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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
Robert Ball played an unusual and critical role in the history of the U.S. economy. Unusual because Ball was a bureaucrat and the stage in economic history is typically reserved for entrepreneurs, politicians, and an occasional labor leader. Ball, however, was among America's quintessentially effective bureaucrats. What makes Ball's role in history important is that he proved so effective in expanding and maintaining Social Security—by far the most massive federal economic program and the most important remaining legacy of FDR's remake of the U.S. economy.
Edward Berkowitz's fine “political biography” of Robert Ball is thus an important contribution to the discipline. As the need to accommodate the transition to a much older society is among the most important economic challenges the industrial world must face over the next quarter century, his biography is also quite timely.
Robert Ball was the chief policy maker within the Social Security Administration (SSA) from 1950 to his departure in 1973, and through much of that period SSA Commissioner. This was golden age of Social Security, when the program expanded to cover the bulk of the U.S. workforce, include disability and retiree health care coverage, and increase benefits to reduce poverty among the elderly to the level of the population as a whole. Ball also led the liberal camp during the retrenchment years of the past quarter century. The 1983 reforms did cut benefits for retirement at any given age. But as they left the basic design of the program intact, the reform was a success from Ball's liberal perspective.
What's truly amazing is that all but one of these milestones (Medicare) came during Republican Administrations: the expansion of coverage and the addition of disability under Eisenhower; the increase in cash benefits under Nixon; and the 1983 compromise under Reagan. The key explanation for this anomaly, according to Berkowitz and other close students of Social Security, is Robert Ball. Berkowitz persuasively shows how Ball's charm, intelligence, discipline, and superb political skills expanded and then preserved the U.S. Social Security system in these politically hostile environments. Berkowitz's biography should become the basic guide to the “within the Beltway” politics of Social Security. It should also become the indispensable primer for aspiring career civil servants.
The major shortcoming of Berkowitz's political biography is the narrow range of the politics it covers. His biography covers small “p” politics. But as Ball's life is fundamentally about big “P” Politics, this is a serious deficiency.
Ball came of age in the 1930s and believed in the New Deal vision. He saw Social Security, or contributory social insurance, as the great alternative to widespread poverty and a demeaning means-tested social safety net. By tying benefits to work and worker contributions, New Dealers saw Social Security as providing protection against the hazards of modern economic life in a way that preserved the independence and dignity of American citizen-workers.
Ball's great expression of this Politics came at the beginning of his career, when the choice between social insurance and means-tested welfare was very much on the table. Congress had not increased Social Security benefits in line with wages in the prosperous and inflationary post–World War II period. So Old Age Assistance, the federal means-tested piece of the Social Security program enacted in 1935, continued to provide more income to the elderly than Old Age and Survivors Insurance (the social insurance piece we now call “Social Security”). Ball was then a young and fast rising star and served as staff director of the 1947/48 Social Security Advisory Council. He elegantly laid out the Political case for social insurance (see, for example, his “Social Insurance and the Right to Assistance,” Social Service Review 21, no. 3 [September 1947]) and convinced the bipartisan Advisory Council, and then Congress, to restore the relationship between benefits and wages set in the 1939 Social Security Amendments, and to expand the program to cover the great majority of U.S. workers.
Had Berkowitz addressed Ball's Politics, his book would be far more useful today. The impending demographic transition, and the rise of a new Politics opposed to the New Deal vision, is again forcing the nation to decide the future of social insurance. Social Security has a major funding shortfall. Reforms that bring the program back into balance could easily reduce benefits to the point where many if not most older Americans become dependent on means-tested programs. Substituting funded individual accounts for a portion of Social Security, the primary component of the alternate Political vision, would not eliminate the need to expand means-tested programs. Indeed, it would add thorny financial and moral hazards to our old-age income system. Had Berkowitz written a larger Political biography of Robert Ball, it would have been an especially useful guide to the debates that will shape the future of the U.S. economy.