The State. This concept is impossible to avoid in France because the country built itself on (or around) this idea from the nineteenth century. Although the ‘State’ was initially ignored by the Revolution (which referred to the idea of the ‘sovereign nation’), the Revolution marked the beginning of the French administration which has continued to develop ever since. However, the administration as a remedy for the instability resulting from 1789,Footnote 2 was a legal tool which changed with the regimes. An intellectual object was therefore necessary to support it and to guarantee its continuity and stability. This is where the interest in the State lies, if only in its etymological sense.
The State was initially a political instrument, but it became of increasing interest to jurists at the beginning of the twentieth century who used the concept in a way which gave it a fundamental role in the legal and political organization of the country. The exercise was not easy, and therefore apart from the standard definition of a State as the sum of its population, territory and organized political powerFootnote 3—its conception is still subject to controversy and interpretation. Paradoxically, studies of the State in France have become something of a rarity,Footnote 4 with French jurists ‘abandoning’Footnote 5 studies of the State, which may be a sign of a gradual loss of interest in the subject.Footnote 6
Thus, the presentation of an overview of the State in French public law is an interesting exercise if it offers avenues for further exploration of this multifaceted but at the same time uncertain entity. The international framework of this conference also invites us to question the French specificity of such a common intellectual entity as the State. This firstly, requires understanding how legal science has adopted this concept (I), and secondly, a study of the development of the theory of the State by French jurists (II).
I. Developing the State to Develop French Public Law
It is now commonly accepted that the State is an entity intrinsically attached to the discipline of law. More precisely, it is one of the central objects—if not the central object—of public law. However, this has not always been the case, and French public law had to adopt this recent notion, which was initially exclusively attached to political scienceFootnote 7 (A). It then fell to the specialist public law lawyers to develop a theory of the State for public law (B).
A. The Adoption of the State by Public Law
1. The “State” in France Before 1789
The creation of the first “legal concepts” dates to ancient times. The concept of the State has its beginnings in the Upper Palaeolithic, when authority over the social group and the hunting territory developed.Footnote 8 It took longer to intellectually consolidate this concept which was still mainly based on intuitive thought. Although France can be said to have existed from around the tenth century, the concrete idea of the State only developed later. Although its main characteristic elements were identified by the end of the Middle Ages, it was only during the last three centuries of the monarchy that the concept began to be used in a limited way.Footnote 9 Thus, although the term “State” was first conceptualized by jurists in the seventeenth century, it was not yet differentiated from the “body politic” and remained relatively superfluous.Footnote 10 As Professor Grégoire Bigot points out, the State was then “a commonly accepted word to describe the unified and centralized monarchy (…) [which] did not question the legal definition of power”. He adds that “the abstraction of royal sovereignty - absolute and perpetual, with the law as its first mark—finds its first definition in the word 'Crown’.”Footnote 11
2. Beyond 1789
The law was completely rethought as a result of the French Revolution. This crucial event in French legal history transferred the ownership of sovereignty—as perceived by Jean Bodin—which had been formerly held by the King (a sovereign by divine right) to a new intellectual tool: the nation. Whilst the “sovereign nation” was proclaimed on June 17, 1789, the State appeared to be forgotten during the revolutionary period. This is explained by the distrust of political tools which were not controlled by the people. After all, to support a sovereign state was to deny the existence of the sovereign nation. The State was therefore an “a-legal” phenomenon, in other words, as Florence Poirat explains, “an entity outside the law, which is not absorbed by it, [which] exists outside the legal order, as an essentially political phenomenon and, consequently, not totally informed by or reducible to the legal order”.Footnote 12
French jurists became gradually frustrated during the nineteenth century, as they desired unity based on their discipline, the law. They had to agree on a solid rallying point that associated both administrative law and the recently established constitutional law.Footnote 13 “The legal state would be the key”Footnote 14 for this. Law and especially public law had to be constructed from the State, which was beginning to be regarded as a preferable solution to the all-too-fragile concept of the sovereign nation. Therefore, going beyond 1789 involved replacing the nation with the State and offering it a new undivine sovereign. Grégoire Bigot summarizes this operation, which, according to him, “offers a political abstraction [i.e., the nation] a solid legal foundation”. He sees it as a way of “melting the uncertainties of politics into the certainties of law”.Footnote 15
3. “The Invention of the State, the Birth of Modern Public Law”Footnote 16
The real birth of the idea of the State dates to the Napoleonic period and the rise of the “administrative State,”Footnote 17 which broke with revolutionary ideals. As Professor Bigot succinctly states “1799 therefore finished 1789 off”. He also points out that this rupture benefited the administrative state, because “principles were denied precisely in the name of the State: political democracy and the democracy of rights were neutralized for the benefit of pure administrative governability”.Footnote 18 The Napoleonic era was therefore characterized by a powerful and centralizing administrative State. But the State was only synonymous with administration and was eclipsed by the monarchical figure of the Emperor. This conception of the State withstood the fall of the Empire but became a “depreciatory”Footnote 19 vocabulary of legal and administrative aridity, “the regime of prohibitions, authorizations, and administrative police”.Footnote 20 It was not until the last decades of the nineteenth century that the law once again adopted it and defined the contours of a theory specific to it.
Thus, the idea that a community of individuals was unsatisfactory without a common foundation of laws and government did not quite disappear. The professors of public law of the Third Republic still regarded the State as a necessary tool for the formation of society. The construction of modern public law thus corresponds to the juridicization of the State in France. However, this operation required prior theoretical work by jurists.
First, the State's power,Footnote 21 that is, its sovereignty had to be legally justified. This distinction enabled the State to be differentiated from other groups.Footnote 22 It was expressed by a “power of original and supreme law”, that is, its holder claims an idea of law and not force, it holds its title itself and that it has “no superior, nor equal, nor competitor”.Footnote 23
Conversely, the existence of the State was more difficult to legally justify, because the State has not eliminated the concept of nation. They both correspond to “two sides of the same coin,”Footnote 24 and they must be perceived as being united although they are separate. The State must therefore acknowledge a legitimate connection with the nation and thereby overcome the nation's higher abstraction. To achieve this, the State must “exist” as a separate entity that legally personifies the nation. Starting from this finding, public law professors wished to endow the State with its own legal personality.Footnote 25
All this coincided with the “German crisis of French thought”. Following the 1870 war, the German model began to construct a theory of State which encouraged some of the great names of French legal science of the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century to “create a State of their own”.Footnote 26 This sudden infatuation with the question of the State gave rise to famous controversies and thus helped to consolidate a specifically French theory of the State.
B. Consolidation of a Specifically French Theory of the State
1. A State Person or Object
“Léon Duguit (1859–1928) and Maurice Hauriou (1856–1929) are the inventors, at the turn of the century, of modern French public law, of which they are the symbols”.Footnote 27 This statement by Olivier Jouanjan is perfectly correct, given the extent of the rivalry between the Bordeaux jurist and the Toulousan jurist, and the leap it allowed French public law to make in the doctrinal field.
The controversy between the two men is often reduced to the question of the legal personality that can or cannot be granted to the State. However, it was in German literature that the concept of “the personality of the State” was born.Footnote 28 German legal writers thus considered that the state organization of a people must necessarily result in the construction of a legal entity which is separate both from the individuals who comprise the nation and from the national body of citizens. As Carré de Malberg sums up: “The State is therefore not the personification of the nation, it only personifies itself”.Footnote 29
Léon Duguit strongly opposed this theory, which he heavily criticized in L'État, le droit objectif et la loi positive, where one of its introductory sections (entitled “the alleged personality of the State”) presents a scathing critique of the theory of German origin. Rejecting out right the State as being the imagination of “inventive public law specialists,”Footnote 30 he exclusively retained a concrete idea of the law by arguing that the personality of the State is purely fictitious and that only individuals exist who impose their will on other individuals under sanction and material coercion. There is no metaphysics in Duguit's thinking, for whom “all these fictions and abstractions vanish upon simply observing reality”.Footnote 31
One might justifiably believe that if Hauriou, himself, favored the theory of the personality of the State this was through mysticism. This was not the case. Maurice Hauriou's thinking which was more complex than is sometimes thought, sought the unity of the State influenced by the public sphere, and which resulted in the recognition of a legal person. His reasoning was deliberate. The Dean of Toulouse, lucid, only intended to support the “dry and abstract algebraic formula of juridical personality” to serve the nation. In his view this was a means for the nation to achieve its destiny, which is indeed “concrete”.Footnote 32 The legal personality granted to the State was thus a rational theoretical construction whose sole purpose was to enable the State to exist legally and to guarantee the general interest and freedom. After all, it is the only way, as Jacques Donnedieu de Vabres explains, to legitimately recognize that “if the State has debts, it pays them; if it makes promises, it keeps them; if it causes damage, it repairs them”.Footnote 33
As Maurice Hauriou summarized: “The mistress is freedom, and the maid is the State's legal personality”.Footnote 34
Therefore, the latter approach has remained,Footnote 35 and why the Italian law professor Santi Romano said that the personality of the State is “the fundamental principle of modern public law”.Footnote 36
2. State and Law
Whether one recognizes or denies the State's legal personality, the problem remains of positioning the law in relation to this State under construction. State theorists could not ignore the question of the which came first. Three answers were given by French public law: first, the State pre-existed the law of which it is the origin—this is the self-limitation of the State; second, the State is derived from a law that pre-existed it—this is the hetero-limitation of the State; finally, the State and the law are consubstantial, so that the State is the very personification of the legal order.Footnote 37
It is no surprise that Maurice Hauriou supported the self-limiting theory. Developed in Germany and defended by Paul Laband and Georg Jellinek, this theory made it possible to “think legally about the State in its legal relations with others.”Footnote 38 Hauriou summarizes: “Laband and Jellinek recognise that the State, either as administrator or as legislator, submits to the rule of law in the way that an autonomous person submits to an internal rule that it has created for itself. In this way, law is not external to the legal person State, but rather a product of its internal will, which is uncontrollable.”Footnote 39
This is obviously a theoretical position which Léon Duguit refuted. He rejected the German realist doctrine and pointed out its weaknesses, using the words of one of its proponents, Max von Seydel, for whom “it is an irrefutable truth: there is no law without the sovereign (Herrscher), above the sovereign, or beside the sovereign; there is no law except through the sovereign.”Footnote 40 Duguit responded, in contrast to this doctrine with “disappointing” results, that there is a law without the sovereign and above the sovereign and concluded: “We reject (…) the doctrine of the self-limitation of the State.” True to his desire to reject all metaphysics or incoherence outside legal science, he adds: “We reject all this, and we firmly believe that there is a rule of law superior to the individual and the State, superior to the rulers and the ruled, which is imposed on both (…). Either law is nothing, or it is a limitation of individual wills, and what is called the will of the state is basically only the will of a certain number of individuals.”Footnote 41 Any idea of self-limitation by the State is definitively inoperative since, again according to Duguit, “a desired limitation is not a limitation for the one who wants it, and, if we admit this limitation alone, it is just as well to say that the power of the State is without limit.”Footnote 42
Finally, the last approach is the one advocated by the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen, which is summarized by Michel Troper who supports this theory in France today as follows: “Kelsen's thesis is well known, at least its conclusion. The State is an object of the science of law because it is not a natural object, but law itself; it merges with the legal order.”Footnote 43
Although these three conceptions of the relationship between the State and the law are distinct from a theoretical point of view, they all reflect the desire to create a “State of law”—a Rechtsstaat—specific to France. However, the end of the Second World War already marked an evolution in the theories of the State which had existed since the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, with respect to the State of law, it was observed that it “is gradually becoming a system in which legal formalism (the principle of legality) is protecting fundamental rights and freedoms. (…) the formal approach is coupled with an [increasingly] substantive approach to the State of law which emphasizes [among other things] the protection of the fundamental freedoms of individuals through procedural guarantees.”Footnote 44 This is the expression of a perpetual movement of legal concepts.
II. Questioning the future of the State and French public law
Since no object—even an intellectual one—is imperishable, one can legitimately wonder about the future of the theory of the State in France. The state model built in the last century by French public law specialists must confront internal demands and external pressures today. Thus, the State appears to be giving way to competitors, both public and private today (A), and it is by no means impossible that in the long run French doctrine will, considering contemporary issues, return to a reduced conception of the State that was considered outdated (B).
A. The State in France in Competition
1. Decentralization
Since 1799 and the advent of the administrative State under Napoleon, the State in France has traditionally been centralized.Footnote 45 However, the first form of competition is a transformation of French territorial organization. This has changed significantly, particularly during the last fifth of last century, with more autonomous public entities gradually freeing themselves from the power of the State.
The French State model has therefore opted for a resolute decentralization, encouraged by the European institutions and their standards. The “European Charter of Local Self-Government” adopted on 15 October 1985 is a good illustration of this. The first paragraph of Article 3 defines local self-government as “the right and capacity for local authorities to regulate and manage, a substantial part of public affairs within the framework of the law, under their own responsibility and for the benefit of their populations”. The question of responsibility should also “preferably fall to the authorities closest to the citizens”. To do so, these authorities must have competences that Article 4 describes as “full and complete”.Footnote 46 The movement accelerated on 28 March 2003 when, after constitutional reform, decentralization became a constitutional principle.Footnote 47
Behind this neutral lexical field, this favored growing autonomy for infra-state legal persons under construction. Olivier Duhamel appeared to share this view when he wrote that “France, a unitary, thousand-year-old, nuclear state, is nevertheless moving towards autonomy. As France is still France, it calls it decentralization”.Footnote 48 Proof, if any were needed, that the conception of the State is not fixed but evolves over time.
The result of this movement is fundamental for understanding the genealogy of the evolution of the concept of the State in France. It is striking to note that the institutionalization of local authorities goes hand in hand with their desire to have an autonomous normative power.Footnote 49 Therefore, the State is gradually being challenged by its own structures. This is what the Italian administrative law professor Massimo Severo Giannini notes when he defines acquired autonomy as “the power attributed to non-sovereign public persons to make legal norms equivalent to the norms of the sovereign public person”.Footnote 50 In the same way, the administrativist Pierre Delvolvé writes in his manual of administrative law that “the pre-eminent position of the State should not hide the contemporary splintering of the administrative organization: within the State, the structures are divided to the point that some are “agencies” and others are “independent”.Footnote 51
Let us take as New Caledonia as an example. Its increasing autonomy has led, following the agreements concluded in May 1998,Footnote 52 to the recognition of “laws of the country”.Footnote 53 Sabine Lavorel has observed that “a territorial community can adopt norms of a hierarchical rank equivalent to the laws voted by the Parliament, for the first time in the history of the French Republic”.Footnote 54 This example is even more important because the agreement signed in 1998 “organizes a progressive and irreversible transfer of powers from the French State (…) and the establishment of the 'full sovereignty of New Caledonia', which will have 'full international status'”.Footnote 55 Thus, going beyond sub-state normative competition, the 19th century conception of the State is disintegrating.
2. Private Competitors
The second type of competition comes from transnational private corporations.
The concept of the State quickly became the preferred form of organizing human relationships, and the model which most nations have adopted. However, what may be “obvious” for most people is being increasingly challenged by other organizational models.Footnote 56
This is not new. The construction of the French State has meant that it has traditionally been suspicious of private enterprise. The French State was cautious about the development of industry in Colbert's time and tried to control parts of it. Indeed, the State apparatus understood that business in its institutional sense, could compete with it to the point of claiming a new modern social order.Footnote 57 However, companies catered for a demand which was limited to the national territory and their wealth remained, consequently, relatively limited.
Two trends have upset this balance in France. Firstly, and without going into detail, the State relinquished some of its powers to private law legal entities through privatization. Secondly, the process of globalization beyond national territory that began at the end of the twentieth century. As demand has become more international, corporate clientele has grown considerably. The new financial power of certain companies (e.g., the Gafam)Footnote 58 now exceeds that of certain StatesFootnote 59 with whom they now interact.Footnote 60
These new difficulties facing the State in France are shared by all States. Professor Jacques Chevallier notes that these transnational corporations are now seeking to use states “as instruments of action to ensure that their views prevail”. He points to the preparation of the action plan of the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 between states and corporations, when the corporations worked in favour of free trade, as an illustration of this.Footnote 61
Thus, from a purely legal point of view, the standard that was once the exclusive domain of States is now being co-written due to the significant pressure corporations are exerting on these States.Footnote 62
Chevallier concludes that “the post-modern state recognizes (…) the existence of other actors, with whom it must negotiate, without hiding behind a sovereignty that has become largely illusory”. He adds that “these new features of international society are encouraging the construction of new entities that go beyond the framework of the nation-state”.Footnote 63
B. The State in France Weakened
1. Reconnecting With 1789?
The relationship between the individual and the State is a central issue in French legal-philosophical debate. Already in his essay entitled The State and its Limits, published in the second half of the 19th century, the jurist Édouard Laboulaye considered that “the French passion for equality and uniformity leads to a centralization of the State, which is then responsible for managing freedoms”. He deduced that “to return to 1789 is to return his or her rights to the individual to the detriment of “this abstraction that we adore under the name of State” and concluded his remarks by affirming that the individual is the only real and living force. To diminish the individual in order to increase the State is to “sacrifice everything to a sterile uniformity”. That is why, clear-sighted, Laboulaye said that “the development of the individual (…), is the problem of the future”.Footnote 64
Although Laboulaye may be thought to have been wrong about the “centralization of the State”, I am convinced that he was able to grasp the difficulty of his century, the twentieth century, and of the twenty-first century through an examination of growing individualism and State holism. This is what Professor Aurore Gaillet observes in her book The Individual versus the State. Considering the German question, certainly ahead of the French doctrine, she notes that “modern constitutionalism starts from the principle that, legitimately, the individual can confront the State and revolt against it”.Footnote 65
Therefore, although we have considered the idea that French public law had of the State, we may have overlooked the idea—less scientific but more concrete—that the sum of the individuals who make up this State have of it. What is striking is that this mass of individuals is becoming aware of the fragility of a structure that no longer necessarily meets their aspirations. Thus, we observe that “this [French] State, so convinced of its power, almost arrogant in its claim to embody Reason, to impose its logic on its own citizens and the rest of the planet, appears to be impotent, defeated, in pieces, weak, a colossus with feet of clay, humiliated (…) by its citizens who despise it”.Footnote 66 The emancipation of the individual and the adoption of public law concepts by individuals appears to be irresistible, although unconscious. This irrefutably mirrors the emancipation of the individual from any higher intellectual structure in the aftermath of the Revolution.
However, the individual cannot exist in isolation. A partial return to the concept of the individual vis-à-vis the State that was in vogue in 1789 cannot avoid the consequences of globalization and its aftermath. Thus, the advent of the “minority legal community” must be seen as a tool that competes with the State—in France and elsewhere—and promotes the development of individuality. A synthesis, in short.
2. The Advent of “Minority Legal Communities”
This last point begins with a question: in the eighteenth century the nation superseded the monarch, in the nineteenth century the State superseded the nation. What legal instrument will supersede the State in the twenty-first century?
Santi Romano, who was ahead of his time, remarked that “the modern State, which asserted itself as the sole sovereign power (…), soon showed itself to be perfectly incapable of regulating social groupings, failing even to recognize the existence of these groupings, which are necessary in any society that has reached a high level of development”. He went on: “It is understandable (…) that social life, which is never dominated by legal rules, continues to evolve on its own, until it comes into conflict with an inadequate system, which may accentuate, as often happens, the conflict between social life and the institutional system, beyond what is necessary.”Footnote 67
This observation made in the last century leads to another. Why can't cosmological models be applied to intellectual constructions such as the State in France? In other words, the meeting of scattered elements in a single point of gravity can always result in the opposite movement of the separation of these elements into as many small autonomous units. Consequently, if human political collectivities were united in States in the past, could it not be envisioned that the French State will lose its atomistic character under the effect of the emergence of particular interests, to the point where political collectivities separate from it? This would then lead to a multitude of coherent, self-conscious collectivities that produce their own legal order, in other words, “minority legal collectivities”.Footnote 68
This shift that can indeed be observed. The confrontation of the idea of the State with that of the individual was mentioned above, in the context of a revival of 1789. However, it appears more relevant to invoke the idea of “minority legal communities” based on the concept of “minority”Footnote 69 against the State. The feeling of belonging to a group thus favours a shift from the notion of nation to what has just been described,Footnote 70 and public law has difficulty in adapting to a social movement which in the meantime, as Santi Romano identified in 1910, is organising itself according to its own laws.Footnote 71
Everything that has just been said is therefore antinomic to the idea of the State developed in France in the twentieth century, which corresponds, it should be remembered, to a legal person who, because it personifies the homogeneous nation, is the holder of sovereignty. In this sense, the initial aim of the French state was to absorb, in favor of a homogeneous community of citizens, the diversity that is now seeking recognition.Footnote 72 The unity of the State is inevitably affected and, whereas yesterday the State meant the gathering of undivided citizens, today recognizing the separate existence of minorities means reconsidering the whole idea of the State. This was recently illustrated in France by the recognition of the existence within the French nation of a separate “Kanak people” following a “political” agreement in 1982 and a “legal” one in 1998.Footnote 73
Romano considered that “an institution is a 'social body', i.e., 'several individuals who coexist or succeed one another, united by a common or constant interest, or by the purpose or mission they pursue'”.Footnote 74 Sabine Lavorel infers from this that “this definition makes it possible to recognize the quality of institution and, consequently, the quality of legal order to an almost infinite number of phenomena”. She concludes that “all intermediate groups between the individual and the State can indeed be considered as legal orders”.Footnote 75
More than just competition, this development would simply lead to the abandonment of the concept of the State built throughout the last century.
Conclusion
This article has attempted, without going into detail, to answer a question that Pierre Birnbaum recently posed in the journal Pouvoirs: “Can we still put forward the idea of an exceptionalism of the French State [and] prove that this State differs from the one hundred and ninety-seven other States recognized by the United Nations?”Footnote 76 While the construction of a French theory of the State by public law made it, until the middle of the twentieth century, a very unique object in the legal landscape, globalization has confronted the French State with new problems that are affecting all States.
Professor Rosanvallon is also aware of this when he writes that “the need to develop a new democratic architecture as a whole is imperative; the redefinition of sovereignty, the modes of legitimacy, the procedures of representation and the conditions of expression in society are being felt everywhere”.Footnote 77
In the end, will the State have been an ephemeral legal experiment? Is it doomed to decline and disappear during the century we are in as Nietzsche argued?Footnote 78 It would be foolhardy to answer this now. However, the question of the future of the State leads to an equally important question: as an object of public law, questioning its permanence also leads to questioning the permanence of public law…
