In the wake of the ongoing international economic crisis, the state's role in fostering economic renewal is a timely subject indeed. For some, particularly those on the political Right, the lesson of the crisis is that state intervention in the economy and the “moral hazard” that it creates distorts economic outcomes and makes capitalism less agile and responsive. For others, the crisis demonstrates the perils of heedless deregulation and the systematic dismantling of state capacity. Far from settling the question about the proper role for the state in facilitating national processes of economic adjustment, then, the crisis has sharpened disagreements about this issue and ensured that it will remain central to debates in comparative political economy.
Dan Breznitz's Innovation and the State explores these questions in an interesting analysis of the development of the information-technology (IT) industries in Taiwan, Ireland, and Israel, with a particular focus on the past three decades. This well-researched book relates how these three late developers deployed the state in different ways and in support of distinctive strategies for developing viable, competitive IT industries in the face of intensifying global competition, beginning in the 1970s. Breznitz argues that each country faced a range of alternatives for developing this strategic sector and opted for paths that were deeply influenced by politics. In his words, “[S]tates and societies … can pursue different strategies of economic growth” (p. 2), and “state actions give rise to different high-technology industries [that] have very different strengths and weaknesses with regard to their sustainability and profitability” (p. 4). Breznitz argues that the state's role “is not fixed” (p. 205), but rather entails “creating capabilities, spurring specific activities, and motivating private enterprises for sustained efforts in [“rapid-innovation-based”] industries” (p. 206). Far from being forced to imitate forebears in this endeavor, latecomers to the global IT marketplace enjoy significant choice about how to respond to these challenges. At the same time, states cannot merely dominate and direct. Instead, they must act in a market-supportive capacity, as what Jonah Levy has called a “constructive state,” which “seeks to cross technological and economic divides and build new markets through the exercise of authoritative and infrastructural power” (The State after Statism: New State Activities in the Age of Liberalization, 2006, p. 385).
Breznitz develops these arguments in three empirical chapters, each devoted to one of his three national cases. These case studies are remarkable for their broad historical scope, covering several decades, and for the detailed, interview-based research that informs them. For readers whose interest lies in the information-technology industry or in the recent economic history of Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan, these chapters provide a wealth of fascinating detail. In the case of Israel, Breznitz shows convincingly that “private entrepreneurs gave the impetus to critical policy decisions” (p. 49) in ways that tended to favor research and development and alliances between Israeli firms and multinational corporations. In Taiwan, by contrast, the state tended to favor the hardware and semiconductor industries over software, which remained uncompetitive. Finally, in Ireland, the state adopted a strategy of what the author calls “neoliberal interventionalism” that prioritized job creation, with mixed results, and left both research and development and the domestic venture-capital sector underdeveloped. Providing extensive evidence (and a number of fascinating anecdotes) gleaned from extensive interviews, Breznitz leaves no doubt as to his expertise about the nuances of information technology in these three countries.
This rich detail represents one of the book's greatest strengths as well as one of its limitations. By the last chapter, the reader has become quite familiar with the “trees” of the details of IT development in these three countries but is less sure of the theoretical “forest” that such detail is meant to constitute. One of the reasons for this discrepancy is that Breznitz at times makes less of his findings theoretically than he might have, and his theoretical narrative does not always connect clearly to his empirical evidence. In Chapter 1, he provides overviews of a wide range of scholarly literatures, from the work of neodevelopmental statists such as Alice Amsden (1989) and Chalmers Johnson (1982), to studies of global production networks such as T. J. Sturgeon (2000) and Gary Gereffi (1999), to systems-of-innovation theories. The problem is that it is not entirely clear how these literatures relate synthetically to Breznitz's own theoretical perspective, which he characterizes as centering on the state as facilitator of networks among domestic and global economic actors (p. 31).
Furthermore, at times, the central contributions of particular strands of scholarship are somewhat mischaracterized, as, for example, with the thematically central discussion of Alexander Gerschenkron (1962). Although Breznitz is right to point out that Gerschenkron shows the “advantages of backwardness,” enabling late developers to imitate their more industrialized predecessors, Gerschenkron's more important point was about how the timing of industrialization in late developers leads to distinctive domestic political-economic arrangements. He did not really argue that “the more economically backward a nation, the more state intervention is needed if it is to grow” (p. 12), as Breznitz claims, but rather that the kind and dynamics of state intervention and the resulting institutional arrangements will vary with national and international economic contexts. It is, in any case, not entirely clear what work Gerschenkron is supposed to be doing here, particularly since Breznitz's empirical accounts demonstrate that the Israeli, Irish, and Taiwanese states were innovative rather than imitative.
Although Breznitz's argument about the scope for political choice in states' development strategies is important, one wonders what the counterargument would be (that no such choice existed?). This claim about political choice could have been complemented by and developed through an even richer story of how the unique domestic political and international economic circumstances faced by each of these three countries shaped distinctive political-economic institutions and why such arrangements were or were not conducive to success in the IT industry. There are also a number of puzzling omissions of relevant literatures, such as Steven Vogel (1996) or Andrew Gamble (1994) on the paradoxes of neoliberal state intervention, for example.
The book's other limitations relate to presentation, organization, and style. The first chapter is fairly long and could usefully have been condensed or broken up. The author also relies excessively on abbreviations and acronyms from the high-technology sector that are relatively inaccessible to a broad audience of political scientists. There are some problems with syntax, diction, and idiomatic usage that should have been caught by the press or an attentive copy editor. In the conclusion, a synthetic overview of the case material in light of the book's central arguments would have helped to tie up some loose ends.
These limitations noted, Innovation and the State represents an important contribution to scholarly understanding of the development of the global IT industry and the ways that international economic pressures are refracted through domestic political institutions. It also reminds us of something that is of critical importance in the current economic context: To paraphrase Theda Skocpol's (1979) observation (citing Wendell Phillips) about revolutions, economic development does not come; it is made. And the state invariably plays a central role in shaping the institutional arrangements and political choices through which that development takes place.
