Visible Cities is a clever title for an entertaining book that captures fragments of the history that transformed the China Sea world-economy between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Leonard Blussé, the leading historian of the Dutch in Southeast Asia, does not quite fashion himself into the persona that Italo Calvino gives Marco Polo, his narrator in Invisible Cities. In Calvino's novel, Polo regales Khubilai Khan with tales of cities that he has visited and Khubilai never will, all the while yearning for the Venice he has left behind and fears he may never see again. In this book, Blussé regales the reader with stories about three of the major port cities anchoring the trading world that linked the Chinese economy with the early modern global economy. His cities are not invisible, however, for a rich archive of descriptions and pictures by Europeans, Japanese, and Chinese (many of them reproduced in the book) makes Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia visible to us. Yet just as Calvino's Khubilai could not visit the cities Polo describes, we cannot visit them as they were in those early trading centuries. We can only look at the traces and wonder at the prosperity these cities generated for some. Knowing them today makes it even harder to imagine how they were when the trading systems that bolstered them were in formation and the modern global economy scarcely imaginable.
Canton, of course, had long been the port through which much of the trade of Southeast Asia passed before the Europeans arrived clamouring to trade. Nagasaki by contrast was just a fishing village until the 1570s, when the local feudal lord made its anchorage available to Europeans. Though the Tokugawa regime severely restricted its growth as a trading port in the 1630s, it did leave this one port open for a few Dutch merchants, thereby ensuring that Japan would have access to the world. Batavia's beginnings were similarly modest, being the former port of the state of Jayakarta (now Jakarta). All three cities were transformed by the upsurge in intra- and interregional trade that European demand and shipping stimulated. When their fortunes flagged in the 1780s and 1790s, it was, according to Blussé, because of the political and industrial revolutions in Europe. Were it not for the arrival of the Americans, all three might have slumped back into comparative obscurity as new players entered the market.
Blussé's master argument is that the history of these port cities demonstrates that when early modern states intervene in the economy, their impact is negative. The state's urge to control business transactions, he writes, “would render all three administrations unable to grapple with the larger changes and shifts in the global economy” (p. 34). In the nineteenth century, modern states had to find a new way of adjusting their interests to commerce, and did by setting up free ports, exemplified by Stamford Raffles at Singapore. The negative correlation between economic growth and state involvement may not be quite so neat, given that the state monopolies controlling all three ports were in large part responsible for their creation. The missing element in this correlation may be the willingness of the early modern state to sanction the use of violence by commercial corporations. Other than the crucifixions at Nagasaki, violence is curiously absent from Blussé's account. But then that is not the story he wants to tell.
