Students of the early American republic are familiar with Daniel Webster the politician, the orator, the member of the Great Triumvirate that included Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun. Webster plays a pivotal role in many of the set pieces of early American history, usually bookended between the Missouri Crisis and the Compromise of 1850. Whereas most historians have focused on Webster's political career, Peter Charles Hoffer takes a different approach by emphasizing his significance as a constitutionalist. Daniel Webster and the Unfinished Constitution is a marvelous look not only at Webster's legal career but also at how he shaped constitutional law in the early republic.
Hoffer's book fits well within a new burst of scholarship that seeks to understand how Americans defined and gave meaning to their constitution. As the historian Jonathan Gienapp has demonstrated in his recent work, early Americans sought to give a fixed meaning to their written constitution. It should have been easy; unlike the British, Americans had crafted a written charter with seemingly great specificity. Nevertheless, even as early Americans enshrined the idea of a fixed constitution into the American story, they found large, unavoidable gaps in the document that demanded further attention. Daniel Webster, according to Hoffer, understood the situation well and sought to define the lacunae in the constitution through his legal practice and, later in his career, in his role as secretary of state and a US senator.
Hoffer defines three unanswered questions that confounded early Americans and animated Webster's legal mind: the relationship between the federal government and the states, between the public good and private rights, and between the law and politics. Federalism proved harder to define and implement than Publius suggested in The Federalist. The protection of private property and rights stood at the center of the constitution but balancing private interests with the common good proved troublesome. Finally, the independence of the American judiciary from partisan influence seemed necessary, but in reality the line between politics and law was frequently blurred.
In the course of his long career, Webster addressed and articulated a vision for American constitutional law based on his interpretation of each of these questions. Hoffer chronicles seven moments in Webster's career where he developed and advocated for his position. Some are more significant than others, but in each Hoffer uncovers Webster's constitutional theory through a fresh rereading of the documentary record.
Federalism vexed both politicians and jurists in the early republic, and constitutional thought on the matter changed during Webster's long career. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) gave Webster the opportunity to articulate legal nationalism in the context of state versus federal power. Much of Webster's legal brief in favor of the Second Bank of the United States made its way into the opinion of the court written by Chief Justice John Marshall, a fascinating point that Hoffer makes in the book. Likewise, the Webster-Hayne debate of 1830 gave Webster, now a senator from Massachusetts, the opportunity to assert the supremacy of the federal government. It also marked a transformation in Webster's constitutional thought. Up to this point in his career, Webster's answers to the three constitutional questions had revolved around private property rights. The nullifiers of South Carolina provoked the Massachusetts senator to apply his constitutional thought to the Union itself. It worked beautifully in the 1830 debate, but twenty years later private property rights and the permanence of the Union collided in the Compromise of 1850. Webster championed the Union during the fractious debates, but in doing so he upheld the right of southerners to protect enslaved property via the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, much to the disappointment of the growing antislavery vanguard in the North.
In addition to federalism, private property rights had always been at the core of Webster's constitutional thought. In Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), Webster delivered an impassioned defense of the college's independence from state influence. His work on the case established a lifelong commitment to the “core of his political philosophy: private property must be protected against the excesses of democracy” and established Webster as a proponent of legal nationalism (42). Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) melded the questions into a case that addressed federalism and private property. Once again, Marshall's decision leaned heavily on Webster's legal briefs and constitutional thought. Commerce, he opined, had both public and private dimensions that courts must address. In the case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837), Webster sought unsuccessfully to protect the rights of the older Charles River Bridge against a newer enterprise that threatened its existence. Webster's argument prevailed in Dartmouth but failed eighteen years later in the wake of the Jacksonian ascendancy and changing attitudes over private rights and public good.
Hoffer sees the debate over the boundary between law and politics in many of the cases he cites but acutely so in Webster's career as secretary of state. Particularly in his negotiations of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty settling the boundary dispute between Maine and New Brunswick, Webster articulated a theory of the treaty power that transcended ordinary politics. Nevertheless, the boundary between the law and political activity remained unclear overall. Through his career as a lawyer and a politician, many times simultaneously, Hoffer shows how Webster attempted to compartmentalize the two. It did not always work for Webster or for other political leaders.
In the end, Webster found it impossible to separate the law from politics—as did most antebellum politicians and jurists. But interestingly, scholars have paid less attention to his career as a lawyer than his service in Congress. Hoffer suggests that we look at Webster the lawyer to better understand him as a constitutionalist. Through a fresh reading of familiar sources, Hoffer has gleaned fascinating new insights into how constitutionalism developed during the early republic.
Hoffer has taken a subject that has received plenty of attention from historians and has found something new and original that merits our careful attention. Anyone interested in the history of the early republic or constitutional history in general will find Daniel Webster and the Unfinished Constitution both engrossing and essential.
