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“Sailing against the Wind”: A Reappraisal of Edward Kennedy's Campaign for the 1980 Democratic Party Presidential Nomination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 July 2009

TIMOTHY RANDOLPH STANLEY
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Abstract

In 1980 Senator Edward Kennedy challenged incumbent President Jimmy Carter for the Democratic Party presidential nomination. Kennedy's defeat has often been used as evidence of a philosophical realignment within the American electorate in the late 1970s away from Democratic liberalism, which culminated in the election of Ronald Reagan as President. However, Kennedy performed better than this interpretation suggests. His defeat was caused by historical accident: a poor campaign, international crises and Carter's use of the incumbency. The strengths of the Kennedy campaign cast doubt upon the theory of realignment and suggest that liberalism enjoyed greater support among the US electorate than has previously been considered.

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Type
Research Article
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Journal of American Studies , Volume 43 , Issue 2 , August 2009, pp. 231 - 253
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

In December 1978 the Democratic Party met for its midterm convention in Memphis. As the media and party officials predicted, it proved to be an opportunity for liberal groups to protest the policies of incumbent President Jimmy Carter.Footnote 1 Referring to Carter, one Michigan congressman ominously reminded reporters, “we elected him and we can de-select him.”Footnote 2 Although the Democratic National Committee had reduced opportunities for activists to debate and vote on fiscal policy, Senator Edward M. Kennedy used a panel discussion on healthcare to attack cuts in federal spending.Footnote 3 Warning his audience not to succumb to an apparent conservative mood within the nation towards government responsibility and expenditure he said, “Sometimes a party must sail against the wind. We cannot afford to drift or lie at anchor. We cannot heed the call of those who say it is time to furl the sail.” He asked the party to endorse his argument for comprehensive national health insurance. His defense of this extension of the welfare state reached across Democratic traditions, “invoking almost the entire litany of Democratic interest groups.”Footnote 4 It was “the great unfinished business on the agenda of the Democratic Party,” a legacy of the New Deal's “noble goals of freedom from want and freedom from fear.”Footnote 5 His proposals appealed to the identity politics of the 1970s, for instance by abolishing “regressive rate structures” for women and lowering costs of long-term care for the disabled. He tapped in to the sensibilities of the Civil Rights Movement by consistently describing heath provision as a “right,” and reminding audiences that “we are the only industrialized nation in the world outside South Africa that does not have universal, comprehensive health insurance.” It was even a fiscally responsible measure that would lower costs for middle-class policyholders and thus reduce inflation.Footnote 6 National health insurance was arguably an example of “universalist” policymaking, by which liberals might “improve the life chances of groups such as the ghetto underclass by emphasizing programs [to] which the more advantaged groups of all races can positively relate.”Footnote 7

The speech electrified the hall and was regarded by the administration and a fledgling “Draft Kennedy” movement as a declaration of candidacy.Footnote 8 Said one witness, “The heart, the soul, the pride, and the passion of the party is in its sponsorship of programs. And that is a tradition that Kennedy – and only Kennedy – now invokes.”Footnote 9 Kennedy solemnly warned that “the party that tore itself apart over Vietnam in the 1960s cannot afford to tear itself apart today over budget cuts in basic social programs.”Footnote 10 That was precisely what it proceeded to do when, on 7 November 1979, Kennedy finally declared his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination.Footnote 11

There is consensus among historians that liberalism in the 1970s endured a period of pronounced decline. It lacked convincing leadership and elements of it had become radicalized beyond reason, endorsing extremist “notions of income by right” and levels of social spending that were unpopular in a period of inflation and recession. It was also divided between generational and philosophical sensibilities. Perhaps most consciously, it was torn between the New Politics of the 1960s that prioritized minority rights, fiscal restraint and isolationism and a residual Cold War liberalism that urged a vigilant foreign policy and redistributive economics.Footnote 12

In addition, liberalism was challenged by a resurgent conservatism that benefited from what some political scientists have identified as a “critical realignment” in electoral politics in the late 1970s. According to this school of thought, “eras of critical realignment are marked by short, sharp reorganizations of the mass coalitional bases of the major parties which occur at periodic intervals on the national level.”Footnote 13 They are typically preceded by major third-party campaigns that express voter frustration with contemporary orthodox politics, socioeconomic change and ideological polarization between and within mainstream parties. Importantly, the electoral revolution that they catalyse is durable.Footnote 14

Applying a model of critical realignment to 1980, James L. Sundquist argued that “the Reagan revolution … accelerated the realigning forces that had been making continuous, though relatively minor changes in the composition of parties and the nature of the party struggle.”Footnote 15 In the 1960s the Democratic Party's embrace of the civil rights movement had caused the defection of the once “Solid South” to the Republicans.Footnote 16 In the 1970s the rise of the “social issue,” defined by Democratic analysts Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg as “law and order, backlash, antiyouth, malaise, change or alienation,”Footnote 17 was successfully exploited by Richard Nixon. The Republican Party was able to paint the socially tolerant Democratic Party as being dominated by a “radical fringe” of feminists, black radicals, and the sexually permissive.Footnote 18

Reagan's election in 1980 on a platform of reduced government and tax cuts seemed to confirm that the public's rejection of liberalism was complete and that a new consensus had emerged in economic thinking.Footnote 19 Conservatives were elated, pointing to a “powerful message in the Reagan campaign to which the American people were decidedly in a mood to respond.”Footnote 20 Many concurred that “economic issues now represent the Republican Party's best opportunity to build a new party”Footnote 21 and that the middle class had begun “to define its interests in terms of a rollback of government programs aimed at helping other groups.”Footnote 22 The significance of the 1970s for most historians and political scientists was the decline of liberalism, a decline predicated upon its failure to realize that political and economic circumstances had changed dramatically.Footnote 23

This consensus has recently undergone limited revision. Jonathan Bell and Timothy Thurber have argued for persistence within the Democratic Party of New Deal liberalism, which “favoured the politics of class over the politics of race” and was more electorally viable than many have supposed.Footnote 24 Additionally, in contrast to realignment theory, many scholars have started to see 1980 as evidence of a dealignment within US politics that has favoured neither Democrats nor Republicans. In a model of dealignment, “voters tend to move away from parties altogether; loyalties to the parties, and to the parties' candidates and programs, weaken, and more and more of the electorate become ‘up for grabs’ each election.”Footnote 25

But the literature still broadly concurs that liberalism was in decline. The unsuccessful campaign of Edward Kennedy for the Democratic nomination seems to confirm this verdict. Although the Carter administration portrayed the candidacy as a vainglorious and opportunistic one, many commentators have seen it as liberalism's “last stand,” appealing to the “shrinking liberal wing” of the Democratic Party which “showed little sensitivity to those worried about expanding government and surging inflation.”Footnote 26 It ultimately failed because aversion to liberalism was emergent even among registered Democrats and what little success Kennedy did enjoy was a reflection of Carter's unpopularity.Footnote 27 This view downplays the role of historical accident in the outcome of the primaries, which this essay will examine. It also overlooks the lingering appeal both of liberal social programmes and of Edward Kennedy as a political personality to large sectors of the American public in the late 1970s. If Carter's re-nomination and Reagan's general election victory were far from certain outcomes, then one might infer that liberalism was more viable a political project in 1980 than many have argued. This would not only prompt a reappraisal of the historical narrative of the 1970s, but would also have profound implications for political science.

I

In every presidential election since 1968, Edward Kennedy was regarded as a front-runner and his refusal to enter the primaries was a relief to many potential challengers, including Richard Nixon.Footnote 28 He even led the Democratic pack in 1972, just three years after he was involved in the death of an intern, Mary Jo Kopechne, in a car accident on Chappaquiddick Island.Footnote 29 Despite fighting an incumbent, 1980 looked as though it would be no exception. Dogged by rising unemployment and inflation, in July 1979 embattled President Carter's public approval rating slumped to an historic low of 25 percent.Footnote 30 This corresponded with a fall in citizens describing themselves as Democratic, from 51 percent in 1976 to 38 percent in 1979. Importantly the biggest falls in party identification took place within the Democratic base, rather than among moderates or conservatives. The number of those describing themselves as “liberal” identifying with the party fell by 33 percent. The fall was 20 percent among African Americans, 18 percent among union members and 13 percent among Catholics.Footnote 31 Carter's presidency had frustrated party liberals. He had risen as part of the generation of “good government” southern governors, who were socially tolerant but fiscally conservative. His argument that government “cannot solve our problems, set our goals, define our vision, eliminate poverty, or reduce inflation” created a gulf of expectations of federal responsibility between administration, party and constituent groups.Footnote 32

In contrast, Kennedy's presumed ability to motivate that electoral base to go to the polls in 1980 was a key factor in the endorsements he received from Democratic office-holders.Footnote 33 The wider public favoured Kennedy as an alternative nominee, too.Footnote 34 In a sample poll from September 1979, 68 percent of all voters felt he should enter the race and 63 percent felt he could “save the Democrats from almost certain defeat under Carter.”Footnote 35 When he announced, Kennedy enjoyed a two-to-one lead against Carter among registered Democrats. This amounted to a “‘landslide’ in public sentiment.”Footnote 36

According to Gallup he also held a lead over Reagan of 64–34 percentFootnote 37 and lobbyists were reporting that he “frightens many Republicans … because no Republican is close to him in national polls.”Footnote 38 Reagan's pollster Richard Wirthlin detected that Kennedy's support stretched across a spectrum of ideology, holding comfortable pluralities among voters who described themselves as “liberal,” “moderate” and even “somewhat conservative.” Interestingly, he was narrowly preferred as a candidate by those who told Wirthlin they were “somewhat for Reagan.” Kennedy led Reagan in the governor's own polls by 55·1–40·1 percent. Kennedy's pollster Peter Hart confirmed Wirthlin's findings that the public felt his candidate was more likely to square the circle of providing free healthcare and reducing inflation than his rivals were. Interviewees did rate him poorly on controlling government spending, but this was dwarfed by the only other concern about his candidacy, that he might be assassinated.Footnote 39 By the summer of 1979 it appeared to some that “Kennedy could become President without really trying.”Footnote 40

Kennedy received a number of Democratic Party endorsements that testified to his potential strength. Most were motivated by his apparent commitment to specific liberal policies. Cardiss Collins, head of the Congressional Black Caucus, said that “Kennedy seems to be right on target when it comes down to things that affect minority people.” Mayor Bill Green of Philadelphia felt that he was “best for the cities.”Footnote 41 Although many endorsements were driven by frustration with the administration, many more were in response to Kennedy's qualities as a politician, to “his compassion, his experience, and above all, his capacity for leadership.”Footnote 42 An additional motivation for office-holders was a concern for “their own ability to survive in an election year that could be an election of rejection.”Footnote 43 The New York Times reported that “the widely held view among non-ideological Democrats is that Kennedy is a far stronger candidate for November.”Footnote 44 Even a district attorney that had been a national co-chair of the 1976 Carter–Mondale campaign suggested that electorally it “might be best” if Carter withdrew in favour of Kennedy. The strength of this support was recognized within the administration. Carter's chief of staff Hamilton Jordan warned his boss that “there is a greater chance we will lose the nomination than there is we will lose the general election.”Footnote 45

Importantly, this support stretched across Democratic generations and philosophies. George McGovern, a “dovish” senator who capitalized upon the burgeoning New Politics in 1972 to become “probably the most liberal of the Democratic nominees since Franklin Roosevelt,” campaigned passionately for the candidate.Footnote 46 But so too did “hawkish” Senator Henry Jackson, whose “Cold War liberalism” was “a compound of vigilant foreign policy abroad and New Deal–Fair Deal economic policies at home.”Footnote 47 He told enthusiastic crowds that he believed Kennedy alone could revive the “party of Roosevelt and Truman.”Footnote 48 Similarly, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, writing in the Neo-conservative Coalition for a Democratic Majority's briefing paper, which looked favourably upon Kennedy's candidacy, reassured her readers that the senator's apparent dovishness was just “electoral posturing” and could be safely overlooked.Footnote 49 Gary Hart, too, felt that Kennedy could have “bridged the gap between generations” of Democrats. Hart, who proclaimed before a Democratic audience in 1974 “the end of the New Deal,” was the figurehead of a “neoliberalism” which was typically dovish, fiscally conservative and critical of the influence of “special interest” groups like labor. Yet in 1980 Hart recalls being “pretty much in awe” of Kennedy, both out of admiration for the Senator's abilities and because he had served as a volunteer for his brother Robert in 1968. The only reason why he did not publicly endorse Edward Kennedy was that “being an incumbent fighting for re-election, you couldn't expect anyone in my situation to get involved in that.” This was typical of the dilemma faced by many office-holders who ultimately preferred to avoid conflict with an incumbent President in a difficult election year.Footnote 50

Outside his party, Kennedy had a remarkable ability to bring together traditional liberal groups, like labor, and new “identity politics” movements like feminists and civil rights activists. In the Californian primary Kennedy targeted the gay vote, assiduously canvassing clubs and bars with his wife and son. In this he set a precedent.Footnote 51 The San Francisco Chronicle noted the “striking diversity” of the crowd at a fundraiser in a Castro bar. It was composed not just of gays, but of labor officials too, like “David Powell, 23, a house painter and painter's union trustee from Stockton.”Footnote 52 Like his speech at the midterm convention on healthcare, Kennedy managed to unite different traditions and special interest groups.

II

Thus Carter's re-nomination in late 1979 appeared highly unlikely. But three factors caused a reversal of fortunes: the weaknesses of Kennedy's campaign, the strengths of Carter's and the President's manipulation of foreign crises. Shortly before declaring, Kennedy was interviewed by Roger Mudd for CBS. When asked what was the rationale for his candidacy, the senator was, to the surprise of interviewer and audience, unable to answer.Footnote 53 This ominous beginning was symptomatic of a tension within his campaign between promoting liberal programmes and causes and speaking in “general themes” that emphasized personal qualities over ideology.Footnote 54 The campaign team was “hopelessly divided,” as well as underfunded. Its younger members were late additions to Kennedy's staff, yet dominated its direction in the early primaries. They told Kennedy to restrain his usually bombastic stump style and engage mainly in “soft-side events … birthdays, anniversaries, St. Valentine's Day,” and seek “identification with movie stars and athletes.”Footnote 55 Kennedy's team urged him to soften his liberalism. One of Carter's staff remarked that “Kennedy is moving rapidly to the right in an effort to take away the center from us.”Footnote 56 Kennedy even told the Investment Association of New York, “We are making a clean break with the New Deal and even the 1960s … There is now a clear consensus, which I share, that government intervention in to the economy should only come as a last resort.”Footnote 57

For a front-runner this approach was tactically orthodox and theoretically sound. Ronald Reagan, equally confident of nomination, was also pursuing an image as a moderate.Footnote 58 But it confused many liberal supporters and weakened Kennedy's appeal to the party's base.Footnote 59 The candidate himself was clearly uncomfortable with the strategy, resulting in a lacklustre campaign style. The Boston Globe reported that “the flame under the charisma has been turned down so low it seems to have gone out, and the motivation seems muffled … It is a Kennedy campaign without a Kennedy.”Footnote 60 He appeared “battened down and unnatural … his hands tied behind him.”Footnote 61 In January 1980, 59 percent of ABC-Harris interviewees described Kennedy as a disappointing campaigner.Footnote 62 Later, the older members of the campaign would take control, marshalled by Robert Shrum. Shrum warned his candidate that “we are running a general election campaign in a primary season. We are failing to raise several issues that can stir intensely among Democratic primary voters and that in fact reflect your own long-time convictions.”Footnote 63 Early primary defeats sparked a reversal in strategy that would correspond with a marked improvement in Kennedy's stump style.

In contrast, Carter's campaign proved resourceful. This was largely due to the power of the incumbency, which was used to bribe or threaten, in equal measure, potential Kennedy supporters.Footnote 64 The administration noted that Ford had failed to use federal funds to his advantage in the 1976 primaries and was determined not to repeat this mistake.Footnote 65 Immediately before a Florida straw poll, public officials distributed copies of memos to Democratic activists that read, “On behalf of President Carter I am pleased to inform you of a grant offer of $1.1 million for rehabilitation funds [for Miami].”Footnote 66 Dade County Mayor Stephen Clarke joked to reporters, “We ought to do this more often.” Little Havana received $2 million and Dade County $1.1 million in public housing grants. Gerald Lewis, State Controller, complained, “Carter is attempting to buy the election.”Footnote 67 Jane Byrne, Mayor of Chicago, supported that accusation by telling reporters that Carter was “on the phone making promises saying he's got 55,000 jobs to hand out … going round to committee men saying, ‘What does your son want?’.”

The attraction of the incumbency was not only pecuniary. Carter offered endorsements for candidates that came with an expectation of reciprocity. Carter threw himself into supporting Dianne Feinstein's mayoral candidacy in San Francisco, as she commanded considerable liberal support that the administration calculated “we will need the help of … in the June primary.”Footnote 68 At the same time, the administration was forced to deny leaks to the LA Times that suggested it planned to “purge” Kennedy supporters after the election.Footnote 69 Personal contact with the President meant a great deal to ordinary activists and Carter made thousands of phone calls from the White House to speak with Iowa Democrats during its January caucus.Footnote 70

Carter also chose to use the issue of Chappaquiddick.Footnote 71 Throughout December 1979 several dailies ran articles re-examining the accident and the Boston Globe pointed out that “what is striking is how much less favourably Edward Kennedy is being treated than his two brothers were.”Footnote 72 When stumping at the St. Patrick's Day march in Chicago, Kennedy was taunted with cries of “Where's Mary Jo?”Footnote 73 Carter ran a series of ads that pictured the President with his family and declared, “Husband. Father. President. He's done these three jobs with distinction.” Self-evidently, he was implying that Kennedy had not.Footnote 74 This “moral issue” began to cost Kennedy votes among Christians, especially within his own ethnic Catholic group.Footnote 75

But the most significant impact upon the fate of Kennedy's campaign was a series of foreign-policy crises that rallied the nation to their President. On 4 November 1979 American hostages were taken at the US embassy in Tehran by radical Iranian students and on Christmas Day the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The events shifted the public's attention from economic to diplomatic problems.Footnote 76 Coverage of the hostage crisis kept a sudden 1·3 percent leap in the consumer price index off the front pages.Footnote 77 Kennedy organizer Barney Frank complained to journalists that “Afghanistan hurts Kennedy … because it diverts people's attention from the price of oil and the unemployment rate.”Footnote 78 In addition, Kennedy claimed that US foreign policy was responsible for the crisis and urged restraint, which angered patriotic voters.Footnote 79

The administration noted with some pleasure that “the enunciation of the so-called Carter Doctrine together with announced plans to increase defense spending have added a large measure of breadth to our potential support.”Footnote 80 In June 1979 just 36 percent of the public approved of Carter's handling of foreign policy, while 46 percent disapproved. By February 1980 the figures had been reversed, the public now approving of it by 48 percent. Ironically, Kennedy's polls found that most citizens felt Carter's previous diplomatic policies were to blame.Footnote 81 Nonetheless, a panicked public heeded the call for increased military outlays, support for the measure jumping from 27 percent of voters to 46 percent in one month.Footnote 82 These crises impacted upon Carter's wider popularity.Footnote 83 At the beginning of November 1979 only 32 percent of Americans felt he was performing his job well, in all social groups a plurality disapproved of his administration and disappointment was highest among traditional Democratic groups in the East. By the end of the month, after the seizing of hostages, his approval rating shot to 51 percent and a plurality of all social groups, bar Republicans, now supported him. By the end of January, after the invasion of Afghanistan, it reached a high of 58 percent.Footnote 84 On occasion Carter would use these crises to directly affect the outcomes of specific primaries. On the morning of the Wisconsin primary Carter held an impromptu press conference at which he implied that the hostages were about to be released.Footnote 85 Approval of the President's diplomatic policies shot up to 48 percent and suddenly replaced the economy as the issue voters identified as the most prescient. He carried the primary comfortably, some 36 percent of Democrats choosing whom to vote for on the day.Footnote 86

Many Democratic office-holders wished to support their President and began to drift away from Kennedy. Congressman Howard of New Jersey informed the New York Times that he could no longer support Kennedy because he felt he had to rally to his President in a time of crisis.Footnote 87 So too did Congressman Tom Harkin of Iowa, despite being “philosophically at one with Kennedy.”Footnote 88 Perhaps the most significant switch in support came from the ranks of the unions. In late 1979 the administration still judged that “Kennedy has a distinct edge in the labor community.” It was prepared for an “uphill fight.” This was a necessary battle because labor provided electoral muscle and organization. Kennedy's campaign in Iowa was almost entirely managed by the United Auto-Workers (UAW) and Machinist unions. Carter's labour support tended to be drawn from skilled and white-collar unions. In contrast, Kennedy's was from older unions with a mixture of skilled and unskilled workers but almost always a history of political activism.Footnote 89

Yet Carter would receive a number of high-level labor endorsements in 1980.Footnote 90 The Electrical Worker's union explicitly declared for the President because of his “ability to lead America in the search for peace.” Even some UAW locals would rebel against national policy and campaign for Carter. The sheet-metal workers' union decided to support Carter in Iowa because of his “boycott of the forth-coming Olympic Games” in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The national union had received petitions to do so from local branches. One explained, “Even though many of us have not been very enthusiastic about the past performance of our president, I think he is doing a good job in a very difficult situation with Iran.” As this qualified statement of support suggests, patriotism did not translate into long-term commitment. Carter's staff in the Iowa caucus characterized his union support as motivated by nationalism, soft and unenthusiastic. In contrast, Kennedy's was “intense.” The President lost the Californian primary despite the combined membership of the unions that endorsed him being considerably larger than that of those who did Kennedy.Footnote 91 Nonetheless, in the early primaries, as Kennedy faced renewed questions about his private life and stumbled his way through a badly managed campaign, Carter was able to capitalize upon a series of convenient crises abroad.

As a result Kennedy performed poorly in the early primaries. He faced a 2–1 defeat in Iowa on 21 January 1980, which was followed by a 23–61 percent loss in Florida on 11 March.Footnote 92 He expected to perform well in Illinois,Footnote 93 where he had received the endorsement of Chicago Mayor Jane Byrne, who had predicted that the President would be unable to carry the state in the fall.Footnote 94 However, Byrne was a controversial figure, unpopular with the city's Democratic machine, and the endorsement lost Kennedy sympathy.Footnote 95 His ignominious defeat on 18 March by a margin of 65–30 percent was at least in part due to association with Byrne.Footnote 96 But it was mostly because 50 percent approved of Carter's handling of foreign policy and the President received the votes of 77 percent of those naming the crises abroad as the most significant issue of the election. Illinois voters rated Carter more highly than Kennedy on issues of trustworthiness (by 60–30 percent) and leadership (by 58–40 percent). They thought the economic situation was healthier than many did in other primaries, although they broadly supported Kennedy's new economic platform of using wage and price controls to reduce inflation.Footnote 97

Nevertheless, the situation would quickly change. Carter's pollster predicted a similar landslide in the New York primary that was to be held on 25 March, a week following the Illinois poll.Footnote 98 But instead Kennedy won a significant victory, taking 58·9 percent to Carter's 41·1 percent.Footnote 99 This time only 35 percent of voters approved of Carter's foreign policy, while the economy was now identified as the biggest influence upon voting preference. Many commentators dismissed the poll as a verdict upon the mishandling of a vote in the UN on Israeli settlements, but even Jewish voters overwhelmingly identified inflation over foreign policy as an influence upon their vote. Of the entire electorate only 10 percent said Israel affected the way they voted. Kennedy led Carter by 39–26 percent in voters' judgement of who was a better leader and by 49–46 percent in who was most trustworthy. Sixty-four percent of those who favoured wage controls, 63 percent who supported domestic spending increases and 67 percent of those who wanted national health insurance voted for the Senator.Footnote 100 Moreover, there was a correlation in New York, and in later primaries too, between those who felt that their financial situation had become worse in the last twelve months and those who voted for Kennedy.Footnote 101

III

The key to Kennedy's victory in New York and in other primaries was a replication of what he had begun to do within his party in late 1979: to bind different liberal traditions and interest groups into a powerful coalition. Carter won the same areas in New York that he had also taken in 1976, rural “upstate” districts. But Kennedy drew his strength from areas that had previously gone for either Morris Udall or Henry Jackson. Among New Yorkers voting in 1976, Udall's supporters were the youngest, the most likely to define themselves as liberal, the best educated and the wealthiest. Jackson had run well in ethnic white districts, 54 percent of his support was unionized and 51 percent worked in manufacturing. His voters were the eldest New Yorkers, with the poorest education. Kennedy took all the districts won by these candidates in 1976, by large majorities. This included winning the heavily black 20th congressional district in the Bronx, where Udall had secured all available delegates in 1976, by 30,066 to 14,523. But he also took the heavily Catholic and white 8th congressional district in Queens, won by Jackson in 1976, by 27,716 to 11,853.Footnote 102 Overall Kennedy dominated voting among those describing themselves as liberal, ran slightly ahead among moderates and, importantly, broke even among conservatives.Footnote 103

In those primaries in which he won, Kennedy appealed to a mixture of liberals, ethnic minorities, traditionally Democratic ethnic white voters and a significant number of conservatives. The Pennsylvania primary on 22 April continued this trend. Carter outspent the Kennedy campaign by $750,000 to $450,000, used more paid campaign staff workers (35 to 12) and circulated 1·5 million pieces of literature. Nevertheless, Kennedy won a narrow victory of 45·7–45·4 percent. This was partly because he was “more effective on the stump than in any previous state,” pushing themes of economic protest.Footnote 104 It was also because inflation was now identified as the biggest influence upon voting intentions. Kennedy lead Carter 2–1 amongst Democrats most concerned about the economy. Although Carter beat him 3–1 on issues of “character” and “trust,” Kennedy beat the President by 6–1 on issues of leadership.Footnote 105 Polls differed on precisely who had voted for Kennedy. He easily carried Philadelphia (where he lost only one district), its suburbs, Scranton and Wilkes-Barre. However, he performed badly in the rural areas and ran narrowly behind Carter in some mining towns. Some commentators blamed Kennedy's views on gun control and abortion for these results.Footnote 106 An ABC News-Harris exit poll explained that Kennedy had won big majorities among blacks and self-described liberals, pulling even with Carter among moderates and losing among conservatives.Footnote 107 However a Times-CBS poll disagreed. Its findings demonstrated that Kennedy had in fact secured majorities among self-described liberals and conservatives, while Carter had led strongly among moderates.Footnote 108 One commentator noted that Kennedy appeared to have reassembled the coalition that his brother Robert had sought to build in 1968, “an alignment of blacks and liberals and blue-collar conservatives, all united in their anger at the way things were.”Footnote 109

This appeal to traditional blue-collar Democrats, which had become a perceptibly more conservative demographic throughout the 1970s, was matched by an ability to bring minorities to the polls in remarkable numbers. Kennedy's late victories in the West were secured by the mobilization of Hispanics. This support represented a rebellion against the organized Democratic Hispanic machine. In December 1979, despite polls showing Kennedy leading Carter 2–1 among their community, the Hispanic-American Democratic Convention endorsed the President in a floor vote by 40–24 percent. Hispanics were unwilling to sacrifice a growing influence within the administration.Footnote 110 Carter was supported by the official Hispanic Democratic group Mexican American Democrats (MAD), which donated $750,000 to his re-nomination effort. However, in early primaries even though Hispanic voters were not yet organized, they came out for Kennedy in numbers that troubled the administration. In Texas, MAD dominated the Hispanic leadership, as did the Carter-friendly teaching union the National Educational Association. Nevertheless, whilst in the 3 May primary Kennedy was beaten soundly (by 55·9–22·8 percent) he won by a landslide among Chicanos (by 68–27 percent). They amounted to 58·5 percent of his support and where they turned out in biggest numbers Kennedy performed best.Footnote 111

In later primaries the organization of minority communities helped give Kennedy a majority of the vote. In the 12 April Arizona primary Cesar Chavez threw his Hispanic-dominated United Farm Workers (UFW) union behind Kennedy's campaign. The UFW's strategy was to “win in predominately Mexican-American areas by a 3 to 1 margin” and to “keep our presence quiet so as not to arouse opposing forces until it is too late.” Its wider goal was to use the primary process to “demonstrate that the United Farm Workers is a power to be reckoned with.”Footnote 112 He succeeded, handing Kennedy a 55–45 percent victory, which the administration was surprised by and blamed entirely on UFW organization.Footnote 113 The President had been endorsed by the governor and had outspent Kennedy enormously.Footnote 114 But Kennedy brought out Hispanic voters in record numbers, winning the 10th district with a 4–1 margin and the 11th by 12–1.Footnote 115

In the 3 June New Mexico primary, where conservative Democrat George C. Wallace had run second in 1972, Kennedy again “beat the party machine and surprised a lot of people.”Footnote 116 Carter enjoyed the support of the governor, the mayor of Albuquerque and the state party chair. But the UFW brought out enough voters to secure Kennedy a 46·3–41·8 percent victory.Footnote 117 He ran strongest in Hispanic counties, taking 3,067 votes to Carter's 1,410 in Taos and 4,324 to 1,089 in Rio Arliba.Footnote 118 Again, a viable comparison can be struck with Robert Kennedy's California campaign in 1968, which also relied heavily upon the registration of large number of Hispanic voters. Indeed, throughout the 1970s Kennedy had maintained links with the UFW and in the 1980 primary exploited his brother's memory considerably.Footnote 119 He also benefited from the support of Native American voters in New Mexico.Footnote 120 In the South Dakota primary his margin of victory was built upon both heavy voting in urban areas and heavy voting in the state's reservations.Footnote 121

Minority voting proved as important in the general election as it did in the primaries. The administration had taken the results in Western states as evidence that it could not rely upon Hispanic votes.Footnote 122 There proved to be a swing of 16 percent among Hispanic voters from Carter to Reagan in November, the largest swing among any individual ethnic group, including whites.Footnote 123 Kennedy's candidacy had energized and exploited constituencies that could provide the margin of victory in key states.

Between March and June 1980 Kennedy began to recover much of his earlier support as Carter's began to ebb away.Footnote 124 By early April he once again led the President among black, Jewish and Catholic voters. He had also achieved swings of 33 percent among students, 27 percent among liberals and 32 percent among self-described moderates. He was edging towards running even in cities and suburbs.Footnote 125 In the final round of primaries on 3 June he won the popular vote, taking California, New Mexico, New Jersey, Rhode Island and South Dakota.Footnote 126 He went on to win the Michigan caucus. He had collected 1,239 delegates to Carter's 1,964 and in the popular vote he had taken 37 percent to 51 percent. In the last primaries Kennedy won the votes of those who were most worried about inflation.Footnote 127 The public showed enthusiasm for the variety of liberal economic platforms upon which Kennedy was campaigning. In February 1980 the New York Times declared that “the people want economic controls” to reduce inflation, a recent poll showing that 65 percent felt they were desirable.Footnote 128 By June the figure had climbed to 71 percent.Footnote 129 Exit polls from primaries in which Kennedy was victorious showed that the voters felt their financial situation had declined, knew Kennedy's economic alternatives and approved of them.Footnote 130

On the basis of Carter's declining popularity and his performance in the final primaries, Kennedy attempted to mount a rules challenge to release all elected delegates to the 1980 Democratic Convention to vote for whomever they wished. This “open convention” movement was marshalled by Senate majority leader Robert Byrd.Footnote 131 Kennedy also proposed a number of “minority” policy planks that created job programmes and put controls upon prices.Footnote 132 The rules challenge failed, but Kennedy's convention speech created a momentum that allowed every one of his minority planks to be passed.Footnote 133 His speech was widely regarded as a triumph that overshadowed Carter's.Footnote 134 It argued that “the blue-collar workers Ronald Reagan is courting will not desert the Democratic Party in 1980 if we respond again … to their needs at a difficult time.” To tumultuous applause he declaimed, “the work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives, and the dream shall never die.”Footnote 135 Said one commentator, “it was Kennedy who touched the party's soul and dominated the proceedings.”Footnote 136

IV

The impact of Kennedy's challenge upon the November election was significant. His negative campaigning against Carter hurt the President's approval rating and the Republicans reminded voters of its central message repeatedly in the fall.Footnote 137 Moreover, a correlation quickly grew between the “Kennedy Democrats” and the blue-collar voters that would leave their party in 1980 to become “Reagan Democrats.”Footnote 138 In August 1980 the New York Times reported that “only 23% of Mr. Kennedy's Democratic followers say they plan to vote for Mr. Carter.” Despite Kennedy's eventual endorsement of Carter, 27 percent of his primary supporters switched to Reagan in November, most of them blue-collar men.Footnote 139

But Carter's inability to appeal to his liberal constituency was as important to understanding the final result as the defection of “Reagan Democrats.” Larger percentages of registered Democrats and independents self-defining as liberal switched to the Republicans than conservatives. As well as Carter's vote falling dramatically among Hispanics, it also dropped among Jewish citizens by 11 percent and in households with union activists by 8 percent. The 1980 election saw an across-the-board rejection of Carter that included a significant proportion of those attracted to the Kennedy candidacy.Footnote 140 Many liberals chose to support the independent campaign of liberal Republican John B. Anderson. Anderson attracted many of the organizations and activists that had campaigned for Kennedy in the primaries.Footnote 141 He even indicated that he would reconsider his candidacy if Kennedy were selected as the Democratic nominee.Footnote 142 In November Anderson took 6·6 percent nationally and performed well among Jewish voters (gaining 17 percent of their votes). He secured large enough percentages in some states, including New York and Massachusetts, to deny Carter their electoral votes.Footnote 143

Kennedy was ultimately denied his party's nomination by historical accident. But the potential his campaign exhibited implies that liberalism was in a healthier state in 1980 than orthodoxy suggests. The divisions within liberalism that had paralysed the party in the early 1970s, if not forgotten, were declining in significance. Not only did opposition to Carter and Kennedy's candidacy facilitate this process, but so too did a shift in policy agenda away from controversial social issues. Liberals were beginning to build new coalitions around “universalist” economic programmes, embodied in the Kennedy platform.

More importantly, Kennedy's broad popularity in 1979, and his victories in 1980, point to the residual appeal of liberal economic and social programmes in the 1970s. Kennedy's allure was arguably unique. In addition to securing the traditionally liberal support of the college-educated, labour, feminists, ethnic minorities, students and gays, he also attracted significant numbers of voters identifying themselves as conservative. Thus he appealed to many blocks of voters associated in political commentary with social and economic reaction.Footnote 144 In an era marked by dealignment and divided government, Kennedy resurrected the New Deal coalition. The 1979 polling suggests that he had the unique potential to broaden it, too. This degree of support for a liberal candidate casts doubt upon the concept of critical realignment. It is perhaps more accurate to see the period as defined by political flux, within which liberalism maintained a greater impact upon the popular imagination than is currently appreciated. Although the American public vented discontent at the political order, they remained attracted to the material promise of the New Deal and Great Society. The resurgent congressional strength of the Democratic Party in the 1980s testified to this.

The 1980 election, then, was an election of rejection, rather than of conservative realignment.Footnote 145 Post-election analysis seemed to suggest that “a large share of the 43·2 million Americans who voted for Ronald Reagan appear to have been motivated more by dissatisfaction with President Carter than by any serious ideological commitment to the Republican's views.”Footnote 146 Clearly the American public's decision to vote for Reagan in 1980 was a more complex one than current historiography implies. Perhaps the paradox of the era was best summarized during the New York Democratic primary by a Queens resident and Kennedy supporter who was asked how he would vote in November. “‘I'm a liberal,’ the man promptly stated. ‘Carter's a disaster. I think what the country really needs is a father figure, so I'm voting for Ronald Reagan.’”Footnote 147

References

1 “For Democrats a Madhouse in Memphis,” Los Angeles Times, 6 Dec. 1978, E7.

2 “Labor Dissidents Confront Carter with a High Noon Challenge,” Los Angeles Times, 14 Dec. 1978, D11.

3 “Democrats Seeking to Curb Floor Fights,” Washington Post, 1 Dec. 1978, A17; “Kennedy Assails Carter on Budget at Midterm Meeting of Democrats,” New York Times, 10 Dec. 1978, 1.

4 “Lackluster Convention Lights Up,” Washington Post, 10 Dec. 1978, A1.

5 “Remarks of Senator Edward Kennedy at Discussion of Health Policy,” 9 Dec. 1978, Papers of Adam Clymer 1958–1999, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA, Box 27.

6 “Speech by Senator Edward Kennedy at University of Iowa,” 29 Nov. 1979; “Remarks of Senator Edward Kennedy in Montgomery Alabama,” 27 Feb. 1980; “Remarks of Senator Edward Kennedy at Discussion of Health Policy,” 9 Dec. 1978, Clymer Papers, Box 28.

7 William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner-City, the Underclass and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988), 120. For the definitive discussion about ‘universalist’ policy see Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in the United Sates: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective (Princeton: University of Princeton Press 1995).

8 Stuart Eizenstat, interview with the author, 21 Sept. 2006; Harold Meyerson, interview with the author, 22 Sept. 2006.

9 “Kennedy exposes a Gaping Carter weakness,” Washington Post, 13 Dec. 1978, A21.

10 “Kennedy Warns of a Party Split by Arms Outlays,” Washington Post, 10 Dec. 1978, A1.

11 “Kennedy Declares His Candidacy,” New York Times, 8 Nov. 1979, A1.

12 For general work on the political and cultural state of liberalism in the 1970s see William C. Berman, America's Right Turn: From Nixon to Bush (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 58–59; Peter N. Carroll It Seemed Like Nothing Happened: American in the 1970s (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 348; Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002), 121–43; Edward D. Berkowitz, Something Happened: A Political and Cultural Overview of the Seventies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 227; David Frum, How We Got Here: The Decade That Brought You Modern Life – For Better or Worse (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 12; Michael Barone, Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan (London: Collier MacMillan, 1990), 572. For a specific analysis on the emergent ‘radicalism’ of the New Politics see Gareth Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996), 219–243; Dominic Sandbrook, Eugene McCarthy: The Rise and Fall of Postwar Liberalism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004); John A. Farrell, Tip O'Neill and the Democratic Century (London: Little Brown, 2001), 525. A more balanced view of the New Politics can be found in LeRoy Ashby, Fighting the Odds: The Life of Senator Frank Church (Washington: Washington State University Press, 1994), 347. For the impact of the New Deal/New Politics divide upon the Democratic Party's electoral performance and its political significance see Miller, Arthur H., Miller, Warren E., Raine, Alden S. and Brown, Thad A., “A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election,” American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), 753–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Steven M. Gillon, Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1945–85 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); William G. Mayer, Divided Democrats: Ideological Unity, Party Reform and Presidential Election (Oxford: Westview, 1996), 45.

13 Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970), 10.

14 For the classical theory of realignment see Key, V. O., “A Theory of Critical Elections,” Journal of Politics, 17 (1955), 3–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Angus Campbell, “A Classification of Presidential Elections,” in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, eds., Elections and the Political Order, (New York: Wiley, 1966), 63–77.

15 James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1983), 437.

16 Terrel L. Rhodes, Republicans in the South: Voting for the State House, Voting for the White House (London: Praeger, 2000), 44.

17 Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, 1971), 125.

18 Miller, Arthur H. and Miller, Warren E., “Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 American Presidential Election,” British Journal of Political Science, 8 (1975), 129–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the impact of Democratic social liberalism upon voting patterns and the gains made by Republicans as a result see Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), 303–4; Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (New York: Norton, 1991), 236.

19 Michael Barone, Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan (London: Collier MacMillan, 1990), 596.

20 Podheretz, Norman, “The New American Majority,” Commentary Magazine, 71 (Jan. 1981), 19–28, 20.Google Scholar

21 William Schneider, “Democrats and Republicans, Liberals and Conservatives,” in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., Party Coalitions in the 1980s (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981), 229.

22 “How the Seventies Changed America,” American Heritage Magazine, July/August 1991, 39–49, 45.

23 Kenneth S. Baer, Re-inventing Democrats: The Politics of Liberalism from Reagan to Clinton (Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 2000). This view was also held by Baer's neoconservative contemporaries: “The Challenge to Liberalism,” New Leader Magazine, 6 June 1977, 8–9.

24 Jonathan Bell, The Liberal State on Trial: The Cold War and American Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 273–4; Timothy Nels Thurber, The Politics of Equality: Hubert H. Humphrey and the African American Freedom Struggle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

25 Ladd, Everett Carll, “The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election,” Political Science Quarterly, 96 (1981), 1–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; For the rise of the ‘independent’ voter see Norman Nie, Sidney Verba and John Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); for dealignment see Everett Carll Ladd Jr. and Charles D. Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s (New York: Norton, 1975).

26 Steven M. Gillon, Democrat's Dilemma: Walter Mondale and the Liberal Legacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 285.

27 “Democratic Voters in Three States Compared,” New York Times, 2 April 1980, A20. For analyses of the campaign that place it in the context of the decline of liberalism see Peter G. Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Post-Presidency (New York: Scribner, 1997), 450; Burton I. Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter Jnr (Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 1993), 172; Larry M. Bartels, Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 219–236; Seymour Martin Lipset “Party Coalitions and the 1980 Election” in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., Party Coalitions in the 1980s (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981), 432–34. The only account of the campaign favourable to Kennedy is Adam Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy: A Biography (New York: Morrow, 1999).

28 “Reckoning with Ted Kennedy This Election Year,” New York Times, 10 April 1972, 35. Nixon, who was obsessed with Kennedy's potential candidacy, placed bugs in the senator's office to discover his intentions. Schulman, The Seventies, 45.

29 “Despite His Lead in Gallup Poll, Kennedy Insists He Won't Run for President in '72,” New York Times, 23 April 1972, 30.

30 “ABC/Harris Poll: Carter Faces Uphill Battle for Democratic Nomination,” 6 August; “ABC/Harris Poll: President Carter's Ratings on Personal Characteristics Spell Trouble,” 6 July 1980, National Organization for Women Records, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Box 139.

31 “ABC/Harris Poll: President Carter's Chances of Re-election in 1980 Seem Dim,” 5 July 1979, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

32 ‘State of the Union Message 1978’, Records of the Domestic Policy Staff, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA, Box 282. For sympathetic evaluations of Carter's liberalism see Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (London: Collings, 1982); John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); Stuart Eizenstat, The Presidency and Domestic Policies of Jimmy Carter, eds. Herbert D. Rosenbaum, Alexej Ugrinsky (London: Greenwood Press, 1994).

33 “The Baron Report: Pressure on Kennedy,” 8 June 1979, National Organization for Women Records, Box 139.

34 “Times/CBS Poll: Presidential Politics,” 9 June 1979, Papers of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 86.

35 “ABC/Harris Poll: Democratic Party Allegiance Down Sharply since 1976,” 18 June 1979, National Organization for Women Records, Box 194.

36 Ladd, “The Brittle Mandate,” 96.

37 “Kennedy Beats Them Both,” Public Opinion Magazine, Oct./Nov. 1979, 23.

38 “Many Republicans Are Fearful of a Kennedy Candidacy,” New York Times, 24 Oct. 1979, A18.

39 “Reagan for President Poll: Nationwide,” April 1979; “Polling Conducted by Peter Hart on Behalf of Senator Kennedy,” Dec. 1979, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

40 “The Drafting of a President,” New York Magazine, 30 July 1979, 14; Adam Clymer, interview with author, 19 Sept. 2006.

41 “Reality Can Make or Break a Candidate,” New York Times, 6 April 1980, E4.

42 “Washington Watch,” New York Times, 20 Oct. 1979, D2.

43 Memo, Arnold A. Saltzman to Stuart Eizenstat, 7 April 1980, PL-5: Political Affairs Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

44 “The Polls Don't Mean a Thing,” New York Times, 7 October 1979, E19.

45 Memo, Jordan to Carter, 17 July 1979, Records of White House Press Office, Jimmy Carter Library, Box 9.

46 Byron E. Shafer, Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983), 534. McGovern recalls, “I thought he had tremendous qualities of leadership … and he had a commitment to deliver on the kind of policies that we had always fought for.” Interview with the author, 4 Aug. 2006.

47 Robert G. Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press 2000), 444; private interview with Ben Wattenberg, 26 Sept. 2006.

48 “Jackson, Attacking Carter Says Reagan Might Win,” New York Times, 23 May 1980, A14.

49 Political Observer, March 1980, AFT President's Office: Albert Shanker Collection, Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Michigan, Box 70.

50 Letter, Hart to Kathleen Ekart, 15 Oct. 1974, Papers of Senator Gary Hart, University of Colorado Archives, Boulder, CO, Box 53; Hart was “one of the ‘new breed’ in the Democratic Party who balances fiscal needs against social concerns.” Wood Energy Institute briefing paper, 28 Aug. 1980, Hart Papers, Box 55; “Hart's Long March,” New Republic, 2 April 1984, 14–15; Senator Gary Hart, interview with the author, 29 Aug. 2006; Birch Bayh recalled that given his election in 1980 he simply “couldn't afford to get involved with either one.” Interview with Senator Birch Bayh, 3 Sept. 1995, Clymer Papers, Box 3.

51 “San Francisco Homosexuals Find Democrats Now Listen,” New York Times, 4 June 1984, B10.

52 “Kennedy Campaigning Hard,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1 Aug. 1980, 14.

53 “CBS News Special with Roger Mudd,” MR2002-11 Q, 4 Nov. 1979, Kennedy, Edward Moore, 1932–: Audiovisual Archives, JFK Library.

54 “Kennedy Says That Leadership, Not Economic Policy, Is at Issue,” New York Times, 13 Sept. 1979, A1.

55 Peter Hart, interview with the author, 25 Sept. 2006; Mark Segal, interview with the author, 27 Sept. 2006; memo, Gary Orren to Steven Smith, Phil Bakes and Paul Kirk, 6 Jan. 1980; memo, Gary Orren and Peter Hart to Steven Smith, 2 Jan. 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 13.

56 Memo, Hubert L. Harris to Hamilton Jordan, 9 Oct. 1979, Records of the White House Press Office, Jimmy Carter Library, Box 9.

57 “Address of Senator Edward Kennedy to Investment Association of New York,” 27 Sept. 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 26.

58 “Reagan is Striving to Project an Image of Moderation,” New York Times, 14 Jan. 1980, A13.

59 “Ted Kennedy Puts His Show on the Road,” Newsweek, 19 Nov. 1980, 39.

60 “A Disappointing Start,” Boston Globe, 12 Jan. 1980, 4.

61 Elizabeth Drew, Portrait of an Election: The 1980 Presidential Campaign (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 62.

62 “ABC/Harris Poll: Public Disappointment with Kennedy as a Campaigner,” 14 Jan. 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

63 Memo, Robert Shrum to Edward Kennedy, 17 Dec. 179, Clymer Papers, Box 13.

64 “As Long as Carter's up He'll Give You a Grant,” New York Times, 21 April 1980, A19.

65 Memo, Jordan to Carter, 17 July 1979, Records of white House Press Office, Jimmy Carter Library, Box 9.

66 “Politics and Pettiness: Carter vs. Kennedy in Fla,” Washington Post, 13 Oct. 1970, 5.

67 Article from the Miami Herald, 12 Oct. 1979, reprinted in Clymer Papers, Box 24.

68 Article by Roger Simon, source unknown, reprinted with attached memo and comments, Jack Watson to Carter, 9 Nov. 1979; memo, Jim Copeland to Carter, 7 Dec. 1979, PL-5: Political Affairs Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

69 “Worry on Inflation Voiced by Kennedy,” New York Times, 14 Oct. 1979, 33.

70 These can be found in the Records of the Office of the Chief of Staff, Jimmy Carter Library, Box 78.

71 “Jimmy Strikes Back,” Newsweek, 8 Oct. 1980, 26–27.

72 “Mystery Still Clouds Tragedy of a Summer Night a Decade Ago,” Washington Post, 8 Dec. 1979, A1; “Kennedy Campaign Woes,” Boston Globe, 8 Feb. 1980, 12.

73 “Byrne Faces Political Wind Shift in St. Patrick's Parade,” Chicago Tribune, 18 March 1980, 14.

74 “TV Ads: An Aid to Some Candidates But Not to Others,” Washington Post, 12 May 1980, A2.

75 “Kennedy against the Wall,” Daily Item, 23 March 1980, 2.

76 “CBS/New York Times Poll: April 1980,” April 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

77 “Stocks Rise on US Bar to Iran,” New York Times, 13 Nov. 1979, D1.

78 “The Campaign Pendulum,” New York Times, 18 Jan. 1980, A12.

79 It lost him the key endorsement of Senator Moynihan of New York, who had been a key neoconservative supporter in 1979: “Moynihan Prefers the Role of a Neutral,” New York Times, 17 March 1980, B1.

80 Memo, Jordan to Carter, undated, Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Jimmy Carter Library, Box 78.

81 “CBS/Times Poll: June 1979,” June 1979; “CBS/Times Poll: February 1980,” Feb. 1980; Hart Dec. 1979 Polls, Dec. 1979, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

82 “Poll Shows Carter Gaining Support on Afghan Moves,” New York Times, 16 Jan. 1980, A1.

83 “ABC/Harris Poll: Carter Now Well Ahead of Kennedy,” 31 Dec. 1979, National Organization for Women Records, Box 139.

84 “CBS/Times Poll: April 1980,” April 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

85 “Iran Wisconsin Primary,” New York Times, 3 April 1980, 36.

86 “CBS/Times Poll: Wisconsin Primary Day Poll,” 1 April 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

87 “Politics: Iran Crimping Race,” 2 Dec. 1980, New York Times, NJ23.

88 Interview with Senator Tom Harkin, undated, Clymer Papers, Box 3.

89 Memo, Landon Butler to Jordan, 21 Dec. 1979; memo, Landon Butler to Hamilton Jordan, 4 Jan. 1980, Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Jimmy Carter Library, Box 78. “Internal polls gave Kennedy the clear edge, not in unions that were backing the challenger, but in unions that were backing the President.” Arch Puddington, Lane Kirkland: Champion of American Labor (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons, 2005), 108.

90 “For Labor, No Place to Go,” Business Week, 31 March 1980, 129.

91 Letter Joseph Vatlentich to Carter, 14 Feb. 1980; letter, Edward J. Carlough to Carter, 22 Jan. 1980; letter, Raymond C. Lith to Carter, 3 Jan. 1980; memo, “Major Labor Unions in California,” undated, Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Jimmy Carter Library, Box 78.

92 “Carter Wins Strong Victory in Iowa,” New York Times, 22 Jan. 1980, A1; “Clear Cut Triumphs,” New York Times, 12 March 1980, A1.

93 “Kennedy's Hope Rely on Chicago and Byrne,” Chicago Tribune, 13 Mar. 1980, 1.

94 “Mayor Byrne, Endorsing Kennedy, Favors a Slate Committed to Him,” New York Times, 31 Oct. 1979, A16.

95 “Primary Issue is Jane Byrne,” Chicago Tribune, 16 Mar. 1980, 1.

96 “Car Whips Kennedy in 3 Caucuses,” Chicago Tribune, 16 Mar. 1980, 5.

97 “CBS/Times Poll: Illinois Primary Day Poll,” 18 March 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

98 Memo, Pat Caddell to Carter/Mondale Presidential Committee, 25 Feb. 1980, Records of White House Press Office Jimmy Carter Library, Box 32.

99 “Kennedy Wins Upset in New York,” New York Times, 26 March 1980, 1.

100 “CBS/Times Poll: New York Primary Day Poll,” 26 March 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

101 “Campaign Report,” New York Times, 16 June 1980, A19.

102 “Jackson Won in New York by Narrowly Based Voting,” New York Times, 8 April 1976, 30; “Democrat's Vote in New York,” New York Times, 27 March 1980, B9.

103 “CBS/Times Poll: New York Primary Day Poll,” 26 March 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

104 “Kennedy and Carter End Efforts in a Close Race in Pennsylvania,” New York Times, 22 April 1980, A1.

105 “Who Votes for Whom and Why,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 23 April 1980, 1.

106 “Kennedy: Why He Lost W. Penna,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 April 1980, 6A.

107 “Why the Voters Chose the Candidates They Did,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 23 April 1980, 4A.

108 “Late Surge for Underdogs,” New York Times, 23 April 1980, A1.

109 “The Kennedy Coalition,” New York Times, 25 April 1980, A18. For a rendering of the standard myth of Robert Kennedy's 1968 Democratic primary electoral coalition see Lester David and Irene David, Bobby Kennedy: The Making of a Folk Hero (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1986), 300–16; and for a key reappraisal see Brian Dooley, Robert Kennedy: The Final Years (Keele: Ryburn, 1995), 19.

110 “Most Hispanics Support Kennedy,” Rocky Mountain News, 10 Dec. 1979, 3.

111 Memo, Franklin D. Lopez to Robert Strauss, 8 July 1980; memo, “The 1980 Democratic Primary Mexican American Presidential Preference Vote,” undated, Records of the Office of Hispanic Affairs, Maria Cruz Collection, Jimmy Carter Library, Box 1.

112 Private notes on “Program,” undated; private notes on “Arizona Primary Project,” undated, United Farm Workers: Office of the President Files, Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, Box 34.

113 “Kennedy Wins Arizona Primary,” Tucson Citizen, 14 April 1980, 1.

114 “Kennedy Overtakes Carter,” Arizona Daily Star, 13 April 1980, 1.

115 Private notes on “Results,” undated, UFW President Files, Box 34.

116 “Kennedy Victory a Surprise,” Albuquerque Journal, 5 June 1980, 5.

117 “Carter, Kennedy Divide Delegates in State's Primary,” Albuquerque Journal, 4 June 1980, 1.

118 “Presidential Primary Totals,” Albuquerque Journal, 5 June 1980, 5.

119 “Chavez Ends Fast at Kennedy Rites,” New York Times, 5 June 1972, 65; “Chavez Boosts Kennedy Here,” Arizona Daily Star, 10 April 1980, 1.

120 Senator Fred Harris, interview with the author, 13 Aug. 2006; “Presidential Primary Totals,” Albuquerque Journal, 5 June 1980, 5.

121 “Tuesday's Vote Ends First Round of 1980 Campaigning,” Aberdeen American News, 1 June 1980, 2; “Late Push in S.D. Worked for Kennedy,” Aberdeen News, 4 June 1980, 1.

122 Memo, “The 1980 Democratic Primary Mexican American Presidential Preference Vote,” undated, Records of the Office of Hispanic Affairs, Maria Cruz Files, Jimmy Carter Library, Box 1.

123 “Displeasure with Carter Turned Many to Reagan,” New York Times, 9 Nov. 1980, 28.

124 “ABC/Harris Poll: It's a Mistake to Say Democratic Race is Over,” 7 April 1980, UFW President Files, Box 34.

125 “ABC/Harris Poll: Recent Gains for Kennedy among Democrats,” 10 April 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

126 “Carter Goes over the Top, but Kennedy Will Press on,” Los Angeles Times, 4 June 1980, B1.

127 “Kennedy Won Popular Vote,” New York Times, 5 June 1980, B8.

128 “The Economic Scene: The People Want Controls,” New York Times, 3 Feb 1980, F18.

129 “Poll Finds Protectionist Trend,” New York Times, 27 June 1980, D1.

130 “CBS/Times Poll: Pennsylvania Primary Day Poll,” 22 April 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 18.

131 “A Reporter at Large, 1980: The Democratic Convention” New Yorker, 8 Sept. 1980, 45.

132 “Platform Changes Studied by Kennedy,” New York Times, 28 June 1980, 8.

133 “Carter Endorses '80 Platform with Few Reservations,” New York Times, 14 Aug. 1980, B1.

134 “Backers Roar for Kennedy as He Hails Party's Cause,” New York Times, 13 Aug. 1980, A1.

135 “A Bid to Keep Faith,” New York Times, 13 Aug. 1980, A1.

136 “A Veneer of Unity,” Newsweek, 25 Aug. 1980, 24–30.

137 “ABC/Harris Poll: Carter and Kennedy after the Primaries,” 23 June 1980, Clymer Papers, Box 18; additionally many incumbents facing re-election attempted to escape identification with the President: “Democrats Run Away from Carter Endorsement,” Rocky Mountain News, 17 Aug. 1980, 1.

138 “Now for the Hard Part,” Newsweek, 25 Aug. 1980, 23; “The Shifting Labor Vote,” New York Times, 11 Nov. 1980, B8; “Blue-Collar Democrats Slipping to Reagan,” New York Times, 20 April 1980, 30.

139 “How Americans Swung to Reagan,” US News and World Report, 17 Nov. 1980, 29.

140 “The Collapse of a Coalition: Carter Failed in Groups that Backed Him in '76,” New York Times, 5 Nov. 1980, A1.

141 “Mr Anderson commands the support of the same type of activists who once rang door bells for Eugene McCarthy and George McGovern.” “What is a Conservative?” New York Times, 31 Aug. 1980, SM3; Kennedy backers who switched to Anderson in November 1980 included the New York Liberal Party: “New York's Top Democrats Backing Anderson,” New York Times, 4 July 1980, A7; and the National Organization for Women: “NOW Parley Dominated by Politics,” New York Times, 4 Oct. 1980, 11.

142 “Anderson Says He Will Reconsider Candidacy if Carter is Not Nominee,” New York Times, 1 Aug. 1980, A1.

143 “Anderson Says He Feels No Bitterness,” New York Times, 6 Nov. 1980, A27.

144 Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 424; Scammon and Wattenberg, The Real Majority, 59–71.

145 This was certainly the contemporary consensus: “The strongest asset going for Reagan in this fall's election now appears to be the incumbent President … rather than the inherent strengths within the Reagan candidacy itself.” “ABC/Harris Poll: Campaign Issues,” 15 July 1980, National Organization for Women Records, Box 194.

146 “Displeasure with Carter Turned Many to Reagan,” New York Times, 9 Nov. 1980, 28.

147 “Of Kennedy, Carter, the UN and the Money Gap,” Newsweek, 24 March 1980, 9.