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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 March 2005
The authors of this work are all associated with Pennsylvania State University, which maintains a collection and web site (www.libraries.psu.edu/tmi) devoted to the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. The work is best described as a brief history of the accident and its consequences intended for a general reader who wants to learn a bit—but not too much—about that event. Anyone wishing a more definitive treatment should consult J. Samuel Walker, Three Mile Island (Berkeley: University of California, 2004). The present volume is based on both primary printed and secondary sources but the authors failed to employ interviews or use any of the rich archival sources available. They also largely ignore the economic literature on either nuclear power or the accident.
After a brief preface and introduction, the book contains seven chapters, a conclusion, and four appendices that provide a time line, define terms, and provide facts. It begins with some basics of nuclear energy and then turns to one chapter on the accident and one on the cleanup. There is then a chapter on the media, one on the impact of TMI on the local community, a chapter on its broader impact, and finally a chapter on future energy sources. The writing is usually sprightly but not always; in the introduction we learn that some TMI information was “rather unknown” (p. x), a concept which is like “jumbo shrimp.” Two pages later the authors breathlessly tell us that TMI was “a day that shook our faith in science” (p. xii). More serious are some organizational problems. The discussion of radiation health effects, rather than being in with the basics of nuclear energy, is postponed to the material on local impacts, and so in the chapter on the accident the reader who learns that there was a release of 1,200 millirem of radiation per hour will not know if this is a lot or a little. Similarly, early regulation is not discussed until chapter six.
Perhaps the major failing is the lack of any discussion of how the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) or Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approached the problem of safety except for one page on the containment building and core rods. The authors ignore the Davis Besse reactor accident of 1977, and although they briefly note the Brown's Ferry accident of 1975, they fail to show its implications for the AEC or NRC's theory of safety. The treatment of media coverage would have been improved had it integrated the literature on risk perception. As it is, the authors tend to emphasize the technological illiteracy of both reporters and their audience, as if concern with nuclear power were simply a matter of better education. Thus they announce that we should “be aware of the risks of technology as well as the tradeoffs” (p. 57). True enough but five pages earlier they told us the industry “simply had not considered this type of accident as a likely event” (p. 52). If the experts do not know the risks how can others? The penultimate chapter on the impact of TMI, while it largely ignores the financial effects, suggests the accident really did lead to change in the industry. Companies set up the Institute for Nuclear Power Operation, an industry-wide safety group. That and changes at the NRC have reduced “scrams” (unplanned shutdowns), which has diminished downtime. Safety and productivity, it seems, went hand in hand.
Although this book provides a useful general introduction to these matters, the authors could have done much more with what they had.