This volume is one of three dealing with the concept of responsibility and edited by members of the Child and Family Research Group and the Centre for Responsibilities, Rights and the Law at Sussex University. All three books explore different facets of the notion of responsibility in the context of the family and of family law. This volume sets out to consider ‘the role of the law in recognizing people's acceptance, or avoidance, of responsibility for one another’ (p. 6), and it analyses, from a range of perspectives, the part the law plays in allocating family responsibilities and in resolving disputes. The contributors, who hail from around the world, include established academics, less-experienced scholars and judges. Topics covered include friendship, same-sex relationships, assisted reproduction families, conceptions of motherhood and fatherhood, children's rights and adoption.
The first chapter, a wide-ranging and erudite contribution by the editors, Craig Lind, Heather Keating and Jo Bridgeman, provides an excellent analysis of the notion of responsibility. The authors engage with the growing debate about the limits of the law in regulating an increasingly diverse range of family and caring relationships. They point to the difficulty inherent in determining where legal responsibilities should lie and what logic should determine where new boundaries should be drawn.
The authors adopt a broad interpretation of the term ‘family’ so as to encompass ‘relationships of responsibility-taking in which there are elements of love, affection, friendship, companionship, intimacy, care, shared experiences and memories’ (p. 1, citing Diduck, Reference Diduck, Bridgeman, Keating and Lind2008). One of the questions they then ask is whether the law should convert the responsibilities that people currently voluntarily assume in such relationships into legal obligations (p. 13). Their suggested answer is to incorporate into law the responsibilities already actually undertaken in diverse family settings. Law, they say, should perform a ‘permissive and supportive framework for a range of acceptable norms by which people might live – and do live – their family lives’ (p. 15).
The main body of the book is divided into four parts. In the first part, ‘Conceptualizing Responsibility in an Era of Transforming Families’, Martha Fineman examines the responsibility of the state to ameliorate the consequences of vulnerability and dependence, Polona Curk provides a psychoanalytic analysis of relational responsibility, while both Baroness Hale and Craig Lind, adopting different approaches, consider the possibility of extending the reach of the law to a wide range of caring relationships.
The chapter by Baroness Hale raises important issues that should give pause to anyone recommending the extension of the law into new areas of family responsibility. She points to the conceptual difficulties surrounding the notion of responsibility: ‘I am not sure that any of us knows exactly what we are talking about’ (p. 25). Responsibility can refer to the coincidence of legal and moral responsibility. It can also be seen as a legal duty, correlative to a right. Moral responsibility often underlies legal duties but it is possible to have moral responsibility without legal obligations. In many cases, she suggests, mothers appear to be held to account to a greater degree than fathers when it comes to responsibilities for children.
Confusion is particularly acute, she says, when it comes to relationships between adults. This, she shows, is apparent in the debate concerning the financial consequences of the termination of cohabitation relationships. And while she thinks caring responsibilities should not be seen only in terms of children, she wonders whether these wider responsibilities should be made into legal obligations. Such ‘dangerous talk’, she says, could lead to the imposition on individuals of caring responsibilities towards adults, as well as those already existing in relation to children, for the benefit of the state (p. 34).
Craig Lind examines the similarities in function and attributes between marriage and some friendships. His argument is that where such similarities exist, friendship and marriage should be similarly regulated. However, he acknowledges the difficulty of identifying those relationships which should be subject to legal regulation. In order to do so, he says, it is necessary to consider the functions that law fulfils when recognising particular family relationships, both in setting up norms and in setting out to achieve just resolution of disputes. While the law's power to shape behaviour is limited, it can impose responsibilities when relationships end so that the vulnerabilities and dependencies created are acknowledged and so that people cannot abandon responsibilities undertaken in the past.
The second part of the book explores adult same-sex relationships. Todd Brower discusses the similarities between same-sex relationships and heterosexual relationships, arguing, in the context of the US, that the failure to accommodate same-sex relationships within the law leads to difficulties. He also points out that when legal rules are extended to same-sex relationships, often the gender-based assumptions underlying some rules governing traditional marriage are exposed. Jackie Jones argues that same-sex relationships should be recognised under the EU Charter and that this would eliminate the current discrepancies between jurisdictions. Anel Boshoff examines the process by which same-sex marriage came to be recognised in South Africa. Using Foucault's work, she reflects upon the significance of the names attached to institutions and argues that legal terms are elements of specific cultural and political histories.
The third part focuses on responsibilities where there are children in a family. Hannah Robert explores the way some men reject responsibility for children who they discover are not their genetic offspring, leading them to terminate relationships that may have been significant for those children. She examines the possible legal basis for the father to claim in tort and suggests that the ‘harm’ underlying such claims – the loss of the choice whether or not to parent genetically unrelated children − reflects gendered expectations of child-rearing. Aileen Kennedy examines the law relating to assisted reproduction in Australia and argues that, while biological and genetic truths are at present given pre-eminence over ‘socio-cultural relatedness’, more nuanced approaches to the allocation of responsibility for children are required. Caroline Jones analyses changes in legislation in the UK and concludes that there are some relationships that lie beyond the scope of what the law can conceive of as giving rise to parental status: for example, the law does not allow the possibility of a legally motherless child from the moment of birth. Amel Alghrani examines the possibility of womb transplants and the consequences these could have.
The final part of the book focuses on the tensions between rights and responsibilities. Laura Byrne examines the law through an analysis of two Irish cases and suggests that the concept of children's rights is being too readily used to label parental decisions irresponsible. Shani King looks at inter-country adoption in the context of the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child. Mary Anne Case argues that what she calls ‘feminist fundamentalism’, that is an ‘uncompromising commitment to equality of the sexes’ (p. 276), is at least as worthy of respect as a religious or cultural commitment to the subordination of women or to fixed gender roles. In particular, and within the context of the US Constitution and US case-law, she argues that courts should favour the equality norm when deciding matters such as the education and custody of children.
The various chapters provide theoretical, doctrinal and policy-based approaches to a number of issues that present challenges to law. There is in this volume probably something for everybody interested in the concept of responsibility within family law.
