It is said there are only two things in life that are certain: death and taxes … maybe only taxes.
A new report from the President's Council on BioethicsFootnote 1 and articles in the medicalFootnote 2 and lay pressFootnote 3 make it timely to revisit the concept of death. Questioning the traditional definitions of death and their practical consequences highlights an age old controversy. Uncertainty about the basis for pronouncing death has been easy to see in both medicine and popular culture, preoccupying the minds of ethicists, physicians, morticians, politicians, and authors.Footnote 4 Cessation of cardiorespiratory function has been a substitute for signs of decomposition for hundreds of years, but neurological criteria have played a major role in diagnosing death and facilitating organ transplantation. Recent critiques and technological developments have complicated how we determine who is alive and who is dead, setting the stage for a shift away from the understanding of death as a universally recognized, permanent state justifying burial and organ harvesting. Despite these controversies, the current criteria for death provide continuity and stability. Considering the inherent problems with making the diagnosis of death a matter of personal choice, we agree with the President's Council in defining death as the irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary or neurological function.
Problems with Death
Conceptual Confusion
A major source of confusion in understanding death is the mixing of the definition of death—a decision about when life has ended—with the criteria and tests used to assess when death has occurred. The definition is metaphysical. What is it that shifts human beings from alive to dead—lack of sentence? Lack of personhood? Cessation of all spontaneous biological activity? Departure of the soul? The criteria for determining death—cessation of cardiopulmonary activity, cessation of all brain activity, cessation of some brain activity—and the tests to see if these criteria are met—chest auscultation, a mirror held under the nose, absence of oculocephalic reflexes, electroencephalography, cerebral circulatory imaging—are epistemological. Battles have emerged over the definition of death, the criteria for determining death, and the adequacy of tests for fulfilling the accepted criteria. These controversies, combined with technological advancements, have introduced another metaphysical problem—are the definitions, the criteria, and the tests for death matters of personal choice? Leaving aside questions about definitions and adequacy of tests, we focus primarily on the criteria for diagnosing death.
Historical Difficulties with Death
For most of human history signs of decomposition diagnosed death. Charnel houses—places to take the dead until putrefaction—were common. More rapid burial and cremation became important with understanding of infectious disease transmission. Cessation of cardiopulmonary function became a surrogate measure for decomposition, allowing diagnosis of death prior to putrefaction. Loss of neurological function was known to be unreliable, as it was confounded by hypothermia, metabolic derangements, traumatic brain injury, drug ingestion, and psychiatric conditions.
But cardiopulmonary criteria were by no means flawless, and recognition of this fact led to a substantial change in medical practice. In the Hippocratic tradition, physicians usually withdrew from patients prior to death, giving family and friends the responsibility for determining death. However, widespread concern about premature burial in the late 1800s in the Western world led to a radical change. Edgar Allen Poe helped popularize the concept in several short stories, including “Premature Burial.” Being buried alive became a source of great fear, such that diagnosis of death by qualified professionals using specialized tests became popular. Even so, people were buried with crowbars and shovels. Specialized coffins were designed with escape mechanisms, systems to summon help, or mechanisms that released poison gas when sealed.Footnote 5 Others’ wills dictated decapitation, stakes through the heart, or other means to “make certain.”Footnote 6 The Society for the Prevention of Burial Before Death undertook strident campaigns to educate the public about the difficulties in diagnosing death.Footnote 7 It also sponsored early efforts at establishing legal standards for death testing. In 1899, a bill before the New York state legislature listed five criteria to be determined by a physician or coroner: permanent cessation of respiration and circulation, purple discoloration of dependent parts of the body, blistering of the skin when touched with a red-hot iron, rigor mortis, and signs of decomposition.Footnote 8
On the other end of the spectrum, it was noted that restoration of cognitive function did not always accompany reanimation of hearts and lungs. Thus began the pendulum swing—away from cardiopulmonary and toward neurological criteria—which took hundreds of years after primitive resuscitation measures became feasible in the 16th and 17th centuries. In the 1920s, practical ventilators and cardiac defibrillators emerged and no doubt prolonged cardiopulmonary function in patients meeting modern brain death criteria. Mollaret and Goulon described irreversible loss of neurological function as “coma dépassé” (beyond coma) in 1959,Footnote 9 and set the stage for the term “brain death” to characterize a heart-beating kidney donor in 1965.Footnote 10 The tremendous success of transplantation probably played a major role in the formulation and rapid adoption of the 1968 Harvard criteria for irreversible coma.Footnote 11 In the 1970s, the United Kingdom established separate criteria for brain stem death (as opposed to whole brain death).Footnote 12 Under these criteria, irreversible loss of higher cortical function when the brain stem is intact does not constitute death. Conversely, death is declared if the brain stem is irreversibly damaged, even in the presence of cortical activity.
Local Criteria
In 1981, the medical consultants on the Diagnosis of Death to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research advocated the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) to settle the diagnosis of death.Footnote 13 It produced a document that reaffirmed the traditional criterion of “irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function” and added the criterion of brain death as constituting the “irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain.” In stating that “a determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted standards,” it recognized the changing nature of medical science but also implicitly acknowledged the validity of local death criteria and multiple definitions of “cessation” and “irreversible.” Not surprisingly, there is considerable variability between hospitals in the diagnosis of death.Footnote 14 The consultants to the Commission also noted that criteria that define “cessation” and “irreversibility” may involve delay and depend on the clinical situation. A 17-year-old involved in a drowning accident may require a higher degree of certainty of death than an 89-year-old with metastatic cancer in hospice.
Current and Future Difficulties with Cardiopulmonary Death
Technological advances in resuscitation science continue to complicate death by cardiopulmonary criteria. Cardiac arrest victims without return of spontaneous circulation (ROSC) after standard cardiopulmonary resuscitative measures (CPR) after 20–30 minutes usually are declared dead using the criterion of irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary function. However, there is a conceptual difference between presumed futility and actual death, highlighted by numerous accounts of reanimation following cessation of resuscitation attempts (the so-called Lazarus phenomenon).Footnote 15 Animal data with a technique called Emergency Preservation and Resuscitation (EPR) suggest that good neurological outcomes are possible after hours in the cooled state with no circulation, followed by resuscitation and controlled reperfusion.Footnote 16 Emergency peripheral cardiac bypass (also called extracorporeal CPR or ECPR) is gaining popularity in Asia as a resuscitative measure in patients without ROSC and is under clinical investigation in the United States and Europe. Initial reports demonstrated improved survival and a trend toward improved neurological outcomes, even following prolonged periods of CPR.Footnote 17 And, of course, vital organs are routinely removed, transported significant distances, and implanted into transplant recipients, where they work well in the majority of cases. These organs have clearly not irreversibly ceased to function.Footnote 18
Approximately 70%–90% of patients die after support is either not initiated or is withdrawnFootnote 19—a choice to allow cardiopulmonary death that could, theoretically, have been prevented or forestalled. If new resuscitation techniques are widely implemented, this figure may increase substantially. People will still die from cardiopulmonary failure out of hospital and because resuscitation and life support technology is not available. Brain death, resuscitation device malfunction, trauma, overwhelming infection, and other causes will still claim victims. But if most patients can be “brought back,” cardiopulmonary death will not be very explicit or verifiable. Errors in differentiating the dead from those who could be salvaged with resuscitative measures will abound.
Current and Future Difficulties with Brain Death
There are conceptual difficulties with the criteria for brain death, aside from the disagreements across the Atlantic Ocean as to whether whole brain or brain stem death is sufficient. Initially, one of the bases for validating the concept of brain death was subsequent (within 2 weeks) cardiopulmonary death. In essence, people are brain dead because they will die, making the point more about futility than how to diagnose death. This basis for validating brain death has been seriously challenged by multiple instances of brain dead mothers supported in order to ensure fetal viability, up to 107 days.Footnote 20 Diagnosing brain death has subsequently relied on the irreversible loss of consciousness and other brain functions essential to integrative functioning. The irreversible loss of the brain's ability to regulate the organism signals death, even if constituent parts can continue to function independently or with assistance. Work that is now decades old, however, discovered that certain brain functions, namely, that of the pituitary, continue to integrate and regulate body systems, despite fulfillment of whole brain death criteria.Footnote 21 The requisite conceptual framework has to specify which integrative functions of the brain continue in the dead state.Footnote 22
Other criteria for death base diagnosis on disintegration of personhood. This concept holds that when there is permanent and irreversible cessation of “higher functions” that define being a “person,” death has occurred. Diagnosis involves demonstrating damage to areas of the brain thought necessary for higher functions plus permanent loss of consciousness or inability to interact with one's environment.Footnote 23 This basis is far more controversial, because patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) and anencephalic infants (who generally have intact brain stem function) do not constitute a unique category of neurological debilitation but are simply dead.Footnote 24 Even proponents acknowledge difficulties in burying patients who breathe and circulate blood on their own.Footnote 25
The President's Commission advocates a different definition involving disintegration of the capacity of “commerce with” or “needful openness to” the surrounding world. “Commerce” consists of receptivity to stimuli, ability to act upon the world, and the drive to act to fulfill needs (based on what is perceived to be available).Footnote 26 Individuals with spontaneous ventilation, effectively beating hearts, and the ability to withdraw to stimuli (as in a PVS) are still interacting with their environment, even if they are not aware of it. Limited internal physiological regulation does not constitute meaningful interaction with the surrounding world.
Irreversible cessation of brain regulatory function, personhood, or commerce with the world is different from irreversible cardiopulmonary failure. Components of the cardiac system tend to fail together or in rapid succession. Brain failure, though based on a similar concept, is often not so clear-cut. For example, some coordinated internal regulation can exist without consciousness or interaction with the environment. Prediction of irreversible cessation of any integrative brain function remains difficult. It may get more difficult with development of “brain resuscitation” techniques.
Efforts to resuscitate the brain date back to Russian experiments in the 1930s that attempted to reanimate severed canine heads via arterial to venous bypass. Dramatic film of a decapitated dog reveals eye opening and attention associated with auditory stimuli. Similar work has been done on monkeys.Footnote 27 Severely brain-injured patients are frequently placed into an electrically silent brain state known as “burst suppression” in order to stave off permanent and irreversible brain dysfunction. Recent successes with EPR suggest cooling can preserve neurological function in the absence of brain blood flow.Footnote 28 Research in the 1980s with patients in PVS attempted to stimulate the brain and return consciousness and cognitive ability.Footnote 29 Terri Schaivo was one of these patients. These experiments failed, but, more recently, some of the same deep brain stimulation techniques improved the mental capacity of a single patient in a “minimally conscious” state.Footnote 30 Although no efforts have successfully reanimated a brain dead patient, these techniques will be in the forefront of neuroscience and may impact public opinion regarding determination of brain death. They certainly raise questions about diagnosing “irreversible” cessation of brain function. In the future, brain death may encounter the same problems as cardiopulmonary death in terms of explicitness, verifiability, and errors in identifying the living (salvageable) and the dead.
Brain death criteria contributed to the flourishing of organ transplantation, which may be impacted if brain resuscitation techniques become successful. These criteria satisfy the “Dead Donor Rule,” which mandates that organs necessary for life can only be taken from dead people.Footnote 31 Without a neurological criterion for determining death, the procurement of vital organs leaves physicians open to the charge of murder. Despite the widespread adoption of these criteria, the supply of organs is inadequate to meet the need. The paradigm of donation after cardiac death (DCD) returns to cardiopulmonary death criteria in order to increase this supply while satisfying the Dead Donor Rule. In doing so, DCD illustrates a novel paradigm: The diagnosis of death involves intent and preferences.
The Relativization of Death Diagnosis
The Paradigm of Donation after Cardiac Death
In DCD, patients who do not meet brain death criteria have cardiopulmonary support withdrawn. After a short period of time, the patient is declared dead, and organs are harvested. The Institute of Medicine recommended the time from cessation of cardiopulmonary function to declaration of death be no less than 5 minutes,Footnote 32 but institutional protocols vary widely, ranging from 75 seconds to 10 minutes.Footnote 33 The legal and ethical justifications rest on the premise that, after 75+ seconds without cardiopulmonary support, spontaneous reanimation is extremely unlikely or impossible (though the Lazarus phenomenon has been reported after 10 minutes).Footnote 34 Active resuscitation is possible, and organs are “restarted” in recipients; thus the premise of death is that there is no intention to restart them in the donor. The decision about death depends on neurological prognosis, family preferences, advance directives, and the time after cessation of cardiopulmonary function specified in the local protocol. In essence, the point at which someone is dead or alive is relative.
Advance Directives for Death
Given the difficulties in diagnosing death by either cardiopulmonary or neurological criteria, officially recognizing the relative nature of the definition of death may solve many controversies. The Dead Donor Rule would be abandoned or modified, and there would be no need for protocols specifying time of harvest in DCD. We could dispense with the UDDA and its concerns about accuracy, explicitness, and verifiability. Some data suggest that such a shift might be acceptable to the public.Footnote 35
Presumably, practical application would include advance directives outlining personal criteria for death. A patient could specify, for instance, that permanent unconsciousness, severe neurological injury, or imminent cardiopulmonary death would render them “as good as dead,” “mostly dead,” or “dead enough” and should trigger withdrawal of life-sustaining measures and organ procurement and/or burial. Another patient, perhaps for religious reasons, might consider such existence worthwhile and instead choose traditional whole brain or cardiopulmonary criteria. Theoretically, a patient or family may refuse a diagnosis of death by neurological criteria but agree to DCD. Practically, there would need to be an emphasis change to focus on futility.
Another option might involve an official recognition of ordinary language. Many patients and physicians refer to any cessation, however brief, of cardiopulmonary function that is terminated by resuscitative measures as death. “I died and they brought me back” is not an uncommon way to explain what happened in a successful code. The phenomenon of “near death” experiences fits the paradigm. If any cessation of cardiopulmonary function equals death, the Dead Donor Rule stands, though without the modifier of “irreversibility.” “Irreversible cessation” could be retained in the criteria for neurological death.
Problems with the Relativization of Death Diagnosis
What Is Dead Enough?
As attractively simple as the relativization of death diagnosis might be, the inherent problems commend sticking with the current criteria for death. The advantage of patients outlining personal criteria for death is mitigated by dismal rates of advance directives.Footnote 36 If patients do not take the opportunity to dictate end-of-life care now, they may not dictate criteria for determining their death. Patients’ individual definitions about what constitutes “dead enough” depend on prognostication that is more nebulous than death by either cardiopulmonary or neurological criteria. There are probably more cases of patients unexpectedly pulling through than of Lazarus cases of reanimation after diagnosis of death. From primitive resuscitation methods to EPR, advances strain the declaration of futility, as well as death. Essentially, premature declaration of futility would replace premature declaration of death.
Such a framework also fails to solve the question of when the termination of resuscitative measures is appropriate. It potentially diagnoses as dead those patients on cardiopulmonary bypass, others with ventricular assist devices or total artificial hearts, some patients receiving shocks from their internal defibrillators, and those who may benefit from EPR. We are left with a convenient semantic fiction that allows cessation of resuscitative measures and organ harvesting without a lack of irreversible cessation of function.
Detrimental Effect on Organ Transplant
Ironically, the relativization of death intended to facilitate organ procurement may reverse the trend toward neurological criteria for death, a foundation of transplantation. Although advance directives outlining personal criteria for death may facilitate donation, organ harvesting under brain death criteria could also be thwarted and dead people (under the current criteria) kept alive on full support. If each patient was allowed to define death for him- or herself, some could choose putrefaction as the only clear sign of death.
Conflicts of Interest
There have always been multiple competing interests that come into play in declaring death. Historically, these have involved interest in reanimation and life prolongation, the avoidance of premature burial, and, of course, personal and financial interest in an individual's death. Except for the latter, interests generally favored caution in declaring that someone was dead. The Harvard brain death criteria established the concept that a more liberal criterion for death could lead to a general social benefit. Extending the application of this concept, as in DCD, may pit the interests of society against the interest of certain individuals or groups, with serious ethical consequences.
In Spain, there is presumed consent for donation, and a system has been established to identify cardiac arrest patients who fail to respond to traditional resuscitation measures, put them on cardiopulmonary bypass, and harvest their organs.Footnote 37 A pilot program based on the Spanish experience may soon be instituted in New York City.Footnote 38 Emergency personnel who fail to resuscitate patients outside of the hospital will contact a separate “rapid-organ-recovery ambulance.” Families will be contacted to consent to organ donation after the potential donor reaches the hospital.
Donation rates may increase, but concerns abound. Certain otherwise underserved sections of the city may be more likely to see the “death mobile” trolling their streets. Despite logical reasons (more people involved in fatal accidents or violence), charges of injustice, error, or abuse are likely. Enthusiasm for organ procurement underlying this proposal may paradoxically lead to greater mistrust on the part of potential organ donors.
These situations typify a conflict between the traditionally separate goals and practices of resuscitation and organ preservation. Cardiopulmonary bypass for organ preservation usually involves occluding the abdominal aorta with a balloon catheter and giving large amounts of heparin, which is not done during resuscitation attempts.Footnote 39 Emergency medical personnel may be required to triage arrest victims, defining them as either patients or donors. Influence from unconscious social biases may be inevitable, with potentially different decisions made for a crack user with a gunshot wound versus a suburban soccer mom in a minivan accident. Families, too, will face more rushed decisions to donate in the emergency department than in the intensive care unit where there is often the luxury of greater time to consider advance directives and family values.
On the other end of the spectrum, the recently passed Uniform Anatomical Gift Act seeks to remove barriers to organ donation by preventing withholding or withdrawing of resuscitative measures that preserve organs.Footnote 40 It specified that, “If a prospective donor has a declaration or advance health-care directive, measures necessary to ensure the medical suitability of an organ for transplantation or therapy may not be withheld or withdrawn from the prospective donor, unless the declaration expressly provides to the contrary.”Footnote 41 The Act potentially prevents palliative care for the sake of organ harvesting. A revision of the legislation advocated a discussion between patient or family members and attending physician to resolve the conflict between palliative care and organ preservation, but “[b]efore resolution of the conflict, measures necessary to ensure the medical suitability of the part may not be withheld or withdrawn from the prospective donor if withholding or withdrawing the measures is not contraindicated by appropriate end-of-life care.” The revision may not be enacted in all states that ratified the original act. The classic “good death” usually involves a peaceful setting with family and friends, symptom control, and attention to psychosocial needs. It does not usually include a cardiopulmonary bypass machine, nor a conflict between families and physicians over the definition of appropriate end-of-life care.
Other aspects of modern healthcare create potential conflicts between social benefits and patients over the timing of death declaration. Shorter lengths of stay generally increase profits for hospitals. Insurers lose money on costly interventions at the end of life. Families exhaust savings paying for expensive medical care. Governments face conflicts between citizens, pitting patients versus potential transplant recipients, to say nothing of strains on public healthcare budgets. All of these players may benefit from less stringent criteria for death, to the potential detriment of patients (and families).
Conclusion
Controversy in diagnosing death has a long history, but the essential difficulties have not changed for hundreds of years. The consequences of making mistakes remain catastrophic, though sometimes tempered by the benefits of transplantation. Advances in resuscitation continue to add complexity by redefining “irreversible” and “cessation.” Our present standards for death may be difficult to defend against all charges, but the current criteria and tests of cardiopulmonary and neurological death provide continuity and stability. They undergird the social sanction of transplantation and establish a firmer endpoint in clinical care than futility. The problems inherent in the relativization of death diagnosis also commend these time-honored standards. Defining death as the complete and irreversible cessation of brain or heart function may not be perfect, but it may be the best we can do.
