Religious studies has undergone something of a paradigm shift in the last half century. From Friedrich Schleiermacher to Paul Tillich, religion was understood as a structural feature of human subjectivity, an anthropological universal, but scholars have increasingly come to view it as a cultural construction. The consequences of this shift for the study of religion and law are visible in at least two areas. The first is religious freedom. Courts rely on general definitions of religion, but if the ways citizens designate their religion in practice become too various, too idiosyncratic for the generalities of law, religious freedom becomes impossible. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan's classic study takes this pragmatic approach to the question.Footnote 1 But the challenge can extend to the whole framework of liberal democracy, that is, to political secularism as an attempt to protect freedom and equality in the midst of moral conflicts between citizens. Postcolonial theorists in particular have attacked secularism's claim to neutrality by demonstrating how secular governance and the category of religion co-originate from church-state conflicts within Western Christendom. Talal Asad has taken up an aggressive critique of this kind.Footnote 2
These lines of thought can converge powerfully in a work like the late Saba Mahmood's Religious Difference in a Secular Age.Footnote 3 As the frame of colonial rule, secularism and religious freedom, so far from easing moral conflict and facilitating shared power, exacerbate and create hostilities by reconstructing religious identities as objects of political force. Geetanjali Srikantan, professor of law at Tilburg University, proposes a similar approach to the challenges of Indian secularism, arguing that “the impasse around the regulation of religion does not lie in the insufficiency of legal reasoning or the failure of the Indian secular state but has its roots in the methodologies and frameworks used by British colonial administrators in identifying and governing religion” (7). Like Mahmood, she emphasizes both a constructivist account of religion and a postcolonial reading of secularism to expose how the tensions surrounding religious freedom arise from the transfer of frameworks structured by Christian tradition. To overcome certain weaknesses in postcolonialism's theorization of religion, Srikantan turns to a third methodological maneuver, incorporating the intellectual history of law—a distinctive contribution in studies of this sort. By focusing on legal reasoning as a process and how law is formulated and recognized, the supporting colonialist conditions of such reasoning can also be “unearth[ed]” (17). It is at these deeper discursive levels that the travails of Indian secularism find their roots.
The explanatory core of the book is a twofold dialectic, described as a “process of theologisation within an outer framework of secularisation” (21). Theologisation names the (seemingly secular) process of constructing Hinduism as a religion through secular colonial law, while secularization is the (no less theological) process by which the secular emerges from Christian civilization as “an absorption of the pagan world by creating a secular world with idolatry as the criterion” (20). When secularism is exported via colonialization, it operates on the basis of Christian theological assumptions “embedded” or “repressed” within its conceptual order (21). The idea that secularism is really Christianity by other means is a familiar theme among postcolonial critics, but Srikantan gives it a new twist with her emphasis on legal history. Oddly, the protestant distinction of faith and works of the law plays almost no role in her account, but she does mention Jesus's accent on a new, inner humanity and the subsequent division of church and state or society, which leads not to “the gradual collapse of secular culture or its progressive Christianisation, but a change in the nature of Christianity itself and the contraction of the scope of ‘the secular’” (31–32).
At this point the reader rubs up against a mostly syntactic confusion. Secularization is a contraction of the secular? The use of secular here borders on equivocation and anachronism, substituting for pagan. Secularization as a process involves the transformation of the pagan into the secular through a clearing away of its idolatrous elements. Srikantan implies that this premodern labor of secularization somehow paves the way for the distinctly modern processes usually denoted by the term (separation of church and state, decline of religion, and so on), but she never explains how the one gives way to the other. Adding to the confusion is the fact that she borrows this theory from Robert Markus, who calls it de-secularization. Again, the issue here is not really conceptual, but the theory as she presents it covers over the rupture in Western life marked by the transition between these modes of secularization. Western history then becomes a continuous line of development from Christianity to colonialism. This is one place where I sense that Srikantan's otherwise capacious grasp of so many disciplines has stretched thin.
The first chapter also presents a second process, theologization, as a colonialist repetition of Western secularization. Where Christianity called the secular into existence by reordering formerly pagan aspects of society, politics, and law in accordance with its moral vision through the concept of natural law, colonial government in India sets in motion its own “dynamic of custom,” sorting out the legitimacy of local practices by identifying them as religious or secular (30). Hinduism is modeled on the (Christian) template of practices that cohere with doctrines located in established sacred texts (like the Vedas) and interpreted by proper authorities (like the Brahmins). So the dyad of religious/secular creates Hinduism through law as the activity that “removes the idolatrous and negotiates the conflict between the religious and the secular” (34; italics omitted). This aspect of the study is on firmer ground, following scholars like Richard King on the construction of Hinduism as a religion, and it opens new and exciting territory by treating law as the medium of such construction. Srikantan is adept at highlighting these processes in the background of legal history, as well as the submerged cultural assumptions that allow them to operate in the first place. The affinities between biblical narratives and the narrations of Indian history (such as the Aryan invasion) struck by the courts provides an excellent example (47).
In chapter 2, Srikantan examines how these patterns play themselves out in similar but distinct ways in the colonial relations to Islam. Here the doctrines and authoritative texts were more readily identifiable, shifting the locus of legal reasoning to textual interpretation, but the problem of interpretive (clerical) authority returns, and the asymmetry between Islamic law and the public/private dichotomy built around the secular/religious binary refashions Islam as an artifact of legal governance.
In chapter 3, Srikantan extends the account of Western history as secularization with a tour through the theological foundations of property law. The concepts of trust and equity emerge from Christian ideals of charity as love of neighbor and of God, the ultimate owner of all property. Augustine viewed property as a sign of the Fall and human self-possession but also (like the state) as a necessary institution. The legal notion of trust begins with Franciscan vows of poverty and the holding of property in common and perpetuity before God. If trust entails a “bifurcated ownership” between God and earthly stewards, Srikantan argues that it can only “be enforced by a similar bifurcation of the judicial machinery in England characterised by the division into equity and common law” (111). That bifurcation carries an “inherent contradiction,” however, between the universalism of equity as a moral ideal of fairness and reasonableness and as a legal procedure for offsetting the stringency of common law (113). The supporting theological condition of this whole set of legal mechanisms lies in the notion that the king owns all property as a representative of God—a secularization of the virtue of charity.
Cut free of their explicit theological supports, these ideas and institutions are transplanted through colonization. In chapter 4, Srikantan explores how the dialectics of secularization and theologization manifest themselves spatially in conceptions of and contests over places of worship. While litigation has focused historically on the propriety or corruption of ritual performers, Srikantan directs attention again to the metastructures in back of the legal order. In a lengthy analysis of both Hindu and Islamic cases, she selects three such conditions, “loosely described as dedication to God, the public and the private, and interpretive authority” (131). Identifying places of worship by their dedication to God silently imports the criterion of idolatry, the exclusivity of which has no clear counterpart in precolonial Hinduism. This in turn subjects temples and mosques to the demarcations of public and private, which neither Hinduism nor Islam can easily accommodate, but which became inseparable from their legal identity through the telescoping of conjoined Western notions of religion and property law into colonial India. The Hindu and Islamic endowments are (convincingly) presented as gradual constructions of colonial law. This legal spatialization of religion provides the “foundation for the application of doctrine,” that is, for theologization in the courts (168). The effective history of this process is evident in the 1946 temple dispute between Tengalais and Vadagalais groups. Even in the late nineteenth century, the courts showed no concern for whether an action could be “religious legally,” but by the end of the colonial period, the legal development of the idea of a religious place “generate[d] the application of doctrine” (169, 170).
Having excavated these many cultural layers and pointing to relevant case histories along the way, the final chapter turns to the theme of religious freedom. Srikantan is most direct here. The courts offer no definitional consensus about the meaning of religion, and its legal conceptualization seems futile; the essential practices test as drawn up by the courts is unworkable. Moreover, religious freedom jurisprudence is hampered by the relation between religion and state in India, where “the idea of . . . strict separation . . . had given way to the concept of . . . equal treatment,” allowing the state to interfere with religion under the guise of equality by abolishing practices like untouchability that the court finds irrational or regressive (178). The reformist narrative of the Indian Supreme Court ultimately derived from nineteenth-century reform movements to modernize Indian religion, exemplified in the high court's ruling over the Satsangis’ request to bar nonmembers from their temple on the grounds that their leader had separated from the Hindu religion, even if they counted themselves Hindus for social and political purposes.
The court's declaration that, contrary to their own (often ambiguous) testimony, the Satsangis were in fact Hindus sounds remarkable, but the judgment that there is “a subtle, indescribable unity which keeps them within the sweep of the broad and progressive Hindu religion” (181)Footnote 4 plainly depends on the colonial conception of religion traced throughout the book. Once more, texts (Satsangi in this instance) are treated as repositories of doctrine and their conflicting tendencies overlooked or homogenized in order to support verdicts they may well contradict. On the litigants’ side, attention to the process of legal reasoning reveals how their contorted self-representation is a function of the law itself, in tension with their actual interests and self-understanding. The complex history of the case bears this out. Between 1948 and 1958, the question framing the case changed radically—from whether the temple was in fact a temple (as it was not dedicated to a god in the court's view) to whether the Satsangis were Hindus and their temple a Hindu temple. The 1951 Indian Constitution explains the shift, with the Satsangis now using the legal identifications provided by the religious freedom articles of the constitution. By not identifying as Hindus, they could avoid the legal public requirement of equal treatment and deny Harijan Hindus of lower caste admittance to the temple, the Harijans only having been classified as ‘Hindus’ by the constitution (!). In these proceedings, the “characteristic feature” is the link of place and religious identity, the spatialization of theologization (197–98).
Taken on its own terms, Srikantan's book initiates a line of investigation that anyone studying the history of law and religion in India will find it difficult to ignore. She offers an original contribution to the growing postcolonial literature on the global history of secularism and religious freedom already undertaken by scholars like Asad, Mahmood, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, and Anna Su. Within this mold, a work like Peter van der Veer's The Modern Spirit of Asia Footnote 5 might correct and supplement elements of Srikantan's analysis, greatly enriching the picture of how Western discourse on religion was creatively appropriated by (and not simply imposed on) figures like Gandhi and Tagore, even as it was linked to reforming efforts like disenchantment. Similarly with a micro-history like C. S. Adcock's The Limits of Tolerance,Footnote 6 which examines the unintended consequences of Gandhi's efforts to fashion an indigenous conceptual foundation for freedom of conscience and mutual respect. Reading these books alongside Srikantan's, one senses the historical complexities facing any interpreter of Indian secularism and the necessity of the postcolonial stance.
One can of course ask if this stance is finally adequate to the whole task suggested by this book: a comparative history of secularism and religious freedom. The other dominant approach to secularism (its liberal defenders aside) stems from the work of Charles Taylor, who has done so much to bring out the inner tensions and varieties of secularism as an historical and political reality, especially in accounting for the genesis of the “immanent frame” and its global migrations.Footnote 7 Srikantan's dialectic of secularization bears some resemblance to Taylor's account, with its emphasis on Christian origins and the background conditions that constitute secularity, but she neglects entirely the road to an exclusive humanism that founds modern secular government. This cultural break explains in large part the profound structural similarities between the problems of religious freedom in America and India, and it is strange that a theory (postcolonialism) so devoted to difference and rupture can present the West in such continuous and homogenous terms.
Postcolonial theory helps us understand the disanalogies between the West's internal crisis and its exported variations elsewhere, but it should not obscure the analogies and the possibilities they allow. As Taylor has pointed out, India is a reflexive secular state with a substantive democratic tradition, but it has accomplished this without the extensive disenchantment of the West and on the basis of an axial culture far removed from rationalizing monotheism.Footnote 8 It therefore stands out as a vital test case for alternative modes of secularism. In short, we need a history that does more to emphasize the successes of Indian secularism. In a world of shrinking democratic futures, much may depend on it.
