In 1939 Hilbert and Bernays [Reference Hilbert and Bernays5] proved, by arithmetizing Gödel’s original 1930 proof of the completeness of quantification theory, that every satisfiable sentence of first-order predicate logic has a model over
$\mathbb {N}$
in which the predicates are all arithmetically definable. Here and below, by “predicate logic” we mean a language that includes predicate letters of arbitrary adicity but no function signs or individual constants. Once the relevant tools were in place, their proof was shown to yield predicates that are
$\Delta _2^0$
. Kreisel [Reference Kreisel6] and Mostowski [Reference Mostowski7] independently showed that the predicates could not always be taken to be recursive; Putnam [Reference Putnam9] strengthened this result by showing that they could not always be taken to be recursively enumerable (r.e.) or co-r.e.
In Putnam [Reference Putnam10] refined the positive result by showing that the predicates could always be taken to be
$\Sigma _{1}^*$
, that is, Boolean combinations of r.e. predicates. Putnam’s proof, however, applied only to logic without identity.
Hensel and Putnam [Reference Hensel and Putnam4] presented a proof that the result could be extended to first-order predicate logic with identity. This article was almost completely unnoticed: it was not reviewed in the JSL, it is not listed, although Putnam [Reference Putnam10] is, in bibliographies such as those in Odifreddi [Reference Odifreddi8] and Hájek and Pudlák [Reference Hájek and Pudlák3].Footnote 1 It was therefore unremarked that the article is nearly unreadable, containing inadequate notation, misleading citations, and cryptic arguments. In particular, the crucial final argument (corresponding to Section 4 below) is expressed extremely breezily, which masks several deductive gaps. Luckily, the proof can be reframed so as to be rigorous and reasonably transparent. Here is a fully explicit statement of the theorem to be proved:
Let T be a recursive set of sentences of first-order predicate logic with identity containing a finite number of predicates. If T has an infinite model, then it has a model over
$\mathbb {N}$
in which the predicates are
$\Sigma _{1}^*$
.
In Section 2 we prove the theorem in the restricted case of a single sentence with no occurrence of ‘=’. This is just a modernized rendition of the argument from Putnam [Reference Putnam10]. The proof of the full theorem occupies Sections 3 and 4.
1 Limit-determination and modulus
An
$(n+1)$
-place number-theoretic function f limit-determines an n-place relation R iff for all
$i_1, \ldots ,i_n$
,
The Limit Lemma, a standard result of recursion theory originally due to Shoenfield [Reference Shoenfield11], states that a relation is
$\Delta _2^0$
iff there is a recursive function that limit-determines it (see Odifreddi [Reference Odifreddi8, p. 373]).
A function f is k-trial iff, for all
$i_1, \ldots ,i_n$
,
$f(i_1, \ldots ,i_n,y)$
changes value at most k times as y increases. Putnam introduced this notion in [Reference Putnam10], and showed that a relation is
$\Sigma _1^*$
iff for some k there is a recursive k-trial function that limit-determines it. This result is used below in the “if” direction. The proof is straightforward, and perhaps best presented by an example. Suppose
$g(i,j,y)$
is a 2-trial function that limit-determines a relation
$R(i,j)$
. Then
$R(i,j)$
can be specified thus: there are two numbers y at which
$g(i,j,y)$
changes value, and at the greater of them the value is 1; or there aren’t two numbers y such that
$g(i,j,y)$
changes value at y but there is one number y at which
$g(i,j,y)$
changes value, and then its value is 1, or there is no number y at which
$g(i,j,y)$
changes value, and
$g(i,j,0)$
is 1. Each of these clauses expresses either an r.e. relation or a co-r.e. relation.
Let f be a recursive function that limit-determines a relation. For any i, an i-modulus for f is a number b such that
whenever
$i_1, \ldots , i_n \leq i$
and
$b \leq y$
. For every i there are cofinitely many integers b that are i-moduli. The notion of an i-modulus is not, in general, recursive. The following is a recursive notion that approximates it and yields an i-modulus in the limit. An r-seeming i-modulus for f is a number
$b \leq r$
such that
whenever
$i_1, \ldots , i_n \leq i$
and
$b \leq y \leq r$
. Note that if b is an i-modulus for f, then b is also an r-seeming i-modulus for f for every
$r \geq b$
; and if b is not an i-modulus for f, then b fails to be an r-seeming i-modulus for f for cofinitely many r.
2 Proof for sentences without identity
Let F be a satisfiable sentence of first-order predicate logic without identity. As noted above, there exists a model
$\mathfrak {M}$
for it with universe
$\mathbb {N}$
in which the predicates are interpreted as
$\Delta _2^0$
relations. By the Limit Lemma, for each predicate P of F there exists a recursive function
$f_P$
that limit-determines
$P^{\mathfrak {M}}$
. We call an integer b an i-modulus (simpliciter) iff it is an i-modulus for every function
$f_P$
, and an r-seeming i-modulus (simpliciter) iff it is an r-seeming i-modulus for every function
$f_P$
.
Let
$\langle. , .\rangle $
be a standard primitive recursive bijective pairing function. Define
$\varphi : \mathbb {N} \rightarrow \mathbb {N}$
by
Clearly
$\varphi $
is onto. Now let
$\mathfrak {N}$
be the structure with universe
$\mathbb {N}$
such that, for each n-adic predicate P of F and all
$p_1, \ldots ,p_n$
,
Since F does not contain identity and
$\varphi $
is onto, it follows that
$\mathfrak {N} \models F$
. (This is a general model-theoretic fact: if a structure
$\mathfrak {N}$
is the preimage of a relational structure
$\mathfrak {M}$
under a function from the universe of
$\mathfrak {N}$
onto the universe of
$\mathfrak {M}$
, then
$\mathfrak {M}$
and
$\mathfrak {N}$
model the same sentences of predicate logic without identity.)
We now show that the relations of the structure
$\mathfrak {N}$
are
$\Sigma _{1}^*$
by constructing k-trial recursive functions that limit-determine them. For each r define
$\varphi _r$
by
Let
$p = \langle i,b \rangle $
. If b is an i-modulus, then
$\varphi _r(p) = i$
for all r. If b is not an i-modulus, then
$\varphi _r(p) = i$
for r up to some point, but = 0 for all greater r. Thus for any fixed p, the value of
$\varphi _r(p)$
can change at most once as r increases, and the eventual value of
$\varphi _r(p)$
is
$\varphi (p)$
for all sufficiently large r.
Let P be any predicate of F, say P is n-place, let
$p_1, \ldots , p_n$
be any numbers, with
$p_k = \langle i_k,b_k \rangle $
for
$1 \leq k \leq n$
, and let
$b_0$
be a 0-modulus. We define
where b is the maximum of
$b_0, b_1, \ldots , b_n$
.
It is easy to see that, for each n-ary predicate P and all
$p_1, \ldots ,p_n$
,
since there will be a q such that
$g_P(p_1, \dots , p_n,r) = f_P(\varphi (p_1), \ldots , \varphi (p_n),b)$
for all
$r \geq q$
, and b is an i-modulus for i such that
$\varphi (p_1), \ldots , \varphi (p_n) \leq i$
. Hence each function
$g_P$
limit-determines
$P^{\mathfrak {N}}$
.
If P is n-adic,
$g_P$
is an n-trial function. For as noted above as r increases, a value
$\varphi _r(p)$
can change only once, from a nonzero value to 0. This implies that as r increases
$g_P(p_1, \dots p_n,r)$
can change value at most n times.
This proof generalizes without difficulty to recursive sets of sentences without identity, provided that there are finitely many predicates in the sentences, since the basic Hilbert–Bernays
$\Delta _2^0$
result so generalizes.
3 Proof with identity: Specification of the model
The mapping
$\varphi $
in the proof just given is not injective, and hence the preimage does not preserve identity. This makes the proof inapplicable to sentences containing “=”. To obtain a suitable mapping that is injective as well, Hensel and Putnam’s strategy is to start with a
$\Delta _2^0$
model that contains infinitely many indiscernibles. These indiscernibles provide distinct objects to be the images of distinct arguments. In order to be injective the mapping
$\varphi $
can take
$\langle i,b \rangle $
to i for at most one b. To insure this, a minimality condition needs to be put on b. This requires much more fine-grained information about the approximation procedure than was needed in Section 2.
Let T be a recursive set of sentences of first-order predicate logic with identity containing a finite number of predicates. Let
$T^S$
be the Skolemization of T. Let Eq be the (purely universal) axioms of identity (that is, reflexivity and substitutivity) for the language of
$T^S$
. Let
$a_0, \ldots , a_k, \ldots $
be distinct constants foreign to
$T^S$
, and let In be the set of axioms asserting that these a-constants are order-indiscernible, with respect to the atomic formulas of
$T^S$
, i.e., axioms
whenever
$F(x_1,\ldots ,x_n)$
is an atomic formula of
$\mathcal {L}(T^S)$
,
$i_1 < \cdots < i_n$
and
$j_1 < \cdots < j_n$
.
Finally, let
$T^+$
be the theory
$T^S \cup {\textsf {Eq}} \cup {\textsf {In}} \cup \lbrace a_1 \neq a_2 \rbrace $
. An argument using Ramsey’s Theorem shows that if T has an infinite model then
$T^+$
has a model (see Chang and Keisler [Reference Chang and Jerome Keisler1, pp. 147–148]). Note that
$T^+$
implies
$a_i \neq a_j$
whenever
$i \neq j$
.
Let D be the set of terms that can be built from the function signs and constants appearing in formulas in
$T^+$
. We assume a standard gödelization of D, and let
$\tau (1), \tau (3), \ldots , \tau (2i+1), \ldots $
be a listing in order of increasing gödel numbers of the members of D that are not a-constants, while
$\tau (2i) = a_i$
for each i. Thus
$\tau $
is a bijection between
$\mathbb {N}$
and D. We assume that if
$\tau (i)$
is a proper subterm of
$\tau (j)$
then
$i<j$
.
Since
$T^+$
has a model, every conjunction of substitution instances of members of
$T^+$
over D is consistent. Compactness then yields the consistency of the set of all such instances, and by König’s Lemma (as in Gödel’s completeness proof) this immediately yields a quasi-model
$\mathfrak {M_0}$
of
$T^+$
with universe D. “Quasi-model” here means a structure in which all the axioms of
$T^+$
hold, but the interpretation of the identity sign “=” may not be true identity. Due to the inclusion of the axioms Eq, however, “=” will be interpreted in
$\mathfrak {M_0}$
as a congruence relation relative to the other predicates and the function signs of
$T^+$
.
Let
$\mathfrak {M}$
be the isomorphic copy with universe
$\mathbb {N}$
of
$\mathfrak {M_0}$
, via the bijection
$\tau $
. The interpretations in
$\mathfrak {M}$
of the predicates of
$T^+$
can be taken to be
$\Delta _2^0$
. Hence for each predicate P of
$T^+$
there is a recursive function
$f_P$
that limit-determines
$P^{\mathfrak {M}}$
. As before, we say an integer b is an i-modulus iff it is an i-modulus for each function
$f_P$
, and similarly for “r-seeming i-modulus”.
By the definition of
$\tau $
, the even numbers are the indiscernibles of
$\mathfrak {M}$
. Indeed, the reason we started with the Skolemization of T and built up the quasi-model
$\mathfrak {M_0}$
over universe D was to insure not only that the predicates were
$\Delta _2^0$
but also that the indiscernibles comprised a recursive set.
Let
$(i_1,\ldots ,i_n)$
be an n-tuple of integers, and let i be the largest odd integer among the
$i_k$
, if there is one, and let
$i= 0$
if all the
$i_k$
are even. An n-tuple
$(j_1,\ldots ,j_n)$
is similar to
$(i_1,\ldots ,i_n)$
iff:
1) for each k if
$i_k \leq i$
then
$j_k = i_k$
;
2) the tuples obtained from the two n-tuples by eliminating all entries
$\leq i$
are order-isomorphic.
Note that if
$i_k$
is an even integer
$>i$
, then the a-constant
$\tau (i_k)$
does not occur in any term
$\tau (i_j)$
for
$i_j \leq i$
. Consequently, the axioms In imply the following: if P is an n-place predicate and
$( i_1,\ldots ,i_n)$
and
$(j_1,\ldots ,j_n)$
are similar, then
We now introduce a different pairing function. Let
$\pi (i,b) = i + \frac {1}{2}b (b+1)$
.
$\pi $
is a bijection between
$\mathbb {N}$
and pairs
$(i,b)$
such that
$i \leq b$
.
$\pi $
is monotonic in each argument. Moreover, if
$\pi (j,c) < \pi (i,b)$
, where
$j \leq c$
and
$i \leq b$
, then
$c \leq b$
. This “ordering property” will be crucial for the proof of Lemma 3(iii) in Section 4.
A pair
$(i,b)$
is ideal iff i is odd and b is the smallest number
$\geq i$
such that:
(i) b is an
$(i + 2n_0)$
-modulus, where
$n_0$
is the largest adicity of any predicate letter of T;
(ii) for all
$j < i, f_=(j,i,b) = 0$
.
Note that if
$(i,b)$
is ideal, then i will be the smallest member of its
$=^{\mathfrak {M}}$
-equivalence class.
Now define
$\varphi : \mathbb {N} \rightarrow \mathbb {N}$
by
$\varphi (p) = i$
if
$p = \pi (i,b)$
for an ideal pair
$(i,b)$
; and otherwise
$\varphi (p)$
is the least even number not among
$\varphi (0), \ldots , \varphi (p-1)$
. Since for every i there is at most one b such that
$(i,b)$
is ideal, it follows that
$\varphi $
is injective and its range includes all even numbers.
Lemma 1. The range of
$\varphi $
includes exactly one element from each
$=^{\mathfrak {M}}$
-equivalence class.
Proof First we show that the range of
$\varphi $
contains at least one element from each
$=^{\mathfrak {M}}$
-equivalence class. Since the range contains every even number, we need consider only those
$=^{\mathfrak {M}}$
-equivalence classes all of whose members are odd integers. Suppose i is the least member of such a class. Thus
$\mathfrak {M} \models \lnot j = i$
for each
$j<i$
. Hence if b is the smallest
$(i+2n_0)$
-modulus
$\geq i$
, we have
$f_=(j,i,b) = 0$
for each
$j<i$
. Consequently
$ (i,b)$
is ideal, so that
$\varphi (\pi (i,b)) = i$
.
Next we show uniqueness. If i is an odd number in the range of
$\varphi $
, then i is the smallest member of its
$=^{\mathfrak {M}}$
-equivalence class. So the only other number that could be in this
$=^{\mathfrak {M}}$
-equivalence class and in the range of
$\varphi $
is an even integer
$j>i$
. But then the pair
$(i,j)$
is similar to the pair
$(i,j+2)$
, so by indiscernibility,
$\mathfrak {M} \models i = j \leftrightarrow i = j+2$
. Thus if
$\mathfrak {M} \models i = j$
, by the transitivity of identity we would also have
$\mathfrak {M} \models j = j+2$
, a contradiction.
Now let
$\mathfrak {N}$
be the structure with universe
$\mathbb {N}$
such that, for each n-place predicate P of
$\mathcal {L}(T)$
and all
$p_1, \ldots ,p_n$
,
Thus
$\varphi $
is an isomorphism between
$\mathfrak {N}$
and the substructure of
$\mathfrak {M}$
whose universe is the range of
$\varphi $
. From Lemma 1 it follows that
$=^{\mathfrak {N}}$
is the identity relation, and that
$\mathfrak {N}$
is a model of T.
4 The predicates of
$\mathfrak {N}$
are
$\Sigma _{1}^*$
As in Section 2, we define recursive functions that approximate those used in the specification of
$\mathfrak {N}$
. A pair
$(i,b)$
is r-ideal iff i is odd and b is the smallest number
$\geq i$
such that:
(i) b is an r-seeming
$(i + 2n_0)$
-modulus;
(ii) for all
$j < i, f_=(j,i,b) = 0$
.
For each r, if
$p = \pi (i,b)$
for an r-ideal pair
$(i,b)$
, let
$\varphi _r(p) = i$
; otherwise let
$\varphi _r(p)$
be the earliest even number not among
$\varphi _r(0), \ldots , \varphi _r(p-1)$
. Note that
$\varphi _r(p)$
is recursive in both arguments.
Because r-seeming moduli are either moduli for cofinitely many r or non-moduli for cofinitely many r, for every m there is a number
$\rho (m)$
with the following property: for every
$r \geq \rho (m)$
and all pairs
$(i,b)$
with
$i \leq b$
such that
$\pi (i,b) \leq m$
, b is an r-seeming
$(i+2n_0)$
-modulus iff b is an
$(i+2n_0)$
-modulus. Hence for every
$r \geq \rho (m)$
and every
$p \leq m$
,
$\varphi _r(p) = \varphi (p)$
.
For any n-tuple
$(i_1, \ldots , i_n)$
let
$[\![ i_1, \ldots , i_n ]\!] $
be the earliest n-tuple similar to
$(i_1, \ldots , i_n)$
. Let P be any predicate of T, say P is n-adic, let
$p_1, \ldots , p_n$
be any numbers, with
$p_k = \pi (i_k,b_k)$
with
$i_k \leq b_k$
for
$1 \leq k \leq n$
, and let
$b_0$
be a
$2n_0$
-modulus. We define
where b is the maximum of
$b_0, b_1, \ldots b_n$
. Note that each
$g_P$
is recursive.
Lemma 2. For each predicate P,
$g_P$
limit-determines
$P^{\mathfrak {N}}$
.
Proof It is enough to show, for each predicate P and all
$p_1,\ldots ,p_n$
, that
Let m be the largest of
$p_1, \ldots , p_n$
. Then for any
$r \geq \rho (m)$
,
$g_P(p_1, \ldots , p_n,r) = f_P([\![ \varphi (p_1), \ldots , \varphi (p_n) ]\!] ,b),$
where b is chosen as above. Hence
for this b.
What remains to be established is that
Let q be the largest integer in the n-tuple
$[\![ \varphi (p_1),\ldots ,\varphi (p_n) ]\!] $
; it suffices to show that b is a q-modulus. If all the
$\varphi (p_j)$
are even, then
$[\![ \varphi (p_1), \ldots , \varphi (p_n) ]\!] $
will contain only even numbers
$\leq 2n_0$
. Since b is a
$2n_0$
-modulus, it is indeed a q-modulus. Otherwise, let
$\varphi (p_j)$
be the largest odd number among
$\varphi (p_1), \ldots , \varphi (p_n)$
. Then
$[\![ \varphi (p_1), \ldots , \varphi (p_n) ]\!] $
will contain only numbers
$\leq \varphi (p_j) + 2n_0$
, that is,
$q \leq \varphi (p_j) + 2n_0$
. But
$(\varphi (p_j),b')$
is ideal for some
$b' \leq b$
, so that b is a
$(\varphi (p_j) + 2n_0)$
-modulus.
Lemma 3. Suppose b is an r-seeming i-modulus but not an
$(r+1)$
-seeming i-modulus. Then for any
$c \leq r$
and any
$j \geq i$
, c is not an
$(r+1)$
-seeming j-modulus.
Proof The supposition on b implies that for some predicate P and some
$i_1, \ldots , i_n \leq i$
,
The existence of such
$i_1, \ldots , i_n$
implies that c is not an
$(r+1)$
-seeming j-modulus, so long as
$c \leq r$
and
$j \geq i$
.
Lemma 4.
(i) Suppose
$i<j$
and both
$(i,b)$
and (
$j,c)$
are r-ideal. Then
$b \leq c$
.
(ii) Suppose
$c \leq r$
and
$(j,c)$
is
$(r+1)$
-ideal. Then
$(j,c)$
is r-ideal.
(iii) Suppose
$(j,c)$
is r-ideal and
$(r+1)$
-ideal. Then for every
$q < \pi (j,c)$
,
$\varphi _r(q) = \varphi _{r+1}(q)$
.
Proof (i) By definition, b is the least number
$\geq i$
that is an r-seeming
$(i+2n_0)$
-modulus and such that
$f_=(k,i,b) = 0$
for each
$k < i$
. We show that c also has these properties; consequently
$b \leq c$
. Since
$i<j$
and c is an r-seeming
$(j+2n_0)$
-modulus, c is also an r-seeming
$(i+2n_0)$
-modulus. Since
$c \geq j$
also
$c \geq i$
. Since
$(j,c)$
is r-ideal,
$c \leq r$
, so that for every
$k <i$
,
$f_=(k,i,c) = f_=(k,i,b)$
. Hence, for every
$k<i$
,
$f_=(k,i,c) = 0$
.
(ii) If
$(j,c)$
is
$(r+1)$
-ideal but not r-ideal, there must be a number
$b < c$
such that
$(j,b)$
is r-ideal but not
$(r+1)$
-ideal. And this, in turn, can happen only if b is not an
$(r+1)$
-seeming
$(j + 2n_0)$
-modulus. But then, by Lemma 3, c is not an
$(r+1)$
-seeming
$(j+2n_0)$
-modulus, contradicting the
$(r+1)$
-ideality of
$(j,c)$
.
(iii) For reductio, suppose q is the least number
$< \pi (j,c)$
such that
$\varphi _r(q) \neq \varphi _{r+1}(q)$
. Let
$(i,b)$
be the unique pair with
$i \leq b$
and
$q = \pi (i,b)$
. Note that, by the ordering property of
$\pi $
,
$b \leq c$
, so that
$b \leq r$
. Now
$(i,b)$
cannot be r-ideal and
$(r+1)$
-ideal, since then
$\varphi _r(q) = \varphi _{r+1}(q) = i$
. If
$(i,b)$
were neither r-ideal nor
$(r+1)$
-ideal, then
$\varphi _r(q)= \varphi _{r+1}(q)$
= the least even number not among
$\varphi _r(0), \ldots , \varphi _r(q-1)$
, which by hypothesis are equal to
$\varphi _{r+1}(0), \ldots , \varphi _{r+1}(q-1)$
. By (ii),
$(i,b)$
cannot be
$(r+1)$
-ideal but not r-ideal.
The only possibility remaining is that
$(i,b)$
is r-ideal but not
$(r+1)$
-ideal. If
$i = j$
, then by minimality
$b = c$
, so that
$\pi (i,b) = q$
, contrary to the choice of q. If
$j<i$
then by (i) we have
$c \leq b$
, so that
$\pi (j,c) < \pi (i,b)$
, that is,
$\pi (j,c) <q$
, also contrary to the choice of q. Hence
$i<j$
. Since
$(i,b)$
is not
$(r+1)$
-ideal, b is not an
$(r+1)$
-seeming
$(i+2n_0)$
-modulus, so, by Lemma 3, c is not an
$(r+1)$
-seeming
$(j+2n_0)$
-modulus, contradicting the
$(r+1)$
-ideality of
$(j,c)$
.
Lemma 5. Suppose P is an n-adic predicate. Then
$g_P$
is a
$2n$
-trial function.
Proof Let
$p = \pi (i,b)$
where
$i \leq b$
and i is odd. Call
$p r$
-unready iff
$b> r$
and r-ideal if
$(i,b)$
is r-ideal. The r-index of an n-tuple of numbers is
$2\alpha + \beta $
, where
$\alpha $
is the number of entries in the n-tuple that are r-unready, and
$\beta $
is the number of entries in the n-tuple that are r-ideal.
First we note that if p is neither r-unready nor r-ideal, then p is neither
$(r+1)$
-unready nor
$(r+1)$
-ideal. This follows immediately from Lemma 4(ii). Hence the
$(r+1)$
-index of an n-tuple is never more than its r-index.
We shall now show the following: If
$[\![ \varphi _{r+1}(p_1),\ldots ,\varphi _{r+1}(p_n)]\!] \neq [\![ \varphi _r(p_1),\ldots ,\varphi _r(p_n) ]\!] $
then the
$(r+1)$
-index of
$(p_1, \ldots , p_n)$
is lower than its r-index. Since the maximal r-index of an n-tuple is
$2n$
, this will prove the lemma, since
$g_P(p_1, \ldots , p_n,r) \neq g_P(p_1, \ldots , p_n,r+1)$
only if
$[\![ \varphi _{r+1}(p_1),\ldots ,\varphi _{r+1}(p_n) ]\!] \neq [\![ \varphi _r(p_1),\ldots ,\varphi _r(p_n) ]\!] $
.
Suppose the indices are equal. Then none of
$p_1, \ldots ,p_n$
is r-unready but not
$(r+1)$
-unready, as this would lower the index by 1 or 2.
If none of
$p_1,\ldots ,p_n$
is r-ideal, then both
$\varphi _r$
and
$\varphi _{r+1}$
take them all to even numbers, although possibly not the same ones. Nonetheless, their order will be the same as the order of
$p_1, \ldots ,p_n$
so that
$[\![ \varphi _{r+1}(p_1),\ldots ,\varphi _{r+1}(p_n) ]\!] = [\![ \varphi _r(p_1),\ldots ,\varphi _r(p_n) ]\!] $
.
Now suppose that at least one of
$p_1,\dots ,p_n$
is r-ideal. Let
$\varphi _r(p_j)$
be the largest odd number among
$\varphi _r(p_1),\ldots ,\varphi _r(p_n)$
. Then
$p_j$
is also
$(r+1)$
-ideal: if it were not then the index would decrease. By Lemma 3(i) and (iii),
$\varphi _{r+1}$
agrees with
$\varphi _r$
on all the other numbers among
$p_1, \ldots , p_n$
except possibly some numbers
$p_k$
larger than
$p_j$
, which are not r-ideal, and so are taken to even numbers larger than
$\varphi _r(0), \ldots , \varphi _r(p_k - 1)$
. (Since at least half of the numbers
$\leq p_k$
are not r-ideal,
$\varphi _r(p_k) \geq p_k$
, whereas, since
$p_j$
is r-ideal,
$\varphi _r(p_j) < p_j$
.) Similarly,
$\varphi _{r+1}$
also takes these numbers to even numbers larger than
$\varphi _r(p_j)$
, else the index would increase; the values of
$\varphi _{r+1}$
on these numbers may be different from those of
$\varphi _r$
, but the ordering of those values will be the same. That is,
$(\varphi _r(p_1), \ldots , \varphi _r(p_n))$
will be similar to
$(\varphi _{r+1}(p_1), \ldots , \varphi _{r+1}(p_n))$
, so that
$[\![ \varphi _{r+1}(p_1),\ldots , \varphi _{r+1}(p_n) ]\!] = [\![ \varphi _r(p_1),\ldots , \varphi _r(p_n) ]\!] $
.
Lemmas 2 and 5 show that each
$P^{\mathfrak {N}}$
is
$\Sigma _{1}^*$
, and so conclude the proof.
The proof shows that, for each predicate P, the complexity of
$P^{\mathfrak {N}}$
depends only on the adicity P, and not on any quantificational structure of T, where by complexity we mean the number of r.e. and co-r.e. sets whose Boolean combination defines
$P^{\mathfrak {N}}$
. No upper bound is put on this complexity. However, there are many different techniques for encoding polyadic predicates of high adicity by dyadic or triadic predicates. Most of these involve additional quantifiers, so their applicability in this context would have to be very delicate. But the question remains: is there an upper bound on the Boolean complexity needed even for predicates of arbitrarily large adicity.Footnote
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