Francisco Gonzalez’s book is a long-awaited and most welcome contribution to the field of discussions dealing with Heidegger’s reading of Plato. While this field has so far tended to be monopolized by studies fundamentally sympathetic to Heidegger, Gonzalez’s contribution restores the balance in this regard, and with forceful resources stemming from solid scholarly background in both thinkers as well as a lucid and sharp critical eye. Gonzalez points out weaknesses at several stages of Heidegger’s attempt. His critique of Heidegger reveals ways in which and reasons why, in spite of his affinity to Plato, Heidegger never quite engaged himself in a real dialogue with Plato. Gonzalez’s analysis of the affinities between the two thinkers suggests hints for the dialogue that could have been.
Following up roughly chronologically Heidegger’s preoccupation with Plato, the book is divided into three parts: the first is dedicated to Heidegger’s reading of Plato in the 1920s; the second deals with his interpretation of Plato’s understanding of truth and untruth in the 1930s and 1940s; and the third part addresses Heidegger’s late works, where the affinity between him and Plato becomes most prominent yet where the seeds for a fruitful encounter between them remain scattered.
The major element that explains, according to Gonzalez, Heidegger’s failure to engage Plato in an authentic dialogue has to do with the different stances that two thinkers take in relation to thinking’s access to truth. For Plato philosophy is dialectic, and thus access to truth is always mediated by logos. For Heidegger philosophy has direct noetic access to truth, and thus goes beyond dialectic and beyond logos into a pure act of seeing. This is Heidegger’s position throughout the 1920s and this seems to remain his view even in his late works, in spite of its leading to the apparently paradoxical result of a “phenomenology of the inapparent” (p. 308). The paradox is apparent only, Gonzalez suggests, since the contradiction at stake is a productive one, whereby the inapparent appears indirectly through the very tension between the phenomenon’s showing and not-showing of itself (p. 306). The main thing to regret and perhaps the real paradox is that Heidegger did not realize (or at least did not openly recognize) that by exploiting the productive nature of this tension, he actually was launching himself into the realm of Platonic dialectic. As Gonzalez explains, Heidegger fails to recognize this because he confines dialectic to a Hegelian understanding of it, whereby dialectic tries to eliminate ambiguity by integrating it into a logos that is absolutized, reflected upon itself, and therefore never transcended. By restricting the meaning of dialectic in this way Heidegger misses the genuinely Platonic aspect of it, namely that of preserving ambiguity and aporia as essential to thinking, while constantly trying to see beyond, yet nevertheless through, logos (pp. 265-266). Gonzalez insightfully hits right on the mark when he notes that the main problem with Heidegger’s critique of dialectic is that it assumes this either/or – either discursive thinking or noetic intuition – which Plato’s dialectic questions and overcomes (p. 27).
Gonzalez’s discussion of Heidegger’s critique of the way Plato combines ethics and value generally in his ontology by positing the Good as the ultimate foundation of metaphysics is brilliantly carried out, and illuminates the roots of Heidegger’s own struggle to separate his ontological project in Being and Time from all considerations of value (pp. 29-50). The discussion of the relation between ontology and value leads Gonzalez to an examination of Heidegger’s reading of the Sophist in light of Heidegger’s commitment to two assumptions: (a) the superiority of direct over indirect access to truth and (b) the importance of dissociating ontology from value. Heidegger approves of the Stranger’s approach through his dialectical method, which is conclusive, value-neutral, and monological, and attributes it to Plato as his own position. Gonzalez leads the reader carefully through several instances of Heidegger’s oblivion to differences between Socrates’ and the Stranger’s methods, respectively. The Plato scholar is left, though, wondering whether Gonzalez would not have more sympathy for the Stranger’s method and its potential for more than it achieves in the hands of the Stranger if it were combined with an ontology that regards reality as impregnated with value, as Plato elsewhere recommends. Gonzalez remarks that, interestingly enough, ”Socratic elenchus makes sudden and mysterious appearances throughout the Stranger’s discussion” (p. 62), but he does not seem to notice also that even the Stranger himself assumes, even if unreflectively, a metaphysical view according to which reality is permeated by value. The Stranger’s talk about an unimportant (smikrois) matter (p. 218d1), his recognition of a noble (genaia) kind of sophistry (p. 231b), of the superior (beltious) nature of the reformed materialists (p. 246d), of incorporeal realities and virtue (p. 247ab), of the philosopher’s honoring (timonti) knowledge, wisdom, and reason (p. 249c), and finally his designation of the five kinds as megista gene suggesting that their greatness is a function of their greater rationality over other kinds: all seem to suggest that he assumes, even if unreflectively, a value-laden ontology . The Plato scholar is left wondering whether Gonzalez envisions any virtues of the method were it to be explicitly related to the ontology that the Stranger assumes (though never articulates in its own presuppositions). Similarly, the reader would like to hear more about what Gonzalez regards as being at stake for Plato in recognizing the transcendence of the Good as beyond being (Rep. 509b), when he reproaches Heidegger for not seeing how radically different the Good is in Plato from all the other ideas (pp. 131-132). Since the book claims to address Plato and Heidegger in a dialogue, a reconstruction of what is at stake for Plato would have complemented the account in a valuable way.
Gonzalez provides a worthwhile discussion of Heidegger’s attack on Plato’s understanding of forms, whereby forms are reduced to static correlatives in a divide between seeing and what is seen, the objectification of being, which is identified as presence. This ultimately leads to Plato’s completely missing the ontological difference between being and beings, a mistake that Heidegger takes to have subsequently plagued all of Western metaphysics. A tour de force is undertaken in reading Heidegger’s interpretation of the Sun Analogy and the Allegory of the Cave in On the Essence of Truth (1931-1932) and Plato’s Doctrine of Truth (1940), where Heidegger seems to discern the turn from truth as aletheia to the conception of truth as correctness. Gonzalez argues that Heidegger’s careless reading is at fault for attributing to Plato the yoking of truth and being in subjection to the idea of the Good, whereby again the seeing and what is seen come to the fore and aletheia is reduced to correctness, instead of recognizing that for Plato truth and being are the light that illuminates the eide and are not themselves things to be seen, while the Good is the ultimate source of this unconcealment or light. For Gonzalez, the great irony is that Heidegger’s own concept of truth “comes extraordinarily close” to Plato’s understanding of aletheia when not distorted by Heidegger himself (p. 166).
Gonzalez’s careful discussion leaves little room for refutation, but the reader misses positive reflections on the genuine merits of Heidegger’s hermeneutical approach. Instead of focusing so firmly on where Heidegger is wrong, Gonzalez might have balanced this with a more productive dialogue between the respective strengths of Plato and Heidegger. If we are to initiate a dialogue with Heidegger, we cannot do so apart from addressing the real significance of Heidegger’s insight into the dangers of objectifying being, the importance of not yoking truth to an idea, the significance of the metaphor of clearing (Lichtung), the relevance of a speaking that communicates in silence, the breakthrough that comes through envisioning being as Ereignis, the constant threat of forgetting the question of the meaning of being, etc. Insights like these remain the mark of a brilliant mind, even when presented as criticisms of texts that actually acknowledge their worth.
In Zeit und Sein, Heidegger comes closest to articulating his kinship with Plato. Gonzalez understands the main points of convergence that could have been the basis for a fruitful dialogue between the two thinkers and indeed ultimately the basis of an articulated Heideggerian act of separation (Auseinandersetzung) from Plato to be (a) their common rejection of poiesis as a model for the interpretation of being, (b) their common appreciation of an understanding of being in terms of the metaphor of light or Lichtung respectively as something that makes appearing possible and not simply as that which appears and is objectifiable, and finally (c) an understanding of being as dynamic and eventful as opposed to a static occurrence. Heidegger, however, Gonzalez argues, does not acknowledge these affinities in their full richness, for he fails to acknowledge the dialectical character of his own thinking, remaining committed to a more direct way of access beyond the tentativeness of dialectic.
In response to Gonzalez’s critique, defenders of Heidegger will probably point out that Heidegger never actually intended his own interpretation to give us Plato simply the way that Plato understood himself, but rather assumed from the start that violence to the given text will only show its richness and virtue—for after all, Heidegger is too original for typical exegetical work. This is an appropriate and worthwhile approach to take, but even it will now have to face additional challenges since Gonzalez argues that Heidegger’s attempt to read ideas into Plato’s text is undermined not simply by the letter of Plato’s own texts but also in fact by both letter and spirit of Heidegger’s own writings on the same topic at different times.
With its lucid construction and sharp critical eye, Gonzalez’s book sets the standard of scholarship in this area at a new level and places itself as a partner of dialogue for everyone charting the paths of the Heidegger-Plato encounter.
