be considered within the framework imposed by military alliances and Washington's plans. However, engagement with the United States varied across Western European countries, as did their domestic situations; consequently, they followed different paths of rapprochement with Beijing and normalized their relations with China at different times: Great Britain came first, in 1950; de Gaulle's France followed in 1964; and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1972.Footnote 1 Italy was not last: it recognized the PRC on 6 November 1970, bringing to a close a process that began shortly after 1949 and which continued on-and-off, with varying degrees of political and economic intensity, for two decades.
The pace of Sino-Italian relations was influenced in equal part by political, ideological, and business stimuli, as well as by earlier relations that had been established with the Chinese empire and later with the Republic. However, these factors were overshadowed by the constraints induced by the climate created by the Cold War and by the need to maintain an internal political equilibrium.
The early 1950s
By joining the Atlantic alliance in 1949, Italy accepted that its foreign policy would necessarily be aligned with American international choices. In that same year, a few months before the birth of the PRC, it had concluded a friendship treaty with Nationalist China. In the years that followed, Italy, like other Western states, maintained official relations with the Republic of China in Taiwan, even though an ambassador was never sent.Footnote 2 Thus, the Italian government was aware that the problems of recognition and trade with the PRC were questions on which the American administration's opinion had to be sought.
During the Korean War, Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi, at the head of his last two centrist governments, respected Italy's international commitments, concentrated on the unresolved question of Italy's Second World War peace treaties, such as the colonial issues and the problem of Trieste, and worried constantly about the internal divisions in his party—Italy's relationship with the PRC was not one of his priorities. In addition, to consider recognition of the PRC would have seemed to favour his domestic political adversaries, the Socialists and Communists. The left-wing parties were very active on the question of China. The Italian Communist Party, in contact with the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties, worked to sensitize its members and the public about what was happening in East Asia, through initiatives such as the creation of the Centre for the Development of Economic and Cultural Relations with China, chaired by Ferruccio Parri, and the organization of cultural and scientific visits to China.Footnote 3
In the Italian Socialist Party, its historic leader, Pietro Nenni, played a decisive role in establishing relations with China. In the 1950s, acting with the Italian Communist Party, he abandoned his party's passive subordination to a common front and sought more room to manoeuvre. Neutral and pacifistic, in the brief period in which he was foreign minister (1946–1947), Nenni tried to adopt a policy of equidistance between Moscow and Washington and showed an interest in setting up bilateral trade agreements, on which even with countries of Eastern Europe had agreed. After opposing Italy's signing of the North Atlantic treaty, Nenni made a Socialist commitment to the growing international efforts to promote détente, neutrality, and peace. He wished to improve East–West relations and thought that détente was possible ‘if finally one decided to recognize or one resigned oneself to recognizing the reality of what had happened in China’.Footnote 4
The support given by this eminent Socialist politician to the initiation of trade between Italy and China, through his own acts or those of his close collaborators, was fundamental. The fact that, for the Chinese, foreign trade was a political question should not be underestimated.
The initiator of trade relations was one of Nenni's closest collaborators, Dino Gentili, an anti-fascist, member of the Action Party, clever trader, brilliant businessman, and an economic Sinologist, described as the inventor of trade with China. Gentili had long been absent from Italian politics due to his exile because of his anti-fascist stance and two missions during the Second World War to Great Britain and the United States respectively.Footnote 5 Strengthened by the friendships he made with Carlo Sforza, Alberto Tarchiani, Ferruccio Parri, and Nenni himself, in the early 1950s Gentili returned to trade and business, and founded companies which involved themselves in international trade.
Gentili, who had a talent for business, a wide-ranging network of friends, and contacts with industrialists, launched initiatives which were guided by the imperative to export, which filled gaps in the Ministry of Foreign Trade.Footnote 6 This was combined with his admiration for the Chinese world, and its the complexity and ‘otherness’; the Socialist businessman followed the development of the new state with interest and wanted to open up trade between the two countries.
To realize this hope for trade relations with China, Gentili founded Comet, Società per gli scambi internazionali srl (Company for Foreign Trade Ltd) to function as an intermediary between Italian companies and Chinese economic bodies. By August 1952—during the Korean War—it was already trading with China. Comet relied on the direct presence of an agent in Beijing, the communist, Spartaco Muratori.Footnote 7 At the 1954 Geneva conference, to which the Chinese delegation had been invited to negotiate about the situation in Indochina, Gentili found a way to approach Zhou Enlai who, as prime minister and foreign minister, led the Chinese delegation, and projected a smiling and reassuring image of his country. In the same year, Gentili, accompanied by an assistant, was invited to Beijing. The visa was arranged by the then-president of the Chamber of Deputies,Footnote 8 Giovanni Gronchi, who was in frequent contact with Nenni and was determined to raise the question with the Socialists of enlarging the government majority at the Christian Democrats’ party congress.Footnote 9
As is well known, in its first years the PRC was internationally isolated, recognized by few states, and dependent on the Soviet Union for its economic reconstruction and military assistance to ‘liberate’ Taiwan.Footnote 10 Gentili was aware of these conditions and understood that China's foreign trade was limited ‘in the years that followed the founding of the state, years in which the Chinese economy was modelled after and depended on the Soviet aid’. China sold to Western companies through ‘corporations’, of which the China National Import–Export Corporation was the most important, responsible for purchases and sales in a wide range of sectors, from textiles for export to fertilizers for import.Footnote 11
In his attempts to open a path of trade between Italy and China, Gentili became the spokesman for interested businessmen, who had already traded with the Nationalist government in the preceding decade in the engineering, textile, and fertilizer sectors (including Fiat and some wool companies). He attempted to overcome the obstacles to trade in restricted goods through forming an alliance with the United Kingdom in Hong Kong,Footnote 12 but to increase the volume of trade he needed the support of the government and was waiting to discover its attitude towards the restrictions imposed by the Americans. Gentili wrote to Nenni in 1953, ‘the core of the problem is to know if the government intends to allow the exportation of goods that are included on the restricted lists or not’.Footnote 13 The businessman was not fooling himself: he understood that it was a general political decision, and one not easily made; yet such a decision was a necessary first step to working with China. Armed with Gentili's recommendations, Nenni did not miss the opportunity to discuss the question with the official authorities. From the early 1950s the Socialist leader had monitored and supported the business of his friend and collaborator, using his role to put him in contact with the appropriate ministers. In September 1953, he arranged a meeting with the Christian Democrat prime minister, Giuseppe Pella. Another attempt was made in 1954 with the foreign minister, Gaetano Martino, nominated by the new Scelba government. Martino was a Liberal, supporter of NATO, and pro-American, holding a broad view of international politics, and sensitive to the demands of the private sector. When a member of parliament, Guido Mazzali, an old friend of NenniFootnote 14 and editor of the Socialist Party's daily newspaper Avanti!, also known for his statements in favour of dedicating more attention to trade with China, formally questioned Martino on this subject during a parliamentary session, the foreign minister answered that the Italian government was in favour of trade with China, like all other countries. As evidence he said that between 1950 and 1953, the volume of Italian exports to China had more the tripled.Footnote 15
From the reactions described above, it can be seen that the Foreign Ministry had a unified position on Sino-Italian trade. Not only were the left-wing parties interested in China, but politicians in the government parties also showed that they did not underestimate the importance of trade with the PRC. Nonetheless, in these years, an attitude of caution and disciplined respect of the will of the American administration prevailed in government policy.Footnote 16
Indeed, if there were reasons to value trade with Asian countries, there were also reasons to justify the prudence of the foreign minister. In the early 1950s dialogue between Rome and Washington was not easy. Italy, which continued to have a deficit in its balance of payments, counted on American economic aid. Even if it sometimes seemed that Italy was not tolerant of the expectations and interference of its ally, especially in relation to the trade embargo with Eastern Europe, in fact American aid was always in the forefront of the minds of the Italian leaders. American politicians, frustrated by the Korean War, immersed in the witch-hunt of McCarthyism, and ever more suspicious of Moscow and Italian Communists, were aware ‘that large assets continued to flow to the Italian Communist Party through the earnings that were made by well-known organizations involved in trade with Eastern Europe’ as well as East Asia.Footnote 17 ‘To satisfy McCarthy’, the American maritime authorities had asked Italian ships not to call at PRC ports on an even more restrictive basis than those already in place internationally.Footnote 18
Furthermore, in order to have better control of Italian politics from within, in 1953 Clare Boothe Luce was nominated American ambassador to Rome, at at time when the country was considered by the Americans to be at risk of communist infiltration and ‘the weakest link in the North Atlantic Alliance’.Footnote 19 The contracts and orders that Italian industry was able to win from the United States had to be put before Ambassador Luce ‘who could express her opinion on each one’.Footnote 20
Nenni, however, did not feel the effects of this influence; instead he focused more on international than domestic issues, and he was certainly knowledgeable about the opportunities in China, both formal and informal, that were being pursued by the British, French and Germans. His objective was to follow these examples ‘to facilitate the development of our relations with Beijing’.Footnote 21
Nenni's visit to Beijing
In 1955, Nenni went to Beijing, having received an invitation from Zhou Enlai, thanks to Gentili's efforts. When the news of Nenni's invitation to China hit the papers in Italy, it was described as an event of high importance.Footnote 22 In preparation for the trip, the Socialist leader contacted Foreign Minister Martino, as his preference was to make the visit in an official government capacity in order to establish an Italian trade office in the Chinese capital. A few days before his departure in September 1955, he wrote to the minister asking for an extension of the visas granted to the Beijing Opera troupe, which was on tour in Italy at the time. In the same letter, Nenni reminded the minister that he had already suggested sending an economic mission to Asia. He argued that the matter had become urgent, as the Italian economic crisis, in particular in the industrial sector, and the deficit in the balance of payments made it necessary to access the markets of Eastern Europe, the Middle and Far East, and not let precious opportunities for Italy fade away, especially as other Western states already had initiatives under way.Footnote 23
In his reply to Nenni on 15 September, Martino granted the visa extension for the Beijing Opera troupe, and said that he followed ‘very carefully everything connected to our relations with China’. In addition, he said that he shared Nenni's concern about the deficit in the Italian balance of trade and was evaluating the opportunities that the Chinese market could present for Italian exports.Footnote 24
At the same time he informed the Chamber that he had seized the opportunity presented by the presence of the Chinese delegation in Geneva to discuss the situation in Indochina with the Americans. Martino had instructed the Italian representatives ‘to express the thoughts of the Italian government on the gradual normalization of trade between the Italian government and that of Mao Zedong’.Footnote 25
Through the Chinese ambassador, Wang Pingnan, an agreement was reached on convening a meeting of economic experts. The main allied governments were informed of these steps.Footnote 26 The American administration, involved at the time in the Geneva negotiations, asked Martino to delay, as they detected in the initiatives of the foreign minister ‘a de facto recognition . . . the first real sign of a new Italian foreign policy’. Martino, ‘pushed by the demands of all the political parties and by the need to anticipate Nenni's moves’, then denied he had given Nenni any official role.Footnote 27
Although he lacked an official stamp of approval, Nenni's trip to Beijing turned out to be very positive: the discussions he had with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong dealt with world affairs in general and with Sino-Italian problems in particular. To Nenni, Zhou Enlai expressed the PRC's willingness to ‘deal with the problems of organizing peace on all levels’ by claiming a permanent seat on the Security Council, and indicated that the attitude of the United States was China's main problem. On the commercial level China intended to increase trade with Europe in general, and with Italy in particular, and was receptive to Italian initiatives. The only condition it imposed was that Italy must break off relations with the government of Taiwan (Formosa). On this point Beijing was intransigent, and Zhou Enlai ‘called “a conspiracy” every attempt to offer a finger to Beijing in the field of trade and a hand to Jiang Jieshi on the two Chinas question’.Footnote 28
Both Chinese leaders were conscious of the serious problems their country faced and thus of the need to seek solidarity and friendship with anyone willing to offer it to them. As Nenni noted, though, China ‘want(ed) to negotiate, but was not in a position of one who is about to drown’. As a result of his visit, the Socialist leader perceived the country's immense possibilities for development, with the potential to make China ‘one of the factors that would influence the future of Asia and balance of world power’.Footnote 29
On returning to Rome, Nenni realized that his visit to China had taken on a political tone in Italy. Thus he reported back to the new president of the Republic, Giovanni Gronchi, who continued to enjoy a preferential relationship with the Socialists domestically, and to Martino, whom Nenni invited to withdraw from the ‘Atlantic pack’.Footnote 30
However, it was not easy to leave the pro-Atlantic domestic camp; on the political front, Martino was subject to different pressures, ranging from the Socialist Mazzali, to the suspicions of Filippo Anfuso of the right-wing party Movimento Sociale Italiano, who accused Martino of having met with Nenni just before his departure for Beijing and entrusting him with the task of laying the groundwork for trade with China, to the threats to provoke a government crisis by Giuseppe Saragat, secretary of the Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano.
To further complicate the picture, at the same time Italy's foreign policy was focused on the issue of its admission to the United Nations. This depended not only on American approval of the package proposed by the Canadian delegation, but also on the veto of the Chinese Nationalists who had a permanent seat in the Security Council and who, ‘with suicidal intransigence’, feared that the inclusion of new members to the Council would call their seat into question.Footnote 31 The Chinese Nationalists’ fears have to be considered in light of Italy's international activity at the time. The country was evidently widening its horizons by getting involved in the Americans’ Asian programmes, and beginning to collaborate actively with Japan, Ceylon, Thailand, and India. China was not included officially in its activities, but there was enough reason to believe that Italy had an interest there as well. Italian political leaders therefore worked actively to make it clear that the attention given to China by the political and economic milieus was aimed exclusively at trade and did not extend to political recognition. In other words, in order to secure its admission at the UN, the Italian government had to take into account American vetoes and the concerns of the Chinese Nationalists.
United States and Italy
The Sino-Italian contact that had taken place in Geneva in 1955 did not lead to meaningful results, since the Chinese made it clear that they were ready to welcome an Italian trade mission only if government approval was forthcoming. As explained above, this was not possible. Nevertheless, in 1955, Gentili was able to organize a mission to China under the aegis of Comet; the delegation included 25 industrialists, among whom were representatives from Fiat, Viscosa, and Montecatini, and several private traders in silk. At the last minute the Fiat representative withdrew from the mission, due to pressure from the American ambassador, Luce. Nonetheless, the mission led to the conclusion of the first Sino-Italian understandings on importation and exportation.Footnote 32
Within the Italian government there was not an a priori negative position on the recognition of the PRC, as Foreign Minister Segni said in 1956.Footnote 33 However, the dialectic between the supporters of Gronchi, who favoured Nenni and an opening to the left, and the supporters of Scelba, such as the minister of foreign trade, Bernardo Mattarella, who opposed it, prevented an agreement being reached on sending an official economic mission to China.
As a result of domestic quarrels, Italy lost its chance to benefit from the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations, which led the Chinese to turn to Western European countries. Italy, for example, was asked to supply ball bearings to China and Martino repeatedly lobbied the American administration to allow the Italian engineering firm RIV to fulfil the Chinese request. In return, Italy would import glycerine and phenol, which was needed by many chemical companies, at lower prices than those demanded by countries in the sterling area. In 1957, however, the White House was not ready to make exceptions for fear that this would constitute a precedent for other countries. In addition, the American administration was irritated by the initiatives carried out by Enrico Mattei, president of the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) company, in Iran and in the Mediterranean countries, as well as by his involvement in the Middle East following the Suez crisis. Although the Italians protested against the privileges already conceded to Japan, which involved American interests, and the discriminatory attitude towards Italy, the Americans did not soften their stance.Footnote 34
The Italians were encouraged by signs that seemed to foreshadow international developments. The unilateral abolition of the restricted list by the British in 1957 sent a clear signal to other European states that were inclined to trade with the PRC, and the trade initiatives of the Germans, British, Belgians, and Swiss began to multiply. As far as the Italian government knew, after its economic mission in 1956, France was about to nominate a trade and cultural agent to Beijing in the face of weak objections by the American secretary of state, John Foster Dulles.Footnote 35
The European moves were not adopted by the American Republican administration, rigidly constrained as it was by the logic of the Cold War, according to which China should depend on the Soviet Union for its trade. Through non-recognition the Americans sought to force the Asian country to gravitate toward the Soviet arena, and then become a constant drain on Russian resources.Footnote 36 There was also the problem of Taiwan. The American administration was not prepared to abandon its old ally, Jiang Jieshi, with whom it had concluded a treaty of alliance in 1954 (although it was made quite clear that there was little hope of them returning to the mainland). In addition, there was a real danger that the PRC would invade the island of Taiwan, as demonstrated by the repeated bombardments of the Quemoy islands, the coastal islets controlled by the Nationalists, in 1958. In fact, the Chinese had the limited objective of resuming ambassadorial talks, and the American secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, understood that the attacks were a means of applying diplomatic pressure. But because the Chinese were backed by the Soviets, Washington took the opportunity to emphasize the relationship and made it clear that an attack on Taiwan would draw the United States into war. This would not involve the European states, though, as these governments only saw the advantages of relations with mainland China. However, the Americans were determined to limit trade opportunities with Beijing.Footnote 37
Enrico Mattei
Despite the Americans’ unfavourable attitude, Sino-Italian trade intensified, thanks to the initiatives of the chemical company, Montecatini, as well as of the textile and shipping companies. Especially powerful was the policy on energy supplies pursued by ENI's president, Enrico Mattei. He was supported by Premier Amintore Fanfani and by President Giovanni Gronchi, both from the leftist wing of the Christian Democrats. Gronchi and Fanfani were the primary exponents of the new Atlantic faction, which expressed faith in the Atlantic alliance and had aspirations for Italian leadership in the process of Mediterranean renewal. With ambitions for Italy to play an international role, they rejected the existing balance of power. They sought a dynamic and assertive foreign policy and thought that showing some autonomy from the United States would be opportune and bring them some gains.
Together with Gronchi and Fanfani, Base, the left-wing branch of the Christian Democrats (a faction that included important members of the Italian Catholic world such as Giovanni Marcora, Ezio Vanoni, and Dino Del Bo) favoured Mattei's commercial and political approaches to North African and Middle Eastern countries. In turn, Mattei, linked as he was to more secular exponents of the Christian Democrats, provided financial support to the faction. His interests in energy supplies and exploration of oilfields brought Mattei to the Mediterranean, as well as to China, in much the same way in which they had previously led to his making contact with the Soviet Union. He could therefore count on the cautiously positive signals that his political faction had previously shown.Footnote 38
It was Enrico Mattei who made the first moves. An awareness of the changes under way in the developing world combined with business realism pushed him to seek territory separate from the oligopoly that dominated the traditional energy reserves, and to consider favourably the possibility of creating an opening in an enormous market that was also in a phase of continuous expansion, such as China. In December 1958, after repeated contacts between ENI and PRC representatives, which took place in the Chinese embassy in Berne, Enrico Mattei secretly organized a trip to Beijing, with the consent of both Premier Fanfani and President Gronchi. The meetings led to a widening of the economic collaboration between Italy and China, and to an exchange of missions in the coming years. In addition to this, Mattei came to a personal understanding with Foreign Minister Chen Yi, whom he had met repeatedly in Geneva, to discuss economic relations between the two countries. The volume of trade and the necessity of licences for the importation of Chinese products required Mattei to use his personal links with the Ministry of Foreign Commerce; Minister Dino Del Bo, a friend of his, granted the exemptions and entrusted the supervision of the operation to the Italian Trade Agency.Footnote 39 At the beginning of the 1960s, bilateral economic cooperation had both widened and deepened, despite the serious economic difficulties experienced by China as a result of the effects of the Great Leap Forward and, in 1962, the death of Mattei.
ENI's able penetration of new markets added to the spaces that Dino Gentili had opened up for private business. ENI's actions, however, had more political relevance. As a public company, the weight carried by its president was recognized as a decisive factor in the government's economic policy; it was as if he had the power to carry out a parallel foreign policy. Mattei's strategies had been seconded by official policy during the transition phase from centre to centre-left governments, which had oriented the government towards the developing world and towards the creation of an international role for Italy. Mattei knew about the American restrictions to trade with China; having noticed earlier than others the growing split between the Soviet Union and the PRC, he understood that one consequence would be the transfer of the flows of trade from the Soviet bloc to Western markets, increasing the import of raw material and equipment, especially chemicals, olive oil, and textiles. All European countries, in particular France, Britain, and Germany, had clearly benefited from this business, while trade between China and Italy, though growing, was still hesitant.Footnote 40
The turning point: the trade agreement
Finally, another factor contributed to facilitating Italian efforts to trade with the Asian world: in the 1960s, thanks to the credibility acquired by Italy through the initiatives of private companies and ENI, Italian trade representatives in Hong Kong began to find real opportunities to increase trade between Italy and the PRC. The most important Chinese fair was organized in Canton (Chinese: Guangzhou) and provided Western representatives with the opportunity to meet Chinese trade officers. An Italian trade adviser, Dino Cappello, was invited there in 1961. In July 1962, during his visit to the Canton fair, trade officer, Saverio Santaniello, received a verbal invitation to visit Beijing.Footnote 41
The turning point came in May 1963 when the Fanfani government—more precisely the Foreign Ministry in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Trade—authorized Santaniello to visit the Canton fair and then Beijing ‘privately to make the appropriate contacts on the technical level’, while ‘taking care to speak off the record and avoid any public statements’.Footnote 42 During the meeting in Beijing, which took place that May, the Chinese expressed to Santaniello their willingness to conclude agreements and exchange missions and trade offices with Italy, provided that there was a change in the Italians’ attitude.Footnote 43
Trade diplomacy was facilitated by the formation, in December 1963, of a centre-left government with Aldo Moro as premier, Pietro Nenni as vice-premier, and Giuseppe Saragat as foreign minister. In January 1964, the news of French recognition of the PRC accelerated the process and intensified the political debate around Italy's policy towards the PRC.
De Gaulle's move provoked perplexity and negative reactions in Europe, particularly in Bonn and Brussels, as well as in Washington. The Italian president, Antonio Segni, seemed particularly opposed to the move. The government was also against the idea of imitating the French, as it could foresee the inevitable complications that would result in its relationship with the United States and cause a potential fallout in domestic politics.Footnote 44
Proceeding to recognition, as France had done, which was the preferred option of the Italian Communists and the left-wing Socialists, would have been premature for Italian politics. Nenni himself, on 3 February, commented ‘certainly (one) cannot ask the government to recognize Beijing today’.Footnote 45 The China question was not on the Socialists’ agenda, yet the conditions were right to reach a trade agreement.
This was the only possible solution after the French move, given the domestic pressures. Yet Italian-Chinese trade was estimated at 30 billion lira and held prospects for growth—it did not seem wise to leave economic relations between the two countries in the hands of groups of traders, without any government direction.Footnote 46 As Santaniello wrote in a report dated 23 June 1964: ‘Considering Italian commercial interests and Chinese demand for our products, the first step towards normalization would be the establishment of trade offices in the two capitals.’Footnote 47
There were no longer reasons to delay the decision. In February 1964, Foreign Minister Saragat announced the official Italian position. It represented an effective synthesis of the positions held by the members of the centre-left government: Christian Democrat Premier Aldo Moro, a neophyte in foreign policy; Italian Socialist Party, pro-Chinese Vice-premier Nenni; and Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano, pro-Atlantic faction Foreign Minister Saragat. A synthesis was very much needed in order to maintain the government's internal cohesion and to ensure Atlantic loyalty. Bearing in mind that the China problem had been a worrying issue in Italian politics for some time, Saragat declared that it was not important ‘to know if our government intended to proceed to an understanding with the government in Beijing, but when it would be opportune to proceed to recognition in the interest of Italy and Italy's allies, and the free democratic world’. The Italian government was simply waiting for the right moment.Footnote 48
Consequently, diplomatic recognition was postponed and the government focused its attention on the trade agreement, proceeding carefully but with determination. In order to deal directly with the Chinese, in subsequent months two initiatives were set up. The first was fostered by Nenni, who sent an emissary to Beijing. The second was the culmination of the endeavours of the private and public Italian business actors in the preceding years.
Between May and June 1964, an exploratory government mission took place; it was led by Saverio Santaniello, who had returned from Hong Kong and joined the Foreign Ministry. In Beijing Santaniello discovered that he was there at the same time as Senator Paolo Battino Vittorelli, who was the Italian Socialist Party representative for foreign policy. The two missions had different characters. The main objectives of Vittorelli's trip were to suggest the establishment of non-governmental trade offices in both countries which, together with their representatives, would enjoy diplomatic immunity; to sign a non-governmental trade agreement between the two countries; and to reach an agreement regarding an Italian trade mission to Canton and Beijing.
Mao Zedong received both delegations. Both Santaniello and Vittorelli had frank, cordial, and even familiar conversations with the Chinese leader, whom they found ideologically intransigent, but tactically flexible. ‘The question was already ripe for solution,’ wrote Santaniello. Indeed, the meetings ended with a Chinese proposal to concede a unique agreement that favoured Italian exports ‘without big shocks and without modifying the line already followed in respect to our allies, having realized that the opening of trade offices on a diplomatic level would represent a notable step towards normalizing relations and a point along the way through which our country assured the existence of Beijing’.Footnote 49
Although the Santaniello and Vittorelli missions were not public knowledge, they spurred diplomacy into action. The next step would be to coordinate with the Americans. During Italian President Segni's official trip to Washington, the American administration was sounded out. The inquiry revealed that non-governmental trade understandings with China had already been concluded by other states without any complications. The Americans made it clear that their forthcoming presidential elections should not be disturbed, and that any decisions and announcements would be postponed accordingly.Footnote 50
The months in-between were used to draw up the necessary arrangements. Avoiding Berne and Warsaw, where political discussions with the Chinese usually took place, the Italian ambassador to Cairo was charged with contacting the Chinese and drafting the trade agreement. Subsequently, Italy began consulting with the foreign ministers of Belgium and Canada, who, likewise, were interested in establishing trade relations with China. Through the consultations, the three countries were able to formulate a common position and agree on the principles to be communicated to Washington.Footnote 51
At the same time, Moro did not ignore domestic reactions in Italy, which comprised the lively pressure of commercial and industrial interests, as well as a growing public interest expressed not only by opposition parties, but also by large numbers of those in the government. In addition, the political right and the right wing of the Christian Democrats feared the repercussions of Italy's stance on the Atlantic alliance. On 6 August, speaking before the Chamber of Deputies, Moro expressed his recognition of the first American reactions to the North Vietnamese attacks, but at the same time reiterated that the decision to carry out trade with the PRC could coexist with NATO membership.Footnote 52
In November, after the American presidential elections, the agreement to open the trade missions in Beijing and Rome was concluded, and on 3 December Saragat made the public announcement. The next day, in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies, he said that the Chinese issue had four distinct aspects: trade relations, diplomatic recognition, recognition of the PRC in the United Nations, and Taiwan. Each feature was independent of the other. Italy had dealt with one, but difficulties remained regarding the others. Italy felt bound to respect the principle of consultation within the Atlantic alliance. Knowing that the United States was committed to a formal alliance with Jiang Jieshi, it did not underestimate the issue of Taiwan in American foreign policy: ‘If the problem of Formosa is not considered in a timely fashion so as to maintain its independent representation in the UN, there is a possibility that it would contribute to military conflict between Beijing and Washington breaking out.’ Finally, Saragat recalled that there were aspects of Chinese foreign policy that were unclear and justified a delay, such as the explosion of China's first nuclear bomb in October, as well as the natural consequence of the PRC's refusal to sign the Moscow Treaty in 1963. In addition, the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 demonstrated that PRC did not operate in harmony with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter, thus compromising its admission to the organization.Footnote 53
The American administration did not react very positively to these developments, but nonetheless its tone was moderate, declaring that it was disappointed by the Italian decision to open trade offices, but aware of strong economic pressures.Footnote 54 This reaction demonstrated once again the fact that China continued to represent a serious problem in American foreign policy, but that the Americans’ focus had shifted away from commerce and trade.
The change from a Republican to a Democratic administration did not lead to a reformulation of American policy towards China. There was not enough time for a change in the Kennedy years. Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Johnson, began ambassadorial talks with the Chinese diplomats in Warsaw, but the attack of North Vietnam in August 1964 soon revived the logic of the Cold War. The White House justified American intervention in Vietnam by citing the need to oppose a plan made by Beijing and Hanoi.Footnote 55 It was not so easy to rule out the possibility that the war would eventually extend to China. The United States thought it essential to demonstrate a united Western position. It feared that if Italy abstained on the ‘important question’ in the United Nations, this could open the way for the recognition of China in the future. They were also concerned that Italy would not limit itself to trade relations with China and would rather imitate French policy, thereby compromising Western unity.Footnote 56
The Johnson administration maintained its firm opposition to the admission of the PRC to the United Nations. At the same time, Johnson was aware that the majority against the PRC had narrowed over the years to only a few votes, It therefore put additional pressure on its allies and friends to avoid a vote in favour of the PRC as this would represent a serious political defeat for Washington.
Italian politicians accepted the American position. On 14 December 1964, Foreign Minister Saragat reassured the American secretary of state, Dean Rusk, that ‘recognizing that the bulk of the responsibility in this area lay with the United States, we have not up to now decided to recognize China, nor will we without timely and friendly contact with the United States’.Footnote 57
The China question in Italian politics was laid aside until such time as the political world and public opinion adjusted to the change. To stop pressure to move forward, in 1965 Prime Minister Moro clarified that recognition would happen when it would favour détente and peace in general, and that ‘the present moment does not seem to be the most favourable’.Footnote 58
Fanfani's initiative
It was Amintore Fanfani, foreign minister since March 1965, and in September elected president of the UN General Assembly, who opposed the inviolate agreement and provoked a confrontation with the United States and with Moro himself. Fanfani gave substance to his interest in the PRC, which had been expressed in the preceding years. He was convinced that the solution to the Vietnam crisis depended on China (like his friend Giorgio La Pira, whom he had encouraged in his mission to Hanoi, and who thought that world peace depended on peace in Vietnam).Footnote 59 He was keen to distinguish his UN presidency, and so in the autumn of 1965, in preparation for the twentieth General Assembly, he entrusted his friend Giacinto Bosco with a delicate task. Bosco, part of the same faction of the Christian Democrats, was the head of the Italian delegation to the United Nations and Fanfani tasked him with presenting a resolution concerning the admission of the PRC to the United Nations. The resolution was drafted in terms of principle and inspired by the theory of two Chinas. As the PRC had always rejected the doctrine of two Chinas, Beijing's reaction was particularly extreme. Isolated and focused on the Cultural Revolution, China placed conditions on its admission that were considered unacceptable internationally, although they were perfectly in line with the ideological propaganda advocated in those years.
The initiative unleashed intense diplomatic activity between Italy and the United States, involving the Italian ambassador to Washington, Sergio Fenoaltea, Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani, Giacinto Bosco, and American Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In Italy, a bitter debate took place both within the government majority and between the latter and the opposition. Even though he supported the initiative, Prime Minister Moro had to mediate both domestically and internationally; in the end he had to submit to American hostility to the admission of the PRC.Footnote 60
The episode attracted diplomatic attention and demonstrated that the time was not ripe for a change in Italy's China policy. The admission of China to the United Nations was an extremely sensitive issue for Washington, and the conflict in Vietnam determined America's stance. As a signatory to the 1961 motion, Italy was induced to confirm the validity of its earlier decision.
In Italy, Premier Aldo Moro was subjected to the Communist Party's demands to abandon NATO; the Socialists, though rejecting the communist motion, reaffirmed their commitment to creating the conditions that would allow for the PRC's entry to the United Nations. Despite these pressures, Moro was able to count on a majority in the Council of Ministers that was in favour of aligning with Washington.
On 7 November 1965, Moro summed up the conclusions reached by the Council of Ministers to Fanfani as follows: ‘It has been highlighted by several parties how, at present, admission certainly does not favour the hoped for détente and the actual work of the United Nations.’Footnote 61
The motion was presented again in the years that followed, but because of the continuation of the Vietnam conflict, America's position did not change. In Rome the government and Foreign Minister Fanfani avoided taking positions that could upset Washington.
In the same years Italian-Chinese relations underwent profound difficulties: for example, Chinese ships were prohibited from entering the ports of Venice and Genoa because of writings that were considered offensive by Interior Minister Paolo Emilio Taviani. This brought to the surface Italian intolerance of the ideological propaganda coming from the Chinese trade representative in Rome, who financed Maoist clubs throughout the peninsula.Footnote 62
The final push
The final push began with Nenni becoming foreign minister in Mariano Rumor's government at the end of 1968. Despite the existing social tensions and the difficult domestic context, Nenni worked to change Italy's traditional foreign policy. Responding to pressure from parliament and following on from the project on which he had worked for some time, he included recognition of the PRC among his objectives. On 24 January 1969, Nenni announced to the Chamber his intention to proceed towards recognition of the PRC. He initiated negotiations that would later be continued by Aldo Moro, his successor at the Foreign Ministry in the new Rumor government in August 1969. Indeed, it was Moro who concluded the long process of diplomatic recognition, with this finally happening in 1970 and China taking its place in the United Nations in 1971.Footnote 63
With regard to Italy, American diplomacy maintained its traditional attitude—prudent, and opposed to expelling Taiwan (a friend of the United Nations) or admitting a hostile and aggressive China to the United Nations. The State Department recommended that Rome vote in favour of the ‘important question’ (under Article 18 of the Charter it would require a two-thirds supermajority for approval) and abstain on the motion proposed by Albania to allow the PRC to join the UN.Footnote 64
Nenni was unwilling to accept delays and obstacles; once he had started on the road to recognition, he wanted to proceed smoothly and rapidly. Furthermore, he was convinced that two Chinas did not exist, that there was only one China, and that with a future on the world stage. In a conversation with the American secretary of state, William Rogers, on 12 April 1969, he expressed Italy's intention to vote in favour of the Albanian motion.Footnote 65
Moro was more cautious and able. When he took charge of the Foreign Ministry, he was aware of the changes and of the discontinuities that were occurring on the international stage. In America, the Nixon administration expressed its intention to extricate itself from the quagmire of Vietnam and to allow room for negotiations.
On 8 October 1969, in a debate at the UN General Assembly, the Italian foreign minister introduced a programme called ‘integral peace’, in which he articulated the objectives of Italian foreign policy together with the principles of a new international ethics. In Moro's new, more lucid vision of foreign policy, he noted that the bipolar nature of international politics was coming to an end and that the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations had raised problems that ‘. . . should be considered with due care’.Footnote 66
For Italy the recognition of the PRC represented an opportunity to play a visible international role and step out of the shadows of the superpowers. At the domestic level it was also the most apt choice for maintaining a balance between the four parties of the coalition.
Shortly after assuming office, Moro chose a diplomatic line that included giving up the initiatives disliked by the Americans, such as the idea of a study committee which had been proposed earlier. Nevertheless, he continued negotiations with Beijing.
On 9 October 1969, he met Rogers, who reiterated the usual worries of the White House and its opposition to the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations. Moro then noted that Italy was already committed through its contacts with the PRC government. Nevertheless, he assured his counterpart that Italy would vote in favour of the ‘important question’. He attempted to adopt the attitude that, while keeping in mind the ongoing negotiations, Italy would not disturb the balance in the United Nations in particular. The minister understood the political opportunities presented by a more elastic approach on the part of the United States with regard to the China problem.Footnote 67
In 1970, the situation became more complex and delicate; it was not possible to accept the Americans’ request to delay recognition of the PRC due to the opposition of parties in the government. In Washington the new administration did not stand in the way of the change in Italy's relations with China. A new American course took more time to develop, however, because of the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam conflict and Chinese reactions. America's first approaches to the PRC and Kissinger's visit were kept secret until 15 July 1971, when the official announcement was made of China's invitation to President Nixon to visit China. Nevertheless, the Americans still seemed wedded to the idea of dual representation. A year after recognizing the PRC, Italy voted in favour of the Albanian motion and the PRC was admitted to the United Nations. Despite Nixon's planned visit to China, the Italian vote provoked negative reactions in Washington that would continue to have consequences in the following years.Footnote 68
Conclusions
With the normalization of relations and the vote in favour of the admission of the PRC to the United Nations, Italy's long and complex process of changing its attitude towards China had reached its conclusion.
Several aspects of the process are worth highlighting. First, the role played by the Socialist Party was significant. The international and neutral tradition of the party and of its leader, Nenni, meant that it pushed for the PRC to be considered as a partner rather than an enemy, and it actively encouraged trade. An important actor with Socialist inclinations, Dino Gentili, also initiated the process of opening up Italian-Chinese trade to private companies.
Second, midway in through the 1950s, the left wing of the Christian Democrats joined the Italian Socialist Party. At first, the most influential politicians of the faction—Giovanni Gronchi and Amintore Fanfani—used the China question more as a provocation and diversion from official politics. Later on, Enrico Mattei, exponent and financier of the Base faction and president of ENI, made it a reality; in his search for energy and for oil, he turned to China, which at the time was thought to be rich in this resource.
Third, in the early 1960s the efforts of private and public actors found support from the Italian trade representatives in Hong Kong who, in contact with private and public companies and aware of the level of trade opportunities, opened a diplomatic channel and responded to Chinese invitations. In 1964 the centre-left government favoured expanding these economic and political efforts by the opening of trade offices in Beijing and Rome. The trade and economic process was concluded and laid the basis for the political phase.
Fourth, the increase of domestic pressure for the normalization of relations contrasted with the weight of American pressure on Italian policy. This was designed to isolate China and keep it in the Soviet arena, first through the embargo of strategic goods, and later by defending their faithful ally Taiwan, which impeded the admission of China to the United Nations.
Only in 1969, during a period of change in American foreign policy, was Nenni's determination able to sway the Italian government to include the China question in its foreign policy programme. Eventually, with the later efforts of Moro, the old problem was eventually solved. The two principal political groupings—Nenni's Italian Socialist Party and the left wing of the Christian Democrats, which since the 1950s had been engaged with the problem—found themselves united in bringing the issue to a positive conclusion. For both it was a way to practise national détente while at the same time contributing to worldwide détente.
Both had seen Asia as a place where the interests of United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe met; they also realized that China was destined to become a determining factor in the future of global politics. For Nenni, normalizing relations with the PRC also meant overcoming the Cold War, breaking up the rigidity of the blocs, and giving a new face to a faded foreign policy. For Moro, it also meant manoeuvring around the Cold War and affirming Italy's presence and role as a mediating power between the superpowers.
In contrast to American and Chinese intentions to use the Sino-American agreement of 1972 as a lever in their own relations with Moscow, Italy's recognition of the PRC did not mean reducing the range of actions of the United States nor was it a hostile gesture against the Soviet Union. Rather it was a means of cooperating to find a solution to the old problem.
