Robert Martin and I both turn to the political conflicts of early America in order to critically engage with debates in contemporary democratic theory, but we do so in quite different ways. Our different approaches are quietly indicated, I think, in our reviews of each other’s recent books. I want to thank Martin for his thoughtful and fair engagement with my work. In the spirit of “critical dialogue” I will amplify our differences as a way of briefly suggesting alternative routes to historically situated democratic theory.
Martin’s primary criticism of Publius regards “context.” While he accurately outlines the book’s argument, and generously compliments my revisionist approach to The Federalist, he claims that the book does not engage enough with “Publius’s actual interlocutors” (presumably Anti-Federalist critics of the Constitution), and engages too much with contextually unrelated political theorists, whether they be Michel Foucault and Carl Schmitt or David Hume and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The book examines the Anti-Federalists more extensively than Martin’s review suggests, but his criticism raises an important methodological question that should be directly addressed. I will do so by responding to one of his particular concerns.
In Chapter 3 (“Governing Interest”), I reexamine the role of interest in Publius’s republicanism, a central concern of the scholarship since the 1913 publication of Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. Martin claims that my argument in this chapter, while “innovative and insightful,” relies too heavily on Hume and Foucault and not enough on evidence from The Federalist itself. He thinks that the chapter would be improved had I engaged more extensively with debates over Hume’s influence on Publius. This claim indicates a misunderstanding of my argument about interest, I think, and also of my use of Hume and Foucault to support it. It treats as a problem what is actually a methodological difference.
The Federalist, I argue, rejects the classical republican association of interest with political corruption and decline and instead converts it into a powerful tool of governance, not only within the institutional structure of the state, or the anticipated behavior of officeholders, but also through shaping, over time, of the political motivations and behavior of the people themselves. Publius takes an “enlarged view” and argues that when assessed probabilistically in terms of tendencies and aggregate effects, a politics centered on interest can create long-term stabilities in governance tragically absent from the tumultuous history of past republics. This indicates a shift in the logic of republican governance, where the previously antagonistic relationship between freedom and power is united in interest, and where governance is no longer imagined in direct opposition to freedom (as it was in the Whig political discourse of the American Revolution), but rather realized through the (interested) free conduct of citizens themselves (again, in aggregate and over time).
I argue, therefore, that Publius offers a canonical example of the “new economy of government reason” that Foucault identified in the period. I turn to Hume because he models this shift in government reason, and to Foucault because it is his historical framework that I am extending to the early American context. It is true that I find claims concerning Hume’s influence on The Federalist convincing, but Hume’s direct influence is not essential to my argument since my focus is on the underlying structure of governmental reason that these writers, as I read them, all share. Such structures are not always explicitly articulated as propositional content, but must be excavated from the relationships among different parts of arguments, or even from necessary presuppositions left unarticulated.
Martin seems to approach his sources as documents rather than texts (following Dominick LaCapra’s well-known distinction), reading them only for their propositional content and explicit claims. He limits himself to what these documents say, rather than investigating how they work or what they do. When Martin urges readers to turn to the Anti-Federalists rather than Publius, for example, it is because he finds a dissenting democratic egalitarianism openly expressed in their writings against the Constitution. I, too, am interested, of course, in what these early American texts say, but close engagement with them should also consider their rhetorical and literary dimensions and the conceptual architecture not always manifest in express statements.
This raises larger hermeneutic questions than can be adequately addressed here, but these issues of reading and textuality are directly related to our different approaches to historically situated democratic theory. Martin’s documentary positivism recovers past political perspectives in order to reveal what he finds missing from contemporary theoretical debates (say, a view of “dissentient democracy”); my dialogic historicism recovers past political dilemmas, not to resolve them but to better understand their persistence in the present, sometimes to learn from past encounters with them, and sometimes to help disenthrall ourselves of their paralyzing grip on the contemporary political imagination.
