Michael Gillespie speaks of the “theological origins of modernity,” in order to describe both the profoundly religious character of the modern West, and tensions within the Enlightenment and within the progressive philosophies of history that it generated and that are instantiated in the works of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Kojève, and the like.
The book is an essay in the intellectual history of modernity that seeks to clarify what we mean by “modernity” altogether. In addition to dealing with thinkers and areas familiar to most students of political philosophy, it explicates aspects of modern thought and thinkers that political theorists too rarely explore, and Gillespie gives reasons why they should. Gillespie wants to break through the “ancients vs. moderns” paradigm to redirect our understanding of what that quarrel was and is about. He discusses “secularization” theory as well, to show the dialectical character of the relation of theology to politics that persists to the present day. As such, this is the capstone to an argument Gillespie developed in his earlier Nihilism before Nietzsche (1995), filling in numerous details and episodes in modernity's story that he had begun to explore in that book.
Gillespie proposes, very ambitiously, to rethink the contours of the modern intellectual terrain. To use a formulation of EricVoegelin's (which Gillespie does not employ, but he could have), he is trying to understand how modernity could seem both to advance and to decline at the same time. There are features of his argument which make it appropriate to put what Gillespie is doing alongside older commentaries such as Voegelin's The New Science of Politics, Löwith's Meaning in History, Richard Weaver's Ideas Have Consequences, and Gilson's Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, and in juxtaposition with current works such as Mark Lilla's The Stillborn God, Emilio Gentile's Politics as Religion, or John Gray's Black Mass. But whereas Lilla and Gray are skeptics who are made anxious by the persistence of religion, and in a vein somewhat parallel to Gentile, Gillespie sees that the overt antireligious attitudes of the intelligentsia mask a deeper, profoundly affecting religious anxiety, the roots of which he traces back to the nominalist revolution in medieval scholasticism. Ours is an age suffused with religiosity that is ill understood if one is informed only in the triumphalist, post-Hegelian story of modern history as the culmination of the human spirit's potential. Gillespie insists that a different understanding of modernity from the one we have inherited from secular enlightenment is essential to truly grasping why we are the way we are today.
Gillespie argues that modern efforts to liberate us from the Platonic/Christian tradition have only succeeded in fomenting a crisis of meaning in which we are caught between disenchantment with the ancient heritage and disillusion with the claims for the “end of history.” From the fall of the Berlin Wall to the trauma of 9/11 we enjoyed an apparent, but illusory, respite from the ordeal of historical existence. There are decided parallels with Nietzsche's critique of the historical consciousness but, in the end, Gillespie is not engaged in a Nietzschean revolt, and his history of modernity is far less partisan than Nietzsche's. For one thing, he shows there is much more continuity between the medieval intellectual puzzles and the philosophical issues of modern times than we usually acknowledge. One is inclined to say that Gillespie's own stance in the face of modernity is Stoic, yet Stoic in a way that is informed by the crisis of the relation between reason and revelation.
Put another way: Hegel remarks in the Philosophy of History that the movement of world history involves gradually reconceiving the “outer sun” as an “inner sun,” or as the self-construction of the human spirit in its restless search for self-understanding. Contemplation of the divine is supplanted by divinized activity by which we construct our world for ourselves. The image clearly refers both to the Platonic sun as in the allegory of the cave and also to Christ as son. Hegel proposed nothing less than to preserve the element of truth in the older traditions in a new philosophical understanding which would release us from the anxiety of God's distance from us while still satisfying the religious dimension of the human spirit by finding God within us. The anxiety Gillespie is identifying and describing has not, however, been assuaged, but continues to haunt us. In this respect, Hegel may be the most powerful analyst of the modern problem insofar as his approach hovers over all subsequent attempts, but his solution is decisively inadequate. Yet Gillespie also is different from Leo Strauss in that he neither makes a radical separation between reason and revelation, nor argues for a return to the classics.
Gillespie's point is that there was a “nihilistic crisis” in the late Middle Ages. This was generated by an intellectual dispute between nominalists and realists, the result of which was to deepen the sense, always latent in the Judaic/Christian tradition, of God's distance from humanity. If we are only reasoning about the names of things and never about the things themselves, how can we be confident of anything we say about God or the divine? Is this not all a human construct to try to speak about that of which we cannot really speak? Moreover, if God is omnipotent and our rationality is not clearly consonant with his rationality, how can we depend on the certainty of the cosmos as we know it? At any moment the whole creation could disappear and us with it. How could we connect to God? How could we be sure that anything we do in homage to God is efficacious? How can we be sure of the end or goal of our existence? How can we connect reason and revelation, and, thus, how can we know a cooperative or collaborative relation with God that gives us assurance of our own rationality? Given this, it is not surprising that, increasingly in later times, there would be efforts to stand alone “against God” and even to declare that God is not there but a ghost of our own making. God's power and unpredictability supplant God's rationality and reason in our thinking. His ways are not our ways. How then shall we proceed? According to Gillespie, all succeeding European thought has been shaped by this fourteenth-century transformation. Inevitably there has been a chronic dispute as to whether this transformation has been good or bad for us, advantageous or disadvantageous.
Gillespie presents detailed analyses of thinkers beginning with Petrarch, a figure not normally examined in the context of the history of political thought. This is not, however, a “historicist” account, for Gillespie is arguing that there is a basic philosophic issue which persists through the twists and turns of modern history. But he does try to show that some of the peculiarities of expression of the problem are related to conditions of time and place. Gillespie believes that ideas have consequences, that they shape the development of our self-understanding and are far more than the epiphenomena of material conditions.
One practical implication of this debate which is most pertinent to political life is a dispute over what might be called the Pelagian tendency and its opposite. One direction out of the nominalist crisis was to “take our destiny into our own hands” and to construct a new world in our own image, to make a heaven of this hell; the alternative was to throw oneself to the mercy of God and hope for salvation despite profound unworthiness and ignorance of how to relate to God. In modern politics this has been transformed into utopian politics and skeptical politics, a polarity which organizes a charged field within which much of modern political life is played out. The figures here include Ockham, Petrarch, Luther, Descartes, Bacon, Galileo, Hobbes, and the ambiguous Machiavelli. The Pelagian tendency honors two modern goals: to master and possess nature (which eventually includes infinite economic growth) and to maximize human freedom.
Petrarch is crucial insofar as Gillespie makes a claim for the centrality of Petrarch to the development of modern self-understanding despite the contemporary neglect or ignorance of his work and his importance. In his detailed account, Gillespie refers to Petrarch's achievement as the “invention of individuality.” The intellectual context was that incited by the nominalist problem which calls into question the orderliness of the cosmos and leads to seeking the source of stability in oneself, rather than in citizenship in an earthly kingdom or a heavenly city. Petrarch sees everywhere strife and struggle, continual change. One could say he experiences profoundly the meaning of temporality. There are elements of ancient Stoicism/Epicureanism and Aristotelianism here, but also the Augustinian confession with its sense of sinfulness and the need to make sense of oneself, to know oneself. Petrarch sought the life of “virtue” as a middle way between Franciscan austerity and worldly excess. It is the virtuous life that allows us to battle against the vicissitudes of fortune in our time and place and to seek such improvement as may be found in our time and place. The ancient sources could provide some inspiration but the work of virtue necessarily belongs to us, and perhaps especially to the solitary individual who attains dignity through self-mastery. Gillespie suggests that Petrarch was semi-Pelagian in that his rejection of worldliness was not a departure from the active life. Petrarch seems to have related the pursuit of pleasure to the virtuous life, or to agree with the Epicurean view that to pursue the pleasurable life properly understood, virtue is necessary. Petrarch pursued a middle way between Epicurus and Prometheus, tempered by his Christianity which limits the claims of human self-sufficiency. Man is not God's rival nor is God absent from us. But the divine is realized in the virtuous individual life.
Petrarch's extraordinary influence was to stimulate the “humanist project” that combines Christian piety with Roman virtue as presented in Cicero. Petrarch identifies the origins of the movement to bring the spiritual and temporal aspects of human existence into fruitful alignment, implying the overcoming of the dualism of the sacred and the secular as a project of the human spirit. Is humanism, then, a revolt against Christianity, a revival of pagan antiquity, or a profound development within Christianity leading to an activist, spiritual involvement in the world? Scholars have argued and disagreed about this for a long time. Gillespie examines this debate and the principal arguments on each side. This is important for his purposes because his aim is to show that these two alternatives are part and parcel of a fundamental set of theological issues which emerged in such a way as to foster this very polarity. Arguments for progress and enlightenment emerge from one side; arguments for moral confusion and decadence emerge through emphasis on the other side. In any case, holding together a passion for pagan antiquity with the Christian pursuit of sanctity was bound to create deep tensions in the formation of the modern mentality. The aim was to avoid having to choose between Athens and Jerusalem. The Christian humanists wanted to defend human dignity while avoiding pridefulness. There is necessarily a tension between obedience to the divine will and self-development according to one's self-understanding. Gillespie works through the various efforts of the Italian humanists to establish the desired synthesis. This was not, he thinks, an incipient revolt against God but rather an effort at a new dimension of Christian understanding. God's authority was to be preserved but human will was to be granted a dignified place in the moral economy. It will be of considerable interest to political theorists to learn that, in Gillespie's view, Machiavelli was not an atheist. For Gillespie, Machiavelli is more a Pelagian who subordinates his Christian outlook to the worldly needs of the political order and argues that God intends this to happen. This is obviously controversial. And if we recall that most famous humanist, Erasmus, who defended a more humble form of human endeavor combining elements of the Christlike with the Socratic life, we can see the deep ambivalence about how to conceive the relation of God and man coupled with the tenacious insistence that this is the central issue.
Gillespie sees Luther as responding to the crisis engendered by the “nominalist God.” Luther was profoundly influenced by Ockham. Luther experienced the tension, evident since Petrarch, between the understanding of man as having been made in God's image and the alternative emphasis on distortion caused by sinful depravity. At the same time there was a growing sense of the human construction of the scriptures, and the crisis engendered by questioning how we can know that God is good or, from a human standpoint, knowable as rational. Luther's monastic striving for perfection failed disastrously. Luther exhibits all the characteristics that came to be known as the “terrors of religion.” Salvation is unmerited and hence uncertain. All works are inadequate and even misguided for, in a way, works are not necessary. Faith alone is possible for us and comes through grace and reading the scriptures in a community of those seeking faith. The debate of faith vs. works became, and remains, a central topic of theological debate in modern times.
Underlying this is a philosophico-theological issue posed by the nominalist heritage. For Luther this meant a radical distinction between God and man such that we cannot begin to grasp the nature of the divine. The Incarnation is the bridge, but it too is a mystery that is beyond comprehension. The most important thing to know can come to us only through faith. We find here a deeply antihumanist, anti-Pelagian strain. Yet there is lurking here a dependency on human interpretation of scripture, since the scriptures have to be received and interpreted by human beings. The element of human endeavor cannot be removed from the equation. Do we share in God's rationality or do we not?
The tensions constituting modernity are exemplified in the debate between Erasmus and Luther on free will, and its relation to the debate over reforming the Catholic Church from within (Erasmus) or from without (Luther, Calvin). Erasmus may be said to emphasize the Platonist/intellectualist tendency where sin is to some degree a matter of ignorance to be corrected by intellectual refinement and study. Luther emphasizes a nominalist/Augustinian tendency where sin is a consequence of a fundamental defect introduced into human nature, which no amount of study and reflection can remedy. Gillespie then connects this to a discussion of Descartes' “path to truth.” Cartesian science is not only intended to move us toward mastery of nature and thus to the perfection of human life, but also to show that in doing this we come to know God as perfect and thus as rational, not a deceiver. This may be said to be the beginning of understanding God within us and ourselves as agents of God. Modern science will thus be not only a contributor to what is usually referred to as secularism but also will encourage the divinization of human activity, making the issue of “secularization” considerably more complex.
This complication we find also in Hobbes's “fearful wisdom.” The advocacy of modern science in Hobbes, especially applied to politics, is not in and of itself antireligious, but it changes drastically the approach to the religious issue. One consequence of the Reformation was to foster a far greater emphasis on “faith” than ever before, involving a move away from ritual observance. Christianity became more a matter of beliefs and confessional statements and less a matter of practices. One result of this is the enormous proliferation of beliefs in the anxious quest for propositional purity. For Hobbes all human things can be explained in terms of the motions of bodies in relation to each other. God is the source of all motion, but we cannot know much beyond this about God. God is the eternally moving mover and thus is “in” all things in a certain way. God is bodily in a special sense. Here is the rejection of the Platonic / medieval Christian understanding of God as eternal. God is unknowable yet somehow intimately present in us. The idea that all is motion is not an argument against God's existence, but it is an argument against the view that God constitutes a fixed goal for humanity to attain to. The world is nonteleological, open ended in its becoming. Such a God cannot be said to care about our attainments even though such a God may move us to attainment as we define it for ourselves. We do not need “actual knowledge” but rather workable “hypothetical knowledge” or practical theorems which work for us insofar as we define goals for ourselves and reach them. We must unavoidably reason about the names of things and never the things themselves. But this is all right if we achieve success in following the hypotheses we have formed—a kind of pragmatism. This is nominalism at work. We do not need the essence of things to know how to conduct ourselves.
In his political science, Hobbes argues for the absolute sovereign because, according to Gillespie, it is in the interest of subjects to keep covenants only so long as there is a penalty for not keeping them. Here Gillespie underplays the rationalism of Hobbes. Hobbes did not think that human beings had only passionate motives for seeking order. Nor did he think that a sovereign could possibly police with total efficiency all the actions of human beings. The framework of law and peace provided by a sovereign allows freer play to individuals to act rationally in pursuit of their interests even when there is only indirect, limited prospect of punishment for misconduct. In this respect, Hobbes paves the way, albeit perhaps unintentionally, for the later development of the search for perpetual peace, as with Kant, which only makes sense if it is possible to imagine a sovereign of a more gentle sort, the possibility of a covenant without the sword. Of course, Hobbes did not argue for the covenant without the sword, but the construction of the modern state leads to the thought of extending peace beyond the borders of the state, and the related question of how to achieve it. This is clear in Locke's portrayal of the universal freedom, equality, and independence of all human beings. There can be, it is hoped, a universal, or cosmopolitan, human community. The perfection of the internal order of the state depends on the perfection of the order among states. In his discussion of Hobbes's theology, Gillespie implicitly points to this by showing how his theology could support a latitudinarian Anglicanism which could eventually claim to be a model of accommodation for wide-ranging theological opinions without disrupting the civil order. This suggests in turn that the Hobbesian state will turn into the liberal democratic state eventually.
The general point is that much of what has been called “secularization” is misnamed. Rather what has happened is that natural science has been given a special prominence and that the revision of religious thinking was guided by the need to make room for modern science. It is true, of course, that many moderns want to establish an either/or regarding religion and science. But Gillespie does not follow that convention. The proposition that God does not exist and the proposition that religion is merely a human construction (what Hegel called the movement from the “outer sun” to the “inner sun”) are themselves contested propositions to this day. Moderns seem to have made room for science, even exalted science, without actually getting rid of theological debate. Is God “not,” or is God hiding his face from us (concealed, per Heidegger)? Gillespie steps back from this since to him it is undecidable. That is, the answer one gives presupposes that answer. Gillespie, remaining in a detached, descriptive mode, argues that moderns have in fact gradually transferred divine attributes to human beings. It is, in Hegelian terms Gillespie does not exactly employ, the “spiritualization of the material” or the drive to make divine things visible to us in the material world. God has not so much “disappeared” as he has been “absorbed” into the way human beings understand themselves.
But this has led in turn to the division between those who would endow human beings with divine powers and those who would define human beings as the predetermined products of their genes and environment. Here emerges once again an opposition at the heart of our self-understanding which reflects in new ways an historic division going back to the nominalist controversies of the Middle Ages. In short, in the midst of these disputes we catch sight of the lurking metaphysical/theological issues that have long been with us (romanticism/materialism, Pelagian/Manichean, for example). An old question raised again: Is the human race constantly progressing? How could we resolve such a question? How could we ever know the “end of history”?
In his epilogue, Gillespie warns that not to reach a deeper self-understanding, along the lines of his analysis, will hurt us in the attempt to learn how to deal with the Islamic world. This may be true but it is an elusive piece of advice. Gillespie is (insofar as one can characterize a complex analysis of this sort) basically a “middle Hegelian.” That is, he is neither left nor right. He seeks to be a mediator of the salient oppositions of our time in the way that Hegel sought to be in his time. Deeper still is his stoicism which seeks to explain better what we already know through experience but do not always attend to sufficiently, as if to identify the anxiety is to calm it. He is asking his fellow political philosophers to rethink almost all the categories within which they today normally operate, but while he presents what he thinks is fundamental to think about, he withholds whatever opinion he may have as to what we should think about what we need to think about.
