Jean-Pierre Cabestan joins the authoritarian resilience debate with an overview in French of the mechanisms explaining the survival of the Chinese Party-state and postponing its demise. His book argues that in light of the Chinese Party-state's high degree of control over society, and of how it manages to convince most of the Chinese population that it should maintain its monopoly over the political system, it overall has the capacity to remain in place for a rather long period of time. While the author thinks that in the end “Fukuyama's arguments will win” and that the Party-state is doomed to breakdown, he analyses in detail how it will probably survive for another 20 or 30 years.
This book has the merit of offering a comprehensive analysis of the factors playing in favour of the Party-state's resilience. It includes in particular: a long bureaucratic tradition of control over society; the weakness of democratic values among the population; the near nonexistence of civil society; the support of large segments of the elite for the regime; and international economic linkages that will all help maintain the regime. The author describes this “new authoritarian equilibrium” in six rich chapters.
The first two chapters focus on the organization of the Party-state and the Chinese political trajectory. The section on the Party organization is particularly rich and highlights the limits of the democratic experiences, within the Party and in villages. In chapter two, Cabestan draws interesting parallels between the Party-state on the one hand and the imperial bureaucratic tradition as well as Republican institutions on the other. Despite previous tendencies towards a stronger state, Cabestan shows that the current Party-state maintains a level of control which is unprecedented in Chinese history.
The three following chapters explore issues of political culture, civil society and elite support for the regime. These chapters cover a vast range of literature to highlight that the dominant culture in China is still undemocratic and civil society underdeveloped. The use of recent opinion surveys is particularly relevant. The author touches upon key debates regarding state–society relations, both linked to recent trends – such as the reform of the legal system or the development of the social credit system – and to deeper ones, such as ethnic tensions, nationalism or the political stabilizing role of the middle class. While the format prevents the author from diving into these issues, the book here raises numerous original points, regarding the parallels between the Chinese Communist Party and secret societies, or the differences between mainland and Hong Kong youth political engagement for instance.
The final chapter is prospective. It reviews the various crises the Chinese Party-state can potentially face in the coming years, linked to issues of inequalities, youth demonstrations, international conflicts and so on. Overall, Cabestan argues that the Party-state is well equipped to deal with most of these issues, despite atrophy and corruption. For example, it would not be as vulnerable to an economic crisis as some argue because it has other sources of legitimacy beyond economic performance. Nationalism and the guarantee of social stability are particularly important in that regard. Some might disagree with the author's view on the resilience capacity of the Party-state, but he provides an articulate and informed argument. This chapter is more about the obstacles to transition rather than transition itself. However, the author thinks that after all the regime is doomed and that its demise will probably be chaotic and violent. He does not believe in a progressive softening of the regime, following either a Taiwanese democratic pattern or a Singaporean rule of law model. The unique credible alternative in the author's view would be that a new generation of leaders decide to democratize the country under pressure, due to the fear of civil war.
For Cabestan, the Chinese Party-state is therefore here to stay for quite a while. He hence calls in his conclusion for Western democracies to be more vigilant, cautious and selective in their engagement with China. They have to be ready to defend their model.
Demain la Chine reads like an ambitious synthesis of works and debates on the evolution of the Chinese Party-state. It is an interesting addition to the debate on its resilience capacity, and a useful reference for teaching purposes.
