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Optimal party strategies on niche issues: a computational approach to multiparty competition for position and salience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 November 2026

Anna Sophie Kurella*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Leibniz University Hannover, Hannover, Germany
Lovisa Mundschenk
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Zurich University, Switzerland
*
Corresponding author: Anna Sophie Kurella; Email: a.kurella@ipw.uni-hannover.de
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Abstract

How should parties respond to competition from a new challenger on a niche issue? Meguid argues that accommodation is effective, but recent evidence shows it may cost votes. We identify vote-maximizing strategies of established parties facing an extreme challenger using an extended Downsian model with position and salience. Based on empirical data from Germany, our results show that accommodation works only for low-valence parties, and only while the challenger is new. Otherwise, adversarial strategies benefit small parties. Major established parties maximize votes by holding moderate positions and engaging weakly with the issue. Our findings offer a theoretical baseline for understanding optimal strategies in party competition.

Information

Type
Original Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of EPS Academic Ltd.
Figure 0

Figure 1.Equilibrium positions on the environment, 1980–1987.1 long description.

Figure 1

Figure 2.Spatial model with valence and party bias. Note: Equilibrium results for parties’ optimal position and salience on the environmental issue dimension, 1980–1987.Figure 2 long description.

Figure 2

Figure 3.Share of partisans by environmental policy preference, 1983–1987.Figure 3 long description.

Figure 3

Figure 4.Equilibrium positions and salience on immigration, 2013–2021. Note: 2013a treats the AfD’s immigration stance as fixed; 2013b treats the AfD’s immigration position as a dimension that is optimized.Figure 4 long description.

Figure 4

Figure 5.Equilibrium positions and salience on immigration when considering party bias, 2013–2021. Note: 2013a treats the AfD’s immigration stance as fixed; 2013b treats the AfD’s immigration position as a dimension that is optimized.Figure 5 long description.

Figure 5

Figure 6.Share of partisans by immigration policy preference, 2013–2021.Figure 6 long description.

Figure 6

Table 1.Summary of vote-maximizing strategies by party roleTable 1 long description.

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