Sjöblad's Metaphorical Coherence joins a host of studies conducted over the last century that explore Seneca's use of metaphor. Whereas earlier studies focused largely on the source domain of Seneca's metaphors (e.g., the human body and its diseases, warfare, the relations between master and slave, travelling by sea and land, the military), S. follows more recent studies in assessing the unity of various metaphors beneath a single target domain. S. argues that the coherence of these metaphors implies that they are mutually interpreting, and that a recognition of their interconnections offers us ‘new interpretations’ of Seneca (8).
Focusing on the most developed and most recurrent metaphors in Seneca's Moral Epistles, S. organises his analysis into three chapters. Ch. 1 investigates the metaphors of movement, health and athletics as applied to the soul. These metaphors cohere in their conception of the soul-as-body: the soul leaps, rises, stands, falls sick, grows healthy, wrestles, conquers. In ch. 2, S. discusses metaphors related to the soul-as-fortress, a bulwark that encircles itself against the threats of externals, things that distract from the inner life. Ch. 3 applies a recent cognitive-linguistic model known as ‘conceptual blending theory’ to the relationship between two different ‘way’ metaphors in Seneca: the iter vitae and the iter ad sapientiam. Each encompasses multiple source domains: erring, altitude, force, travelling, on the one hand, and burdens and social elevation, on the other. We gain deeper insight into Seneca's philosophy, S. suggests, when we map these master metaphors onto each other: death (iter vitae) and wisdom (iter ad sapientiam), each the final destination of their respective metaphor, correlate with each other and so are ‘identified with each other, or almost so’ (76). Consequently, ‘wisdom’ is achieved when the soul escapes the body, i.e. at death.
S.’s book adds to the growing number of studies that have applied cognitive linguistics to classical texts. Attention here to coherence between metaphors offers an innovative approach to our efforts to ‘reproduce’ Seneca's philosophy as a whole; these places of coherence, moreover, highlight in brighter colour Seneca's sharpest lines of emphasis. Although a cognitive-linguistic approach promises a kind of ‘soft-scientific’ grounding, such analysis also faces the shortcoming that our object of observation is only text, a trace of a person's mental events, not the empirical brain of the person. Because the generative metaphor at the centre of some metaphorical elaboration is often only implicit (cf. 41, 63), the particular metaphorical matrix within which we are to understand its individual entailments is not always transparent. Moreover, interpreters venture onto shaky ground where they propose coherences not made explicit by the author (as in S.’s blending of the two ‘way’ metaphors). In such cases, we may not be discovering coherences, but imagining them.
S.’s study also pushes to the fore questions about the nature of discourse itself. S. reflects awareness that material that appears to be metaphorical to the modern interpreter Seneca may have intended literally, or ‘physically’ (‘disease’ of the soul is a good example). Confusing the issue further, Seneca was not always conscious, admits S. (6), that he was using metaphor. How, then, can we be sure that we are seeing one? Put differently, in some cases it is metaphor only for the interpreter, and in others it is metaphor for Seneca, but without his recognition of it. Such as it is, it is easy for us to get our wires crossed in this kind of work. But perhaps this is only to point out that the boundary between literal and figurative discourse is a fuzzy one, and by implication, that there are limits to propositional discourse (logos), that, in short, even philosophy cannot do without ‘myth’ (mythos).
