This book is the fruit of research extraordinarily impressive not least in the range of the materials which the author has used. Professor Probert comprehensively examines the traditional sources of legal scholarship (statutes, law reports, ‘works of authority’), demography and genealogy (how many readers are aware of the riches available in The Vicar-General Marriage Licence Surname Index, for example?), not to mention political, economic and ecclesiastical history (how many of us who have gone into print on marriage have even heard of the 1706 edition of the Clergyman's Vade Mecum?). She also draws eclectically on a wide range of ‘non-legal’ materials ranging from The Gentleman's Magazine through the novels of Jane Austen to the comparatively neglected fiction of Tobias Smollett (amongst others). She displays a, surely unmatched, familiarity with the considerable volume of modern writing about the legal formalities relating to marriage and their social and economic implications. And it is by no means all ‘book learning’: Professor Probert has made extensive (and no doubt sometimes rather frustrating and exhausting) enquiries into what actually happened – research which is all the more necessary because historians working in this area (even those as eminent as the great Maitland) have, as Professor Helmholz puts it in his massive contribution to the long-awaited Oxford History of the Laws of England, long ‘been obliged to guess about what happened in practice’ and have then drawn from those conjectures conclusions ‘reasonable enough…on the basis of the available evidence’ but which research into the actual records has subsequently shown to be false. And in one especially notable respect Professor Probert has gone far beyond the techniques of traditional legal scholarship: she has applied computer searching techniques to the increasingly wide range of records which are now available in digitised format. In this way, she has been able to trace links between events in one set of records (for example, marriage registers) and those recorded in others (for example, baptismal registers and decisions on ‘settlement’, so important in the administration of the Poor Law). The word ‘groundbreaking’ is, for once, an accurate description.
Professor Probert (or perhaps her publisher) opens the book with an admirable ‘mission statement’ of what she believes she has achieved. This is to:
‘provide a radical reassessment of eighteenth century marriage. [The book] disproves the widespread assumption that couples married simply by exchanging consent, demonstrating that such exchanges were regarded merely as contracts to marry and that marriage in church was almost universal outside London. It shows how the Clandestine Marriages Act of 1753 was primarily intended to prevent clergymen operating out of London’s Fleet prison from conducting marriages and that it was successful in so doing. It also refutes the idea that the 1753 Act was harsh or strictly interpreted, illustrating the courts’ pragmatic approach. Finally, it establishes that only a few non-Anglicans married according to their own rites before the Act; while afterwards most (save the exempted Quakers and Jews) similarly married in church. In short, eighteenth-century couples complied with whatever the law required for a valid marriage.’
A ‘radical reassessment’ indeed. And there can be no doubt that Professor Probert’s work makes necessary (and will provide a secure basis for) much reconsideration of what has previously been orthodoxy. Professor Probert comprehensively trashes the work of many scholars (including some of great eminence) who have written about marriage and the family – indeed some of them might think they should hand back their honorary degrees and many more will breathe sighs of relief that research funding once granted cannot in practice be reclaimed. The bestselling work of Professor Laurence Stone is only one example of highly acclaimed literature which Professor Probert finds, in some important respects, seriously wanting.
And yet…to say that the present research is of very high quality and that it will give a much-needed stimulus to further debate and questioning does not mean that everyone will feel satisfied that Professor Probert has established all her claims ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ – language appropriate because much of the text is written in a polemical style which makes at least one reader feel that he has heard the case for the prosecution put with forensic brilliance but that he has not yet heard what counsel for the defence is going to say.
On the one hand, Professor Probert’s debunking of the claims made (especially in the second half of the twentieth century) about ‘local and customary forms of marriage’ (e.g. ‘broomstick’ marriages) is to this reader entirely convincing – and the author strikes a shrewd blow when she suggests that some of the research on which such claims were based may have been over-influenced by researchers’ ideological hostility to state regulation of personal relationships and their wish to ‘present modern-day alternative practices as equal or even superior’ (p. 344) to marriage. But what of the central issue: what were, before Lord Hardwicke’s Act 1753, the legal consequences in England of a contract per verba de praesenti? Here the author seems to this reviewer to be on less secure ground (although he must admit that he increasingly came to wonder how far such questions are meaningful). It may well be that in practice it would often be extremely difficult to prove the existence of such a contract. Anyone with experience of the working of legal systems knows that the common belief that oral contracts are not generally enforceable is in practice (as distinct from in legal theory) nearer to the truth than legal textbooks suggest. Equally, those who interest themselves in these matters have not usually claimed that a marriage per verba de praesenti contract has exactly the same legal consequences as a marriage in facie ecclesia: the surviving wife’s right to dower is one example of a case where compliance with the full formal requirements would be required. But even so, what as a matter of law would have been the legal consequences had the circumstances of cases such as Taczanowski [1957] P. 310, CA, Kochanski [1958] P. 147, Merker [1963] P. 283 and Preston [1963] P. 411 – all involving formally defective marriages in war-torn continental Europe upheld in the English courts as valid ‘common law’ marriages – been replicated in, say, 1750? Professor Probert believes that the judgment of Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell) in Dalrymple (1811) 2 Hag. Con. 54 is responsible for the (in her view erroneous) belief that a contract per verba de praesenti amounts to a full marriage. She believes that Scott had simply misunderstood the law. She also appears to reject the same judge’s belief (expressed some fifteen years earlier in Lindo v. Belisario (1795) 1 Hag. Con. 216, 229) that pre-Reformation canon law would have treated marriages, though clandestine and irregular, as nonetheless valid. (It may be that the Reformation brought about some change in how English law would regard these matters, but Professor Probert does not make clear whether that is her view or what the basis for it might be.) Yet it must be said that if Stowell was wrong, he was only the first of many (not least judges in the United States who have accepted the notion of the ‘common law marriage’ with apparent enthusiasm). To repeat an error does not alter its falsity but it is an interesting question as to how far ‘the law’ at a particular moment in the past is what it was thought to be at the time and how far it is what subsequent generations have discovered that it ought to have been. It might also be pointed out that although the two conflicting decisions of the House of Lords in Millis (1844) 10 Cl. & Fin. 534 and Beamish (1861) 9 HLC 247 can be cited as authority for almost any proposition they do not shake what had been the conventional view that an ‘actual marriage’ could indeed be created notwithstanding some degree of informality.
Do any of these doubts really matter? Professor Probert’s great contribution is to throw an enormous amount of light on the realities of marriage practices in the ‘long eighteenth century’, and she may well be right in believing that she has disproved the widespread assumption that couples ‘married’ simply by exchanging consent, and shown that in truth such exchanges were regarded merely as contracts to marry. The fact that some may doubt whether she is wholly convincing in defining the state of the law at that period does not in any way diminish the importance and permanent value of her research. Publication of this book will surely reinforce her standing as one of the foremost legal scholars of her generation.
