This volume seeks to explore how political clientelism works and evolves in different developing regions. By result are multiple, parallel explanations as to how clientelism is used or links to various forms of political representation, an academic exploration that is loosely tied around debates over the exchange of social benefits. Its overall success however, is that it ingeniously moves far beyond these stated aims.
The ten case studies are methodologically electric, predominantly based on intensive fieldwork and inductive-based research, which allows the book to be organised in a way that all 16 authors' voices are heard and none dominates. Brun opens the volume by acknowledging the work of Kitschelt and WilkinsonFootnote 1, setting the benchmark from where most of this book's authors depart. The study of clientelism is firmly set within the discipline of political science, followed by attempts to enrich it by shifting our focus to overlooked structural and sociological factors which can elucidate clientelism's persistence.
Part 1 includes six case studies from Latin America based on original empirical research. Auyero's chapter 5 on studying the ‘gray zone’ ought to have opened this section. His chapter stands out for its methodological and analytical contributions (the value and need for close context-dependent observation) which he asserts is needed in order to grasp clientelism as both ‘a mechanism of political domination’ (p. 115) and as ‘a strategy for solving problems of the poor’ (p. 116). In fact, his call to look at ‘where the action is’ was taken up by almost all of the authors in the Latin American section.
Calvo and Murillo compare Argentina and Chile in order to find out what forms the distributive preferences of voters' expectations, based on past experience, within two institutionally distinct cases, machine politics versus ideologically coherent politics. Nichter's chapter on Bahia applies a simplified game theoretic model and an impressive amount of interviews to establish an argument that citizens strategically declare their support in order to secure future benefits from politicians. Tanaka and Meléndez alternatively deconstruct clientelist exchanges in Peru, claiming that within such a weak institutional context where the links between society and the state are so volatile and unstable, there is context of politicians without parties, civil mobilisations without leaders, and politics without potential legitimation via patronage.
Eaton and Chambers-Zu highlight the limits of institutional reform and the stubborn resilience of clientelism in Colombia by focusing on the education sector and the consequences of decentralisation. Decentralisation does not come out too well in this case or others, as is flagged by Brun in the introduction. Eaton and Chambers clearly assert however that clientelism should be understood in its embeddedness in social relations, arguing primarily that institutional reforms cannot eliminate it. Thus decentralisation is not the cause of clientelism in Colombia or elsewhere, rather it is yet another institutional reform that enables its metamorphosis. Luna and Mardones' case on Chile is the most focused on social policy per se, and, the most institutionally oriented, yet, it still runs contra-theory. Built from a mixed-method approach, they assert that even in Chile's highly institutionalised context where social programs are designed ‘clean’, political targeting still occurs as an investment strategy that does not follow a simple ‘core’ versus ‘swing’ logic, nor it is necessarily an electoral strategy. In order to avoid generalisations, they make a valid point for cross-programme research that exhibits variance within a single case.
Part 2 of the book, lessons in political clientelism from other regions, are refreshingly not read as add-ons to the Latin American cases. Chandra's chapter on India looks at the effect of business expansion on this ‘patronage democracy’ (p. 156), while the other chapters are broad cross-national theory building cases that cover almost entire regions. They answer yet another of Auyero's calls to move beyond the dichotomy of regime type and clientelism. In both Chandra's India and Hutchcroft's cases of Japan, Thailand and the Philippines, clientelism is an intervening variable that operates as a mechanism translating change into (or cementing democratic politics within) a local regime. Equating to ‘business as usual’ (p. 156), Chandra even worries it can be read as pro-patronage.
For both Hutchcroft's Asia-Pacific and Van de Walle's Sub-Saharan Africa however, it is clear that clientelism and/or patronage is part of state formation, societal relations and is not going to disappear. It may even, as echoed throughout the book, be compatible with democracy. Van de Walle even challenges the reader to consider that democratisation in Africa might have enabled ‘the emergence of a more redistributive form of clientelism’ (p. 241). Here, Hutchcroft's elucidated conceptual distinction could provide a valuable tool to analyse the differing consequences of what he calls ‘micro-particularistic’ versus ‘meso-particularistic’ politics (p. 178). Does a cross-programme analysis of Brazil and Chile as done by Nichter, and Luna and Mardones, not show these coalition-based presidential democracies now exhibit both ‘programmatic’ and ‘meso-particularistic’ politics? Is it something very different from Peru and the Philippines and Auyero's ‘gray zone’?
The only criticism of the book is that Cook's chapter on Eastern European clientelism and social policy could have been the book's conclusion, but was not. Although Magaloni broadly defines political clientelism's persistence in the book's conclusion based on her own research, returning to established theoretical frames like ‘core versus swing’, ‘voters’ coordination dilemmas' and ‘counterfactuals’ is a bit frustrating after the rich, context-dependent, contra-theory contributions that have evolved since Brun's introduction.
Cook's cases are the counterfactuals. She openly ponders and reflects on all of the author's contributions to ask why democratisation and liberalisation did not lead to the kind of strong clientelisitic linkages that erode both democratic quality and the provision of social goods in her cases. Returning to the factors previous chapters highlighted, Cook concludes that East Central European states had a weak capacity to supply clientelistic institutions, primarily because they were not embedded in society, plus there was not a strong demand from ‘clients’ because the conditions that create them, poverty, basic needs and limited opportunities that make selling one's loyalty seem like a good option, were largely absent.
Taken as a whole, this book rejects over-arching models that consider political clientelism a tool used by politicians to win/buy votes framed within a clean matrix of binary opposites. Instead, clientelism takes on multiple context-dependent meanings. It changes and transforms itself over time, and it intermediates relationships between state and society, within diverse political regimes types, from various directions.
