This is a first-rate study of the political economy of development in Thailand, written by one of the country's most theoretically astute observers, that makes numerous contributions to the study of comparative politics and political economy. First, it engages directly with an important puzzle in the political economy of development literature by advancing an original, structural argument based upon an analysis of Thailand's developmental problems. Second, the book reveals a deep understanding of Thailand's economy, both at the macro and micro level. The empirical chapters provide a trove of information for specialists on Thai political economy, with a particular focus on the sugar, textile, and automobile sectors; but more importantly, these chapters work to sustain the momentum of the argument. Third, the extremely thoughtful use of the comparative method throughout the study provides numerous angles from which to buttress the argument. While concentrating primarily on Thailand's developmental pathway, Richard Doner uses observations across time, sectors, and countries to advance his thesis. The sophisticated blending of theoretical analysis, area studies knowledge, and comparative methodology ensures that this book will stimulate debates in comparative and Southeast Asian politics, as well as serve as a model for rigorous comparative analysis.

In the early 1990s, Thailand appeared to be on its way to becoming an East Asian newly industrializing country (NIC), following in the footsteps of developmental giants like Taiwan and South Korea. But the road to NIC status has been more complicated than some analysts initially thought. The Politics of Uneven Development provides a sobering analysis of Thailand's failure to reach the same level of development as its East Asian neighbors. The use of “uneven development” in the title may lead some readers to think that unevenness refers to inequality, but the unevenness that Doner addresses is structural change versus industrial upgrading. He contends that Thailand's pattern of economic development has succeeded in diversification and structural change, but it has stalled in its ability to upgrade industry in terms of higher-value-added products, local input, and greater efficiency. The reason for this inability to upgrade has to do with a lack of institutional capacities, particularly in the areas of consulting, credible commitments, and monitoring. These capacities, Doner argues, must be generated by effective institutions, such as cohesive state structures, organized business associations, and transparent public–private partnerships. In Thailand, such institutions remain fragmented and clientelistic, thereby inhibiting industrial upgrading.

The central theoretical contribution of the book is its explanation for the failure of effective institutions to emerge in Thailand. Doner claims that the absence or low level of “systemic vulnerability”—domestic threats, external threats, and resource constraints—has left Thailand's economy in an intermediate setting: competent enough to maintain macroeconomic stability and to pursue a relatively successful export-oriented economy, but severely limited in its ability to forge its own technologically advanced industries. This thesis is particularly important because it addresses a major gap in the literature on the developmental state. The literature has not adequately explained why elites in states such as South Korea and Taiwan decided to advance development rather than loot the treasury. While some scholars have pointed to the importance of nationalism or geopolitical constraints and others have emphasized autonomy from social elites as a basis for pursuing the public good, none has provided a defining theoretical statement on this puzzle. Doner picks up on this gap and provides the most systematic argument, relying largely on the meta-theoretical idea that structural constraints shape behavior in positive ways.

While the meta-theoretical claim that underlies the argument is powerful, it is also open to a number of challenges. Despite being an avowed structuralist myself, I am not convinced that the argument for explaining the success and failure of developmental patterns, but especially of industrial upgrading, can be accounted for primarily on the basis of structural constraints. Constraints matter, but it is not clear that they will necessarily provide enough momentum to lead elites toward constructive behavior that builds institutions. Although South Korea and Taiwan faced severe threats that aided them in creating institutions that propelled growth and facilitated industrial upgrading, they may also initially have had some competent state structures with the requisite capacities to actually implement reforms. Thailand, and other middle-income countries, may not have had the same institutional foundations as the East Asian NICs. Simply putting pressure on a state may not elicit positive change unless there already is some basis for converting that pressure into institutional reforms. Furthermore, in the absence of even some moderate institutions, these pressures may have catastrophic results. For example, it is highly unlikely that a very poor country with weak governing structures facing domestic and security threats, as well as resources constraints, may be able to convert those vulnerabilities into positive institutional armature. More likely, that country will simply fall apart.

Thus, a country's ability to take advantage of a combination of threats cannot be a priori determined on the basis of a theoretical proposition. To explain the effect of a condition of systemic vulnerability, we must place countries and their behavioral capacities and choices within historical frameworks. While structures do condition behavior, the mechanism through which this occurs must have a contingent basis that rests upon prior historical-institutional settings, capacities, and proclivities. Doner is attentive to these alternative arguments, and he addresses them in the conclusion, indeed noting that “economic and/or political institutions operating prior to shifts in structural pressures can influence the reaction to such pressures” (p. 284), as well as in a footnote, where he concedes that a historical argument (particularly relying on colonialism) may not necessarily contradict a vulnerability thesis (pp. 285–86).

Nonetheless, the concept of systemic vulnerability is key to the overarching argument, and another question that arises from this concept has to do with the substantive character of these threats and their effect on elite choices. Thailand is currently buffeted by a number of crises, including issues of legitimacy, social inequality, and ethnic/religious unrest in the southernmost provinces. These crises are not directly addressed in the book, yet they are important because they relate to the broader abstract claim: that popular unrest should have some positive impact on elite decision making. If we take the pressing crisis in the southern provinces, it is not clear in what way this domestic threat may have an impact on institutional development related to industrial upgrading. The point is that it may not be a combination of threats, or the severity of a few threats, that affects institutional development that then leads to industrial upgrading, but rather it may be the character of particular threats that matters for upgrading. Thus, an economic crisis may have a larger impact on institutional development that relates to industrial upgrading, compared to a crisis of an ethnic/religious nature. What this means conceptually is that we need to unpack further the very character of threats—beyond whether they are external or domestic—in order to understand their effect on developmental outcomes. In the same way that Doner claims that “different development strategies demand different institutional capacities” (p. 15), it would seem logical to argue that different development strategies require different types of constraints in order to affect elite choices.

These theoretical debates aside, Doner should be commended for developing an extremely compelling and well-buttressed thesis that addresses an important puzzle in the development literature. This is political economy at its best.