This two-volume economic history of Europe since 1700 is both ambitious and unusual. Its ambition is made plain by the editors: to produce a state of the art economic history of Europe founded on the solid bedrock of national income accounting and exuding the modern spirit of pan-Europeanism. In pursuit of this goal, the editors were also ambitious in assembling a corps of 60 contributors, drawn from many European countries and including a contingent of “honorary Europeans” from North America. These scholars, grouped in teams of up to four coauthors, were directed to write 26 thematic chapters (rather than comparative histories based on national narratives) that would comprehensively describe relevant developments in all European regions and analyze these through the lens of modern growth accounting. In short, this volume was designed to be a monument to the impressive flowering of quantitative, analytical economic history in Europe over the past two decades and an homage to the new Europe emerging in the same period.
What makes this volume unusual is implicit in its ambition. Many of the chapters are exploratory in nature—synthesizing recent scholarship or speculating on how to fill the many remaining gaps in our knowledge—and often take on the character of high-level literature surveys. Yet, the volumes are intended to serve as texts for university students. Any volume composed of separately authored chapters risks unevenness in quality and focus, and one with 60 contributors and only one single-authored chapter stands fully exposed to this problem. The editors appear to have been stern taskmasters in keeping the contributors focused on the pan-European scope of their project. The unevenness appears chiefly in goal of accessibility to students. Some chapters bring together masses of country-level data and seek to generalize from them (which is accessible and often a bit tedious); others use historical data to critique various macroeconomic theories and assume a substantial familiarity with an advanced literature (which is usually interesting but probably not accessible to undergraduates).
Volume one covers the period 1700–1870, and is focused on accounting for the great transition to modern economic growth. The British Industrial Revolution stands at the heart of this transition, but here British experience is embedded in chapters on aggregate growth and sectoral developments throughout Europe. A final section addresses apparent consequences of these developments in the realms of living standards and urbanization. The volume concludes with a necessarily speculative but very useful assessment of Europe's “transition” in relation to the “great divergence” hypothesis.
Volume two covers the period since 1870 in three chronological parts: the era of globalization up to World War I, the war and depression-wracked era of deglobalization that begins in 1914, and the post-World War II era of European integration and globalization. Each part is treated in five chapters, which address integration, aggregate growth, sectoral developments, economic cycles and instability, and population and living standards. The premise of this approach must be that profound regime shifts justify separate treatments of the main themes in each chronological period. This is not a controversial claim, of course, but the resulting organizational framework gives rise to a good deal of repetition and overlapping discussion. It also shortchanges the third and by far the longest period.
A full generation has passed since economic historians were last moved to write comprehensive accounts of European economic development. If one consults the older volumes by David Landes, Alan Milward and S. B. Saul, Clive Trebilcock, and Sidney Pollard and the later volumes of the Cambridge Economic History of Europe, three differences immediately present themselves.
First, the earlier works focused on the process of industrialization while the Broadberry and O'Rourke volumes focus on the phenomenon of modern economic growth. Nations that did not develop heavy industry (whether the distant Balkans or nearby Holland and Scandinavia) did not figure prominently in the earlier studies. The present volumes take pains to be inclusive, incorporating Eastern Europe wherever possible, but they devote much less attention to the experience of Russia, which figured prominently in all the earlier volumes.
Second, the earlier volumes devoted a great deal of attention to comparative national histories. Whether these histories were integrated into a Rostovian stages model, Gerschenkron's comparative backwardness model, or simply subjected two countries to intensive scrutiny, as Charles Kindleberger and Patrick O'Brien and Caglar Keyder compared Britain and France, the national experience was the essential building block for broader generalization about economic performance. Sidney Pollard dissented from this focus on the nation, arguing that industrialization proceeded on a regional basis, but comparative history remained his method of analysis. The present volumes try to avoid comparative history. Although no explicit argument is put forward to justify it, most chapters implicitly accept that the aggregation of national data into some supranational total is more meaningful, and that the national data points serve to illustrate some larger, encompassing process.
Finally, the earlier volumes all devoted considerable attention to (national) policy making. Economic performance was not measured only by GDP growth, but also by social indicators and military power, and it was shaped by institutions, values, social structures, and a heavy dose of path dependence. Thus, explanations of European economic development involved the study of the legal status of peasants, the political aims of the Prussian state, the political agenda of socialist parties, the security concerns of postwar France (twice), the massive entry of married women into the labor force, and much, much more. The Broadberry and O'Rourke volumes do not ignore these matters, but they are discussed in relation to their direct impact on macroeconomic growth. The policies of a Frederich List, Piotr Stolypin, Jean Monnet, or Margaret Thatcher are difficult to capture in this way (although, see Eichengreen and Boltho's determined efforts to do so with respect to Monnet and the other architects of European integration in Vol. 2, Ch. 11). As a result, a good deal of the drama and, for lack of a better word, moral instruction of economic history is washed away.
The focus of the present volumes faithfully reflects the research agendas of contemporary economic historians and the work as a whole is, as these things go, a disciplined and systematic study of Europe's economic growth. It is, however, not a comprehensive study of Europe's economic history.
