Even a casual perusal of the body of scholarship devoted to judicial decision making demonstrates that it is vibrant both in its theoretical insights and in its empirical rigor. The richness of the theoretical content is a function of the robust dialogue and debate among scholars who have advanced distinct theoretical frameworks to explain the choices that judges make. In particular, those who favor the legal model focus on the influence of precedent as structuring judicial decision making, while those who champion the attitudinal model direct attention to the role of judges' policy preferences in explaining judicial choice. Still other scholars advocate a strategic model in which judges are constrained in the choices they make by the preferences and likely reactions of others (e.g., the president, Congress). Integrating these disparate theoretical arguments into a unified whole is the enterprise at the heart of Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court and the state of the scholarly understanding of judicial decision making is much the better for this effort.
The particular temporal focus of Richard Pacelle, Brett Curry, and Bryan Marshall is on the Supreme Court in the post–Brown v. Board of Education era. This modern Court clearly shifted its attention to civil rights and liberties issues: it “became a major campaign issue, had significant swings in ideological composition, and changed doctrine and the political theories underlying constitutional interpretation” (p. 8). It is also a Court that has contended with powerful presidents and the ebbs and flows of congressional power. As such, the post-Brown Court affords a particularly appealing venue for evaluating the exercise of judicial power under varying conditions. More specifically, it provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate how issue area (civil rights and liberties cases versus economics cases) and the type of interpretation the Court is called upon to offer (constitutional versus statutory) shape how it behaves.
The authors set themselves to the task of answering three primary research questions: Do the preferences of the justices work to the exclusion of other factors in accounting for judicial decisions? Is the explanation of the Court's constitutional decisions and the explanation of the Court's statutory decisions one and the same? And does the salience of the issue matter when it comes to understanding judicial choice? Using a database of almost 5,000 cases from the 1953–2000 terms, the authors construct empirical models of the ideological direction of the Court's decisions (liberal or conservative) that incorporate legal, attitudinal, and strategic factors. The initial set of analyses (laid out in Chapter 4) demonstrates that among other things, judicial preferences matter, but so do the preferences of other actors (e.g., the president) and legal factors (e.g., precedent). Further, the authors find that the preferences of the political branches (proxies for strategic motivations on the part of the justices) are more influential when it comes to statutory interpretation cases than constitutional cases. Subsequent chapters take a more fine-grained look at constitutional civil liberties and civil rights cases (Chapter 5), statutory civil liberties and civil rights cases (Chapter 6), constitutional economic cases (Chapter 7), and statutory economics cases (Chapter 8).
Considered collectively, the findings make clear that judicial preferences, though undeniably influential, cannot be considered the definitive or exclusive explanation for judicial decision making. (And, indeed, judicial preferences lack much in the way of explanatory power at all in the context of constitutional economics cases.) The empirical findings also indicate that the dynamics underlying constitutional and statutory decision making differ, with the Court more susceptible to the influence of other actors in statutory cases than in constitutional cases. Further, they provide support for the idea that the salience of the issue matters, with attitudinal forces playing a larger role (and legal factors receding in importance) in salient cases, such as those involving civil rights and civil liberties claims.
The overriding strength of the book arises directly from its synthesis of elements of the legal, attitudinal, and strategic models into a coherent framework that eschews a one-size-fits-all approach to explaining judicial decision making. Rather than insisting on judicial choice as a function of legal forces or judicial preferences or strategic concerns, the authors here develop a theoretical structure that both allows for the operation of each of these factors and offers persuasive arguments as to the conditions under which one or another should matter most. Although they are not the first to argue in favor of an integrated model, these authors are the first to offer such an extended treatment and bring to bear so many layers of evidence in one place.
The authors articulate a clear research design and are entirely transparent about their measurement strategies. Especially nice is their consideration of the role of issue evolution using a measure developed earlier by Pacelle (“The Emergence and Evolution of Supreme Court Policy,” in Mark Miller, ed., Rethinking U.S. Judicial Politics, 2009) and more than one measure of precedent (precedents cited by the Court as well as on-point precedents “that are virtually identical to a recent decision”; p. 60). More generally, the thoroughness that characterizes the book is to be commended. One example of this attention to detail is the appendix, which provides an extended exposition of competing measurement strategies for judicial preferences. As a bonus, the book is entirely accessible to a wide audience, remaining scholarly in tone but sprinkled with charmingly humorous suggestions (“You really should visit the Vatican”; p. 27) and delightful wordsmithing (“Does the Court perform a constitutional soliloquy, or is it part of a colloquy in building doctrine?”; p. 199).
Despite the numerous attractive aspects of this volume—and there are many—there is one issue that nags just a bit. Specifically, the authors' unit of analysis consists of cases rather than the individual votes of the justices. This is not a casual choice, by any means, as the authors in Chapter 1 self-consciously frame their efforts as an investigation of institutional (rather than individual) decision making. And they offer some very useful thoughts about the intersection of micro- and macro-level analyses in the concluding chapter. But the fact remains that the theories they seek to integrate in this book are individual-level theories, not institutional-level theories. Considering the exercise of judicial power in institutional terms makes a great deal of sense when the concern is (at least partially) with the Court acting as an institution vis-à-vis other institutions (e.g., Congress). But that should not obscure the fact that the animating motivations in the legal, attitudinal, and strategic models are properly understood as the motivations of individuals.
This caveat aside, Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court represents an important advance in our understanding of judicial behavior, particularly of the Supreme Court. It will be of interest not only to students of law and courts but also to presidential and congressional scholars who care about the separation of powers. Further, the careful attention to detail and accessibility of the writing reflect what should be best practices in the scholarly literature.
