Martin Shaw is among the most provocative and insightful scholars working on the topic of genocide. His two previous books, War and Genocide (2003) and What Is Genocide? (2007), developed sociologically sophisticated analyses of how genocide and related forms of violence are conceptualized. In those works, he advocates moving away from the narrow focus on perpetrator intentionality and victim identity typical of much research and toward focusing on the structure of violent conflict situations, which allows for greater exploration of the ways in which forms of violence interact and reinforce one another. In his newest book, Genocide and International Relations, Shaw continues with his project of critiquing genocide research. This book poses a series of challenges for international relations and comparative politics scholars of mass violence and deserves to be read widely. Rather than a study of specific cases, it takes aim at some of the basic epistemological and ontological assumptions in contemporary genocide research.
Shaw begins by defining genocide as a “form of violent social conflict or war, between armed power organizations that aim to destroy civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction” (p. 5). He then moves on to a critical analysis of genocide studies in the first three chapters of the book. His first critique is that the field has for too long combined advocacy work with research, which has distorted the way cases are selected, framed, compared and analyzed. This is most evident, he contends, in the political advocacy work of major genocide scholars and organizations. The politicization of the field has led to enormous debates over which contemporary cases deserve moral condemnation and which do not. At its worst, Shaw sees a dangerous combination of the scholar’s expert knowledge with Western state power, which legitimizes the selective condemnation of some countries as genocidal and thus sanctions military intervention.
The author’s second critique concerns what he calls the dominant “comparative genocide paradigm” (p. 28) in the field, which treats genocide as primarily a country-level phenomenon that rests on a number of problematic assumptions. The first is the assumption that genocides are stand-alone events that are rather straightforwardly comparable. This underplays the various epistemological and practical challenges to drawing boundaries around cases. With the focus on stand-alone cases, including “mega-genocides” (p. 32) like the Holocaust, Armenia, and Rwanda, genocide misleadingly appears as relatively rare. Shaw persuasively argues that this ignores the variety of subnational instances of mass violence that exhibit genocidal dynamics and outcomes. Furthermore, the comparative case method risks distorting our understanding of causality: With its focus on the country case as the unit of analysis, the dominant paradigm emphasizes transhistorical comparisons between like cases, rather than the examination of the historical connections between cases and their regional and international environments. In other words, the tendency has been to privilege domestic contexts over the systematic analysis of international contexts. For Shaw, “the task is to identify particular temporal and geographical clusters of genocidal violence, the specific international conditions in which they are located, and the larger international dynamics involved” (p. 63). He makes a compelling argument for this shift, and in fact a number of researchers like Donald Bloxham and Mark Levene have already moved in this direction.
The following chapters sketch this alternative approach by examining how major changes in the international order have important implications for understanding patterns of genocide across the globe. Chapter 4 examines Europe in the early and mid-twentieth century. Shaw shows how nationalist movements and political polarization in various regions interacted with Great Power politics and war, which set the structural conditions across the continent for genocide. Chapters 5 and 6 reconstruct how the conditions for genocidal violence in Europe disappeared during the Cold War and emerged across the global South. He traces two broad structural changes that facilitated genocidal violence around the world: The first was the collapse of European imperial power in the face of anticolonial and postcolonial struggles in Africa and Asia, which often generated severe polarization among colonized groups and genocidal violence against minorities. The second was the Cold War, a conflict for global supremacy that transformed and radicalized politics in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Shaw’s reconstruction of these international contexts provides a useful corrective to studies that bracket the role of international politics, and he brings to the fore the important role of the superpowers in genocidal violence.
Chapter 7 contends that the end of the Cold War marks the most recent shift in international relations, though he argues that this has not had the same catalyzing effects on mass violence as the changes that occurred at the end of World War II. The elaboration of new global norms of “humanitarian” intervention and democracy promotion over the past two and a half decades have in some instances served to mitigate genocide, but have also sanctioned the use of Western power around the world. One thinks of the second Iraq war of 2003 as the starkest example of this shift.
The final two substantive chapters are devoted to new patterns of genocide and include sustained engagements with recent research on civil wars and other forms of political violence. Shaw provides a spirited critique of much of the current civil war literature, charging it with marginalizing genocide through the use of problematically reductive conceptualizations of violence and actor motivation. Here, the book is perhaps less convincing—much of the recent work on civil war has sought to disaggregate processes of violence escalation, dissemination, and decline, and although there are certainly some differences in conceptualization between Shaw’s work and civil war research, there are also fruitful areas of potential overlap.
Genocide and International Relations is an impressive work of theory and critique. It does, however, raise some important questions: How would this analytical reorientation connect to continued case study research? For instance, what are the general causal theoretical links between international and national dynamics that facilitate genocide? What are the factors, mechanisms, or processes that explain variation across regions of the world, especially within the same time period (e.g., Cold War, post–Cold War)? Shaw is certainly aware of these questions and he addresses them to some extent, but they could use more elaboration. Of course, such a short book (a bit over 200 pages) cannot develop an extensive causal theoretical framework—or perhaps more accurately, frameworks, since Shaw emphasizes throughout the importance of changes in global conditions that produce their own genocidal dynamics—but it would be useful to see greater discussion of what his alternative would be. Perhaps that will be the next book. Regardless, this work marks a significant contribution to genocide studies and international relations.
