282
Disraeli to 15th Earl of Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/1
17 May 1874
10 Downing Street
L[yons]'s meagre & frigid letter,Footnote 1 enclosed, is another instance of the infelicitous judgment [sic] of our diplomatists[.]
It may almost rank with Cowley[’]s letter to Malmesbury about the Hubner outrage.Footnote 2
Pray, may I ask you, did you receive any telegram of the fall of the French Ministry? I did not: had I not been dining, en famille, with Lionel Rothschild I shd. have known nothing. His telegram arrived while we were at dinner. This shd be looked after.Footnote 3
283
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/1
19 May 1874
10 Downing Street
I must call your attention more particularly, & more formally, than I did on Sunday, to the affair of the Paris telegram.Footnote 4
I pointed out to you, then, that no official information, respecting the division in the French chamber, had reached me, altho’, on Saturday, during dinner, I had become acquainted with the fact.
If a telegram had been received in D[owning].S[treet]. on Saturday afternoon, there was great negligence in not furnishing it to me: if it had not, the service of the Queen is most inefficiently & injuriously conducted. [. . .]
284
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fo. 59
19 May 1874
Foreign Office
I have been enquiring into the matter to which your note refers: I don't apprehend Lord Lyons is to blame, but there was somewhere great neglect in not sending you the telegram as soon as it arrived. I shall know more presently; but I suspect the fault has not been at Paris.
285
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/1
20 May 1874
2 Whitehall Gardens
I have received an answer from Tenterden.*
His reason, that the tel:, when it arrived, was not sent to us, is not a bad reason, tho’, strictly, not an adequate one.Footnote 5
It is, that everybody knew the event, & that the news was stale.
This proves, that those in fault are at Paris.
With a priority on the lines, why was the telegram to Her Majesty's Government hours after those received by private individuals?
286
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fo. 61
20 May 1874
As you appear to attach some importance to the delay of the telegram on Saturday, I will ascertain exactly
(1) When the event took place.
(2) When it was telegraphed from the embassy.
(3) When the telegram arrived.
I am not sure that we have a priority over the French lines for our messages. At any rate the French government has precedence for its own messages over ours.
287
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/1
12 January 1875
Whitehall
It is a capital despatch; comprehensive and complete; & will please the country.Footnote 6 You did well to have a recital of the past. In these days, one must write, or speak, as if people had no memory. [. . .]
What about Spain?
It is unfortunate, we have such a man as Layard* there.Footnote 7 Tho’ of unquestionable talents, he is prejudiced & passionate, and always – I will not say misleads – but certainly misinforms, us. I am told he was the same with our predecessors, & entirely misled Granville & Co. as to the Italian king.
He was as wrong about him, as he has always been about Serrano.Footnote 8 I wish you cd. get rid of him.
288
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 13–14
12 January 1875
Foreign Office
I hear the most alarming reports of financial demands likely to be made by army & navy – whether in Cabinet today, or later, you know better than I.Footnote 9
It seems to me that we are in a strong position to repel such attacks.
We have next to no available surplus.
To borrow in time of peace is on the face of it absurd.
To impose new taxes would discredit us doubly.
First, because it is a reproach on our want of foresight, if we take off taxation in 1874 and put it on again in 1875. Next, because the late Cabinet made large reductions during their tenure of power; they may fairly claim half the credit for last year's budget, as they prepared the surplus: and the contrast will be rather too marked, if we begin spending and taxing as soon as we get a chance.
Europe is at peace: no present cause of quarrel exists.
The division of France and Germany makes it extremely improbable that either state will quarrel with us. As a matter of fact, both court our alliance.
It is not for me to say how largely augmented estimates will be received by the H[ouse]. of Commons: but that body must be greatly altered if they are popular, even on our own side.
Can we not tell these people that there is hardly anything for them this year but that 1876–7 may possibly be more productive?
Remember the D. of Northumberland and the house-tax in 1852.
289
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 26
25 February 1875
Foreign Office
The enclosed tells its own story.Footnote 10 I do not think the matter to which it refers is serious. It is part of Bismarck's policy – or an effect of his temper – to keep questions of this sort open, and stir them from time to time. And it is Belgian nature to live in fear of some neighbor [sic], and to be constantly appealing to England for protection. When we were in last you remember how every six weeks there was a fresh rumour of French invasion. Now, the danger is thought to lie in the direction of Germany.
290
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 50
2 May [1875]
The enclosed is worth your reading. I believe the alarm is over now, but nobody will answer for next year.Footnote 11
291
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/1Footnote 12
6 May 1875
2 Whitehall Gardens
I had an audience yesterday:Footnote 13 she was very gracious, &, speaking entirely on foreign affairs, I thought very sagacious & intelligent. [. . .]
My own impression is that we shd. construct some concerted movement to preserve the peace of Europe, like Pam did when he baffled France & expelled the Egyptians from Syria.Footnote 14
There might be an alliance between Russia & ourself for this special purpose; & other powers, as Austria, & perhaps Italy, might be invited to accede. [. . .]
292
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/1Footnote 15
18 May 1875
Hughenden
Your policy seems to [be] very popular, & very successful – I congratulate you heartily. It is encouraging. We must not be afraid of saying ‘Bo[o] to a goose’.Footnote 16
But we must get our forces in trim. We shall be able to do that next year. The revenue is coming in well. [. . .]
293
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fo. 202Footnote 17
[Undated]Footnote 18
I should be more impressed by these papers if I could remember a time when the C[ommander]. in Chief Footnote 19 had not been seriously alarmed at the state of our armaments.
No doubt the continent is arming; but with Germany & France watching one another, both are more likely to be civil to us than if they were on good terms.
It is a question, too, how long these enormous armaments will be endured by the masses who are compelled to serve. [. . .]
294
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 54–55
22 August 1875
Fairhill, Tonbridge
You will have seen Elliot's telegram of the 20th on the Herzegovina affair.Footnote 20 And you will observe by it that all the Great Powers have agreed to send consuls to inform the insurgents that they are to expect no support &c and advise them to lay down their arms. The Porte accepts their proposal, and asks England to join.
Whether the Turks are well advised in accepting this kind of mediation may be a question: but they have accepted it: and that being so, and the Grand Vizier asking us not to stand aloof, I conceive that we have practically no option. I propose therefore at once to signify our willingness to join. If the apparent friendliness shown by the other Powers is sincere, there is no harm done, and some good: if otherwise, we shall be of more use in checking mischief by taking part than we could be if we declined to act.
I shall go on at once with the affair, unless you telegraph to stop me. I will be in London on Tuesday, and shall defer acting till then, to give time for your answer.
295
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/1Footnote 21
24 August 1875
Weston Park, Shifnal
There is no alternative after telegram of the 20th. But I don[’]t like it —Footnote 22
296
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 56
4 September 1875
Fairhill, Tonbridge
[. . .] — I have not written to you about Turkish affairs, for your sources of information are the same as mine. What strikes me most strongly in connection with them is the very small progress which the insurgents seem to have made, though for all practical purposes unopposed.
Andrassy* is either quite undecided, or playing a double game.
The Russians appear to be rather disposed to keep things quiet.
I have no belief in the success of the consular mediation.Footnote 23
297
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
24 November 1875
Cabinet suddenly called to consider a tel. from Egypt.Footnote 24 Khedive asks 4 millions for his shares. Agree to give it. Rothchild [sic]Footnote 25 finds the money & holds the shares at 5prct. 1 million down – 3 in Jan[uar]y & Feb[ruar]y – Telegraph to StantonFootnote 26 to close. Then a pressing demand from Hunt* for 12 gunboats for China – Refused in an offhand manner. I tried for six but not one member seems to care for the state of the navy & Derby tho’ F[oreign]. Sec[retary] less than any oneFootnote 27 – It is inconceivable unless they disbelieve the statements of the Admiralty. We are 10 ships short of our peace establish[men]t & the Cabinet will only give 2 gunboats & 6 sloops – therefore the deficit will increase yearly in effective men of war. Some day we must rue this policy, & at the same meeting we borrow £4 000 000 to hold less than half the shares of the French Suez Canal Co – desirable in itself but not to be compared in importance to having ships to guard our commerce & support our foreign policy!
298
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/1
26 November 1875
2 Whitehall Gardens
[. . .] I have just come from Windsor: the great lady, in a state of utmost excitement, & unbridled delight, about the Suez-purchase. She kept saying ‘it is a blow to Bismarck’. That was evidently her Sovereign impression. I suppose, she referred to Bismarck's insolent declarations, that England had ceased to be a political power. [. . .]
299
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fo. 238
26 November 1875
[. . .] As far as I can make out, the Suez business is likely to be popular. First impressions are everywhere in its favor [sic]. [. . .]
300
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fo. 242
30 November 1875
Windsor Castle
[. . .] — When I wrote to you that ‘Harcourt said his friends were a little sore’ I meant the French Harcourt,* not the English.Footnote 28 However, he is mollified. I have allowed him to publish a report, which I have seen and in some particulars amended, of a conversation which he had with me, and of another reported by Gavard.Footnote 29 Decazes* will read these to the Assembly, or lay them before the Assembly in some form, by way of showing that nothing against French interests is intended. [. . .]
301
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fos 249–250
2 December 1875
Foreign Office
The ChancellorFootnote 30 and Northcote have been with me about this telegram of Stanton's, and we are all agreed that it would not be desirable to bid against the French.Footnote 31 It would be a bad bargain: at least a very speculative one: it would look as if we wanted exclusive possession of the canal which is just what we have always disclaimed: and it would excite the French government and people, who at present seem disposed to take the matter calmly.
If we don't buy, we can hardly object to their buying, after our own performance in that line: no territorial rights being involved in the proposed sale. Moreover, it is not certain that a second purchase by us would be as popular as the first.
This is our view, but we shall wait to hear from you.
If you agree, we must tell Stanton that we are not prepared to buy, and that we make no objection to the sale, provided no territorial rights are conveyed by it.
302
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/1Footnote 32
3 December 1875
I am clearly of opinion that we ought not to act. My principal reason is that, having asked for a mission, he has no right to enter into any new financial arrangements. Corry* will call on you to-morrow afternoon with my views.
303
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fo. 261
3 December 1875
F.O.
[. . .] I don't altogether go with Carnarvon* about the canal,Footnote 33 and have told him so: but it is useless now to discuss the point, since what I said to Gavard & Harcourt is in the Times.Footnote 34 Remember that France is not all the world, and that there is a wide difference between the attitude of objecting to monopoly in other hands, and claiming monopoly for yourself. And what we want is security for free passage through Egypt under all circumstances: not Egypt itself.
304
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/1
18 December 1875
2 Whitehall Gardens
I congratulate you on all yr triumphs.
I need not trouble you with a line on the matter on wh: I wished to see you. Lady Derby* knows all about it & will tell you. I hope it will blow over quietly – but it is amazing.Footnote 35
305
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fo. 265
20 December 1875
Knowsley
My lady has told me the story of ‘Alfred's secret’ getting out.Footnote 36 You may like to know from myself that I never mentioned it to anybody. But I fancy he himself has not been discreet, and probably if the public knows anything it is through some of his private friends.
After all, the public will care very little how he gets the money, provided that Parliament is not asked for it. — The only thing I don't understand is Schouvaloff* saying that he got the story from a minister. He must be a reckless kind of talker, for a diplomatist.
306
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 60–63
7 January 1876
Knowsley
By this time you have the Austrian noteFootnote 37 in your hand: printed.
Beust is here, having asked himself, to explain it: he has not however added much to what appears on the face of the document.
My impression is that the reforms proposed are moderate and reasonable enough in the main. [. . .] — I gather that France will undoubtedly join in the move, and Italy also: and I do not think that we can hold aloof. If we decline to join, what follows? The Porte will refuse, and then we are responsible for the failure of what is at least a promising attempt at conciliation: or the Porte will accept, and then we stand in the foolish position of being more Turkish than the Turks. Either way, we are isolated in Europe: and not backed by opinion at home.
[. . .] If we join, we ought to insist on the form being as little unpleasant to the Porte as it can be made: about which I do not suppose there will be much difficulty; and also on some sort of pledge being given by the Austrian & Russian governments that they will use their utmost exertions to induce the insurgents to lay down their arms. It is still possible that they may fail, and that the war may go on; but in that event we are no worse off than if the attempt at pacification had not been made. If, contrary to advice, the Porte ignores the suggestions addressed to it, our hands are free: we cannot take the responsibility of results arising from a policy which we have deprecated.
I should be glad to know your views, even in the briefest outline. It is too late to stand on the dignity and independence of the Sultan: a sovereign who can neither keep the peace at home nor pay his debts must expect to submit to some disagreeable consequences.
We may be dupes, but I think both Austria & Russia desire peace. Mutual jealousy, and fear of the establishment of an independent Sclave [sic] state, make it reasonable & natural that they should wish to see the status quo maintained. Whether the old fabric is not too rotten to bear patching, is another question: but a question we cannot answer till we have tried.
307
Derby to Marquis of Salisbury, SP, fo. 40
9 January 1876
Knowsley
I have read more than once your able letter.Footnote 38 I am waiting for a communication from Disraeli, and as yet the Cabinet is not in any degree committed on the Austrian proposals.
To stand aloof absolutely is to my mind out of the question. France & Italy will support Andrassy, therefore we should stand close, and with what result? The Porte, encouraged by our abstention, might resist: in which case we should be responsible for the failure of the whole scheme, and the continuance of the war. If [on] the other hand heFootnote 39 gave way against our advice, our position would be simply ludicrous. Nor should we be supported at home, for however little hopeful may be the prospect of a pacification, we have nothing better to suggest, and could only advise the parties to fight it out. But while thinking that a rejection of the Austrian scheme is not our interest, I agree with you that there is no need of being identified with it. All we have to do is to consider whether we can honestly tell the Sultan that he will on the whole lose more by rejecting than by accepting the advice offered by the three powers. As to the question of what will happen in the event of the insurgents rejecting all schemes of conciliation, I do not see that he can discuss it in the present state of affairs. Austria can do much to check the movement by merely closing the frontier: and Russia by warning Servia & Montenegro that they must not take part. If there is any part of your letter from which I dissent, it is that in which you seem to assume that a military occupation of the disturbed districts is contemplated. It may be: but various reasons lead me to a different conclusion. The jealousy between Austria & Russia is strong and marked: it is only kept in check by the fear which both feel of the formation of an independent Sclave [sic] state. The Magyars, who are too powerful to be quarrelled with, detest the notion of an increase of the Austrian Sclaves [sic]: and Andrassy is a Magyar, imbued with their feelings. It is rather dread and perplexity than ambition which seems to be the predominant motive at work in Vienna. – I could explain all this fully in conversation, but it is a long story to write. – I agree, generally, in the purport of your advice: and more especially as to our having nothing to do with the suppression of the insurrection by force. That is not our business in any case. But the insurrection is mainly fed from beyond the frontier: and if that external support were cut off, I believe even those wretched Turks could deal with it. [. . .]
308
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 40
9 January 1876
Hughenden
Three considerations first strike me.
Firstly. Is Austria justified in sending a note advising measures which the Porte has, generally speaking, announced, with the exception of one or two points which are extremely vague, and which, so far as they are intelligible, would appear to be erroneous in principle and pernicious in practice?
Secondly. This would seem an act of imbecility or of treachery. It may begin in one and end in the other. In all probability it will have no effect upon existing circumstances; then Austria and Russia, who probably contemplate an ulterior policy or should do so, will turn around upon the other Powers and say ‘The advice you gave has been rejected, you are bound to see that it is carried into effect.’
Thirdly. Whether in the advice which we are asked to give Turkey, we are not committing ourselves to principles which are, or which may be soon, matters of controversy in our own country: for instance, the apportionment of local taxation to local purposes and the right of the peasantry to the soil.
These are three suggestions which occur to me, which should make us hesitate, but there are others. I write by post.
309
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 41
9 January 1876
[. . .] I cannot resist from expressing to you, by letter as well, my strong conviction, that we should pause before assenting to the Austrian proposal.
You know how great is my confidence in your judgement, &, therefore, you can better appreciate the hesitation wh: I feel in differing from the course wh: you recommend.
I think it will land us in a false position, & it would be preferable to appear isolated, wh: I usually deprecate, than, for the sake of a simulated union, wh: will not last many months, embarrass ourselves, when independent action may be necessary.
In declining to identify ourselves, as requested, with the Note, is it necessary to appear as Turkish, or more Turkish, than the Turks? Could we not devise a course wh: might avoid that? [. . .]Footnote 42
310
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 43
19 April 1876
Hughenden
[. . .] I say nothing about Turkish affairs.Footnote 44 You are a younger man, than yr friend & correspondent, & will have eno’ to do for the rest of yr life in these matters.
311
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 45
20 April 1876
Hughenden
[. . .] Altho’ I am not very surprised at the position of Turkish affairs, I confess there is something cynical about Gortchakow's treatment, wh: I think is not exactly respectful to us, after his representations.Footnote 46 But with no Russian ambassador here, & a mere Polonius at St Petersburg,Footnote 47 it is difficult to ascertain with precision the situation.
The illimitable trust, wh: all the great powers have in Andrassy while, apparently, they do everything to counteract his efforts, would be amusing were it not so dangerous. [. . .]Footnote 48
312
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/3, fo. 44
27 April 1876
I presume we have a Cabinet on Saturday: if so, I shall be present.Footnote 49 You know why it has been impossible for me to call upon you: but as far as F.O. is concerned, there is not much to discuss. Egypt I think is settling itself: and as to the great question of the east, there is nothing any way urgent. Matters here come to a dead lock [sic], and it is clearly for the Powers which initiated the policy of the Andrassy note to suggest a new way out of the difficulty. [. . .]
313
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
15 May 1876
2 Whitehall Gardens
I must, I am sorry to say, again complain of the want of order & discipline in your office.
The Queen sent to me twice on Saturday, to enquire, whether there was news from Berlin, & wrote to me on her point of departure, requesting, that I wd. forward the expected information immediately.
I did not go to the German embassy on Saturday, but I have since heard that the communication made to the excluded ambassadors was generally known there.Footnote 50
Nothing had reached me, & on Sunday morning, when the messenger went to Windsor, I had to inform the Queen, that Her Majys Govt. knew nothing.
At one o’[clo]ck: I received Odo Russell[’]s tel:, wh: left Berlin at 5 o’[clo]ck: on Saturday, & wh: ought to have been here before you left town!
I went instantly to the ‘resident clerk’ for an explanation, & with an enquiry (to have in writing) at what hour the Berlin tel: reached him.
The ‘resident clerk’ was not in residence!
I believe yr office is very badly managed – the clerks attend there later, than any other public office, witht. the excuse of being worked at night as they were by Palmn. It is only a default at a most critical moment like the present, that the negligence becomes insufferable – & so one complains.
I say nothing here of the contents of the tel:, respecting wh: we can confer when you like.
[PS] The Queen complains, that she never receives tels: direct: only in a bag when they are stale.
314
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/3, fos 48–49
16 May 1876
Foreign Office
I don't know whether you will care to look at the enclosed papers – the result of your letter to me of yesterday.Footnote 51
It seems that the German telegram did not arrive till late at night. Probably the German authorities took care that their own messages should have a good start.
You might have received it the first thing on Sunday morning: and to that extent there has been negligence. I do not suppose you would have wished to be called up for it in the night.
Some loss of time must occur in the case of long telegrams. This one would probably take an hour and a half to decypher [sic].
I do not think the resident clerk can be blamed for being out for a couple of hours. The same man is on duty for a week and close confinement to the office would be impracticable.
I will consult with Tenterden about the Queen's telegrams.
315
Note by Disraeli, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 52
16 May 1876
Mr Disraeli fears that we are being drawn step by step into participating in a scheme which must end very soon in the disintegration of Turkey.
Though we may not be able to resist the decision of the three military empires, he does not think we ought to sanction or approve their proposals.
It is almost a mockery for them to talk of a desire that the powers should act in concert and then exclude France, Italy, and England from their deliberations, and ask us by telegraph to say yes or no to propositions which we have never heard discussed.
Moreover it is asking us to sanction them in putting a knife to the throat of Turkey, whether we like it or not. [. . .]Footnote 53
316
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
[17 May 1876]Footnote 54
2 Whitehall Gardens
I have just returned from Windsor, & am very unwell.
Odo Russell, in his tel: to day [sic], talks of ‘most serious consequences’ from the course we are contemplating.
Would it not be as well to enquire of him by tel: what he means by that phrase?
317
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 70
17 May [1876]Footnote 55
Foreign Office
On every account I am very sorry for your being unwell. I am puzzled by O[do].R[ussell].'s telegram: having just seen Macdonell [sic],Footnote 56 who tells me that he (O.R.) is quite aware of the impracticable nature of the scheme, & expected us to withhold our assent. I have telegraphed to him today that he may announce our refusal confidentially to Bismarck: and Münster* will telegraph also.
I will ask as you suggest what are the dangers that R. apprehends; but it is too late to draw back, nor do we wish it.
318
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
18 May 1876
2 Whitehall Gardens
Nothing can be better;Footnote 57 it touches all the points.
The proposal to support an armistice, with[ou]t. any reference to the other propositions, is absurd – They always argue, as if the armistice depended merely on the assent of the Turks. They always evade the reciprocity due from the insurgents.
I don't think much of Odo's reply to the ‘serious consequences’ tel: Whatever is done now, the consequences will probably be serious.Footnote 58
I think you will find, that public opinion will ratify your policy.Footnote 59
319
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
20 May 1876
2 Whitehall Gardens
[. . .] Don't you think we ought to ascertain the exact naval force of for[eign]: powers in the Mediterranean, & consider about strengthening our own? [. . .]Footnote 60
320
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 75
24 May 1876
Foreign Office
We telegraphed yesterday, at the request of the Admiralty, to know the strength of the Turkish fleet: asking various details.
Here is the answer: just come. Do we require further information? If so, can you tell me more exactly what it is? I failed to gather this morning what were the further details required.Footnote 61
321
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 83
27 May [?1876]
Foreign Office
You have seen the long Vienna telegrams. Our resident clerk was up till 5.a.m. this morning deciphering, and began again at 8. So we are not always lazy!Footnote 62
322
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 63
28 May 1876
10 Downing Street
[. . .] The Turkish Fleet is at present in everybody's mind: a prize the possession of wh: may influence the fate of nations. [. . .]
The danger from the Dardanelles is of another kind. The treaty of 1841 must not be violated.Footnote 64 That should be a cardinal principle with us. But if violated, there is but little compensation to be found in the consciousness, that we have made a protest. What if secret instructions were given to our admiral, that, if any of the naval forces assembled propose to violate the treaty of 1841, he shd. warn them, that it must be on their responsibility, & that he is instructed to maintain that treaty by force? [. . .]
323
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
28 May 1876
2 Whitehall Gardens
It reaches me from a high quarter, that yesterday it was all but settled, that a proposal shd be made to us for a congress: the proposal really coming from the three powers – but, – to spare their pride as much as possible, – to originate with France.Footnote 65 Not [that], as I am told, either Germany or Austria have any pride they care to be spared, Gortch[ako]ff. having a monopoly, in this instance, of that quality. The wires bet[wee]n. Paris & Ems had little rest yesterday. It was understood, that the proposal was to be made to us immediately.
If the Berlin Memorandum be not presented to the Porte, & a congress proposed in its stead, I think our diplomatic triumph wd. be complete= but the withdrawal shd. be a condition precedent of any assent on our part. I have myself no fear of a congress, tho’ I doubt it doing much.
324
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 91–92
28 May 1876
Keston
A draft has gone or is going to you, founded on a conversation between Harcourt and me of yesterday's date: in which he made overtures in the sense you mention, saying that in Decazes's opinion a congress was the only expedient to get us all out of the mess. I had no doubt in my mind but that this was a Russian proposal.
No immediate answer was expected or asked for: and I should not have given one without consulting the Cabinet.
I have no objection to a congress or conference in principle, but unless we go into it with a fairly clear idea of what we want, it will only add to the muddle.
The rest when we meet.
325
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
29 May 1876
2 Whitehall Gardens
I do not like Lord Odo's letter, or anything, so far as I can gather, he has done — He was not, originally, justified in offering his personal opinion, that our Govt would accept the Russian note – an unheard-of step!Footnote 66 And the worst of it is, it indicates such a want of ability – He does not even seem now to comprehend the situation. I have myself no doubt, that, if we are stiff, we shall gain all our points, because no one is really adverse to them, except Russia —
I have no fear of a congress, but I entirely agree with you, that before we enter it, our scheme shd. be matured. I am myself inclined to stipulate, that it should be founded on status quo= but that a liberal interpretation shd be placed on that phrase, so that we may create other vassal states.
I think it would be better not to increase the territories of Montenegro or Servia. I fancy all the powers, ex[cep]t Russia, wd. agree with us in this= & if secured, the defeat of Russian designs would be complete.
326
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 93
29 May 1876
Foreign Office
I should quite agree with you about Odo Russell, if I felt sure that he had expressed himself in the sense of the views ascribed to him. But I doubt it. Russians are not scrupulous, and Gortschakoff may probably enough have told the French ambassador & others that he had ascertained that we were ready to join, on the mere speculation that such a statement would be useful. It is possible that Russell may have allowed his personal opinion to be guessed at, but without more proof I cannot believe that he has gone further. — I will think well over what you say as to the basis of a conference.
327
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 67
31 May 1876
2 Whitehall Gardens
Elliot tells us nothing as to who brought all this about.Footnote 68 It is always one man who does these things – It ought to have been Elliot himself, but that, I fear, is not the case.Footnote 69
What will happen? Until we know, we can scarcely shape our course. If the Turks were to establish ‘a constitution’, they would go up in the market of Europe, wh: is always liberal= perhaps get a new loan.
But pray think of our last conversation as to possible congress – I feel convinced it is the only practical solution in the long run – conference or congress on the basis of status quo; admitting creation of new vassal states but siné quâ non [sic], no increase of the territory of any existing vassal state. If Bismarck agrees to this, the affair is finished, & for a generation.
328
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
[31 May 1876]Footnote 70
I am very anxious about Besika Bay & its contents.
Instructions as I intimated mean, you say, war. That depends entirely on the men instructed[.] With a competent ambassador & admiral, it shd. mean peace not war.
The ambassador & adm[ira]l: under existing circumstances, must be in confidential communication with the other envoys and commanders, & it is their principal duty to make these colleagues aware of contingencies.
Instructions may lead to war, but non-instructions may bring about catastrophes.Footnote 71 Witness Navarino!Footnote 72 The circumstances were very similar & the British admiral was left entirely with[ou]t instructions.
329
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 97
4 June 1876
I return the letter with many thanks.Footnote 73 It is curious & interesting. All that reaches me, from whatever quarter (and I have heard comments from many quarters) tends in the same direction. Our refusal of the Berlin note is a success both at home & abroad.Footnote 74
330
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 75
24 June 1876
2 Whitehall Gardens
I met Schou: last night at dinner, & he got me in a corner before he went to Beust's ball.Footnote 76
He was full of matter: clear, for him calm, & not at all claretyFootnote 77 — This is the upshot, wh: I thought you ought to know.
The affairs must be settled: there must be a thoro’ good understanding between Eng: & Russia. The despatch was one of confiance & bon vouloirFootnote 78 – This he repeated often: at last, he asked me whether I did not think it so? Obliged to speak, I said I wd. not doubt it, but he must admit, that with all its confiance &c, it suggested, or proposed, a great deal.
Really, he replied, not more, than, we believe, you wish & is for your interest — But if you disapprove, propose yourselves & we will follow you —
Now this is the important part —
England is under a false impression about autonomy:Footnote 79 we [the Russians] don[’]t propose, or wish, a military or political autonomy; only an administrative one. The sultan may have his troops, his fortresses, his political affairs, provided the people may manage their own affairs.
As for Montenegro, it has got about, that Russia is intriguing for a port under the pretence of increasing the territory of Montenegro. No such thing, we renounce the idea, Montenegro need have no port, only a little garden to grow cabbages and potatoes.Footnote 80 We do not care for Servia as we do for Montenegro, but what Servia wants is not much, & I believe the Sultan has more than once been on the point of granting what they wish — [. . .]
331
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 81
28 June 1876Footnote 82
2 Whitehall Gardens
If war takes place between Turkey & Servia, & the Porte is victorious, & seeks the legitimate consequences of victory, as, for example, the restoration of Belgrade, it shd. at once be distinctly signified to Russia, that if Russia interfere under these circumstances, the position of affairs will be considered by England as most grave.
Servia will not move, unless she is confident, that Russia will step in, in case of Servia being worsted, & so save her from the consequences of her headstrong audacity.
At present, it[’]s heads I win, tails you lose.
If this declaration, on our part, is simultaneously accompanied by a determined effort to detach Montenegro from Servia, war will not take place – but this decided course ought to be taken today. Even hours are precious.
332
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 123
28 June [1876]
Foreign Office
Can you see me about one o'clock (sooner, if you like) about the Russian proposal?Footnote 83 Circumstances have changed since we talked about it last. Andrassy objects strongly to Bosnian autonomy. — The Montenegrin part of the business is done as far as we are concerned. — Servia seems hopeless. It is a new world since last week. I am to see the Russian at 3.Footnote 84
333
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 121
[?28] June 1876Footnote 85
Foreign Office
I am making a note of my conversation with Schou. which you shall have as soon as it is written out fair.Footnote 86
He pressed very hard on the question of autonomy – gave up the notion of asking anything for Servia at present – did not know much of what was doing there &c[.] He has been misrepresenting us both in a wild manner, as I learn from Harcourt.
334
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 125–126
28 June 1876
Foreign Office
All other considerations apart, I suspect the Russian proposal is too late. The Servians seem bent on fighting. I have the answer to Schouvaloff in hand, and hope to have it ready today.
Andrassy is strongly against all suggestions of autonomy, saying that the two parties in Bosnia will do nothing if left alone, but cut at one another's throats. I am afraid he is not far wrong. Beust read me his telegram, which I copied, a little abridged, and you will have it in the shape of a draft.
Our debate on MondayFootnote 87 went off well. NapierFootnote 88 & Hammond being so much more Turkish than the government, make L[or]d Granville's position difficult. He felt it, and was very obviously annoyed.
335
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 89
14 July 1876
2 Whitehall Gardens
I must again complain of the management of your office, & request your personal attention to it.
It is impossible to represent F.O. in the House of Commons, in these critical times, with[ou]t. sufficient information. What I receive is neither ample, nor accurate.
After I had made the declarations,Footnote 90 wh: I did on yr authority respecting the Bulgarian ‘atrocities’, I find a despatch from our consul at Rustchuk, received, if I remember right, on the 28th June, & which reached me a fortnight afterwards, wh: if it do [sic] not confirm them as facts, refers to them as rumors [sic], wh: are probable, & refers to them in some detail.
Last night Mr BaxterFootnote 91 gave notice of a question to be put on Monday to me. =whether the Bulgarian outrages, referred to in the Daily News, were not regularly communicated, at the time, by our consul at Adrianople, & whe[the]r. our ambassador at Const[antinople]: had not consequently remonstrated with the Turkish Govt?
This was pretty well giving me the lie in the H[ouse]: of Commons, &, under ordinary circumstances, I shd. have at once risen, & not waited for moving for the reply. But I have no confidence what[eve]r. in yr office, & I was obliged to submit in silence to the indignity, & for aught I know, Monday may increase the pain of my position.
336
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 127–128
14 July 1876
Foreign Office
I communicated your letter of yesterdayFootnote 92 to Tenterden, from whom I understand you had the information on which your answer was given; and he tells me that he has explained to you verbally the circumstances. I do not see that you have anything to retract or even to modify in your answer. The despatch which you did not see, as well as I remember did not bear on the particular subject on which you were questioned. I am not disposed to defend the office where they have been negligent, but where papers must pass through various hands (mine, Tenterden's, Bourke's*, and afterwards the Queen's and those of our colleagues) I don't see how it is possible to guard against the chance of a paper which you want at very short notice being out of the hands of the department. I have often asked for papers to refer to and been told that they were in circulation – and this must happen, unless every despatch of importance here [is] to be copied and only the copy sent round.
There is later intelligence since come in, which will supply material for your answer on Monday.Footnote 93
337
Disraeli to 6th Duke of Richmond,* Goodwood MS 865Footnote 94
24 July 1876Footnote 95
10 Downing Street
Some little time ago, when we had extricated ourselves from our difficulties, & the government was not less popular & strong, than at present, I was obliged to inform the Queen, that it would not be possible for me to carry on Her Majesty's affairs after the present session.
Altho’, being well acquainted with the Queen's sensitiveness, or perhaps I ought to say constitutional convictions, on the subject, I did not presume to recommend my successor, I ventured to observe, that, if Her Majesty wished to retain Her present Cabinet, I thought there would be no difficulty in keeping them together under an individual, whose fitness would be generally admitted by themselves & the country.
Her Majesty did not seem to believe in this, or to approve of my communication, & wrote to me from Scotland to propose, that I should continue in my present post, & go to the House of Lords, which, she was graciously pleased to say, she had always contemplated since my illness at Balmoral two years ago.
As I have no heir, I was unwilling, in the decline of life, to commence a new career in a House of Parliament of which I had no experience, & where I should be looked upon as an intruder, & I requested Her Majesty's permission to adhere to my original feeling & to make some confidential enquiries on the subject.
I found, to my great surprise, that the Queen had judged the situation more accurately than myself, & that my secession might lead to serious consequences.
Altho’ my continuing in the House of Commons for another session would shorten my remaining life, I was prepared to make such a sacrifice, if, at the end of the year, I could have found the difficulties, occasioned by my withdrawal, removed: but I see no prospect of that. The identical difficulties would reappear.
Under these circumstances, I have had to reconsider the Queen's proposal, & to bring myself to contemplate, as an act of duty to Her Majesty & my colleagues, the possibility of my going to the upper house as a minister, a condition which I had never foreseen. I invite you as a colleague, whom I greatly value, & with whose parliamentary position such a step on my part would necessarily, in some degree, interfere, to speak to me frankly on this subject: clearly understanding, that my only motive now is the maintenance of the ministry & the party, & to secure these, I am ready still to try to serve them, or cheerfully altogether to disappear.
338
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
25 July 1876
10 Downing Street
Altho’ I have not spoken to you before on the subject of this letter, it has not been from reserve, but because I was aware, that, thro’ the medium of our dearest friend,Footnote 96 we were not altogether uninformed of what was passing thro’ each others’ mind on the matter.
Some little time ago, when we had extricated ourselves from our difficulties, & the government was not less popular & strong, than at present, I was obliged to inform the Queen, that it wd not be possible for me to carry on Her Majesty's affairs after the present session.
Altho’, being acquainted with the Queen's sensitiveness, or perhaps I ought to say, constitutional convictions, on the subject, I did not presume to recommend my successor, I ventured to observe, that, if Her Majesty wished to retain Her present Cabinet, I thought there would be no difficulty in keeping them together under an individual, whose fitness would be generally admitted by themselves & the country.
Her Majesty did not receive this communication very graciously, nor did she generally approve of my communication, & she wrote to me from Scotland to propose, that I shd. continue in my present position, & go to the House of Lords, which she was pleased to say, that she had always, since my illness at Balmoral two years ago, contemplated.
As I have no heir, I was unwilling, in the decline of life, to commence a new career in a House of Parliament of which I had no experience, & where, in an official position, I might be looked upon as an intruder, & I requested Her Majesty's permission to adhere to my original feeling, & to make some confidential enquiries on the subject.
I found, I may say to my great surprise, that the Queen had judged the situation more accurately than myself, & that my secession might lead to serious consequences.
Altho’ my continuing in the Commons, for another session, would shorten my remaining life, I was prepared to make such a sacrifice, if, at the end of the year, I could have found the difficulties, occasioned by my withdrawal, removed: but I see no prospect of that. The identical difficulties would re-appear.
Under these circumstances, I have had to reconsider the Queen's proposal, & to bring myself to contemplate, as an act of duty, the possibility of my going to the upper house as a minister; a condition which I had never foreseen.
I invite you, not only as my principal colleague, & whom I wished to be my successor, but as a very old friend, & the faithful companion of all my public fortunes, to speak to me frankly on this subject: distinctly bearing in mind, that I have, now, no other object but the maintenance of the ministry & the welfare of the party = & that, to secure these results, I am prepared, either to endeavour still to serve them, or altogether cheerfully to disappear.
339
Duke of Richmond to Earl Cairns, Cairns Papers, PRO 30/51/3, fos 101–102
27 July 1876
Goodwood
[. . .] I recd a box from the Prime Minister yesterday, detailing his views as to the House of Lords &c and asking me what I felt about [it]. I answered in the terms we had agreed on and said no one would welcome him more sincerely or cordially than I should, and that I considered it not only the best but the only arrangement that I considered was at all practicable and likely to keep all parties together. I hope he will be satisfied with my answer. I wrote it in a hurry. I intended it to be very cordial.
[. . .] I had a long talk last night with Lady Bradford but did not mention Disraeli[’]s letter: she seems to know everything down to the most minute details of every thing that passes.Footnote 97 She actually knew that I had written to the P.M. to complain of Hardwicke[’]sFootnote 98 non attendance. He also told her we had a stormy Cabinet on Monday, which I do not admit was the case.Footnote 99
340
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
2 August 1876
2 Whitehall Gardens
I don't think we ought to let France & Germany bully the poor Turks with ultimatums about the Salonika compensation.Footnote 100
Surely we have influence eno’ with F. and G. to gain a little reasonable time; particularly as their governments expressed themselves satisfied to Sir H. Elliott.
Ought we not to send a tel. to Paris & Berlin?
341
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 101
7 August 1876
House of Commons
We have had a very damaging debate on Bulgarian atrocities,Footnote 102 & it is lucky for us, in this respect, that the session is dying.
Had it not been for an adroit and ingenious speech by Bourke, who much distinguished himself, the consequences might have been rather serious.
But two grave results are now evident:
1. That Elliot has shown a lamentable want of energy & deficiency of information:Footnote 103 &
2nd. That our own F.O. is liable to the same imputations.
The F.O. misled me in the first replies wh: I gave on their voucher, & had I seen that despatch of Consul Reade,Footnote 104 which never reached me, I wd. never have made those answers, &, what is more, shd have pressed it on you to follow up Reade's revelations.Footnote 105
I write this now, because HartingtonFootnote 106 wants more papers, & wants them before Prorogation, that he may have more damaging debates.
It is a very awkward business, &, I feel, a great exposure of our diplomatic system abroad & at home.
342
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 147
21 August 1876
Fairhill, Tunbridge
[. . .] The Servian government does not seem to know its own mind as to war or peace. But we have done all that under the circumstances can be attempted. Pressure put on the PrinceFootnote 107 would only be misconstrued.
I am to see Beust & Schouvaloff tomorrow.
343
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 149
25 August 1876
Fairhill, Tunbridge
You will have seen White'sFootnote 108 telegram. The Servians ask for mediation. I have sent off in reply the two telegrams of which I enclose copy. There was no time to lose, and I know the view you take: therefore I acted at once.
344
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
26 August 1876
Hughenden
I received your tels: last night, by messenger, of which I quite approve.
I fear from Elliot's letter, just read, that the position at Constantinople is too strained for his nerve.
I cannot believe in the 15 000 Russian soldiers & all that. If true, the Turks have licked the Russians.
I hope you will be able to arrange affairs with[ou]t. a conference. That is a sort of thing at which ‘the old coxcomb’Footnote 109 plays a great part, & invents questions for solution, wh: need not be solved.
345
Gathorne Hardy* to Cairns, Cairns Papers, PRO 30/51/7, fo. 43
29 August 1876
Hemsted
I do not know whether you get intelligence of foreign affairs. The Eastern matter is so serious that I did not like to remain in total darkness & wrote to Derby for some information.Footnote 110 I send you his note to read. The stir about the atrocities is I think real and is penetrating deep. My impression is that in any negotiations they must be recognised and a repetition if possible provided against. Derby is I fear not enough alive to thisFootnote 111 but I hope our chief who generally tries the public pulse will not be unmindful of it on this occasion. Horrible as war is at its best[,] the accounts of what took place exceed[,] as they become more authentic[,] what was first reported. I write to you because I know that you generally are more consulted on foreign affairs than others of the Cabinet. [. . .]Footnote 112
346
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 151–153
31 August 1876
Fairhill, Tunbridge
I have been thinking seriously over what you say of Sir H. Elliot; but with only, so far, a negative result.Footnote 113
I am clear that to remove him at the present moment would be unwise.
First, it would look too [much] like making him a scapegoat, which is always a shabby & unsatisfactory expedient: and those who now ask for his recall would be the first to say we were throwing on him the blame of our own acts or omissions.
Next, it is ill to change your instrument at a crisis: as President Lincoln told the American public, – it is not the moment to ‘swop horses when you are crossing the ford.’
No new man could at once know as much of what is required as Elliot must do: however superior in ability:– and the most important work is that which will have to be done in the next few weeks. Again, he is trusted and liked by the Turks: and a sudden removal of him, if employed by the enemy to convey the notion of a change of policy, would lessen our influence just when we are in a position to use it to the most advantage.
Peace made, he might not be unwilling to retire, and the same objections would not apply. The one essential thing now is to make a peace, and for my part I am prepared to put any necessary amount of pressure on the Porte. In fact it is in the interest of the Turks, for continued war means Russian intervention, and their destruction. We could not save them, or even try it, as English feeling is now. You will see by my telegrams that I have made that clear at Constantinople.
It looks as if all the world, with possibly the exception of Austria, wished for an early settlement: but the more mechanical difficulty of getting the assent of six governments to every proposition causes delay.
I shall be in town tomorrow, and no doubt shall see most of the ambassadors or their substitutes.
347
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 155Footnote 114
1 September 1876
I propose to send the following telegram to Sir H. Elliot. Let me know if you concur. Time is of great importance.Footnote 115
‘As Austrian Government objects to collective action, and as time presses, I have to instruct you to propose at once to the Turkish Govt. an armistice of not less than a month's duration, with a view to the immediate discussion of terms of peace. The armistice should include all combatants. You will inform your colleagues of these instructions and ask for their support.[’]Footnote 116
348
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
1 September 1876
Hughenden
I concur, for I think you ought to be supported in every thing at this moment. But with so long a term, I think some of the principal preliminaries shd., if possible, have accompanied it. But, probably, that's not possible.
The great thing is to bind Russia to something — [. . .]
349
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
2 September 1876
Hughenden
What you say about removing Elliot, at this moment, is quite unanswerable, but when I brought the matter before you, the application of Prince Milan had not been made.
Elliot's stupidity has brought us near to a great peril. If he had acted with promptitude – or even kept himself, & us, informed, these ‘atrocities’ might have been checked much earlier. As it is, he has brought us into the position, most unjustly, of being thought to connive at them. — And yet Tenterden will maintain he has not committed a single fault! He has nearly destroyed a strong and popular government.
But in a scrape, we shd. turn it into ‘commodities’ as Falstaff says, or something like it.Footnote 117 These ‘atrocities’ will permit us to dictate to the Porte, & they must be told, that, unless they follow our counsels, they must be prepared for autonomy in Bulgaria, & other things. [. . .]
350
Disraeli to Salisbury, SP, fos 149–151Footnote 118
3 September 1876
Hughenden
[. . .] Affairs are most critical. Had it not been for those unhappy ‘atrocities,’ we should have settled a peace very honorable [sic] to England, & satisfactory to Europe.
Now, we are obliged to work from a new point of departure, & dictate to Turkey, who has forfeited all sympathy. If these efforts fail, Russia & Austria will march their armies into the Balkan [sic] in the spring, either simultaneously & with an understanding, or the one following the example of the other from jealousy & fear.
All this must lead to partition. I think we ought to get the lead in our own hands & anticipate all this. But I won't go on, & perhaps mislead you by my imperfect expressions. Derby is behaving with energy, & I hope will be up to the mark – It will not be from want of bottle holding. It is the most difficult business I have ever had to touch.
351
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 119
4 September 1876
Hughenden
I have been thinking much about the present state of affairs, & our new point of departure: wise & inevitable, & wise because inevitable. But it is difficult to conceal from ourselves, that it is a course, which will probably bring about a result very different from that originally contemplated.
I cannot help doubting whether any arrangement, tho’ I have confidence in your skill & your fortune, a quality as important as skill, is now practicable. I fear affairs will linger on till the spring, when Russia & Austria will march their armies into the Balkan [sic], either simultaneously, & with a certain understanding, or one following the other's example from jealousy and fear.
As Count Andrassy observed to Sir Andrew Buchanan,Footnote 120 ‘There is no alternative between the notes of this year, & the solution of the Eastern Question.’
I think, the probability is, that it will be the ‘solution of the Eastern question’, &, if so, it is wise, that we shd. take the lead in it – Our chance of success will be greater, because, from us it will be unexpected.
If old Brunnow were here, the work, so far as Russia is concerned, might be shorter than with others. Perhaps Schouvaloff may be equally handy, but, certainly, Palmerston with Brunnow managed in 1840 the solution of the Eastern Question, in the other direction, and admirably.
Whatever the jealousies of Austria & Russia, they would prefer a division of the Balkan spoil under the friendly offices of England to war, between themselves, certainly, &, probably, with others: Constantinople, with an adequate district, should be neutralised, & made a free port, in the custody, & under the guardianship, of England, as the Ionian Isles were.
I fancy there would be no difficulty in the enlargement of Greece. Nature indicates, & policy would not oppose, it. [. . .]Footnote 121
I write this on the assumption, that the present attempt at peace will fail. God grant it may not! But if it do, I humbly think we cannot act too powerfully & too promptly. Decision & energy will render the work practicable; hesitation & timidity will involve us in infinite difficulty & peril, in the whirlpool of wh: we should disappear.
352
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 159–160
5 September 1876
Fairhill, Tunbridge
I return Northcote's letter.Footnote 122 It seems to me that we are acting in the sense that he recommends. I can't write officially about the ‘atrocities’ till Baring's report arrives,Footnote 123 but shall then lose no time. I agree as to the necessity of making some stipulations for the better government of the disturbed provinces – including Bulgaria. But the first step is the armistice. If you have seen my telegrams, you will, I think, be of opinion that I could scarcely have impressed on the Porte the necessity of making peace in more decided language. I have warned the Turks in plain terms that as matters stand we could not now protect them from a Russian attack. What more is it possible to say? Your letter raises much wider questions, and I must think it well over before giving any answer. If once we raise the question of partition, the risk of war is great, for the Powers will all want something, and the division of the spoil is not likely to be made in an amicable manner. — For my own part, I do not believe any territorial advantage on the frontier would reconcile Russia to seeing Constantinople in the hands of a Great Power, friendly or not. But all this I reserve for further & fuller consideration.
353
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 124
6 September 1876
Hughenden
I got your box this morning —
I sent you Northcote's letter, because he has an ingenious mind, with popular sympathies, but timid, unwisely timid – which timidity always is, tho’ caution has many charms.Footnote 125 What I wish to impress upon you, at this moment, as regards home, is not to act, as if you were under the control of popular opinion.Footnote 126 If so, you may do what they like, but they won't respect you for doing it.
After all, all this tumult is on a false assumption, that we have been, or are, upholding Turkey – all the Turks may be in the Propontis, so far as I am concerned, & the first thing, after we had declined the Berlin mem[orandum]:, that you did, was to tell Musurus so.
If the thing goes well & we get what we want, all this row will subside, & be forgotten before our first Cab[inet]. Council, & we shall get the credit of the arrangement, but if an arrangement takes place, & it is supposed that we have acted under the pressure of this HudibrasticFootnote 127 crew of high ritualists, dissenting ministers & ‘the great Liberal Party’, we shall be contemptible.
Now, what is going on? [. . .] I fear there must be a congress, tho’ I hate it & I am quite confident we cd. have managed without it, had it not been for this Bulgarian Bogy.
I fancy the report of the joint Mus[lim]: & XtianFootnote 128 Commission at Phil[ippopol]:iFootnote 129 is well founded. It agrees with the reports of the Belg[ian]: Cons[ul]-Gen[era]l. &, what is better, it agrees with the probability of human nature — But Baring is, probably, such an intense ass, that he will not dare to speak the truth.
It is fearful to think we had Elliot – but his entourage seems worse.
354
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 161–162
7 September 1876
Fairhill, Tunbridge
I have your letter: many thanks. I am not more discomposed than you by the Bulgarian agitation; which as far as it is sincere, is directed against the Turks rather than against the Cabinet; though naturally it is utilised by the enemy. It is only so far serious, that being known to all Europe, and probably exaggerated by foreign journals, it weakens our hands. I have thought it only fair to warn the Porte of our position in that respect, and it was in the interest of our policy to do so: but peace, if we get it, will stop all the noise. I have not yet read with close attention the ‘verbosa et grandis epistola’ that has come from Hawarden.Footnote 130 From what I have seen, it appears to resolve itself into a demand for autonomy for Bulgaria: a small result for so large a document. [. . .]
355
Lord John Manners* to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 106/3, fos 92–93
7 September 1876
St Marys Tower, Birnam
[. . .] To turn to graver matters – the country, under skilful management,Footnote 131 has gone stark staring mad, and there is little or no use in endeavouring to stem the tide of foolish talk. I don't think however that it will last much longer.
The chief danger to my mind is the possible effect at St. Petersburg. Derby's declaration to Elliot of August 29th that if Russia attacked Turkey we should not interfere having unluckily got wind Russia may be tempted to act upon it, and the circumstances and end of a war so commenced no one can predicate. My own belief is that Turkey, left to her own resources, would make a much better fight of it than most people here anticipate, and I conclude with her maritime supremacy in the Black Sea she would not, as we did, spare Odessa. But what a prospect! I hope you will not, in deference to this outcry, withdraw the fleet from Besika Bay. [. . .]
356
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 132
8 September 1876
Hughenden
[. . .] Gladstone has had the impudence to send me his pamphlet, tho’ he accuses me of several crimes. The document is passionate & not strong; vindictive & ill-written – that of course. Indeed, in that respect, of all the Bulgarian horrors perhaps the greatest. [. . .]
357
Sir Stafford Northcote to R.A. Cross,* Cross Papers, BL Add. MS 51265, fos 112–113
8 September 1876
Balmoral
[. . .] I forget whether I told you that I am likely to have to address the Cons. W.M. at Edinburgh before I go south.Footnote 133 I must say something about the Eastern question then; and I shall be rather glad of the opportunity.Footnote 134 I don't think Gladstone's pamphlet will do us much harm. It is a powerful bit of rhetoric; but its conclusions are very weak and inconclusive. I expect that we shall see a subsidence in the agitation before very long. What I am anxious about is the obstinate resistance which the Turks seem likely to make to an armistice, and the effect which their refusal may have upon Russia. Derby has sent very strongly worded telegrams to impress moderation upon them; but the result is still doubtful. [. . .]
358
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 173–174
12 September 1876
Fairhill, Tunbridge
My deputations went off well.Footnote 135 There were two of them. The first respectable and sensible; the second a gathering of idiots who talked about doing away with war, abolishing standing armies, and all that sort of thing. To these last I said nothing beyond what civility required: the others I answered at length: [. . .]Footnote 136
359
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 175
13 September 1876
Foreign Office
I have just parted with Odo Russell. He goes tomorrow to his post. He says Bismarck has no plan about this eastern question – wishes for peace – but otherwise does not care how it is settled.
Bismarck's chief anxiety is to keep Austria & Russia on the terms that best suit his views – not hostile, nor yet intimate. He, Bismarck, is especially desirous of keeping Andrassy where he is, thinking him a friend to Germany.
I asked Odo to do all he could to find out what danger there really is of Russian intervention. He does not consider it great. [. . .]
360
Salisbury to Earl of Carnarvon, Carnarvon Papers, BL Add. MS 60758, fos 180–181
13 September 1876
Chalet Cecil, Puys
[. . .] For the present, I think Derby's speech is as much as can be said. I gather that at Constantinople we are still pressing for an armistice. If we fail, I presume Russia will act: & an entire change of scene will take place. If we succeed, there will of course be a conference: & the instructions given for the conference will [be] of primary importance. Elliot is evidently very much disposed to make everything pleasant to [sic] the Turk. No advantage to England can result from such a policy now: & their alliance & friendship is a reproach to us. The Turk[’]s teeth must be drawn: even if he be allowed to live. [. . .]
361
Hardy to Cairns, Cairns Papers, PRO 30/51/7, fos 99–101
14 September 1876
Hemsted
[. . .] Derby's speechFootnote 137 is calm & clear but cold and too much addressed to the reasonable world only.Footnote 138 At the same time it proves non complicity in fact by dates and otherwise and he was right not to answer the violent men like Freeman who impute wilful connivance.Footnote 139 I hope his histories are more impartial than his letters[,] which are specimens of malignant calumny[,] particularly against Beaconsfield & Derby[,] such as one seldom has seen. I wish the Cabinet were more fully informed of what is going on [. . .] What he [Gladstone] calls ‘easy’ is a task which might baffle the highest order of politician for it requires the cordial concurrence of six Powers – three at least of wh. have or think they have conflicting interests. I suppose Northcote will speak ‘by authority’ on SaturdayFootnote 140 – & I hope may do some good but he cannot aid diplomatic negotiation[.] Indeed Russia as it seems to me never occupied such a position for mischief as she does now. If she decides upon open action public feeling (I won't call it opinion) would tie our hands. The present indignation[,] well founded as it is[,] of the mass would furnish the factions with means of obstruction to all useful diplomatic action — It is clear that Russia has no sincere desire for peace and I question whether Austria wants it yet. Has Derby any scheme in his mind for there is no inkling of it in his speech or in the blue books. [. . .]
362
Cairns to Hardy, Cranbrook Papers, HA43: T501/262
16 September 1876
Millden Brechin, N.B.
[. . .] I am very glad to hear your views about the East, & I entirely share your anxiety & uneasiness about it. As to knowing what are D[erby]'s views & intentions, I fear there is little to know. All seems to me to be negative, like his speech, wh was good as far as it went, but sadly deficient in sentiment or suggestion. [. . .] But what are we doing, or going to do? I have said to Northcote, & Carnarvon [. . .] & I am saying to B[eaconsfield]. today, that if we are to take any distinct step, I think the Cabinet shd meet, however inconvenient it wd be. [. . .]
My idea is that we (with the other powers) shd force Turkey to a reasonable peace with all the existing combatants, & then have a conference, at wh the powers who now guarantee Turkey might guarantee a system of autonomous provinces. But all this needs talking over.
363
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
21 September 1876
Hughenden
[. . .] I am convinced myself, that Russia, at the present moment, wd be glad to wind up affairs, & apparently with us. I think you will succeed in yr undertaking, & gain glory.
Cairns, in the wilds of Scotland, harks about calling the Cabinet together, & suggests ‘a distinct’ policy – wh. as far as I can judge consists of every thing wh: the other powers wd. not assent to = but all is to be done by a conference, creating & guaranteeing autonomous, but tributary states! A few more Servias!
We must do without a conference now that Gortch[akov]: has given that up; no one can want it.
Let nothing shake youFootnote 141 — The more I think & see, the more sure is my conviction, that this outcry is all froth, except where it is faction.
[. . .] Yesterday was the largest dinner of the kind ever known in this county = all the notables of both sides. I was forced to speakFootnote 142 – & every mention of your name was received with rapturous cheering. [. . .]
364
Cairns to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 91/3, fo. 75
21 September 1876
Millden Brechin, N.B.
[. . .] I am most anxious to see your reference to eastern affairs at the meeting at Wycombe last night. I cannot help feeling that D[erby]. is wrong in not letting the Cabinet know what proposals he is making or supporting for adjusting the difficulties betw[ee]n. the Porte & Servia, & the other provinces. It may result in some dissent in the Cabinet on the subject, which will be most unfortunate. The F.O. send me papers, & ask me questions about extradition & other rubbish, but, on this all important subject, they send nothing but telegrams a fortnight old.
365
Cairns to Richmond, Goodwood MS 868, B37
23 September 1876
Millden Brechin, N.B.
[. . .] The Bucks election is a narrow squeak.Footnote 143 We shd have had 1000 maj[orit]y. However it is safe now, & we may hope that next time there will be no Bulgaria.
I wish Disr[ael]i.'s speech has [sic] not been so defiant of public opinion.Footnote 144 The F.O. papers, wh came to me yesterday (& to you also, no doubt: I wrote strongly, & said we ought to know what was going on:) shew that D[erby]. has made propositions which I think are good, & wd. be generally approved of: but I can't see why he & our chief don't put a little more sentiment, & sympathy with public feeling, into their speeches. [. . .]
366
Disraeli to Cairns, Cairns Papers, PRO 30/51/1, fos 141–145
23 September 1876
I can't help feeling that you are misconceiving the course wh: L[or]d Derby is taking. There is no use in calling the Cabinet together, for there is nothing to consult them about. He is acting on the lines wh: the Cabinet approved when we separated, & has not got beyond them. He has availed himself of an opportunity of a successful mediation, wh: was not easy; & he has obtained a virtual armistice wh: was still more difficult. He has proposed to the five powers that (roughly speaking, recurring in the cases of Servia & Montenegro to the status quo.) they shd. agree to establish administrative autonomy in Herz[egovina]: & Bosnia after signing preliminaries of peace, & also consider what guarantees for fair government can be devised for Bulgaria. If he succeeds in this, & can get the preliminaries signed, there will no doubt be questions to consider for the Cabinet.
But he has not yet succeeded in doing this, tho’ he has shown an energy & fertility of resource, & fixity of purpose, in the matter for wh: I never previously gave him credit.
One great point is, Russia has assented to these proposals, but Austria demurs even to administrative autonomy tho the last accounts from Vienna are more favorable [sic].
Germany will not decide till Russia & Austria are d'accord.
I think that Derby will succeed, & that in a few days, these preliminaries may be submitted to the Porte – but I am not at all clear, that we may not find great difficulties in that quarter. Derby however, of late, has been successful in controlling the Porte. Nevertheless I understand a real resistance is to be expected.
As for the plans you suggested for consideration in one of your letters; autonomous & tributary states, & a conference, or Congress, to settle affairs generally:– every power is opposed to political autonomy. Servia has not proved a very encouraging example, having never paid her tribute, & then made war on her Suzerain.
Russia was once for a conference, the only power; but P[rince] Gort[chak]ov: has now quite relinquished the idea as unnecessary. He says this in accepting Derby's preliminaries.
In fact it comes to this, if the English people insist upon the resolutions being carried into effect, we must make war on Turkey with that object with[ou]t. allies, & then the Grand Signor will appeal to the Russians to enter his dominion to protect him. [. . .]
367
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 185
26 September 1876
Foreign Office
I return Salisbury's letter with thanks. His plan is large and new: it amounts to a new constitution for the Turkish empire. — I hardly think we could get it adopted, or that if adopted it would work.Footnote 145 But it deserves consideration[.]
368
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 187
27 September 1876
Foreign Office
I telegraphed to you about the meeting.Footnote 146 It was chiefly composed of Liberals, though the Lord MayorFootnote 147 & HubbardFootnote 148 were there. The feeling against Turkey very strong. Evident disappointment was felt that I could not support Gladstone's plan of complete autonomy.Footnote 149 They were civil enough on the whole, but could not refrain from interrupting and expressing dissent. I have stuck to our colours pretty steadily, and I think said nothing that can be twisted so as to make mischief. But I will have no more deputations! They don't help one to negociate. The numbers were about 150, as far as could be judged.
369
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 150
29 September 1876
Hughenden
[. . .] I had written you a long letter yesterday congratulating you on yr speech – wh: was perfect; and wh: induced the ‘Times’ to throw over both LoweFootnote 151 & Gladstone specifically, showing, after all, we were exactly in the right.
But the Serv[ian]: tel: upset me.Footnote 152 I don't see my way. If Austria step in to put an end to the conspiracy, the same reason that prevents Russia interfering herself, will force her to oppose Austria. There is war, & a long one. [. . .]
I don't think we ought to join in the war, but I think with an understanding with the Porte, we shd. occupy Const[antinop]l[e]. as a ‘material guarantee.’
Everybody will be wanting something: even Italy.
It is now or never with Bismarck, if he really wants peace.
370
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 153
30 September 1876
Hughenden
[. . .] You are in great favor [sic],Footnote 154 which pleases and amuses me.
Keep up yr spirits – You have shown some of the highest qualities of public life, & I believe the great mass of the nation believe in you.
We may yet confound their politics.
371
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 200Footnote 155
1 October 1876
Keston
A thousand thanks for your cordial note. One really wants encouragement just now. I sometimes feel like the juryman who complained of having been sitting along with eleven of the most obstinate men he ever met. [. . .]
372
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 208–209
6 October 1876
Foreign Office
[. . .] I am to see Schou. today and will find out whether he can or will tell anything.Footnote 156
I am disposed to think that the intelligence has been purposely allowed to get out, in order to frighten Loftus and us: and that the object is to drive us into sending up our fleet to bully the Porte as being a lesser evil than the threatened occupation.
I cannot think that after having agreed on a joint course of action, the Emp. would suddenly take a step of this kind. It would be a declaration to all Europe that he meditates a war of aggression – which is not in his character or ideas, for which we know Russia is not prepared, and which if it were intended would probably be disguised under some more plausible pretext. [. . .]
373
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 210–211
10 October 1876
Foreign Office
[. . .] Matters at home are looking better – see the Times of today on Gladstone – but I do not like the look of them abroad.Footnote 157 The Russians now seem to wish to exclude from the conference any representative of the Porte; which is hardly an admissible proposal; and the Austrians, though they agree to a conference in principle, evidently do so with reluctance, and are disposed to make as much as they can of all possible objections of detail.
Bismarck is still silent and impenetrable. France & Italy are with us sincerely enough, but can do little. The Sultan is prepared to go as far as he can to meet our wishes: he has however immense difficulties, and after all it is not certain that we can help him.
374
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 212–213
11 October 1876
Foreign Office
I don't like the notion of a special mission to Livadia.Footnote 158 First – we don't know how long the Emperor is to stay there, and it might very probably come too late for any useful purpose.
Next – I doubt if the Emperor wants to receive an English diplomatist — Schou., whatever else he may be, is on the side of peace, and not likely to make mischief. Then there is a certain awkwardness in communicating with the Russian government through three channels at once. You cannot be sure that the same communications will arrive in exactly the same form.
And lastly, I dislike the idea of seeming to make Russia the supreme arbiter of European peace or war. It may be that Russia is so – but is it for us to give prominence to the fact? Does not the sending out of a special mission to the Czar look a little like placing him in a position of superiority? He would not think of sending a special ambassador here!
As to Loftus & his telegram. I think there are really military preparations making in Russia & perhaps on a large scale: but I have no doubt that care is taken to make the most of them in his eyes, so as to impress him with the absolute necessity of peace.Footnote 159
375
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
12 October 1876
Hughenden
I must congratulate you on the good news, & can hardly believe, that any conditions have been made, which will not be granted, or relinquished.
In that case, we have six months to breathe in, & much may be done in 6 mo[nth]s.
By that time, England will have quite recovered her nerves, & an English Minister, backed by the nation, can do a great deal. That will be your condition[,] I believe, & you will deserve it.
Posterity will do justice to that unprincipled maniac Gladstone – extraordinary mixture of envy, vindictiveness, hypocrisy, & superstition: & with one commanding characteristic: whether Prime Minister or Leader of [the] Opposition, whether preaching, praying, speechifying or scribbling – never a gentleman!
376
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 214
13 October 1876
Foreign Office
Thanks for your letter. Gladstone is wilder than ever. What can his last letter mean? Does it refer to the Rothschilds and the Bucks election?Footnote 160
We are not yet out of our troubles. Russia will do all that is possible in the way of making difficulties about the armistice. This is plain from the reports that reach us from all quarters. Schou. says he has telegraphed urging an acceptance, but he admitted that the first impression at Livadia was unfavorable [sic]. What is gained is that the Russians must now show their hand; if they reject, or encourage others to reject, this armistice, they mean war, and all Europe will see it. [. . .]
377
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 217
14 October 1876
Foreign Office
[. . .] You will see what is passing. Russia dislikes the armistice which she asked for in the expectation of a refusal, and will break off if a pretext can be found. Schou. is I think sincere in his wish for peace, and professes to be doing all he can.Footnote 161 Italy is also making difficulties: Germany gives a cold and reserved support – but it is support.
I am not sanguine, but the chances vary from day to day.
Carnarvon has had Liddon staying with him at Highclere for some time – so I am told. Considering that Liddon has attacked us more acrimoniously than any one [sic], I think our colleague might have postponed his hospitalities.Footnote 162 But he has not shown any sign of dissent from our policy so far.
378
Manners to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 106/3, fos 102–103
14 October 1876
[. . .] The question which the Cabinet, perhaps wisely, declined to discuss t'other day, viz what should be done if Russia invades Turkey?, seems to require prompt attention.
The extreme cleverness of the last Turkish move must apparently unmask the real intentions of Russia, and if they are war, it will be war without delay.
There will then be no time to consider with our co-signatories what steps should be taken to guard the neutrality of Roumania, or any other of the peaceful provisions of 1856: and I see nothing for it but what you hinted at in Cabinet, the friendly occupation of Constantinople.Footnote 163
But I noticed with alarm that the most energetic spirits were inclined to pummel not the strong aggressor, but the weak victim; and unless the assumed misconduct of Russia changes their views you may encounter serious difficulties in that quarter. [. . .]
379
Manners to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 106/3, fos 104–105
15 October 1876
Balmoral
[. . .] SheFootnote 164 received the news of the Russian refusalFootnote 165 with sorrow and some anger, but without any appearance of dismay, and expressed her opinion in favour of meeting it, and it's [sic] possible results boldly and, to use her own words, ‘without flinching’. I am convinced that any resolute policy her ministers may think fit to recommend will meet with her assent and approbation.
The whole feeling here is strongly anti-Russian, and the Princess AliceFootnote 166 last night told me that it is so among the younger men in Germany: they wish to break the ties which bind the 2 empires so closely together. Is Bismarck biding his time to take advantage of this feeling, and pay off Gortshakoff for his conduct last year? [. . .]Footnote 167
380
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 218–219
16 October 1876
Foreign Office
I have today received the Russian refusal of a five or six months’ armistice. The reasons given for it are on the face of them mere pretexts[.] Schou. (I believe) has really exerted himself against this decision, and he told my lady this evening that a week ago he should have said confidently that his Emperor wished for nothing but peace, but now he did not know what to think of it. This is pretty strong coming from an ambassador.
It is clear that I can make no new proposal. It is equally so that the six months’ armistice will not do – Italy sides with Russia, France wavers and advises compromise, Austria hesitates, Germany is silent.Footnote 168 We had a German approval, as we understood it; but as nothing was said about the armistice being too long, (a point not then raised by any one [sic]) Bismarck has not pledged himself on the present question. I shall send for Münster tomorrow, and try and get from him what Bismarck really wants. If his professions are sincere, now is the time.
But I suspect he would like a war between England and Russia, crippling two Powers neither of which he loves. [. . .]
381
Disraeli to Salisbury, SP, fos 161–163Footnote 169
17 October 1876
Hughenden
[. . .] Elliot was successful in his last moveFootnote 170 but the state of affairs, throughout Europe, & Asia too, is highly unsatisfactory – Russia is mischievous, but ‘willing to wound & yet afraid to strike’[.]
If she continues to hesitate, she may give time to infuse some energy into public affairs. I believe the old Emperor of Germany is the great stumbling block to haute politique;Footnote 171 clinging, as he does, to family traditions —
My own feeling is, & I request your opinion upon it, is that it wd. be desirable to make a treaty with Germany to maintain the status quo – not an alliance, offensive & defensive, as Brunow [sic] proposed to Derby pêre [sic], in 1852,Footnote 172 & wh. was wisely & promptly refused: but the maintenance of the status quo. It would make us easy about Constantinople, & wd. lay the bugbear of Bismarck, wh: is an eventual Anglo-French alliance, that may make him restore the two captured provinces.Footnote 173 [. . .]
382
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2Footnote 174
17 October 1876
Hughenden
Nothing can be more unsatisfactory, than the whole state of Europe – & Asia too – in a great degree. [. . .]
What if we could negotiate a treaty with Germany to maintain the present status quo generally? Not an alliance offensive & defensive, as Brunnow offered to yr father in 1852 – & wh: was wisely & promptly declined; but a treaty for the maintenance of the status quo. This wd. make us easy about Constantinople, & relieve Bismarck of his real bugbear, the eventual alliance of England & France, & the loss of his two captured provinces. [. . .] it wd. settle everything for our lives, & immortalize yourself.
383
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
21 October 1876
10 Downing Street
[. . .] I conclude the invasion of Turkey, & conquest of Constantinople, may be rapid.Footnote 175
If so, our determination as to our ultimate course cannot be too soon decided on. Constantinople occupied by the Russians, while the British fleet was in Besica [sic] Bay, would be the most humiliating event, that has occurred to England, since the surrenders of Whitelocke & Burgoyne & Cornwallis, but infinitely in its consequences more important & disastrous.Footnote 176
384
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/2
22 October 1876
10 Downing Street
I am anxious about the state of affairs.Footnote 177
There seems to me no doubt, that after the passage of the Pruth, the Russians may reach Constantinople in sixty days; at the most sixty four[.] [. . .]
Any movement on our part, whether we fortify the peninsula by lake Durkos, or the Chersonese & the Dardanelles, would be sixteen days too late, if delayed till the Russians cross the Balkan [sic].
But what alarms me, is that Turkey, feeling she is utterly deserted, may make some mad compact with Russia, opening the Straits, & giving to her complete control over the Asiatic shore.
As for compensation to England by having Egypt & Crete – this is moonshine. If Constantinople is Russian, they wd. only be an expensive encumbrance. —
Has it been represented to Turkey, that our last move was not intended as a desertion of her, but rather an assertion of her policy? This is necessary to save her from throwing herself into the fatal embrace of Ignatieff.* [. . .]
385
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 226–227
22 October 1876
Foreign Office
I will be in town early tomorrow. I bear in mind all you say, and your opinion always has the greatest weight with me. But my impression is that the Russians are by no means in the state of readiness which you assume, and that a dash at Constantinople is not their object. However I will not dispute that with you. But are you not taking for granted that their march will be practically unopposed? and is this likely? I do not think that immediate war is expected by any diplomatist – not that they are infallible. If it were intended, why press for six weeks armistice? The Porte might utterly baffle them by an acceptance.
386
Derby to Ward Hunt, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fos 228–229
24 October 1876
Foreign Office
The step of ordering a British fleet to pass the Dardanelles (the consent of the Porte not having been asked) is not one to be taken offhand, nor without the fullest consideration.Footnote 178 — I cannot sanction the order which has been suggested to you as matters now stand. If a Russian vessel went through – which I do not consider as probable – there would be plenty of time to send the order by telegraph. But I repeat that I do not expect the contingency to occur, since the passage would be resisted, and as we know, the Russians have no fleet to match that of Turkey.
387
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/4, fo. 243
29 October 1876
Foreign Office
I hear from the War Office privatelyFootnote 179 that a requisition has been made for 80 ‘guns of position’ – ‘in consequence of certain engineer officers being sent to Constantinople.’ May I ask what this means? We have never sanctioned the sending out of guns to Constantinople. I am told farther that they cannot be supplied without the whole affair becoming public. — I do not think steps of this kind ought to be taken – with the result of creating a panic throughout Europe – unless after full consideration & discussion.Footnote 180
388
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fos 7–8
7 November 1876
Foreign Office
As we have the Queen's approval of Salisbury, there is no object in keeping his mission a secret any longer.Footnote 181 As to its having got out, I can only say it did not do so through me. There is not a hint of it in any of the papers. [. . .]
Of Bismarck I can tell you nothing certain: but my belief is that his support meant, that he would have been ready to stir us up to a quarrel with Russia, not much caring which side won: and that he is disgusted at the prospect of England and Russia coming to an understanding. His only object is to prevent any two Powers coming to an understanding if he can help it. [. . .]
389
Disraeli to Salisbury, SP, fos 171–173Footnote 182
10 November 1876
Sandringham
[. . .] You must remember we suffer from a feeble & formal diplomacy,Footnote 183 & there has been little real interchange of thought between the English government, & foreign powers. I agree with the Prince,Footnote 184 & I think it highly desirable, that at this moment our communications with the powers shd. be lifted out of the slough of despond, they have so long grovelled in. [. . .]
Consider this matter for yourself, & whatever you decide on I will support – only don't concede your own convictions on the subject to Tenterdenism, wh: is a dusty affair, & not suited to the times & things we have to grapple with. [. . .]
390
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fo. 17
18 November 1876
Foreign Office
I send you at once a very important communication which I have received from Beust. Please send it on to Salisbury.
[Enclosed:]
The Austrian ambassador has been with me, and says he is authorised to assure me confidentially —
(1) That Austria is under no engagements to Russia
(2) That Austria will not adopt a policy of neutrality under all circumstances but will protect her own interests if she thinks them menaced by any act of Russia —
I expressed satisfaction.Footnote 185
391
Derby to Salisbury, SP, fos 52–53
28 November 1876
I add one line to my former letters to say that I have received your deeply interesting letter from Berlin.Footnote 186 It confirms and emphasises what we knew, or thought we knew before, as to the ideas and policy of Bismarck. I am inclined to think that he has talked to you sincerely, with the only exception that he publicly wishes for a war more than he has thought fit to acknowledge.
Russia crippled (as, whoever wins,Footnote 187 Russia would be for some time) puts an end to the danger which he most fears, that of a Russo-French coalition.Footnote 188 The question is, not whether Germany will help us; that we know is out of the question: but whether Germany will interfere actively to prevent Austria from helping us, if so disposed. I wish with some anxiety to know how you have found Andrassy inclined. He does not trust Beust – a feeling wh. is reciprocated – and he does not open out much to old Buchanan, wh. is not surprising. Therefore you will be able to tell me more of his real views than I have yet learnt from anybody. [. . .]
Two dangers occur to me as specially to be guarded against. One, that we shall be marking plans for ‘Bulgaria’ without having defined what Bulgaria is. The Russians, left alone, wd bring it to the suburbs of Constantinople. The other is to get us pledged to support something wh. they know can only be enforced by war & then call on us to join in the war which they have brought on. [. . .]
392
Disraeli to Salisbury, SP, fo. 183Footnote 189
29 November 1876
10 Downing Street
[. . .] It is a most critical moment in European politics. If Russia is not checked, the Holy Alliance will be revived in aggravated form & force. Germany will have Holland, & France, Belgium, & England will be in a position I trust I shall never live to witness. [. . .]
393
Derby to Salisbury, SP, fo. 54
7 December 1876
Foreign Office
I have your interesting letters from Vienna & Rome.Footnote 190 You don't seem to have made much out of Andrassy, and I am not surprised. Your description of him as a man pulled different ways by conflicting forces, and not sure of what he shall be able to do, tallies precisely with my observation during the last twelve months. He has been so vacillating & undecided as to create a suspicion of his sincerity: but I do not think he means to deceive, he only does not know his own mind. Add to this a considerable share of indolence, and a strong disposition to let things take their course, and you have the man. I doubt his being as closely connected with Bismarck as you suppose. — I have been very careful in speaking to Beust, and in fact have told him nothing. [. . .]
Salisbury and the Constantinople Conference
Salisbury had left Britain on 20 November, proceeding via Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, and thence to Brindisi, where he sailed for Constantinople on 2 December, arriving on 5 December. On 11 December, after a series of bilateral meetings between Ignatiev and Salisbury, the representatives of the powers gathered in a preliminary conference that met for six sessions and concluded on 19 December. The full Constantinople Conference, with the Turks finally included, began on 23 December, meeting on 28 and 30 December 1876 and 1, 4, 8, 11, and 15 January 1877. The Turks were not prepared to accept the powers’ proposals and the conference concluded at its last meeting on 20 January 1877. The great powers withdrew their ambassadors. Salisbury left on 22 January, although Elliot negated the effect somewhat by delaying his own departure.
394
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
15 January 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
[. . .] I have ascertained by an accident,Footnote 191 that there is ‘no understanding’ bet[wee]n. the 3 Imp[erial]: Courts, & that Schou: lied, & intentionally lied —Footnote 192
But what are we to say of Odo Russell!
Careless & false – perhaps both – I never was more disappointed in a man.
395
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fo. 66
15 January 1877
Fairhill, Tunbridge
[. . .] I agree with you entirely about O Russell. He is quite at sea; knows little, & gets that wrong.
I have no certainty about the union of the three emperors: it is affirmed at Berlin & Petersburgh, and denied at Vienna; on the whole the denial seems most likely to be right. [. . .]
396
Salisbury to Carnarvon, Carnarvon Papers, BL Add. MS 60759, fos 20–21Footnote 193
19 January 1877
Constantinople
[. . .] The telegraph will have informed you that we have failed to make any impression on the obstinacy of the Turk. The terms have been reduced to the lowest possible point, consistent with the preservation of any guarantee: & therefore their refusal must be interpreted as a disposal to escape from European tutelage altogether.
On the whole, I think that a belief in Russia[’]s weakness has been the most potent encouragement to resistance; & next to that a belief (encouraged by many persons & writers & by sundry circumstances) that I do not really represent the Government of England. [. . .]
397
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
30 January 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
I don't quite reconcile this fidgetiness of Bismarck with the ‘intimate understanding’ of which we hear so much.Footnote 194
It does not seem to exist among the ministers; & as for the sovereigns, Germany must die tomorrow, Russia may, & Austria is a nincompoop.
398
Derby to Hardy, Cranbrook Papers, BL Add. MS 62537, fo. 74
3 February 1877
Foreign Office
[. . .] I do not like these plans of occupation, ‘compensation’, and mixing ourselves up needlessly in the affair.Footnote 195
If we tell the Russians that Constantinople is not to be touched, it will not be. You had better consult the Premier on the whole question.Footnote 196
399
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
5 February 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
What about a Cabinet?
There are points that ought to be settled as to the statements to be made in both Houses, wh: shd. be identical & consistent.
And yet it is awkward to consult on these with[ou]t. SarumFootnote 197 —
400
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/3, fo. 142
5 February 1877
Foreign Office
I think on the whole you had better let it alone. Absolute unity of opinion will not be possible if many speak: but the opening is not likely to lead to very long debate; and for the rest we have time.Footnote 198
401
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3Footnote 199
9 February 1877
10 Downing Street
[. . .] The position of affairs is most critical, & requires decision —Footnote 200
I believe that, at no moment, was Russia more anxious for peace, than the present. She is perfectly conscious of the intrigues of Bismarck to involve her in a struggle, wh:, whatever the ultimate result, must be materially disastrous to her – but she must have a golden bridge – The Moscow speech, & the host on the Pruth, render this necessary.
If war begins, I think it will end in partition. I cannot learn, that Turkey has any adequate resources: no money; not many men. In that case we must have a decided course, & seize, at the fitting time, what is necessary for the security of our Empire — No one will resist us, either at the time, or afterwards.
But can war be avoided? Only by a reply to Gortchakow[’]s note, or a negotiation with Russia thro’ the ambassador here, wh: will construct the golden bridge.Footnote 201
[. . .] He who gains time, gains everything. By that period, France will be armed. [. . .]
I don't fancy the country will stand laisser faire, but they will back us, I believe, in whatever we do, provided we are doing.
[P.S.] You can talk to me about all this.Footnote 202
402
Mary Derby to Salisbury, SP, fo. 36
10 February 1877
23 St James's Square
Ct. Shouvaloff came yest[erda]y. to urge strongly that there shd. be no delay in answering the circular. He said he had kept – or tried to keep, his Emp[ero]r. & Govt quiet for the last five days on the ground that the Govt. here was entirely occupied with the opening of Parlt. But this wd. not last forever, & he hoped Ld D[erby] wd. see the importance of time now.
I promised to push with my small efforts in the same direction & have done so, but I know not with what success. [. . .]
403
Derby to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50022, fos 131–132
26 February 1877
Foreign Office
[. . .] — I have never thought CobdenFootnote 203 an oracle either on foreign or home affairs. He believed three things with all his heart – That the repeal of the corn laws would break the power of the landed aristocracy. That the example of England would bring about free trade all over the world. That great wars would never be made again, being incompatible with the ideas of an industrial age. In all three points he has been wrong. The landowners are stronger than before – Europe is showing more protectionist tendencies than 20 years ago, and America itself following suit – and all the world is armed to the teeth. [. . .]
404
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fo. 80
1 March 1877
Foreign Office
Here is a draft answer to the Russian circular.Footnote 204 [. . .] — We cannot be too cautious. By saying too little, we risk breaking off the negociation, and causing war: but on the other hand Russia will be anxious to put on our words the construction that we agree to coercionFootnote 205 under certain circumstances, the opposition here will take up the cry, and we shall look foolish if we have not a sufficient answer. [. . .]
405
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
3 March 1877
10 Downing Street
With reference to my rough note of yesterday,Footnote 206 I entirely agree with you, that we must have no controversial matter in our answer to Gort[chakov]. — Yet it may be considered, whether we shd. not assume, in our reply, our own view of the raison d'etre [sic] of our proceedings, equally as he does of his own —
But I don't wish in the least to insist on this, but wd. rather leave everything to you in whom I have complete confidence.
406
Carnarvon to Salisbury, SP, fo. 290
16 March 1877
Do you notice in one of the telegrams circulated this evening that HMG: are said to have proposed their modifications of theProtocolFootnote 207 & that Bismarck urges their acceptance at S[t]. Petersburgh [sic]? What does this mean? Are we to be convened tomorrow merely to register an accepted conclusion? This was not the understanding of the Cabinet.
407
Salisbury to Carnarvon, Carnarvon Papers, BL Add. MS 60759, fo. 24
24 March 1877
Hatfield
I trust the close of the scene is not appropriate. Lest it should be, read Norfolk[’]s advice to Buckingham – first scene of Henry VIII.Footnote 208
I cannot find out that any one [sic] knew what was coming.Footnote 209
408
Carnarvon to Salisbury, SP, fo. 294
25 March 1877
Windsor CastleFootnote 210
The case is a very serious one – and my impression is that we may be on the edge of a crisis. The ground has been completely undermined here and all the more skilfully that the Queen whilst entirely imbued with Disraeli's ideas & prepared to support him & aware that there is strong difference of opinion and eager to overcome it has not yet been led up to the last point of requiring our resignations. In order not to startle her too much this last measure has been kept back: but the train is all laid and it now only needs the spark to fire it. I do not feel sure that before the Easter holidays are over we shall not have the explosion. [. . .]
409
Salisbury to Carnarvon, Carnarvon Papers, BL Add. MS 60759, fos 25–28Footnote 211
26 March 1877
India Office
Your letter ‘donne à penser.’Footnote 212 But I find a difficulty in believing that B[eaconsfield]. contemplates any course so violent as you suggest. I admit that, if he means war with Russia, it is his interest to get rid of us now rather than when the crisis comes. But he can only get rid of us in one of two ways. He must dismiss us: or he must pick a quarrel & provoke us to resign. The first supposition hardly seems to me possible. No Minister has dismissed a colleague in the Cabinet since Pitt dismissed Thurlow: & then the provocation was considerable, because Thurlow spoke & voted against Government bills in the House of Lords.Footnote 213 Being an act of so unexampled a kind[,] some cause must be shown – to the Queen, the colleagues, Parliament. But no cause could be even pretended except our prospective unwillingness to go to war with Russia. Assuming – which is a vast assumption – that such a motive would seem sufficient to the Queen & the colleagues – how would it look in Parliament? Why the statement of it would blow up the whole plot. Whatever change may come when they see blood, the people are in no humour for war at present. The avowal that the Prime Minister had broken up his Cabinet in order to be ready for war would create a terrible outburst of peace – atrocity – & commercial feeling, which might well bring him to the ground. Perhaps he might not give this reason. But he must give some reason – & a cogent one for such a step. However, if he did not give this explanation we should; & that he knows full well. The other plan is to pick a quarrel. But it takes two to make a quarrel: & the opportunities for doing so in our case are not frequent. Nor, though he has courage enough, is he coldblooded enough to maintain the resolution to pick a quarrel over any considerable space of time.
We must be cautious till the crisis comes. There will be no need to interfere very conspicuously in foreign affairs for the present. We are rolling down the incline now: war (between Russia and Turkey[)] seems to me inevitable.
I feel certain that none of our colleagues, except the two,Footnote 214 have any notion of any peculiar difficulty or tension. [. . .]
410
Carnarvon to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50022, fos 209–211
30 March 1877
Highclere Castle
I cannot forbear calling your attention – if indeed it has escaped you – to the official article in last night's Pall Mall in which it is said that the resolution to sign the Protocol is due to causes operating within and without the Cabinet.Footnote 215 This is in fact an advertisement of our differences of opinion and since I have had anything to do with politics I cannot remember a precedent. For weeks past the Pall Mall has been ostentatiously the F.O. organ: and of course amongst all who are in any way behind the scenes it is known to be inspired. Such a statement therefore as this is a very serious one: nor do I see how a Cabinet can long hold together if one member of it allows a newspaper to announce that a particular line of policy has been forced upon him by colleagues who take a different view of the question – For this is really what it all comes to – and to anyone who has followed the course which has recently been taken by the Pall Mall there can be no doubt as to its’ [sic] meaning. We have discussed all these questions so often & so unreservedly that I do not hesitate to write this, and to say how anxious I feel as to the future of the Govt. — The extraordinary address which Disraeli made us on the disturbers of the unanimity of our Cabinet and which was obviously directed against Salisbury & myself, the things which I know to have been said out of the Cabinet on the same theme – Derby's intemperate conduct even in the ordinary relations of daily lifeFootnote 216 – and now this new method of advertising our differences in the newspapers – all this seems to me to be full of danger & if it were to be carried much further wd. threaten our existence.
I do not know that there is any thing to be done. I sincerely deplore it all – I am not responsible for its’ [sic] present or its’ [sic] future effects – but I feel it wrong to with-hold from you both as an old friend & as the leader of the party in the House of Commons my own great anxiety as to the course along which we are now drifting.
It is not creditable to us personally and it may lead us as a Govt. into very great difficulties & mistakes.
411
Montagu Corry to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 69/1, fos 86–89
15 April 1877
St James’ Club, Piccadilly
I have just had some conversation with Comte Schouvaloff, of which I make a note.
He considers that no possible ‘moyen’ remains, and that the declaration of war between Russia & Turkey within a few days is inevitable. [. . .]
Our further efforts, he thinks, should, now, be directed towards making the war ‘une courte affaire’.
He proposes, so soon as war is declared, to go to St Petersburg, and hopes to return charged with a proposition which England will not only accept, but endeavour to forward.
He begs that, meanwhile, nothing shall be done by England likely to disturb the friendly understanding between herself and Russia.
He hopes to be able to fix, with the agreement of the two countries a limit – say north of the Balkan [sic] – beyond which the victorious Russian army shall not advance.
He proposes that, so soon as that limit is reached, peace shall be concluded, on these bases:– that Bulgaria shall become an autonomous province, – a dependency of, and paying tribute to, the Porte. — That Serbia shall remain as she is. — That Bosnia [. . .] shall be ceded to Austria, together with a ‘petit bout’Footnote 217 of Herzegovina. — That there shall be a rectification of the frontier of Herzegovina. — That Russia shall again have restored to her the triangle at the mouth of the Danube, which she had to give up in 1856. [. . .]
[. . .] I observed that the Germans in 1870, were forced as it were to march on to Paris, and that the logical and natural ‘but’Footnote 218 of Russia must be the capital city of Turkey, – to my mind.
He replied ‘no’, – but gave no reasons for his assertion: – adding that England would be foolish to endeavour to protect Constantinople, – first, because she had no sufficient army to defend it, and, secondly, because all her object would be attained by holding the Dardanelles. But, he added, I might rest assured that Russia had no designs on Constantinople; and that, even should his proposition come to nothing, the Sultan should be left there, with an ample zone of territory, round Constantinople, to preserve his dignity.
I asked what would happen if Austria were to occupy Servia as well as Bosnia? That, he answered, he knew would not be permitted by Germany.
I then asked what achievements he proposed for the army in the Caucasus? He replied, that Russia would, there, look for an increase of territory: but, really, he knew nothing about those parts! True, he had been told by Count Münster that there was a port in the Black Sea, called ‘Batoum’, which ought to belong to Russia: – but, really, he knew nothing about it! [. . .]Footnote 219 But it really did not matter to England what occurred in those unknown regions!
I answered that it seemed to me that the interests of this country might be almost more touched by what took place in eastern, than in western, Turkey.
He shrugged his shoulders, and remarked what dreadful things these complications were! And so we parted!
412
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fos 69–70
21 April 1877
Downing Street
I fear that I may not have made my views clear at the Cabinet, and therefore venture to trouble you with a line to state them.Footnote 220
1. I think that we cannot combine a policy of avowed neutrality with any such step as the occupation of Gallipoli. Yet at the opening of the war we shall be obliged to profess neutrality; and if we wait to occupy Gallipoli till the war has taken such a turn as to prove to all the world, or at all events to all England, that English interests render such a step really necessary, we may run the risk of waiting till it is too late.
2. That there is much danger in our taking a separate line of our own, which may either encourage other powers to join in a scramble, of which they will say we are setting the example, or may lead them to combine with Russia in bringing about a settlement exclusive of ourselves, in which our especial interests in Asia will be very cavalierly treated.
3. That the best chance of at once securing fair play for ourselves, and of bringing pressure to bear upon Russia to make her localise the war lies in concerted action between ourselves and other powers, – some if not all; and that we ought to make an attempt in that direction.
If the other powers could represent to Russia that she must not cross the Balkans, nor extend her territory either in Europe or Asia without their consent, we should have a standing ground from which to act if she showed signs of transgressing these limits; and we should probably keep her within them.
I feel very anxious that we should not drift on in this matter without a policy, and that we should not commit England to any course which she is not strong enough to preserve to the end.Footnote 221
I will only add that I feel how important it is that we should be united — But we shall run great risk of disunion if we do not take full counsel together before anything is done or decided on which commits us to a line of policy which cannot be changed without discredit.
[PS] I also strongly urge the consideration whether we ought not to be prepared to take bodily possession of the Suez Canal in order to keep it open. This I suppose we might do without any breach of neutrality.
413
Derby to Count Shuvalov, Confidential Print, FO 881/3171
6 May 1877
[. . .] Her Majesty's Government do not propose again to enter on the question of the justice or necessity of the present war;Footnote 222 they have already expressed their views with regard to it, and further discussion would be unavailing. They have accepted the obligation which a state of war imposed upon them, and have lost no time in issuing a Proclamation of Neutrality. They, from the first, warned the Porte that it must not look to them for assistance, and they are determined to carry impartially into effect the policy thus announced, so long as Turkish interests alone are involved.
At the same time they think it right that there should be no misunderstanding as to their position and intentions. Should the war now in progress unfortunately spread, interests may be imperilled which they are equally bound and determined to defend, and it is desirable that they should make it clear [. . .] what the most prominent of those interests are.
Foremost among them is the necessity of keeping open, uninjured and uninterrupted, the communication between Europe and the East by the Suez Canal. An attempt to blockade or otherwise to interfere with the Canal or its approaches would be regarded by them as a menace to India, and as a grave injury to the commerce of the world. On both these grounds any such step [. . .] would be inconsistent with the maintenance by them of an attitude of passive neutrality.
The mercantile and financial interests of European nations are also so largely involved in Egypt that an attack on that country, or its occupation, even temporary [. . .] could scarcely be regarded with unconcern by the neutral Powers, certainly not by England.
The vast importance of Constantinople, whether in a military, a political, or a commercial point of view, is too well understood to require explanation. It is, therefore, scarcely necessary to point out that Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to witness with indifference the passing into other hands than those of its present possessors, of a capital holding so peculiar and commanding a position.
The existing arrangements made under European sanction which regulate the navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles appear to them wise and salutary, and there would be, in their judgement, serious objections to their alteration in any material particular. [. . .]Footnote 223
414
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
9 May 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
[. . .] There is great anxiety about Austria in certain quarters, & I have been asked, whe[the]r you have had an overture made to you from that quarter on wh: some of our friends rely as a solution of difficulties — [. . .]
415
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 112/3, fo. 159
[?9] May [1877]Footnote 224
Foreign Office
I will call tomorrow early – on my way to the office. Enclosed is a minute of conversation with Beust. He has told me nothing!
416
Derby to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50022, fo. 140
16 May 1877
Foreign Office
We only differ (if we differ) as to wording.Footnote 225 You cannot speak of unconditional & absolute neutrality when you are saying that under certain conditions you will have to make war. The two statements are mutually contradictory. But – as you well know – I agree entirely with you & Cross as to the line to be taken & the language to be held.
417
Derby to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50022, fos 142–143
19 May 1877
Fairhill, Tonbridge
Lyons is perfectly safe, & you can tell him anything. He may, as you say, do something through the Austrian ambassador at Paris: but I doubt the Austrians being able or willing to move. They will say, and probably with truth, that they do not think Constantinople threatened: that they have assurances to that effect: & so forth.
What I expect Russia to stipulate for, if an early peace should be made is
(1) Batoum – & a slice of territory inland; how much we cannot even conjecture.
(2) Freedom of the Dardanelles.
(3) Bulgaria autonomic and tributary.
(4) Part of the Turkish fleet by way of compensation.
But it is impossible to judge with any certainty what the demands will be. The Turks seem full of fight, and may give more trouble than we expect.
You will find the French too busy with their own affairs to care about those of their neighbours. Never did man so wantonly create a difficulty for himself as MacMahon. He is stupid, & honest; and it is the nature of such men in high authority to fall into the hands of others who are neither stupid nor honest.
418
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fos 131–132
20 May 1877
Fairhill, Tunbridge
[. . .] Between ourselves, I expect nothing from the Austrian move.Footnote 226 Austria has interests involved, but they are not ours. In some respects they are opposite to ours. Austria cares very much for what is done on the Danube, & nothing at all for what is done in Asia. She will therefore press the Russians to go on in Asia, and only make a demonstration in Europe: which is not what we wish.
Constantinople is equally important to both countries, but I have never thought, & do not think, either that Constantinople is really threatened, or that Austrian statesmen will suppose it to be so.
419
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3Footnote 227
22 May 1877
Hughenden
I think affairs look very bad for us, & that some other body will yet fall before the Ottoman Empire tumbles.Footnote 228 [. . .] The tactics of the Opposition are clear: they were laid down by HarcourtFootnote 229 in the debate — He distinctly laid the ground for an appeal to the people against the Ministry, whose want of foresight & courage will have compelled us to acquiesce either in a ruinous war, or a humiliating peace. Having successfully acted on a nervous & divided Cabinet, & prevented anything being done, they will now turn round & say ‘This is the way you protect British interests!’ They will probably turn us out in this Parliament, or they will force us to a dissolution under the influence of a disastrous defeat abroad.Footnote 230
When do you expect the answer from Austria? I never thought anything wd. come of it, but there is a strong party in the Cabinet wh: does, and wd. agree to nothing till it was tried. I think you ought to press, & press hard for a reply. Every moment is now golden. Austria never acts, only writes despatches. [. . .]
A government can only die once: it is better to die with glory, than vanish in an ignominious end. The country wd. still rally round British interests: in three months time, Brit[ish]: interests will be in the mud.
I have written this with difficulty, for my hand has relapsed.
420
Carnarvon to Salisbury, SP, fos 304–305Footnote 231
23 May 1877
Melbury, Dorchester
Montgelas* is here and I have had a good deal of conversation with him as to the last note to Beust proposing cooperation to Austria for the defence of Constantinople. The clear understanding of the Cabinet was, as I apprehended it, that Derby s[houl]d in conversation supplement his note by intimating our readiness to undertake for Austria the transport of her troops to Gallipoli or Constantinople and even further to indicate our readiness to give what Disraeli called a buono-mano.Footnote 232
Derby however seems to have remained absolutely silent and to have said nothing on either of these points. His conversation was confined apparently to the merest generalities of cooperation in it's [sic] vaguest sense – and thus the offer, wanting in all ‘practical point’ as Montgelas termed it, will probably fail of real acceptance.
It is really despairing: for it shows that whatever may be the decision in the Cabinet it is always liable to be upset afterwards. As to the ‘buono-mano’, I never thought much of this: I do not believe in subsidies or like them: but the transport was essential – and anyhow it was an understanding.
Pray let me know what you think.Footnote 233
421
Cairns to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 91/3, fos 138–139
24 May 1877
Lindisfarne, Bournemouth
[. . .] I agree with every word you say of our position. I feel it to be deeply critical. We have defined British interests, & said we would protect them: & we are not taking any real step for their protection. It is quite apparent that Russia is trying to bridge over the few weeks which will make her safe against any action of our's [sic]. She will then be, potentially, mistress of Constant[inopl]e., & will arrange the passage of the Straits as she & Germany please, & will snap her fingers at us. Then the opposition will turn on us, – & our own friends will join them – & no mercy will be shewn, or allowance made, on the score of the difficulties in our way in the House of Commons. They will say you had a majority of 130, & might have done whatever was necessary.
It would, in my opinion, be infinitely better for the Cabinet to determine on a strong & (as I think) a wise step; the occupation of Gall[ipol]i.; & if we are thwarted in taking the step, to lay down the emblems of a power which we are not allowed to use. Were it not that I detest the appearance of a selfish disloyalty to the colleagues of my whole public life, this is the course which, as an individual, I shd. be disposed to pursue.
What is to be done? Should there be a Cabinet, & a fresh, & perhaps final, review of the situation? Every day is of importance. [. . .]
422
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fo. 133
24 May 1877
Knowsley
I am very sorry for your renewed attack of the enemyFootnote 234 – knowing from home recollections what an infliction it is – and not less so that you take a desponding view of the situation. You have been so often right when others were wrong that I hardly like to express dissent: but I am quite sure that in the middle class at least the feeling is so strong against a war that you would lose more support by asking money for an expedition than you could gain by the seizure of an important military position. [. . .]
423
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3Footnote 235
25 May 1877
Hughenden
The same messenger, who brings me your letter, brings me a box from the L[or]d Chan[cello]r.Footnote 236 It is a very distressing one, as he does not see affairs in the light you do [. . .]Footnote 237
I must say that all this expresses very much my own views, & indeed I often ask myself, if you had resolved to do nothing, why not have accepted Bismarck[’]s offer?
Nothing can justify isolation on the part of England but a determination to act.
The L[or]d. Chancellor wants the Cabinet to be called together & to review the situation again, preliminarily to a final decision. I suppose it will break up. [. . .]
424
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fo. 125Footnote 238
[?26 May 1877]Footnote 239
Foreign Office
I will do as you like, but I do not see what there is to discuss in the present state of affairs. And I doubt as to the wisdom of ‘talking over’ things when no action is possible. Men only work each other up into a state of agitation, and are then ready to rush into anything rash to relieve it.Footnote 240
Why does not Cairns tell us the points which he wants considered?Footnote 241
425
Salisbury to Carnarvon, Carnarvon Papers, BL Add. MS 60759, fos 38–39
27 May 1877
Hatfield
It is, as you say, quite despairing. It seems to me we must give up all hope of any positive action on the foreign policy[.] We may prevent evil: but we can do no more. The result will be an emasculate, purposeless vacillation, which will be very discreditable: but perhaps it is what suits the nation best.Footnote 242
I shall be in town before the end of the week & hope to see you before you go north. Balmoral is becoming a serious nuisance.
426
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
29 May 1877
Hughenden
[. . .] I return OdoFootnote 243 & Loftus’ letters. That of the latter would justify the immediate assembling of the Cabinet.
427
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fo. 139
30 May 1877
Fairhill, Tunbridge
I don't think much of Don Pomposo'sFootnote 244 alarm: if he had had a grain of sense he would have seen long ago what the Russians were after, instead of telling us that they thought of nothing except peace & philanthropy. Now he has been taken by surprise, he has gone sharp round, and exaggerates his new opinions as all converts do. Still – what he says may have force, though he says it. [. . .]
428
Disraeli to Layard, LP, BL Add. MS 39136, fos 31–36Footnote 245
6 June 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
I find, at the last moment & on a busy day, I have the opportunity of communicating with you by a trusty hand — Understand, this is not an official communication, but one strictly personal, & of the utmost confidence.
The campaign has hitherto realised my anticipations= disastrous in Asia, on the Danube, doubtful, but big with menacing consequences.
Are there no means, notwithstanding the paralysing neutrality in vogue, which might lend, if effected, to maintain generally the status quo, &, at the same time, place England in a commanding position when the conditions of peace are discussed?
Is it impossible for the Porte to invite the presence of our fleet at Constantinople, & for us to accede to the invitation, still asserting our neutrality, on the ground, that we are taking a material guarantee for the observance of existing treaties?
A maritime movement of that kind could not be hazarded without securing our communications; otherwise, the Russians might be at the Dardanelles before they occupy Constantinople, & our fleet might be caught in a trap.
The material guarantee, therefore, should also consist of a military occupation of the Peninsula of Gallipoli by England. Twenty thousand men would secure this. We sho[ul]d engage to evacuate this position on the termination of the war.
If such a proposal came from the Porte, I would recommend its adoption by the Cabinet, but the proposal must come from Constantinople.
I wish you would consider these matters, & communicate with me in entire confidence. Time is of inestimable value, as I sh[oul]d think the preparation & despatch of the military portion of the expedition might require ten weeks. It could hardly be delayed later than the passage of the Danube by the Russians, & it would be most appropriate, if that event were the occasion of the appeal to us of the Porte.
[P.S] I cannot refrain from mentioning my sense of the skill & energy with which Yr Excellency is conducting the Queen's business at your Court.Footnote 246
429
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
11 June 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
I return you Layard's letterFootnote 247 — He certainly ought to be encouraged in his efforts to prepare the Sultan to treat for peace, but the Russians are intent on not making peace until they are at Constantinople, & all Schouvaloff[’]s intrigues and secret memoranda are to that end.
They cannot reach Constantinople if England takes an efficient step – & that they know. They will promise anything now, so as they can secure our ‘neutrality’, & no English expedition to the Dardanelles.
If we were to consent to their proposals, they wd. offer, in due time, not to cross the Balkan [sic] according to their engagement, but they will take steps to ensure the refusal of their terms by the Turks, & then the crossing will be a ‘necessity’[.]
P.S. [. . .] The ‘Times’ is now a Russian journal, & DelaneFootnote 248 calls daily for his instructionsFootnote 249 — [. . .]
I saw Odo yesterday – not satisfactory. He is not English eno’ for our ambassador. His mind & culture are entirely continental.
430
Manners to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 106/3, fos 154–155
12 June 1877
The Queen sent for me this afternoon, and told me to read the enclosed ‘distressing’ letter from Derby.Footnote 250
I have never seen her more moved.
She reads it as contradicting the views of herself and her government, and as accepting whatever terms Russia chooses to ask for. ‘They must get another sovereign than me to agree to them’!
She wishes you to return Derby's letter when you have read it.
At her request I place it in a sealed envelope. [. . .]
I cannot understand that blind belief in Turkey's warlike incapacity – nor the complacency with which Derby appears to view the Russian occupation of Constantinople, and acquisition of Batoum and territory.
What has happened between the last Cabinet & yesterday?
431
Disraeli to Salisbury, SP, fos 246–247Footnote 251
14 June 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
Derby saw Beust yesterday; the conference was long, &, so far as I can understand, D. faithfully made the proposition, as to active alliance, wh: the Cabinet sanctioned. D. pressed for a reply with[ou]t. delay, & said it was, if possible, most desirable it shd. be laid before Cab[inet]: on Saturday next[.] I think it best, therefore, to have no Cab[inet]. till that time, & I will fix it at three o’[clo]ck, so that we may have the morning for the chance of the arrival of the Austrian answer.
Beust promised to telegraph instantly.
It is but ingenuous to tell you, that the Queen is ‘greatly distressed’ about the very wavering language of Ld. Salisbury, wh: will encourage Russia & the Russian party. This with a reply from Ld Derby, which ‘fills her with despair,’ ‘greatly moves’ her. ‘Another Sov[ereig]n. must be got to carry out Ld Derby's policy.’
432
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fo. 145
14 June 1877
Foreign Office
Nothing in the nature of sanction or approval has been given by us to the Russian proposition. — Absolutely nothing. — We merely communicated the fact of its having been made – and asked what was thought about it at Vienna. Nor should we have done this but for Schou.'s assurance that it had been sent confidentially to Andrassy. [. . .]Footnote 252
433
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
14 June 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
It is my conviction, that nothing of their plans, as to peace, had been communicated by Russia to Andrassy.
You must not believe a word that Schou: says on this subject – It is all part of a system of ceaseless mendacity, to convince us, that Austria is bound hand & foot to them.
The mischief is, that Andrassy, apparently approving of the terms, & under the impression that they are favored [sic] by us, will speak in that spirit to the Emperor, &, so, will be disinclined to break to his master the English proposals to Austria.
434
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3Footnote 253
17 June 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
I hope you will support me at this juncture. It is necessary, that I shd. take this issue to decide the existence of the present Cabinet. It is quite evident to me, that Ld. Salisbury wishes the Russians to enter, & indefinitely occupy, Constantinople, acting, as he has done throughout, under the influence & counsel of Lyddon —Footnote 254
It is the conference over again, in wh: unquestionably, he much compromised us, tho’ both you, & myself, then, treated him with generous magnanimity; wh: however was thrown away on his sacerdotal convictions.
The ministry will not be weakened by his secession, &, I think, I can supply his place, & if necessary, that of others, in a manner wh: wd. commend itself to the country at this exigency.
But your course, on this occasion, is not that of an ordinary colleague — My heart is as much concerned in it as my intelligence, & I wish not to conceal, how grievous would be to me the blow, that severed our long connection & faithful friendship.
My colleagues are bound to no particular course by the vote I am suggesting. I shd. be sorry to take any future step, wh:, after mature reflection, did not meet with your particular sanction, & their general approval — All I want now is, to reassure the country, that is alarmed & perplexed; to show, that we are in a state not of puzzled inertness, but of preparedness for action; – so to assist negotiations, wh: will be constantly cropping up & place ourselves in a position, if there be eventually a crash, to assume a tone, wh: will be respected. [. . .]
435
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fo. 149
17 June 1877
Foreign Office
I will write, or, (better,) speak to you tomorrow on the whole question. Enough for the present to say that as far as you and I are concerned, I do not think we shall have any difficulty in agreeing, at least in the present stage of the affair. It seems to me that the vital question is not yet raised: and I hardly anticipate a disruption until it is raised. No doubt Salisbury's language was anxious, but he did not absolutely declare himself against preparation.Footnote 255 I need not add that a political separation between us two would be as painful to me as it could possibly be to you.
436
Layard to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 70/2, fos 116–117Footnote 256
18 June 1877
[. . .] We are now informed by Russia of the terms she is willing to accept before reaching the Balkans. It cannot be disguised that they amount to the dismemberment of Turkey in Europe with all its consequences to England & to the balance of power. [. . .] Should Russia cross the Balkans she may & probably will demand the greater part of Armenia and the freedom of the Straits, thus virtually commanding our alternative routes to India. The gravity of the situation cannot be exaggerated. The news from Asia looks a little more favourable, & the Russians still hesitate to attempt to cross the Danube, but if we are to rely upon our military authorities the Turks must yield in the end. [. . .] It appears to me of the utmost urgence [sic] and importance that something should be done without loss of time to form proper defences on Gallipoli peninsula, and we ought to occupy it as a material guarantee as soon as the Russians cross the Danube. I think that I could get the Sultan to ask me to do so, but until I know that H.M.G. have determined upon the occupation it would not be safe to hint at the subject. The result of such occupation as regards Germany, Austria and Italy and perhaps France must not be lost sight of. In my judgement the occupation of Gallipoli is of far more importance at present than bringing the fleet up to Constantinople. The latter could be done at any moment, and if we determined upon occupying Gallipoli the fleet should be stationed at Besika Bay. Gallipoli can be taken by a dash, Constantinople could not. If you will instruct me to get the Sultan to appeal to us to occupy Gallipoli as soon as the Russians cross the Danube I will ascertain what can be done. But you must remember that my position here is a most difficult one, with much to ask and nothing to give, & what has passed has given the Porte great suspicion and distrust of us. There are no doubt means at our disposal if we chose to resort to them of checking Russia, of maintaining the status quo, & of placing England in a commanding position, but to avail ourselves of them we must abandon our position of unconditional neutrality.
437
Layard to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 70/2, fos 126–127Footnote 257
10 July 1877
If anything is to be done to save the Turkish Empire, and our own interests in Europe and the East, no time should be lost. [. . .] It appears to me that the time is come for Her Majesty's Government to decide upon the course to be taken, and that I should receive definite instructions upon the subject. [. . .]
Admiral Hornby*, who is here, informs me that the fleet could do something for the defence of the Gallipoli lines, if the matter were very urgent. [. . .]
438
Layard to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 70/2, fo. 128Footnote 258
10 July 1877
The Russians may soon cross the Balkans and advance upon Adrianople. If Her Majesty's Government have decided upon occupying the Gallipoli Peninsula, not a moment should be lost in getting the Sultan to consent to our doing so. The very fact of our being there, even if marines and sailors were to be landed, provisionally, from the fleet, would raise the Turks from their present state of depression, and encourage them to resist in Bulgaria, and, at the same time, perhaps, make it more easy to obtain for them moderate terms of peace, especially now that they have been so successful in Asia. Admiral Hornby agrees entirely with me.
439
Disraeli to Richmond, Goodwood MS 865
12 July 1877
Whitehall Gardens
I wish to know what force we have of the marines in the present Medit[erranean]: squadron, &, also, whether we could re-inforce the existing force thro’ the ships about to join Hornby.
440
Manners to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 106/3, fos 158–159
12 July 1877
At the Ball last night I had an opportunity of putting some questions to Admiral Commerell.Footnote 259 [. . .]
The result is as follows —
In his opinion
The Fleet at Constantinople would be able to render valuable fighting assistance to the defence of the city.
If thought necessary a body of 5000 blue jackets and marines could be sent ashore forming a highly disciplined and most effective force of artillerists who could by themselves maintain a defensive position for a considerable time —
But important as would be the material assistance so rendered by the ships, and by that detached force, he estimates far higher the moral effect which would be produced by the presence of the fleet at Constantinople; and lastly
Although of course he would prefer that the Gallipoli lines should be in our, or in friendly hands, he derided the idea of the fleet being seriously impeded in it's [sic] movements by them even if they were held by the Russians. [. . .]
441
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fos 169–170
14 July 1877
In reference to our conversation after the Cabinet, I think it right to say, in writing, so that there may be no mistake about it, that any one proposing to have seen notes of mine, or to have been made acquainted with their contents – such notes referring to current political affairs – is either saying what he must know not to be true, or has been hoaxed by somebody else.
The notes which I generally take at Cabinets have never been seen except by Lady Derby or by my secretary.Footnote 260* They have been kept merely for purposes of convenient reference, those of old date have been from time to time destroyed, and all will be. — I have always understood it to be an unwritten rule of administrative practice, that no permanent record should remain of what passes in Cabinet. But to temporary memoranda kept, while they exist, for personal use, I know of no objection.
442
Disraeli to Salisbury, SP, fos 248–249
18 July 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
[. . .] The more I reflect about the Med[iterranean]: garrisons, the more I am convinced, that sending out some troops to Malta is desirable. It wd. have a great effect on the continent, & like every warlike move of England, lead to peace.Footnote 261 [. . .]
443
Manners to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 106/3, fos 162–163
22 July 1877
Hemsted Park, Staplehurst
With a heavy heart, but with no misgiving as to the necessity of the course I am taking I am compelled by the decision at which the Cabinet arrived yesterdayFootnote 262 to place my resignation in your hands, and to ask you to request Her Majesty to be pleased to accept it at such time and in such manner as shall seem to you least inconvenient to Her service, and least hurtful to the Government.
I need say nothing of the reasons which force me to this step, nor of the pain it occasions me.
You well understand both.
I had confidently hoped to remain by your side, and to render you what little assistance it was in my power to render to the close of your administration; but it was not to be.
444
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
23 July 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
[. . .] A defensive treaty with Austria for a term of years, say seven or ten, might yet put all right, & even the emperor might accept it. Austria is terribly afraid of the Italian navy, from which we shd. protect her, & she is not a power, like Germany, who would convert her defensive, into an offensive, alliance.
445
Disraeli to MannersFootnote 263
24 July 1877
2 Whitehall Gardens
Your letter is a great blow to me, and most unexpected. I really don't exactly understand what decision of the Cabinet you refer to.Footnote 264
I must beg you, at all events, to keep your resignation secret, until I can communicate it to the Queen personally, as a written announcement would lead to much excitement. Her Majesty, of all my colleagues, most depended on your supporting me, and now, when, for the first time, her Cabinet has unanimously and heartily agreed to declare war against Russia, if she evinces the slightest intention to fortify, or remain in, Constantinople (if she ever get there), the Queen will be greatly distressed and surprised at your determination.
I most earnestly request, therefore, that all may be suspended until I see Her Majesty, which I will try to effect on Saturday next.
446
Manners to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 106/3, fos 164–166
24 July 1877
I have not said a word to anybody on the subject of my communication to you, and will refrain from doing so until I hear from you again.Footnote 265
The decision of the Cabinet which forces me to leave it is that which allows Russia to occupy Constantinople and Gallipoli —
I am not aware of any unanimous decision to go to war with her afterwards, nor do I believe that any such intention, if it exists now, would or could be carried into effect then.
The occupation by Russia of Constantinople and Gallipoli is, in my judgment, the destruction of Turkey, and the establishment of Russian supremacy in the East, and I cannot support a policy which produces such results. [. . .]
I leave it entirely to you to settle the time and mode of making this known to the Queen, and my colleagues, and will attend, or not attend the next Cabinet as you think best.
Nothing can ever alter the feelings I entertain towards you, and I shall slip back into private life with only an encreased [sic] admiration of your great qualities and character; but I cannot consent to bear a part in what I believe to be a policy fatal to English interests in the East. [. . .]
447
Disraeli to Layard, LP, BL Add. MS 39136, fo. 66Footnote 266
29 July 1877
Osborne
The telegram sent you yesterday from the Cabinet opens a prospect of recurring to the wise and ancient policy of England. The British fleet in the Turkish waters with the consent of the Sultan may be the first step in the virtual preservation of his Empire. I much depend on your energy and skill in both [of] which I have the utmost confidence.
448
Queen Victoria to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 80/3, fo. 18Footnote 267
5 August 1877
Osborne House
I hope you will see Colonel Wellesley* at once and warn him about Lord Derby's views[.] Let me have a notion of what his mission is as soon as possible. Would like to see him before he returns. Merely assurances must not be accepted.Footnote 268
449
Disraeli to Layard, LP, BL Add. MS 39136, fos 72–75Footnote 269
6 August 1877
Many thanks for your letter. I regret the suspicions in the mind of the Sultan as regards our intentions — I admit they are reasonable but they are not true – at least, so far as I am concerned; being resolved to maintain, if possible, ‘the integrity & independence’ of the Ottoman Empire — The Turks have proved their independence, for without allies they have gallantly, &, I think, successfully, defended their country, & I still hope to see, at the conclusion of the war, the Porte a recognised power, & no despicable one, in Europe.
If there is ‘a second campaign’, I have the greatest hopes this country will interfere, & pronounce its veto against a war of extermination, & the dark designs of a secret partition, from wh: the spirit of the 19th Century recoils — As we have the command of the sea, why shd not a British corps d'armée (viâ [sic] Batoum) march into Armenia, & even occupy Tiflis?
We might send another to Varna, & act on the Russian flank —
But all this requires time. The Turks gain victories, but don't follow them up. After Plevna, they shd have driven the Russians across the Danube, destroyed the bridge, & taken the Emperor prisoner — Wellesley tells me, that might have been done—
The thing is – to secure another campaign, or rather the necessity for one, for if Russia is told by England, that ‘another campaign’ will be a casus belli, she may be inclined to make what P. Gortchakow calls ‘une pavé boiteuse’.Footnote 270
The danger is, if the Russians rally, again successfully advance, & reach Adrianople this autumn.
What then is to be done? With her suspicions of England, Turkey would be ruined — That is why I shd like to see our fleet in her immediate waters, & Gallipoli in our possession as a material guarantee, & with her full sanction. We shd then be able to save Turkey — [. . .]
450
Northcote to Corry, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fos 115–116
15 August 1877
Pynes, Exeter
[. . .] We are always discussingFootnote 271 some ‘minor premiss’ without being agreed upon the major, and so are continually arriving at absurd conclusions. [. . .] Each of us, when a particular step is proposed, considers how it will agree with his main view, or how it can be made to do so. The proposal is modified accordingly, and modified so often that at last it suits nobody; and then some unmeaning step is decided on; after which it is taken in a manner which was not exactly what any one expected; and lastly it is explained according to every man's separate theory.
How we have got on so far without getting into a worse scrape is a marvel to me. [. . .]
451
Wellesley to Corry, Dep. Hughenden 80/3, fo. 57
17 August 1877
London
My dear Monty – please forgive my sending you such a rough copy.
[Enclosed:]Footnote 272
The subject of the correspondence and conversations which have passed between the Queen, Lord Beaconsfield and Col. Wellesley to be considered secret and on no account to be mentioned at the Foreign Office.
Col. Wellesley is the bearer of an answer from Her Majesty's Government which he will communicate officially to the Emperor. Although Col. Wellesley has no orders from Lord Beaconsfield to make any further statement to His Majesty, it is thought advisable in the interests of Russia as well as of England that the Emperor be informed with regard to the future attitude of this country under certain contingencies.
His Lordship has therefore communicated to Col. Wellesley his views and intentions, which coincide entirely with those of the Queen, and which it is left to Col. Wellesley's discretion to make known to the Emperor, should a favorable [sic] opportunity present itself.
The policy of the Government is as follows:
The Queen and H.M. Gt. have a sincere desire to see the speedy re-establishment of peace on terms honorable [sic] to Russia and would be glad to contribute to such a result; should however the war be prolonged and a second campaign undertaken, the neutrality of England could not be maintained and she would take her part as a belligerent.
In bringing the above facts to the knowledge of the Emperor it is most important that Col. Wellesley should disabuse His Majesty's mind of certain misconceptions which could only lead to a false appreciation of the actual state of affairs.
It has been stated that there are dissensions in the Cabinet which would prevent active intervention on the part of England.
This is entirely false. The Cabinet is led by one mind and has the entire support of the Sovereign.
There exists perfect harmony of opinion between the Queen and Lord Beaconsfield respecting the foreign policy of the country. The Government is as strong as ever, and possesses the confidence of the people[,] which is proved by the present tranquil attitude of the public, who are convinced that the interests of England are safe in their hands.
It must not be thought that the policy of Lord Beaconsfield is one of hostility to Russia, and it might fairly be asked who has proved himself the greatest friend to Russia, Prince Bismarck or Lord Beaconsfield, the Chancellor who has done all in his power to urge Russia to undertake this disastrous war, or the Prime Minister who has endeavoured to save her from it?
It is commonly supposed in Russia that the mind of the English public is poisoned against Russia by Lord Beaconsfield and that His Lordship is responsible for the present relations which exist between the two countries[.]
Col. Wellesley is in a position to deny these statements, and to show that on the contrary it is Lord Beaconsfield who has recently discouraged discussions in Parliament with a view to avoiding the possibility of leading Turkey to believe that sooner or later England may be on her side, a belief which would no doubt have been created had the Government been compelled to make a distinct statement with regard to their future policy.
A private letter from Lord Beaconsfield to the Queen[,] which Her Majesty shewed Col. Wellesley[,] proved that Lord Beaconsfield has checked parliamentary discussion as well as anti-Russian public meetings with the object of avoiding all encouragement to Turkey.
However much Lord Beaconsfield may desire peace he is equally determined to uphold the honor [sic] and defend the interests of England, and Russia should not indulge in any erroneous impressions as to the weakness or vacillation of the British Govt.[,] which, Colonel Wellesley knows, enjoys the support of the Sovereign and the confidence of the nation.
Col. Wellesley should not fail to point out to the Emperor that the influence of the English Govt. at Constantinople is not by any means such as His Majesty appears to think, and that as a matter of fact the influence which Mr. Layard can bring to bear on the Porte is far more personal than official.
Col. Wellesley has had the exceptional advantage of two interviews with the Queen as well as frequent conversations with the Prime Minister[,] which has enabled him to obtain the most correct information with regard to the policy of England[,] and he is authorised if necessary to make use of the name of the Queen and that of Lord Beaconsfield in making this confidential communication to the Emperor of Russia.
452
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
21 August 1877
Hughenden
[. . .] I doubt not the Russians are really in a state approaching to desperation. As for a second campaign, England ought not to permit it.Footnote 273 Turkey has shown a vigor [sic] & resources, wh: entitle her to rank among the nations, & justify her position of 400 years.
Besides, civilized Europe must shrink from countenancing, even by neutrality, a war of extermination!
We must speak very strongly to Servia, & must not acknowledge that a great & multiform power like England cannot strike even an inland mongrel like Servia. [. . .]
In Odo'sFootnote 274 curious letter there is a remark, wh: shows that the 2 Emperors contemplate, if possible, indirectly assisting Russia, thro’ Servia.
This must not be tolerated – & you ought to tell Beust, & Buchanan, that if this sort of thing is encouraged, all our understandings with Austria on all points are tabula rasa.Footnote 275 [. . .]
453
Layard to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 70/2, fo. 142
29 August 1877
British Embassy, Constantinople
Our influence here is now reestablished beyond what I could possibly have hoped; I must do the best I can to maintain it. The Sultan is convinced that of the European powers, England alone can give him help – if not in money and men, at least in sympathy and moral support – and he looks to us. [. . .] I have made use of this influence that we at present enjoy to get the Porte to take measures to complete the defences of Constantinople and to make various changes in the commanders and positions of the Turkish troops suggested by our military attachés, whose hints have been of very great use to me, and whose advice is now readily, and even eagerly, received by the Turkish War Office and military authorities. [. . .]
454
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3Footnote 276
1 September 1877
Hughenden
I observe you have to go to some meeting in your county. I suppose it will be necessary to say something on public affairs, tho’ silence is golden.
Let me impress upon you not to mistake the feeling of this country. It is for peace, but it is, every day, getting more Turkish.
It is for peace, because it has confidence in our policy: i.e. peace with British interests all safe.
But we know this is a mere delusion; & that, had it not been for our good luck, British interests would not have been safe, the Russians wd. virtually have been at Constantinople, & H.M.'s Government no where [sic].
Opinion is getting more pro-Turkish every day, because the country recognises, that the Turks have the vigor [sic] & the resources, & the national spirit, which entitle them to rank, & to remain, among the sovereign powers of the world; & that there is no clear evidence, that a better government than the Ottoman can be established in the regions in question. [. . .]
It is to Russia & to Austria, that we ought to have addressed ourselves, & to have warned those powers, that, if they wish to preserve the neutrality of England, they must be careful in this matter.
The feeling is, that our honor [sic] is concerned in the issue, & I cannot say I think the feeling unfounded.
Pardon these rough hints.
455
Disraeli to Richmond, Goodwood MS 865
4 September 1877
Hughenden
[. . .] The Turks go on fighting, & fighting well; yet not quite well eno’ to remove all my uneasiness. I am afraid, now & then, of large re-inforcements & the Shipka pass.Footnote 277
I am extremely annoyed to find, that, notwithstanding the positive orders of the Cabinet, renewed to Smith,* the Admiralty has not ordered a single Torpedo boat.
456
Hardy to Cairns, Cairns Papers, PRO 30/51/7, fo. 47
6 September 1877
Balmoral
The Queen notified her wish to me yesterday that I should remain here until Monday next. She will I believe go away on her excursion the next day. Cross will probably not be required for about a week. This information will I hope enable you to judge of your own prospects. I told her that you were third on the list. She said she had only asked those who were likely to give her support although Carnarvon was the only one from whom she expected none. After a long interview during wh. she shewed me Beaconsfield's letterFootnote 278 and freely laid open her mind she lent me her reply to him and I may as well give you the effect of it for your guidance. She thinks that for humanity's sake as well as grounds of policy we should do all in our power to prevent a second campaign[,] the first having shewn us that a war of extermination is going on. [She thinks] That the Cabinet should come to a distinct conclusion what it will not allow without intervention and that it should do so at once even if 2 or 3 are opposed or even retire. This would be better than such a disruption at a moment when decision was urgent & necessary. She complains much of Derby's dilatoriness & put a curious question to me whether I thought that in case Lord Lytton'sFootnote 279 health should fail he would go to India. I answered in the negative & told her how strong Derby was in public opinion especially in the North though perhaps on grounds which wd not bear examination. She thought that it was justly said that the Govt. had done too much or too little but admitted that it was partly her fault as she had pressed constantly that ‘something should be done’. I need not go into all she said of Gladstone – Granville &c: Their conduct on the TitleFootnote 280 rankles and her feeling against them is increased by their Turkish bias. [. . .] I was glad to see that Beaconsfield spoke of his own health as quite re-established by some new system.
457
Northcote to Cross, Cross Papers, BL Add. MS 51265, fo. 134
9 September 1877
Pynes, Exeter
[. . .] I hear that you go to Balmoral next week, and that you will find H.M. much excited about the war news. I hope we shall be calm, for we have a most difficult task before us. I am not sure that the defeat of Russia would not be even more dangerous than her success. If it led to a break-up of that great Empire it would indeed be a letting out of waters.
It seems to me to be a time at which the neutral nations ought to take free counsel together, and to endeavour to agree on a modus vivendi which they could authoritatively recommend to the belligerents. But I fear there is little chance of our doing anything but ‘wait and see’.
458
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3Footnote 281
13 September 1877
Hughenden
I have re-opened yr box, to [say] that I have received yr letter & entirely approve of yr projected appointments. It will be a great thing to have got rid of HarrisFootnote 282 & Buchanan – I wish we cd. get rid of the whole lot. They seem to me to be quite useless. It is difficult to control events, but none of them try to. I think Odo Russell the worst of all.Footnote 283 He contents himself with reporting all Bismarck's cynical bravadoes, wh: he evidently listens to in an ecstasy of sycophantic wonder.
Why does not he try to influence Bismarck, as the Prince controls him? Why does not he impress upon Bis., for instance, that if Germany & Austria police Poland, in order that Russia shd. add 50,000 men to her legions, England will look upon that as a gross breach of neutrality?
Why does he not confidentially impress upon Bismarck, that Turkey has shown such vigor [sic] & resource that she has established her place among the sovereign powers of Europe, & that if they continue to play their dark game of partition they must come in collision with England, who will not permit the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire.
As for the arrangement, that Russian compensation is to be found in Armenia & so on, an English army, 40,000, men, with the Black Sea & Batoum at our command, cd. march to Tiflis.
We want no allies. We are not going to fight in Bulgaria. The situation is much the same as when Wellington went to the peninsula, except that a Turk as a soldier is worth 20 Spaniards – What allies had we then?
459
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
16 September 1877
Hughenden
[. . .] If Bismarck does not play fair, we ought to make an example of him. It can be done.
460
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
17 September 1877
Hughenden
I entirely approve your appointments, & only trust you may soon have the opportunity of making more, as I am quite wearied with the present men, who seem to me to have sunk into being the mere parasites of the courts & ministers with whom they are placed in relation. Our principal ambassadors ought now to be confidentially informing the great powers, that neutrality can only be the occasional policy of England; we have given Russia her fair chance; & she cannot be allowed to enter into a second campaign of a war of extermination, at least on the conditions under wh: she has conducted the present. [. . .]
461
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3Footnote 284
28 September 1877
Hughenden
I have summoned the Cabinet for next Friday.Footnote 285
I wish to place, before it, this proposal[:]
It being of the utmost importance, that there shd. not be a second campaign, the only object of wh: wd. be the seizure of Constantinople, it is proposed, that Her Majesty's ambassadors shd. sound the Porte as to the terms of peace it is prepared to offer.
If they include the settlement of Bulgaria on the basis of the Protocol of London & the restoration to Russia of the portion of Bessarabia, forfeited by the Treaty of Paris, it would seem that the honor [sic] of Russia would be sufficiently vindicated.
It is assumed, that the Porte would agree to these, or any other reasonable terms, provided England, if empowered, as mediator, to make them to Russia, & they being rejected by that power, would assure the Porte, that, under such circumstances, we shd. depart from our present position of neutrality, & inform Russia, that, if Constantinople be menaced, England would afford material assistance to Turkey to prevent its seizure —
This is a clear and precise policy: it gets us out of all the embarrassing distinctions bet[wee]n. temporary & permanent occupation, wh: harassed, & nearly humiliated, us last session; &, if rejected by Russia, wd. put her more in the wrong in the eyes of Europe, while it wd. place H.M. Government in an honorable [sic], an intelligible, & popular position.
What I shd. like most is, that the proposal shd. be made by yourself; the natural organ of the government on these high matters, & it will be a source of the highest satisfaction to me, if, on reflection, you will comply with my wishes.Footnote 286
462
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fos 205–206Footnote 287
29 September 1877
Knowsley
I am not sorry that you mean to call the Cabinet; both for the sake of the effort out-of-doors, and also because after two months, or nearly that time, it is well to compare notes.
There can be no harm in trying to find out what terms of peace the Turks would accept, when once the campaign of this year is over. I doubt whether they would give any opinion now, as they may still hope for successes that will alter their position[.]
I am not prepared to support the proposal which you suggest, still less to put it forward; but a preliminary discussion will be of use as showing how far, and on what points, there is likely to be agreement among us as to the course which we ought to take.
463
Disraeli to Richmond, Goodwood MS 865
30 September 1877
Hughenden
[. . .] A second campaign is greatly to be deprecated, for it wd. not be undertaken by Russia exc[ep]t. with the determination of seizing Constantinople.
Can the Porte be induced to offer, thro’ us, terms to Russia, wh: that power may accept?
I think so. You will have to consider, & decide.
If Russia refuse them, she will put herself more in the wrong in the eyes of Europe, but, at all events, we ought to take up a clear & precise position, & extricate ourselves from all these embarrassments about ‘temporary & permanent occupation’, wh: hampered us last year, & almost humiliated us. [. . .]
464
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fos 125–126
1 October 1877
Pynes, Exeter
I am very glad to hear of the proposed Cabinet. It is time that we should consider our position with regard to this war, and the possibility of doing something to put an end to it.Footnote 288 Its continuance for another year would, as it seems to me, be not only an outrage on humanity, but might be the cause of serious danger to Europe and to ourselves.
What I am anxious for is, that we should be seen to take a broad view of the questions involved. I do not disguise from myself the desirableness of averting the capture of Constantinople, or the dangers which might be apprehended from its falling, even for a time, into the hands of the Russians. But I think we have other, and larger, interests to look to; and I am anxious that we should not jeopardise them by placing ourselves in a position resembling selfish isolation.
If we are still to limit ourselves to a neutrality, qualified by a regard for the maintenance of our road to India, I don't know that we can do much better than sit still and see the fight out. Russia, if she succeeds in her object, will have exhausted herself so much, and will have such difficult work to do, that it must be many years before she could turn even the permanent possession of Constantinople to any such account as to threaten our communications. And on the other hand, assuming that the other Powers do not wish to see her mistress of the Black Sea, she will be in no condition to disregard their notice to quit. The danger, therefore, of her permanently taking possession is much less than it was; and, if we did not think it right to enter into the field before, it is questionable whether (on this ground) we ought to enter it now. You must also consider the danger of our taking up an attitude which might bring Germany into the business in opposition to us. Germany may say, we don't desire to see Russia in possession of Constantinople; if she attempts to take it for her own, we will, in concert with Austria, interfere to prevent her; but we wish to see her vindicate her superiority over Turkey, and we think she ought to be allowed to march to the capital if she can, and to dictate a peace as we did at Paris. Suppose England to step in and to say, we cannot consent to this, may we not give Germany a plausible ground for declaring that we are selfishly impeding the settlement of a great question of general interest, and for encouraging Russia to disregard our opposition? We might in that case find ourselves awkwardly situated.
But I think we should have a really good line open to us if we could induce the Porte to make some such proposals as you indicate; and could then come forward to support them in the face of Europe, as affording the best and perhaps the only means of stopping a war which must entail such ruin and misery on all, and bring so little good to anybody; and I think we might go the length of offering not only our moral support, but of intimating that, in the event of Russia's refusing to desist from her aggression after fair terms had been offered, we would give Turkey our material support likewise. Everything will depend upon how this is done. If we do not carry public opinion with us, we shall make matters much worse. [. . .]
465
Carnarvon to Salisbury, SP, fos 314–315Footnote 289
8 October 1877
Highclere
I conclude that we shall have before very long another – and an important – Cabinet.
From my point of view the question of terms is a specious absurdity: but I suppose that some scheme will be put forward. As yet none has been suggested. Disraeli seemed studiously to avoid any statement on the subject: & though Cairns had intimated that there were possible terms none have been brought forward. Have you any idea what he is likely to propose? & have you any notion of any active course in the way of counter proposal that could be with advantage taken? I see none —
I conclude that the interval between our last & our next Cabinet will be employed in an attempt to win over the hesitating element amongst them= and to secure a distinct and overwhelming majority. When that is accomplished, I shall not be surprised if extreme pressure is applied. The influence from Balmoral was curiously manifested on Friday: but you will see that I was not wrong in the summer when I told you that Richmond was morally what he is intellectually. [. . .]
466
Cairns to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, fos 152–153
10 October 1877
Pitlochry
[. . .] I am very glad we are to meet to consider our position with reference to a second campaign. I am convinced that a policy of inactivity will be fatal to our own interests & to the peace of Europe, & I trust we shall never again be driven, as we were last summer, to deliberate on what our interests required to be done at Constantinople & the Dardanelles, with the consciousness that, whatever might be required, it was too late to do it. It will be too miserable if this war is renewed another year, & I am quite for taking some step, such as you suggest, to prevent it. [. . .]
467
Disraeli to Layard, LP, BL Add. MS 39136, fos 99–106Footnote 290
11 October 1877
Brighton
I received your letter yesterday, & answer your enquiries at once.
The feeling in favor [sic] of Turkey has greatly improved in England, & not slightly in Europe. This is to be attributed, 1st, & mainly, to the gallantry of the Ottomans, & 2ndly, to the relief felt by the diminished prestige of Russia.
I think the appeal, wh: you suggest, by the Sultan, to the parties to the Treaty of Paris, would still more favourably enlist public feeling on his side: but I question, whether it wd. do more. No power is for peace except England.
England cannot offer to mediate, unless solicited by one of the belligerents. I do not think Russia, in her present position, cd. solicit any one, = certainly not us.
If Turkey invited our good offices, we shd. be indisposed to interfere, unless there was a fair chance of effecting the common object.
Would this be possible? Turkey to sketch the outline of terms, &, if approved of by England as sufficient and satisfactory, then, to ask England to present them to Russia, & to advise their adoption.
If Russia refused, she would put herself much more in the wrong: &, if the terms were publicly acknowledged by England as just & satisfactory, it would be very difficult for us to adhere to our present neutrality. Opinion at home wd. force us to action. [. . .]
I mark this letter ‘secret’, for it expresses, & very roughly, only my own views & thoughts. It is not, therefore, the letter of a minister as much as of an individual, who sympathises with your views & entirely approves of yr conduct in these difficult affairs of the East = but if you find the suggestions I have thrown out feasible, I shd. be prepared to recommend them to the Cabinet. Of course, before that however, they would be made by you, in due course, to the Secretary of State.
468
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fos 211–212
12 October 1877
Knowsley
[. . .] Beust was so anxious to see me that he asked to come down here, though I told him I should be in town next week. I conclude therefore that he or Andrassy, attach [sic] more than usual importance to his communication: of which you have the substance in this draft.Footnote 291
You will probably come to the same conclusion that I do: that Andrassy is only playing with us. His reason for not choosing to interfere just now is absurd: and one does not understand how he can suppose that anybody will be taken in by it.
The deception is useless and silly; for if he had simply told the truth – that Austria cannot afford to quarrel with her two big neighbours, everybody would have known what he meant, and few people would have blamed. To make the game of cross-purposes more complicated, ZichyFootnote 292 appears to be holding at Constantinople language quite different from that of Andrassy. — I cannot make it out – possibly because the parties concerned don't know their own minds. You have all the information I possess.
469
Salisbury to Carnarvon, Carnarvon Papers, BL Add. MS 60759, fos 40–43
14 October 1877
Hatfield
My letters were not forwarded to me in Yorkshire – so I only got yours of the 14th when I got back.Footnote 293
At present I do not see very serious danger ahead. Offers of mediation – so long as they contain no pledges of assistance, are – at worst – ridiculous. I think we may be sure that Derby will not allow them to contain any such element.
For anything more than this there is at present no pretext. It would be impossible to say that C[onstantino]ple is in danger now. I trust it will continue impossible till the first week in February. By that time many things may have happened: but in any case, the country will have very much changed, if it desires any increase of taxation in order to help the Turk. My impression from what I have seen is that, though the feeling against Russia is strong, it nowhere rises nearly to income-tax point. When Parliament has once met we shall I trust be safer[.] I do not see any opening for a counterproposition on our part.
The terms D. talked of proposing, in a letter he wrote to me before the Cabinet – are the terms contained in the Protocol. As I pointed out to Hardy who spoke from that text, there are no terms in the Protocol. There is only a recital of intentions couched in the vaguest possible language. Russia must be very much beaten indeed before she will accept any such suggestion.
470
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
15 October 1877
10 Downing Street
Your letters arrived so late yesterday, that my messenger, as well as Lord Tenterden, had departed, & I cd. not reply to you, as I had intended. [. . .]
Before Tenterden arrived on Saturday, C[oun]t. Beust made his appearance & stayed an hour, of which 55 minutes were devoted to himself & his affairs. He said to me everything he had said to you at Knowsley, but I don't think anything else= except, when I rather pressed him about mediation, I don't think he was as firm as I had expected.
Andrassy, if one may speak of a man one does not know, seems to me to be both tortuous & careless, & capable of directing Zichy to make a reconnaissance, which Zichy has perhaps magnified into a greater movement. I don't think we ought to show any eagerness in the matter either at London or Constantinople, but it is as well, that Layard shd. not throw cold water on the communications, as they may have a really tentative character, tho’ not of immediately practical application. [. . .]
471
Disraeli to Corry, Dep. Hughenden 69/1, fos 16–18
20 October 1877
Brighton
I have broken to the Faery,Footnote 294 that it is very doubtful, whether, in my present state, I can manage to lead the House of Lords, & remembering my sufferings last session, it seems to me impossible. [. . .]
[. . .] There is no striking news. I fear our friends the Turks have done their best & the Russians have done their worst. [. . .]
[. . .] In my own part, I firmly believe Bismarck is contemplating the partition of France, & if Spain, instead of 15 mill[ion] of population, had 30, wh: wd. be the average according to her territory, so that she cd. send 500,000 armed men into the field, I believe Germany, Italy & Spain – & perhaps Belgium let in for a slice, – could do it.
I don't think B[ismarck] wishes to destroy our Empire but he wishes to deprive us of all influence. An Empire with[ou]t. influence wo[ul]d not be of long duration.
472
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
27 October 1877
Brighton
I believe that Bismarck's great, general policy is the partition of France, as the possession of Constantinople is that of Russia [. . .]Footnote 295
I don't think Bismarck, which some do, wants to destroy the British empire, & probably would have been glad originally to have worked with us, but what he wants is to destroy our influence, & expel us from the political arena, & I fear he may succeed. Empires without influence do not endure.
473
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fos 129–130
3 November 1877
Though I like your suggestion of yesterday better than the one which we had before us last month, and am willing to agree to it if Derby approves, yet I cannot say I am much in love with it.Footnote 296
I therefore wish to ask you to consider one other suggestion, which seems to me worthy of discussion.
Why should we not address a carefully drawn review of the situation, as it appears to us, to the four other neutral Powers, and invite them to join us in making some kind of appeal to the belligerents?Footnote 297 [. . .]
I cannot help fearing that a private communication, either to Turkey or to Russia, would lead to misunderstandings and complications; while, being secret, it could not be turned to account in the way of explaining our attitude, either to the people of England, or to other countries. [. . .]
Forgive me for adding a 7th. party to the Cabinet[.]Footnote 298
474
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
19 November 1877
10 Downing Street
The Lord Chancellor called on me on Saturday, & he spoke, not only for himself but for some of his colleagues, about the despatch to the Russian government.
I told him, there was a sort of indirect communication, wh: had reached us, from wh: we gathered, that, in negotiating a peace, a demand wd. be made with respect to Bulgaria, of wh: we cd. not approve, & that if our note, respecting Const[antinople]: &c., were forwarded & pressed at this moment, the Russians might conclude, that we agreed to their Bulgarian proposal.
He agreed with me, under these circumstances, it was best not to send in the note, but he thought it ought to be prepared, & considered by the Cabinet–
The unfortunate fall of Kars will, I fear, revive those agitations in another quarter, wh: I had quieted.Footnote 299
475
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fo. 223
19 November 1877
Foreign Office
I will see what I can do about the draft. — I accept the decision of the Cabinet,Footnote 300 and indeed approve of the general policy indicated: but it is a very awkward paper to draw, as matters stand. — I don't believe the Russians would care to go further than Adrianople, where they stopped in 1828, and where they are near enough to overawe the capital without entering it. We shall have to take care that we don't seem to give them more freedom of action than we desire.
476
Manners, Memorandum, Dep. Hughenden 106/3, fos 184–185
26 November 1877
I think the time has come when the Cabinet ought to determine and act upon a definite line of policy in the Turco-Russian question. [. . .]
Russia should be asked to give a positive answer as to the occupation, whether temporary or not, of Constantinople and the Dardanelles; and, pending it's [sic] arrival, preparations should be made for sending a corps d'armée to the East.
If the answer should be unsatisfactory or evasive, or should a Russian force cross the Balkans before it's [sic] receipt, the expedition should be despatched forthwith [. . .]
It is submitted that this would not necessarily constitute, or produce a state of war against Russia; but would be in strict accordance with our conduct when there was an apprehension that Russia intended to force the Suez Canal by her ships of war, in consequence of which we despatched an ironclad to the mouth of the Canal with orders to resist any attack upon it. [. . .]
In my judgment such action would greatly contribute to a pacification; and it is obvious that were peace negociations once entered upon, the presence of an English army and fleet at and about Constantinople would enormously strengthen the hands of our diplomatists. [. . .]
477
Cairns to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, fos 160–163
30 November 1877
London
Layard's letter to Ld. D[erby]. (1333) as to the consequences of Servia and Greece coming into the war [. . .] is very serious: & so is the information of Sir C. DicksonFootnote 301 as to the defenceless state of the country south of the Balkan [sic].
In conjunction with these, I have been reading the private note given by Schouvff. to Ld. D. in June last: & also the conversation between Bismarck & Ld Odo R[ussell]., in the secret despatch of the latter (May 27 last): & I cannot help thinking that any one applying these documents to the present crisis would say not only that an overture for mediation from this country would not be officious, but that it has been invited both by Russia & Germany. Pray read these documents before the Cabinet.
[Enclosed:]
1. The tripartite treaty of 15 April 1856Footnote 302 has never been formally cancelled or abrogated.
2. On the other hand various events have occurred since that date in reference to which the provisions of the treaty might have been invoked, & yet none of the Powers parties to the treaty have, so far as we know, called upon the other Powers to put in force its’ [sic] provision.
3. Whether any of the other signatory powers may hereafter invoke the provisions of the treaty H.M. Govt. cannot of course foretell. If an appeal should be made to H.M. Govt. founded upon the treaty, it will be the duty of the Govt. to consider the appeal with reference to the circumstances under which it is made, & the events which have occurred since the date of the treaty.
N.B. I have myself no doubt that the treaty is at an end, & that the specific ‘independence & integrity recorded in the Treaty of Paris’, which the tripartite treaty guaranteed, no longer exists. There is therefore no danger in the answer assuming this complexion, tho’ it may be unnecessary & undesirable to affirm it categorically.Footnote 303
478
Manners to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 106/3, fos 186–187
1 December 1877
Balmoral
I have not much to report. H.M is – as you may suppose, displeased with Derby's speech,Footnote 304 and not satisfied with Northcote's language while here.
I endeavoured to put the best possible construction on Derby's speech, explaining the character of his interlocutors; but the question naturally arises – what was meant in our declaration – or rather definition of conditional neutrality by the allusion to our interests in the Persian Gulf if – as D's language would seem to imply – the occupation of Armenia by Russia will not be resisted by us?Footnote 305
It is true TrebizondFootnote 306 alone was mentioned; but the whole tone was one of indifference to anything that might happen in Armenia. Meanwhile I still put trust in the Turks, and the weather. [. . .]
479
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3Footnote 307
5 December 1877
10 Downing Street
[. . .] I consented to change, yesterday, the form of the note to Russia,Footnote 308 wh: the Cabinet had previously agreed to, in compliance with your wishes, wh: I always wish to meet if possible, but I prefer the original proposal. [. . .]
Its tone cannot be too firm & clear — Whatever may be told to you, I believe, that Russia, generally, is more ready for peace, than her journals pretend, but the war party is encouraged by our presumed supineness.
I was sorry to hear you say yesterday, that you were not prepared to make the occupation of Constant[inopl]e, or rather the menaced occupation of that city, a casus belli. I hope I misunderstood you. I hold, myself, both this event, if impending, as well as the simultaneous opening of the Straits to Russia & then closing to other powers, should decidedly be casus belli for this country, with or without allies – and with regard to this last consideration, we shd. remember, that Turkey herself is now a powerful ally. In the Crimean war, she literally had no army. After a fierce campaign, she has still 400,000 men in the field, armed with admirable weapons & her arsenals are well supplied [. . .]Footnote 309
480
Wellesley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 80/4, fos 178–181
7 December 1877
Torad[?eric] near Plevna
The Emperor yesterday informed General Werder, my German colleague, that he had received a telegram from Count Schouvaloff to the effect that, at a cabinet council recently held in London on the subject of the Eastern Question, the peace party had been victorious, but that notwithstanding this, it had been decided to address another note to Russia.Footnote 310
It is needless to say that this intelligence was received with the greatest satisfaction, and his majesty is doubtless now convinced that there does exist a difference of opinion among the members of H.M's Government, which will permit him to push his aggressive policy, or rather that of his counsellors, further than would otherwise have been deemed safe.
Whether there be a divergence of opinion among Her Majesty's ministers or no, it is fatal that the Emperor should be induced to believe that it exists, especially at such a critical moment, when all Russians are speculating as to the possible conditions of peace, and loudly proclaiming their views as to what is due to them for the sacrifices they have made. [. . .]
[. . .] Holding the Quadrilateral to the east, the Turks ought to be able to make a formidable stand on the road to Adrianople, and if they had but English officers to command them, the Russians would find an advance to that city as difficult, if not more difficult a matter than the capture of the Plevna position.
War is, no doubt, a great calamity, but if it be true, as most Russians affirm, that a conflict between their country and England is inevitable sooner or later, then surely it would be better to fight Russia now that she is well nigh exhausted, and before our ally, and perhaps the only one, is completely crushed. [. . .]
481
Hardy to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 80/4, fo. 189
11 December 1877
Edinburgh
The startling news of the fall of PlevnaFootnote 311 and our knowledge of the little force which intervenes between that place and Adrianople must make us very anxious. The possession of Plevna secures a fortified road to the Russians and may make the great fortresses of less importance. The time has come when mediation should be pressed & if refused ought we not to call Parliament & ask for increase of force. Events will I fear hurry on & find us as we were.Footnote 312
482
Layard to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 70/2, fos 163–167Footnote 313
12 December 1877
British Embassy, Constantinople
The last messenger brought me your letter of the 27 Ult[im]o.Footnote 314 I had an opportunity on Monday last to obtain some information which may enable me to answer some of your enquiries. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom I was calling, shewed me a telegram from Musurus relating his conversation with you on the subject of a loan to Turkey. [. . .]
[. . .] He then took up Musurus’ idea of making an arrangement with the creditors, and of freeing a part of the guarantees assigned to them, for the purpose of raising a new loan. He seemed to think that by this means, and with the help of H.M. Government, the Porte might get the money it required. I pointed out to him that after Mahmoud Pasha's decree, amounting to a declaration of bankruptcy, and the way in which the bondholders had been treated as regards the guarantees given to them, there was very little hope of the Porte being able to raise a loan without giving [?other] solid guarantees, upon the punctual application of which the utmost reliance could be placed. [. . .]
[. . .] My conversation with Server PashaFootnote 315 was strictly private and confidential, and for obvious reasons I made it as general as possible. It was merely an ‘exchange of ideas’, in diplomatic phraseology. I gathered from what fell from him that, under present circumstances, the Porte would not be likely to listen to any proposal for a cession of territory. The Sultan & the Turkish Ministers still cling to the formula of ‘the independence and integrity’ of the Empire, and they would think that to give up territory would be to renounce the latter. The subject could only be approached with the greatest caution. Their suspicions of our intentions [. . .] have been revived by the reports sent to them of Lord Derby's recent speech, and of its effect upon public opinion.Footnote 316 [. . .]
[. . .] I do not believe that, at the present time, the Porte would be prepared to cede Crete, Cyprus or any other island in the Mediterranean to us. [. . .]
I quite agree with you in thinking that if the Porte could be enabled to enter upon a second campaign, and we could help her to get money to do so, and could combine with it the presence of the English fleet in the Bosphorus, and a British army corps at Gallipoli & Derkos, the result as to after negociations might be great. But in order to accomplish this we ought to abandon at once a hesitating and undefined policy. The Turks do not know what to make of us. We seem to them to blow hot and cold. They think that we take an interest in them, and advise them for their good; but that we will abandon them at once should Russia decline to listen to us, and that we are not even ready to make an effort in support of the most vital English interests. [. . .]
483
Northcote to Salisbury, SP, fo. 123Footnote 317
14 December 1877
11 Downing Street
Your concluding sentence adds much to my uneasiness.Footnote 318 I am afraid of the most serious consequences if Derby cannot rouse himself to take a lead and give us a line of his own. He would find a good backing in the Cabinet if he would do this; but we cannot go on without a policy, or with nothing but a non possumus:Footnote 319 and a break-up in the present state of affairs may lead to chaos and to war. Shall you be visible [sic] at any time tomorrow?
484
Carnarvon to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50022, fos 227–231
15 December 1877
Highclere Castle
Though I fear after the discussion of yesterday in the CabinetFootnote 320 that we have reached a stage when it is vain to attempt to reconcile opinions which have long been so divided and are now so divergent, I do not like the next 24 hours to pass without saying to you that I deplore the division which I now see imminent, that in the general interests of the country I think it dangerous and that so far as I am concerned I would do much to avert it, provided only that the escape from evil is not purchased at the price of still greater dangers. And I say all this to you not only as an old personal friend but because as leader of the H[ouse]. of Commons you seem to me to have a special responsibility cast upon you.
I need to repeat to you – what you know well – that I do not oppose the proposal for an increase in armaments because I oppose all war and am anxious to maintain peace at any cost: I have both in private and in the Cabinet on former occasions advised very strong measures: I desired that we should consider the occupation of Egypt and should have been presently ready to incur considerable risks in such a case: but any such suggestion, whether proceeding from me or others, has as you know been always put aside because competing with the insane scheme of undertaking the defence of Constantinople; and as a consequence a Turkish alliance. My opposition therefore does not arise from a desire to do nothing or a fear of attempting large things if circumstances require them: but it results from a conviction that in the course which is now proposed to us for adoption there are nine chances of war as against one of peace.
It is idle to deny that what is proposed is a threat to Russia and an encouragement to Turkey: and though it is just possible that Russia who does not desire the continuance of war may accept our armed mediation yet she cannot accept it unless she is guarded against humiliation: and who, that has sat in the Cabinet the last twelve months and knows the temper in which these matters have been discussed, will say that there is any guarantee on this point with a reconstructed government? The chances are at least very unfavourable.
As regards war itself I think it is difficult to exaggerate the folly of it. We sd. [sic] go into it not only with inadequate resources and without allies – perhaps even with serious opposition to expect from Germany & Italy if not Austria – but we should certainly open the door wide to European disturbances of every kind if there are any persons who desire to disturb the peace of the world.
Nor have we the miserable excuse of being able to save & restore even to its’ [sic] former position the Turkish Empire. It is breaking to pieces past all remedy and we are simply shutting our eyes to facts that are as clear as noon-day. I cannot therefore knowingly be a party to the idea of a war with Russia and a Turkish alliance which finds so much favour in many quarters: and it really seems to me a matter of little importance how we arrive at such a result – whether by plainly & distinctly throwing in our lot with the Turks or whether we adopt some circuitous method of reaching this same end. I believe this to be Derby's view and holding it to be the right one I cannot see any reason for refusing my support to it: but I do not the less deplore the fatal tendency of present events.
If indeed any formula could be devised which would give me a sufficient assurance that the increase of armaments would not be applied in direct support of Turkey and more particularly in the impossible scheme of a defence of Constantinople – thereby involving us actively in the present war – I should be ready at all events to consider whether some increase of our forces might not be made: but here it is that the last discussion in the Cabinet makes me feel how hard it will be to come to a clear understanding.
On re-reading this letter I think it right to say that though I have marked it private I do not desire to interpose any objection to your showing it to anyone, if you think it desirable to do so. I need not say that none of our colleagues have seen it —
485
Salisbury to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50019, fos 53–57Footnote 321
15 December 1877
India Office
I have put down in a separate note the difficulties, which the present proposition combined with Derby's almost certain resignation if they are pressed, raise in my mind.
I quite agree with you that the non possumus is leading to very blank results.Footnote 322
But this remedy is worse than the disease.
An active policy is only possible under one of two conditions – that you shall help the Turks, or coerce them. I have no objection to the latter policy: or to a combination of the two. With the former alone, I cannot be content. But, as you know, neither the Queen nor the Prime Minister will have anything to do with the latter.
[Enclosed:]
It is proposed to summon Parliament in great haste to ask for money wherewith to arm. Before the recess, the money might have been obtained as a measure of precaution, without any full exposition of policy. But money which is so urgently wanted that we cannot wait three weeks to have it in the usual session of Parliament, must be wanted for a special purpose. Parliament will insist on knowing what that special purpose is. Your reply, I presume, will be, ‘the defence of Constantinople.’ But, if you want money so urgently for this purpose, you must, in consistency, use it without delay. You must arm at once: & send your contingent to Constantinople at the earliest possible date. Meanwhile, at the very first moment of the announcement that Parliament is summoned, the Turks will abandon all idea of negotiation, & prepare for a desperate defence. The infernal newspapers, who dog our footsteps, pretending to belong to us, & howling for blood, will from the very first moment place the most belligerent interpretation on the summons of Parliament: & I doubt not, they will know of the vote of money to be asked for. The result will be that the war will go on; the Turkish resistance will be renewed: & the campaign will be raging at the foot of the Balkans, when our troops arrive in Constantinople. Do you imagine that they can remain there in an attitude of ‘conditional neutrality’ – not helping or encouraging the Turk, not showing any sign of life, until the first Russian shows himself on the slope of the Dyrkos earthworks? Even if the Turks permitted us to come otherwise than as allies – which is very doubtful, such a proceeding, taken at this time, must end in cooperation with the Turks. It will be a Crimean war: only postponed until our allies have been half destroyed.
The proposal of yesterday seems to me therefore to place us on the steep slope which leads to war. Is there any justification in danger to ‘British interests’[?] Russia has not yet crossed the Balkans; – the roads are still impassable to artillery, or nearly so; there is a long distance to traverse for commissariat: & winter has but just begun. But the most important consideration of all, is that Austria has pledged herself not to suffer any Russian possession of Constantinople in language so distinct, that unless we are [to] treat her as a Power with whom language has no binding force, she must prevent it.
I hold, therefore, that Constantinople is in no real danger: & that a call to arms, hasty & urgent, may have the effect, & probably succeeds from the wish, of involving us in war to uphold Turkey.
This would be difficult enough to swallow. But to me the matter presents itself in a still more serious light. I shall have to ask myself how, with such a policy laid down, affairs are likely to be conducted in a Cabinet, in which the Queen'sFootnote 323 and the Prime Minister's wishes are no longer balanced by Derby's well-known aversion for war. His resignation will create, at such a juncture, the utmost consternation. Not only will it unite all sections of the Opposition, & throw into great discouragement the non-warlike portion of our own party: but it will divide the nation into two camps – those who are for aiding the Turks, & those who are for leaving them to their fate. The latter will attack furiously, by every weapon which popular agitation or parliamentary forces can furnish: the fight will become intensely bitter: those who are for war will become more warlike, those who are for peace will become more anti-Turkish. In such a melée all half opinions, all nice distinctions will be crushed out. It cannot be doubted, that under pressure of engagements into which they will have slid, & in the heat of the fight with the Opposition, the Cabinet will surrender itself to the war party: & any advocates of peace who may have stayed behind Derby will not be in a pleasant position.
These are the thoughts which were suggested to me byFootnote 324 the Cabinet of yesterday – & found expression in the few words I added to my note to you.
I shall be in town early on Monday & will try to see you.
486
Northcote to Salisbury, SP, fo. 127
16 December 1877
Athenaeum
I agree with almost every word of your letter, – though perhaps I could not go with you in your hypothetical willingness to coerce both sides; which however we need not discuss, as it lies outside the range of p.p.Footnote 325 [. . .]
487
Salisbury to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50019, fo. 59
16 December 1877
Hatfield
I will try and find you towards midday tomorrow.
The postponement of the summoning of Parliament to the end of the monthFootnote 326 will take all the sting out of the proposition – or nearly all: for there will then be no hot haste – & consequently no implied pledges of immediate action[.]
488
Manners to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 106/3, fos 188–189
17 December 1877
6 Cumberland Terrace, Regent's Park
I was surprized at Smith'sFootnote 327 defection on the main point, but was relieved by his saying as we were breaking up that it was far more important for the country that your administration should continue than that his or any individual's view on that question should prevail.
I expect therefore to see him tomorrow ranged on our side.
If you think there would be the slightest use in referring to my tender of resignation last summerFootnote 328 in conversation with Derby, or in the Cabinet[,] don't hesitate to do so.
Your's [sic] in disgust
489
Corry to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 69/1, fos 130–131
17 December 1877
10 Downing Street
Count Schouvaloff informed me last night that, for certain, Germany would decline to mediate, according, he said, to a distinct understanding come to between the Chancellors at Gastein. – that Russia would decline an armistice, her army, now, in Turkey being almost exactly three to the enemy's one – that mediation by England would undoubtedly be refused by Russia – and that he felt confident that Turkey during the winter would herself sue for and conclude peace.
So far as his information went, even now, Russia would be content with the terms which, six months ago, he had stated to Lord Derby.
His general tone was that of entire confidence that England would not interfere, except to offer mediation.
Count Montgelas is to call upon me before the Cabinet today, with a confidential proposal from Austria to join with England in answering the Porte's circular.Footnote 329
490
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fos 135–136
17 December 1877
11 Downing Street
There was one consideration in my mind which I could not state in Cabinet, but which weighed most heavily with me.
If the adoption of your proposalsFootnote 330 were followed by Derby's resignation, it is certain that Salisbury and Carnarvon would follow him. This would at once give a colour to the policy, and mark it as being in the opinion of your own Foreign Secretary and others of your colleagues a war policy. And it is obvious that this would give an immense advantage to our opponents. [. . .]
Now as to the policy to be adopted. Is it not possible to come to a compromise, which may prevent a break-up?
The compromise I would suggest is, that we should give up the idea of defending Constantinople, but make all preparations for occupying Gallipoli the moment it is threatened. Smith says we could make preparations quietly which would enable us to land a small force there at three days’ notice [. . .]
Could you not propose to Derby to come to an agreement on this basis?
I am strongly impressed with the danger of calling Parliament before we have a policy on which we are united; and I have strong doubts as to whether Derby will ever agree to what we understand by the defence of Constantinople itself.
491
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fo. 223
17 December [1877]
I will call on you – a little after eleven – and happy indeed I shall be if we can see our way out of this mess. We all want to keep together: and no one in the Cabinet will feel as I shall if circumstances separate me from my old friend and teacher in public life.Footnote 331
492
Northcote to Salisbury, IP, BL Add. MS 50019, fos 61–63
18 December 1877
Will you look at the inclosed and tell me what you think – Cross is disposed to like the plan.Footnote 332
[Enclosed:]
Would such a policy as this be practicable?
After clearly ascertaining that nothing was to be done by joint mediation, let England propose to the Porte to act as sole mediator, sending up the fleet to Constantinople, and stipulating for a position at Gallipoli to secure it from being caught in a trap?
The Porte to be told that, if it was unreasonable in the matter of terms, England must withdraw and leave Turkey to her fate. We should, however, in that case probably retain our hold on Gallipoli, which would give us a vantage-ground in subsequent negotiations.
We should inform Parliament of all that we were doing; and should state that if Russia attacked Constantinople while the mediation was being attempted we should consider it free to England to take such measures as she might think it necessary.
We should of course ask for a vote of credit.
493
Cairns, Memorandum, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fos 246–249
21 December 1877
10 Downing Street
The despatch to Ld A. Loftus agreed to in CabinetFootnote 333 appeared likely to secure three objects.
1. It wd., without expressing any opinion on the tone of the Turkish note,Footnote 334 or on the Russian proposals of June last,Footnote 335 shew the Porte that we considered that any business to be done, must be done on the lines of the latter, & not of the former document.
2. It wd. shew those who placed faith in the disinterested objects of the Emperor of Russia, that his aims were not unmixed with a considerable desire for personal aggrandizement.
3. It wd., on some points as to which Russia has latterly shewn a tendency to enlarge her demands, tend to limit her, morally, to what she originally proposed.
It now appears that the proposal of this despatch has had another very important, – though somewhat unexpected, effect. It has drawn Austria from her state of torpidity, & led her to shew a real alarm at the proposals of the Emperor of Russia being even mentioned by England.Footnote 336
I think every effort shd. be made to take advantage of this state of the Austrian mind.
It wd. I think be desirable in the first place (this was perhaps not sufficiently considered by the Cabinet) to ascertain from Turkey, categorically, whether she wishes, even tho’ a joint mediation by the Powers shd. not be undertaken, still that England shd. endeavour to mediate alone. I think the Porte shd. be, privately, encouraged to desire to do this.
Supposing that the Porte, as is most probable, solicits this separate mediation, I shd. then recast the despatch to Ld A. Loftus agreed to in Cabinet.
I shd. leave out the enumeration of the specific conditions proposed by Russia in June last. I shd. simply remind Russia, as the despatch does, that the Emperor, thro’ Count S[huvalov]., & Coll. Wellesly [sic], expressed his desire to make peace north of the Balkans, & urged on England & the other Powers the propriety of their inducing Turkey to do this. I shd. say, generally, that certain conditions were then mentioned, but that we did not think it right to assume, after a lapse of time, & change of circumstances, that those conditions wd. now be proposed. That we felt it to be our duty, in harmony with the tone of the Emperor's previous communications, to inform him of the application made to us by the Porte, & to state that we were ready to make known to the Porte the terms on which he wd. now be ready to make peace.
I shd. then go to Austria, & say we were prepared, in deference to her wishes, to shape our communication to Russia in this way, on, substantially, the following terms. If Russia declined any mediation, or overtures of peace, we should further consult with Austria as to the protection of our common interests. If Russia, on the other hand, shd. state the terms on which she wd. make peace, we wd. confer with Austria as to how far these terms were in accordance with the common basis on which we were endeavouring to act, & wd. express our views upon them accordingly.
We should, I think, make a great point of appearing to place in abeyance a course of action which we might have been free to adopt alone, for the sake of an harmonious cooperation with Austria.
494
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
21 December 1877
10 Downing Street
The affair is so important, & time so precious, that the L[or]d Chan[cello]r., & myself, think, that no Cabinet shd. be called, but that the matter shd. be left entirely to you.Footnote 337
I send a mem[orandum]: of the joint deliberations of Cairns & myself wh: please return to me when you have copied it. It is for your consideration – As Hatfield is so near, Salisbury might be easily consulted.Footnote 338
495
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fos 243–244
22 December 1877
Foreign Office
I think we can hardly make a complete change in our method of proceeding without consulting such men as Cross and Northcote – who will have to bear the chief burden of defending whatever we do.
But we need not lose time in the meanwhile. We may ask the Porte to say whether it is willing that we should address Russia on the subject of terms of peace. So far I agree with Cairns: and the step pledges us to nothing to which we were not pledged before. We can do nothing more till we get an answer: and as that will probably not be immediate, a Cabinet called for next Friday would involve scarcely any delay.
Considering how very ticklish the whole affair is – the early approach of the session – and the possibility of disagreement among ourselves in future stages of the affair, we cannot be too careful to give no colleague reason for saying that he has not been consulted.
496
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fos 137–138
22 December 1877
Pynes, Exeter
The Vienna telegrams seem very awkward. If we go forward with our communication to Russia against the remonstrance of Austria the latter will have an excuse for throwing us over; and she will at one and the same time take credit with Russia for having disapproved our efforts at mediation, and with the Porte for having protested against our giving colour to terms which are so unfavourable to Turkey. [. . .]
Would it be possible to [. . .] propose that England and Austria should make a joint (or identic) communication to the Porte recommending it to ask Russia for her terms, and promising that if Turkey would follow our counsels (and not make peace without our consent?) we would do our best to obtain favourable terms for her?
497
Derby to Salisbury, SP, fo. 95Footnote 339
23 December 1877
Foreign Office
The more I reflect on the present situation, the more uneasiness I feel. It is difficult to give a definite reason for suspicions, however strongly one may entertain them; but I know our chief of old, and from various things that have dropped from him I am fully convinced – not indeed that he wishes for a war, but that he has made up his mind to large military preparations, to an extremely warlike speech,Footnote 340 to an agitation in favor [sic] of armed intervention (recollect that he said in Cabinet ‘the country is asleep and I want to wake it’), and if possible to an expedition that shall occupy Constantinople or Gallipoli.
Now I am not inclined to any of these things, and I believe others among us are not so either: but if we don't take care we shall find ourselves, as you said last year about the vote of credit, ‘on a slippery incline’: each step will make another necessary, and in the end we may find ourselves in a position which none of us either expected or would have accepted beforehand.
I have no feeling towards the Premier but one of personal friendship and good will, and would make personal sacrifices to help him out of a difficulty: but his views are different from mine, where such matters are concerned, not in detail but in principle. He believes thoroughly in ‘prestige’ – as all foreigners do:Footnote 341 and would think it (quite sincerely) in the interests of the country to spend 200 million on a war if the result of it was to make foreign states think more highly of us as a military power. These ideas are intelligible, but they are not mine, nor yours: and their being sincerely held does not make them less dangerous. We are in real danger, and it is impossible to be too careful. I write without any more specific object than that of general warning: but I know what the pressure of the court is on our chief, I am convinced that the Queen has satisfied herself that she will have her way (it is not disguised that she wishes for a war): and the conviction is universal among the diplomatists that she and the Premier will leave no stone unturned to accomplish their purpose.
The first thing to see to is that nothing shall be done without the Cabinet being consulted. That I can ensure, so far as diplomatic business is concerned.
The next is to keep the military preparations within bounds, and to insist on knowing exactly why they are wanted. In this we should only be anticipating the inevitable criticisms of the H[ouse]. of C[ommons].
The third is to be ready for a difference on the speech from the Throne – which as matters stand is of the greatest consequence.
Andrassy won't have our plan, and has got another to propose, which we shall know in a day or two. — I have insisted on a Cabinet before the end of this week – though it is a nuisance at this time of year. — I go to Knowsley till Wednesday or Thursday, but return on that day at latest.
498
Disraeli to Salisbury, SP, fos 265–267Footnote 342
24 December 1877
10 Downing Street
I enclose you a letter, which I have not shown to any of my colleagues, but which requires, & deserves, your deep attention.
When Colonel Wellesley last left England, & had his final interview with me, I advised him to impress upon the Emperor that England was unwilling to depart from her neutrality, that it wished to assist in bringing about a settlement, not only honorable [sic], but fairly advantageous, to Russia, but that I could not conceal from myself, that if the Emperor was obliged to enter into a second campaign, it wo[ul]d be difficult for England to rest in her present inertness. The Emperor accepted this statement with confidence, & in the conciliatory spirit in which it was conceived, & he acted on it.
I have myself been convinced, both from thought & information, that a firm front shown by England would terminate the war without material injury to our interests. I hope, I could persuade you of this, but I will not dwell on the matter now. What I wish to show you is, that, if the present system of the Cabinet is persisted in, & every resolution of every council regularly reported by Count Schouvaloff, it seems inevitable, that our very endeavours to secure peace, will land us in a totally different conclusion.
I have endeavoured to arrest this evil by some remarks I made in Cabinet, & I have been told, that Lady Salisbury with the wise courage which distinguishes her, has, socially[,] expressed her sentiments to the great culprit.Footnote 343 But more decisive means are requisite.
We must put an end to all this gossip about war-parties & peace-parties in the Cabinet, & we must come to decisions which may be, & will be, betrayed, but which may convince Russia, that we are agreed & determined. You and I must go together into the depth of the affair, & settle what we are prepared to do. I dare say, we shall not differ when we talk the matter over together, as becomes public men with so great a responsibility, but unless we make an effort to clear ourselves from the Canidian spells,Footnote 344 which are environing us, we shall make shipwreck alike of our own reputations, & the interests of our country.
499
Salisbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 80/4, fos 244–245Footnote 345
26 December 1877
India Office
I return the enclosed most interesting & disquieting letter, with many thanks.
I sympathise fully in the solicitude this information causes you. Throughout the last anxious year, the apparent ease with which a knowledge of our councils has leaked out has placed us at a constant disadvantage. I hardly see in what way you, or the Cabinet as a body, can do anything to check the evil. It is a question of honour for each member of the Cabinet individually: but the public mischief of any such breach of our implied engagement as that to which you refer is enormous.Footnote 346
I do not think Wellesley's advice ‘to fight Russia now’ is sound. She is exhausted in the sense, that she cannot go on fighting without great sacrifices. But she is not so exhausted as to be unable to make head against any great national danger – such as a war with England. Nor would the Turks be of any great value as allies. Enrolled as troops under our officers they would fight admirably: but such an arrangement on an extensive scale will never be permitted, so long as the Turkish government retains a shadow of independence. Under their own officers, they would be of little use. I see therefore no reason for agreeing with Wellesley that this is a good moment for seeking to bring on the inevitable collision with Russia, if it be inevitable. And there are particular circumstances in our own case that make it unsuitable. Owing to financial difficulties our Indian army is in a less efficient state than will probably be the case some years hence: & the position of CabulFootnote 347 is a difficulty. Our English army has not had time to accumulate reserves under Cardwell's system.Footnote 348 Our manufacturing industries are depressed: & profoundly averse to war. And, owing to the peculiar condition of the Continent, Austria, our natural ally in such a question, has been seduced from us at least for the moment. The national feeling here, though strongly partial to the Turk, shrinks from war; & I think with a true instinct. Of course, it is possible that events may take such a turn as to force us into war ultimately: but it will be unpopular, & unprofitable. [. . .]
500
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/1, fo. 252
27 December [1877]
Foreign Office
We must be cautious, for the sake of accuracy, as to any public announcement that we are going to ‘mediate.’
As the word is understood in diplomacy, what we are now doing is not mediation.
It may be a preliminary step to mediation, but it is nothing more.
We are only asking the Russians whether they are prepared to treat for peace. The overture will probably end there, in consequence of a Russian refusal.
We should therefore be misleading foreign governments if we stated that we were ‘mediating’: which would imply giving advice, and the discussion of conditions of peace.
The distinction is important, for the Porte has now asked us to mediate, and if we tell the public here that we are doing so, we shall create an idea at Constantinople that we are doing more than is really the case.
You may say with truth that we are ‘taking the initiative in bringing about negociations for peace.’ That is an accurate statement of the situation.
501
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fos 139–140
4 January 1878
11 Downing Street
[. . .] I retain my opinion that it is most desirable to avoid a rupture, if it is possible to avoid it, which I think very doubtful. I believe Carnarvon intends to write to you, but I hope he may wait till tomorrow before doing so.Footnote 349 [. . .]
It seems to me that we have created for ourselves a position which we must accept; though it is a peculiar and a difficult one. It would have been simple enough to have taken our stand on treaties, and to have declared ourselves ready to fight for Turkey — The nation would not have supported us, and we should have had to give up the conduct of affairs; but we should have been understood. It would have been simple to associate ourselves with the other Powers, and to join in coercing Turkey, and claiming our voice in the ultimate settlement. Or it would have been simple to say, we will not concern ourselves with this war, but if we see Turkey going to pieces we will strike in for such arrangements as may secure our own interests. But we have rejected all these lines, knowing that if we had attempted to follow any one of them we should have disagreed among ourselves, and we have stuck out a line of our own, which may lead to a successful termination of the question if we can follow it out, but which will be rendered impossible by disunion among ourselves. [. . .]
Now I admit that Carnarvon's indiscreet speech was calculated to do harm: but I doubt whether the harm was as great as you are disposed to think it; and I feel very doubtful whether an attempt to remedy the mischief will not make it much worse. [. . .]
502
Corry to Disraeli, Memorandum, Dep. Hughenden 69/1, fos 134–135
7 January 1878
St James’ Club, Piccadilly
Editorial note: In the following letter, Corry surrounded two sections with square brackets and marked them ‘A’ and ‘B’. To avoid confusion with editorial interpolations, those sections are here italicized, and – as in the original – appear in square brackets, marked ‘A’ and ‘B’.
During the last few days I have had some private interviews with the Turkish ambassador – and, for fear of after misconception, I make a very brief note of certain points.
On Dec 27th, at the Porte's request, the Eng[lish]. Govt asked in the name of the Porte if Russia would entertain overtures for peace.
A [P. Gortchakow replied that Russia desired nothing better than peace but that, as a preliminary, an armistice must be settled [. . .]]
H.M. Govt. replied to this that they were willing to forward suggestion of an armistice to the Porte, but that it must be done in a ‘form likely to produce a practical result’: – and added reasons to show that negotiation between the respective governments – and not the commanders [in the field] offered such a prospect.
P. Gortchakow replied to this that he adhered to his former statement, and that the commanders were informed of the conditions on which the Govt of Russia would agree to an armistice.
To this, the English Govt have, today, replied that, this being so they were not unwilling to suggest that the Porte should send accredited persons to the Russian commanders in order to learn the conditions on wh: the Russian Govt had decided. In coming to this decision, Lord B, at least, was influenced by Lord D[erby].'s statement that the Turkish ambassador had told him that an armistice was necessary for Turkey.
On Sunday Dec 30, – before the answer wh: I have marked A. was considered by the Cabinet, I called on the T[urkish]. Amb[assado]r to learn, for Lord B, how Turkey viewed the question of an armistice, generally. The proposal was new to Musurus Pacha [sic] and he gave reasons, (his own, at first sight) against an armistice, and gave a decided opinion against the conclusion of one in the mode proposed by Russia.
During the week wh: followed I saw Musurus Pacha, at his invitation, once or twice, when he read to me his own despatches to his govt, & despatches from the Porte, containing argument & suggestions which have produced no result and, already, are dead matter.
On Sunday Jan 6. he called on me, and, after communicating other telegrams – propositions wh: today's Cabinet have set aside as impracticable – he showed me a very confidential enquiry from the Porte. – B [How did Lord B. reconcile the existing attitude of H. M. Govt, as explained to him by Lord D., with his own confidential instigation (through Musurus Pacha) that the Porte should request our mediation?] I denied that Lord B. had held out the promise of mediation, and declared that what H.M. Govt was doing was quite consistent with – in fact was – what Lord B. had undertaken to do. The ambassador, then, decided to withhold the question, for the present: and I promised to call on him after today's Cabinet.
I saw him late this evening, and found him desponding. Lord D. had just informed him that H.M. Govt had already, since the Cabinet, telegraphed to Mr Layard to advise the Porte to instruct their commanders to apply to the Russian generals. ‘Very bad’ he said. I said that I was not aware that this was intended, until a reply had come from Russia to the message sent today: – and I explained that H.M. Govt would not have contemplated such a step, except on the assurance, already given, that the commanders had the instructions of the Cabinet of St Petersburg. This was new to him.
I went on to say, as to the whole question, and as to the confidential enquiry B he was instructed to make of Lord B. that his best course was not to hurry – but to wait until Parliament met on the 17th; that it would be folly, on the eve of that event, for Turkey to discard the friendship of this country, however dissatisfied with its present evidence. His excellency seemed to share this view.
503
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
7 January 1877
10 Downing Street
Can we ‘advise’ the Porte to accept the armistice? Is this consistent with our neutral position? We held, that we could not give advice to Russia —
I assume, also, that the Porte is adverse [sic] to armistice — Why shd. we force her to a step, wh:, in the event of refusal on her part, wd. have the appearance of disregarding her only friend?
504
Layard to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 70/2, fo. 179
9 January 1878
British Embassy, Constantinople
We must not conceal from ourselves that the state of affairs in Turkey is extremely critical. The Turks are greatly disappointed at what they call our ‘desertion’ of them, and very bitter with us for the advice we have given them to make their own arrangements with Russia for an armistice. They maintain that if we did not intend to use our influence to obtain a favorable [sic] basis for an armistice, we ought not to have led them to lose most precious time, of which the Russians have availed themselves to the utmost by occupying a considerable part of Rumelia. [. . .]
505
Corry to Disraeli, Memorandum, Dep. Hughenden 69/1, fos 136–137.
10 January 1878
St James’ Club, Piccadilly
In continuation of memo: dated Jan 7.
I called upon Musurus Pacha on Jan 8 – chiefly [to] tell him what I had heard from persons lately arrived from the East as to the condition of Russia, vis à vis of the question of [an] armistice.
The testimony of Archibald Forbes – the Daily News correspondent who had just returned from Bucharest, via Petersburg; of Lt Col Parker (of the Reserve forces) who had been all the autumn in Turkey (see his letter to me): of J.S. Bowles the editor of Vanity Fair, who returned from Constantinople on the 6th inst: (these 3 names I mentioned): and of Col. Wellesley (whose name I did not mention) – all pointed to this, that an armistice was necessary for Russia, owing to her want of supplies and difficulties arising from the season. His excellency told me that his information pointed to the same conclusion.
He then read to me a secret despatch he had sent that day to Constantinople; in wh: he gave his own views as to differences in our Cabinet, which he said were the cause of its being desirable that he should not have personal intercourse, at present, with Lord B. Hence his interviews with me – the result of wh: (from his reading of what I had said, – generally correct, tho rather overstated–) he recapitulated. He ended by advising the Porte to keep negotiations alive, at least until the meeting of Parliament.
He regretted, much, that Lord D[erby]. had advised the Porte to apply direct by their commanders to the Russian generals for the conditions of armistice, but felt sure that the Porte would agree to do so.
I mentioned that, after all, it was most important, by whatever mode, to obtain from Russia a statement of their conditions.
But, I added, there was reason to apprehend that Russia would attempt a ‘coup’, and would at the same time perhaps endeavour to obtain from Turkey suddenly the acceptance of bases for peace. This, it was of extreme importance to guard against.
It was, besides, of great consequence that we should have the earliest information of the conditions for armistice wh: Russia might prescribe, and should, generally, be informed of what might pass.
His excellency undertook to write to his government on both these points, and to advise his being at once acquainted with what took place, promising to let me know immediately on his hearing.
I have not since heard from his excellency.
The Cabinet and the war
During this period, the Russians advanced rapidly into Turkish territory, taking Sofia, Philippopolis, and Adrianople, and being by the end of the month in sight of Constantinople. On 10 January, Layard requested that the British fleet be moved up to Constantinople. On 12 January, Disraeli proposed in Cabinet the occupation of Gallipoli, as a guarantee of the security of the Dardanelles. Derby and Carnarvon would not consent to this, but in the end the Cabinet agreed to a compromise suggested by Salisbury, whereby the Turks would be asked if an application to send the fleet into the Dardanelles would be favourably received. On 14 January, Carnarvon privately informed Derby that he would resign if the Turks agreed to this. On 9 January, Derby fell ill, and was unable to attend Cabinet between 12 January and 21 January. On 15 January, the Turks refused to allow Britain to send in the fleet as a neutral power, which was exactly the answer Derby had expected. Meanwhile, in Derby's absence, Disraeli continued his own confidential negotiations with the Austrians, in an attempt to come to an agreement with them to contain Russia.
506
Corry to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 69/1, fos 138–139
14 January 1878
Turf Club, Piccadilly
I met Beust at dinner.
He evidently is not aware of the Austrian communications to Petersburg and Constantinople, as to a ‘direct’ peace, of which we have heard;Footnote 350 but he is conscious of the vast importance, common to Austria and England, of the moment. And he hinted his great desire to see you: – since he has been told today that Lord Derby will not be well enough to see him for some days!Footnote 351
So I invited him to call on you tomorrow and he will do so at four o'clock, unless I write to change the appointment. I can, at present, recall nothing which stands in the way!
507
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fo. 5
15 January 1878
23 St James's Square
It is vexatious in every way to be helpless in a crisis: but I am bound to tell you at once that both my doctor and my own sensations tell me that I cannot hope to appear in the H[ouse]. of Lords for the next week or ten days. I have passed most of the time since our last Cabinet in bed, and though picking up, am very weak and pulled down.Footnote 352
After the next two or three days, I could manage to attend a Cabinet, but not to make a speech.Footnote 353
More I think of the Dardanelles business, less I like it. Will not negociations supersede the necessity for any such step?Footnote 354
508
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fo. 153
15 January [1878]
11 Downing Street
Are you going to take any steps to prevent Tenterden's influence over his chief from stopping the despatch of the telegram?Footnote 355 I am very much afraid of it. [. . .]
509
Thomas Sanderson to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fo. 7
16 January 1878
Lord Derby's doctor is decidedly of opinion that he could not attend a Cabinet council today without risk of a relapse —
Lady Derby thought it might perhaps be more satisfactory if Dr. Drage called himself to explain his opinion on the subject, and he is the bearer of this note.
Lord Derby is in bed, but may probably send me later with a message, unless he writes.
510
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fo. 9
16 January 1878
I enclose a short minute, stating what I should have liked to be able to say in Cabinet today. I cannot put too strongly the objections which I feel to the sending up of the fleet.
511
Derby, Minute dictated to Sanderson, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fos 11–16
[16 January 1878]
Being unable to attend the Cabinet held today I wish earnestly to advise my colleagues against the proposal to send ships to anchor within the Straits. It does not appear that the Porte will consent to a proposal of this kind so long as we accompany it with a declaration of our continued neutrality, which in practice we must do, lest we should create unfounded expectations.
If we take this step without the consent of the Porte, we do so, as I conceive, in violation of treaties, and thereby place ourselves in the wrong —
Not having heard the naval opinions, I cannot say what amount of danger to the fleet may be involved in thus sending it up. But if this danger were found or thought to be serious, it would furnish a strong argument in favour of supporting the fleet by a land expedition, in which case we should be reversing the decision come to last week, and doing that which I firmly believe Parliament would not sanc tion.
I have never been able to understand what the ships are to do when they get into the Dardanelles. If the Russians do not go to Gallipoli, they are useless:– if the Russians do go there, there is imminent risk of a collision. Their presence would not prevent an occupation of the coast by Russian troops, supposing that to be intended:– on the contrary the presence of Russian troops on the sea board would render their position precarious. Suppose such an occupation to take place, – the ships being there, – what would follow? Either we must bring them back – in which case the whole proceeding would be ridiculous, – or if we left them there, their presence in face of a Russian army would only show the inutility of their having been sent.
I fail to see what object, – diplomatic or parliamentary, is to be gained by sending them. From the diplomatic point of view our position is this – negotiations for peace have begun, the result of which we cannot possibly know as yet, but we know that the Porte is inclined to make peace on almost any terms, and considering the heavy losses incurred by Russia, and the attitude of Austria now becoming more decided, there seems reason to hope that the Russian conditions will not be extreme. We are acting in concert with Austria, and with her assistance we are able to exercise a real control over the conditions of peace without risk of being involved in war. I cannot see that there is anything in this situation of affairs to justify hasty or hazardous proceedings, especially when they are of a nature to irritate one Power and to be misunderstood by all the rest.
For parliamentary purposes I should have thought it was sufficient to be able to say that we adhere to the conditions of neutrality laid down in May last – that it is through our good offices that the negotiations for peace have been commenced – and that we have claimed and shall continue to claim a voice in the final settlement. Looking to the state of public feeling, I cannot conceive that more is needed to satisfy the requirements of Parliament.
I object to the proposed step as contrary to treaty, as increasing the risk of collision with Russia, as tending to irritate rather than to conciliate, and as being, so far as I can judge, useless if not dangerous in a military point of view. I see every reason to hope that if we continue on our present course we may be able in the course of the present spring to announce that a peace has been concluded which, if not in all respects such as we might have desired to make it, will be accepted by the great majority of the public as a relief from the anxieties and uncertainties of the last 18 months.Footnote 356
512
Note by Salisbury, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fo. 29Footnote 357
21 January 1878
The continued occupation of Bulgaria by foreign troops, or of any part of the shores of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and Dardanelles, or any alteration of the rules affecting the navigation thereof are to be declared inadmissible without the consent of Austria and England.
513
Corry to Disraeli, Memorandum, Dep. Hughenden 69/1, fos 140–142
22 January 1878
St James’ Club, Piccadilly
I called at the Austrian embassy, at 7.30 this evening, where, at my request, Count Montgelas read to me the telegram wh: Count Beust sent, last night, to Count Andrassy, reporting his conversation in the afternoon with Lord Beaconsfield. I afterwards saw Count Beust, and supplied some explanations and additions, which appeared necessary to convey Lord B.[’]s full intentions.
I explained (there seeming to be doubt in Count Beust's mind) that the ‘defensive’ alliance, wh: Lord B. offered,Footnote 358 was a ‘continuous defensive alliance’ (specially pointing out that it was not ‘offensive’) – & not merely a ‘defensive alliance’ to repel invasion resulting immediately from the proposed identic note.Footnote 359 I told Count Beust that the British Govt would guarantee a loan.
And I said I was empowered by Lord B. to say that he was prepared, if England and Austria arrived at an understanding, to send the British fleet to Constantinople.
On being pressed, I told Count Beust & Count Montgelas that I was not in a position to say when England would so send the fleet – whether on the conclusion of the agreement to send the identic note – or on its presentation – or on the issue of the order by Austria tomobilize.
I found both of them positive on this point, viz: that Count Andrassy would not agree to the last of the above three conditions[.]
I said that I had no reason to believe that England would insist on this, if it should appear that the end in view could be otherwise obtained. But I declined to commit Lord B. on this head, and invited Count Beust to call on Lord B. at one tomorrow to discuss the point.
My impression is that, Count Andrassy will at once conclude the alliance, provided that Lord B. will meet his views on this head.
At the moment I left the embassy – 8.20 – no answer had reached them from Count Andrassy.
_______
The objections of Austria to mobilize, at once, are, mainly – that the act must be viewed by Russia as an act of war – that the common object we have in view can be obtained without it – that it entails a large and not necessary expenditure.
I replied that mobilization on their part was not an act of war, and quoted as a precedent the mobilization by Austria in 1854.Footnote 360
They answered that that was an act of folly on the part of Austria, wh: their then acquired experience had taught them not to repeat.
I said that it only seemed equitable that, if England sent up her fleet, Austria, acting with us, should take some step ‘pari passu’,Footnote 361 – wh: could only be mobilization.
They replied that our sending up the fleet was a natural and in any case to-be-expected step, and could not be regarded by Russia as an act of war, and besides would cost us nothing[.] I did not admit all this contention: – but its force is, no doubt, great.
My opinion is that the point is not in reality material. If Austria will but agree to join us in the Note, all the rest must follow, should Russia prove obstinate.
I should add that I insisted upon instant action as ‘sine quâ [sic] non’.
My general impression is that Austria desires the alliance quite as much as we do: – and that it will be concluded forthwith, on Count Andrassy's receiving the report of the above interview.Footnote 362
514
Sir William Hart DykeFootnote 363 to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 125/3, fos 177– 179
23 January [1878]
You have always dealt leniently with any opinions I have expressed upon public affairs, and I cannot resist therefore placing before you my views upon the present crisis.
Of two alternatives – ‘that of taking immediate action possibly resulting in war’ – and ‘that of allowing Russia to advance to a position from whence she can dictate the terms regardless of those interests which the Cabinet has pledged itself to preserve’ – In my opinion if the first be adopted ‘that of taking immediate action’ you will find you have in the House of Commons with a few exceptions a united Party at your back – also a very considerable support from our opponents, resulting in a majority I believe more than double the actual number upon which we usually rely.
[. . .] Should however the second alternative be adopted I can see nothing but disaster in the future – a divided party in the House of Commons – hostile motions from members sitting behind ministers & a feeling of disgust amongst our supporters in the country generally, which must prove disastrous at every election. [. . .] The feeling in the House of Commons amongst our supporters is intense & is largely shared by all the younger members of your government. This is the tenth year since I first became connected with the management of your party & I claim a right to speak plainly – although the position is a grave one and even perilous – one thing only can injure the Tory Party of the future – namely if it ever can be hinted either in public or private that in a great national emergency; of two courses open – it's [sic] leaders forsook the brave one & preferred the timid.
515
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fos 38–39Footnote 364
23 January 1878
After our repeated discussions in Cabinet on the question of sending up the fleet to Constantinople, and the decision which was come to this afternoon,Footnote 365 you will feel as I do that only one result is possible so far as I am concerned.Footnote 366
The question on which we were unable to agree is obviously one of grave importance: it is certain to be eagerly and frequently discussed both in and out of Parliament: the Foreign Secretary more than any other minister would in the ordinary course of things be charged with the duty of defending the decision taken: and as I cannot think it, or say that I think it, a safe or wise one, it is clear that no alternative is left me except to ask you to allow me to retire from the post I hold.
I deeply and sincerely regret that we should differ on any point of policy; but two considerations reconcile me in some measure to a step which is quite as painful to me personally as it can be to you. You will get on better with a thoroughly harmonious Cabinet: and you are so strong in the Lords that the loss of two colleagues will not practically affect you there. — I may add that the incessant anxiety of the last two years has made me often doubt of late – all questions of political difference set aside – whether I should long be capable of even moderately efficient service in an office which at times like these admits of no rest from responsibility and labour.
It is needless to say that whatever I can do, out of office, to support your government will be done by me, both as an obligation of public duty and from feelings of private friendship which no lapse of time or change of circumstances will alter.
516
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fos 171–172
23 January 1878
11 Downing Street
[. . .] Our position is just now one of so much delicacy that I hope you will allow me to know whatever steps you may be taking, and especially whatever communications you may be making to foreign powers, as I may by and by have to defend our course. Several of our colleagues have spoken to me as to the difficulty we shall be in, as we are without a Foreign Secretary, and as the Cabinet cannot conveniently meet, shorn of two members, till we are able to tell our whole story – I would venture to suggest that it would be important to keep Salisbury well informed — Several of us think that some kind of communication should be made to the other Powers, as soon as the secret of the fleet's movement can be divulged, explaining the character of the act. [. . .]
517
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
24 January 1878
10 Downing Street
I can't trust myself at this moment to make any remark on your letter just received, & would willingly let four & twenty hours elapse before I attempted to do so, but it is my urgent duty to remind you, that no explanations or statements can be made in the House of Lords till I have received Her Majesty's pleasure on yr resignation, & her permission for your remarks.
I mention this, as Lord Carnarvon, in a letter I have received from him seems inclined to make his explanation prematurely.
518
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fo. 42
24 January 1878
I have no wish to make explanations at any time, and the less said at the present moment the better. I think it will be as well that I should not be in the Lords this afternoon. Pembroke can very well put off his question. I have not been in communication with Carnarvon since the Cabinet.
519
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fos 179–180
25 January 1878
11 Downing Street
I think it right to tell you that I hear alarming accounts of the effect which Derby's resignation might produce, especially on our Lancashire and Cheshire members. Dyke has not given me any names, but he says the feeling is much worse than he believed it to be when he spoke to you, and he thinks the division may be seriously affected by it.
The Home Rulers, I am also told, have held a meeting and resolved to go as a body against us. [. . .] Of course this line will be taken independently of Derby's action.
On the other hand I hear that Derby would not like to take anything but the F.O. He would look upon an exchange of office at such a moment as a descent.
Whether he would return to his old post if he had the option does not seem certain. He is very well disposed to us, and if all were suddenly to go right he would probably be willing to come back, – but then if all went right we should not want him so much, and the objections you spoke of would I suppose continue.
We on our part cannot change our policy even to get him back; and we must face the chance of a bad division – and be prepared for a possible overthrow —
Cross has been asked to call on Lady Derby in the morning; and I am thinking of calling on our friend himself, probably about 11. But I shall hardly know what to say.
If you wish to see me before I go I will come to you; otherwise I will feel my way with him as best I can and commit nobody.
520
Hart Dyke to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fos 50–51
25 January [1878]
You asked me a question today with reference to the possible resignation of the Foreign Secretary — Since giving you my views I have heard much that confirms my opinion that he should at this moment be retained if possible in the Cabinet — The feeling in Lancashire is very strong & I have had many telegrams on the subject, all expressing great anxiety. The commercial element existing there, may also if thoroughly alarmed affect members in this House, & I am sure it would be well if no further change took place. The discussion in the Lords tonight was most useful in every way.
521
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fo. 44
25 January 1878
I understand that you wish I should defer making any statement in the House until Monday. I cannot object to this, more especially as I have not received from you a formal announcement that my resignation is accepted.
522
NorthcoteFootnote 367 to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fo. 54
[?25 January 1878]Footnote 368
The personal arrangement won't work.Footnote 369
F.O. or nothing. He does not understand the former to be hopeless.
523
Derby to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50022, fo. 164
25 January 1878 ‘3.P.M.’
St. James's Square
Would it be inconvenient for you to look in here again? I have been reflecting anxiously on our conversation, and should like to renew it.
524
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fo. 181
26 January 1878
11 Downing Street
I have had another very long conversation with him.Footnote 370 He sent to ask me to come, and raised more points than I could have imagined. Finally he has promised to send me an answer before dinner – I think he will come in, but I can't feel at all sure.
525
Derby to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50002, fos 160–162
[?26] January 1878Footnote 371
Foreign Office
I have considered carefully and anxiously the subject of our conversation today, and with the following result.
I do not conceal from you the feeling of extreme uneasiness and distrust which is created in my mind by the situation.Footnote 372 What happened on WednesdayFootnote 373 may happen again, and with worse results. What with pressure from friends in parliament and from other quarters, I feel painfully the risk in which we are placed of compromising ourselves and the interests of peace by some hasty determination.
Nor do I like the vote which you are going to take: but in that matter you have gone so far that it is impossible to recede, except under altered circumstances.
Under these conditions, I should have been well pleased if the Prime Minister had dealt with me as he has with Carnarvon.Footnote 374 But he has not done so, and I have to consider whether I am justified – the immediate cause of difference having disappeared – in persisting in an intention to retire for which the original reason is no longer assignable. On the whole I incline to believe that if I can be of use in my present post, it is my duty not to quit it without fresh cause. My doing so might lead to misunderstanding here, and possibly on the continent. I should, by withdrawing, weaken that section of the Cabinet which most inclines to pacific views; and the spectacle of internal dissensions is not one which it is desirable that we should present to Europe.
I have taken this resolution reluctantly and doubtfully, but I have taken it, and if the Prime Minister wishes me to withdraw my letter of resignation, I do so. I need not add that on personal grounds it is more agreeable to me that our differences should disappear. But in face of such questions as we have to deal with, the personal aspect of the matter is not one which ought to influence a decision one way or another.
526
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fo. 52
27 January 1878
11 Downing Street
Here is the letter – now shall I telegraph anything to Osborne? I can do so in cipher —
I might say, – ‘Since writing yesterday I have seen reason for much stronger alarm as to the possible effects of D[erby]'s resignation. I think it might endanger the loss of the vote and the defeat of the government.’ But have you made any communication to Her of his willingness to remain?
527
Disraeli to Salisbury, SP, fos 270–271Footnote 375
27 January 1878
10 Downing Street
I inferred from your significant remark, at yesterday's ‘Cabinet’, respecting Derby, that you desired his return.
I have succeeded in accomplishing that, tho’ a pyrrhic victory: at least I feel I have not sufficient energy remaining to go through another such trial.
The Cabinet is called today at 5 o’[clo]ck: It is necessary for Northcote's sake, but I thought it desirable, as the most effective mode, tomorrow, of answering the rumors [sic] afloat respecting D[erby].
I must express my sense of the cordial co-operation & confidence I have received from you throughout this affair. It is a good omen for the Sovereign & the country & I can assure you, and I ought to assure you, that yr behavior [sic] at headquarters is entirely understood & completely appreciated.
528
Salisbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 92/4, fos 47–48Footnote 376
27 January 1878
20 Arlington Street
I am very glad Derby has come back. At this juncture his secession would have exposed us to all kinds of wild suspicions, & would have much added to the difficulties which, in any case, the country will have to face.
I am very much grateful to you for your kind expressions – & to the Queen for those you have conveyed to me from her. I should have rendered with great willingness any service in my power: but I am glad to be spared the duty of undertaking a task which under the peculiar circumstances of the case I might not have been able to discharge advantageously to the country.
529
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
27 January 1878
10 Downing Street
I have at this moment received a cyphered [sic] telegram from the Queen approving of yr withdrawal of your resignation, & I have summoned the Cabinet at five o’[clo]ck: today, as there are points on wh: the C[hancellor]. of Ex[cheque]r. wishes to consult his colleagues before his important statement tomorrow–
Yr attendance at the Cabinet will be a sufficient reply to all rumors [sic] respecting yourself, & from my management, they have only been rumors [sic], & will do away with the necessity of explanations & ‘all that’.
Carnarvon, I thought, made an ungentlemanlike speech,Footnote 377 as well as a vain, & egotistical one – I believe Salisbury much disapproved it, & was annoyed.
530
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fos 59–60
28 January [1878]
I have your letter, and can assure you with perfect sincerity that I neither have, nor at any moment had, the wish to hurt your feelings.
There is always a certain awkwardness in the renewal of interrupted official relations: and it seemed to me that this awkwardness would be best avoided by our meeting first in Cabinet, and under such conditions as to make explanations neither necessary nor possible. I know your difficulties and will do what I can to lessen them: the difficulty of the position is this, that the question now dividing the whole political world is one which cuts across the existing divisions of parties, so that men who have always acted cordially together find themselves separated. It was the same in the Crimean time, as we both recollect. I do not despair of a solution: and will help to the utmost of my power.
I have destroyed your note, and have neither shown it nor mentioned it to any one – not even Lady D. – so that no record may exist of personal unpleasantness between us. Do the same with this.Footnote 378
531
Disraeli to Salisbury, SP, fos 272–273
30 January 1878
10 Downing Street
Have you read Sir H. Elliot[’]s tel: received by me this morning? All depends on our decision today. That will settle whether we are men or mice.
I greatly, almost entirely, depend on you.
As our ships unhappily are not in the Sea of Marmora, the Russians will certainly enter Const[antinople]:, unless, with Austria, this day we prevent it.
532
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
1 February 1878
10 Downing Street
C[oun]t Shouvaloff addressed me in the Hall of Ho[use]. of Lords yesterday evening, told me of the telegram he had just shown you, announcing appeal of Sultan to Emperor, spoke of affairs as now happily all terminated, & said that he did not think he could have borne the excitement any longer, & all that sort of thing — I cannot say his narrative quite satisfied me, & I ventured to observe, that I hoped his anticipations would be realised, but that there seemed to me some mystery in the affair wh: neither Emperor, nor Sultan, seemed to be able to control —
Last night, I received this secret information in the accuracy of wh: I believe[:]
‘C[oun]t. S. will this afternoon show a tel: to Lord Derby, just received from St. P[etersburg]. announcing appeal of Sultan to Emp: to stop hostilities as he had accepted all terms demanded &c., & favorable [sic] reply of Emp: virtually amounting to peace.[’] This is all a comedie [sic] – C[oun]t. Schou:, at the same time, received two telegrams, one to show to Ld. Derby, as above, & another for himself, which ran thus ‘Delegates have not signed: we are in full march onConstantinople, and only 40 verstsFootnote 379distant[.]’Footnote 380
I fear, & feel, that in a few days, & perhaps hours, we shall be the objects of general indignation & contempt, but as I have ceased to direct the Cabinet, I can only lay this matter before yourself.Footnote 381
Punica fides!Footnote 382
I think, at any rate, Schou:, who has done so much mischief, shd. receive his passports.Footnote 383 [. . .]
533
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fo. 72
1 February 1878
I suppose you will be at the House, and we can talk about Schou. It does not seem easy to prove that he is consciously lying to us. If his employers want him to lie with effect, they probably mislead him – they certainly did in the Dardanelles case, for he showed me the telegram. No doubt we could send him away as a mark of displeasure: but should we get a better in his place?
534
Salisbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 92/4, fo. 51
6 February 1878
20 Arlington Street
Very grave news indeed. The mere fact that our ambassador is cut off, & that the Russians are still advancing, seems to require the presence of the fleet at C[onstantino]ple. At all events a strong remonstrance ought to go to St. Petersburg at once. But if it were possible I should much like to move up the fleet.Footnote 384
535
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
6 February 1878
10 Downing Street
The last tel: of Layard is very grave.
We shall have French, & perhaps Italian, squadrons at Const[antinopl]e. before England.
This will not look well. I believe you will see a burst of indignation in this country, that has not been equalled since —32.Footnote 385
The entry of the Russians will be an act of wanton duplicity, & may lead to infinite confusion.
536
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fo. 79
[6] February 1878Footnote 386
Foreign Office
I quite agree. If the Russians go in now, without military reasons to allege, or any justification for what they know we regard as an offence, the anti-Russian feeling here will grow beyond all control.
I am telegraphing to Loftus to find out what he can. Schou. has not been here.
537
Northcote to Salisbury, SP, fo. 139
[?8] February 1878Footnote 387
11 Downing Street
We are to have a Cabinet at 2. I am inclined to propose that we should at once, openly, send orders to our fleet to go up to Constantinople to protect life & property, and invite the other maritime powers to do the same; and I would openly announce this in the House tonight. We shall do no good by confidential communications, and shall only make ourselves contemptible.
A bold move of this sort is really the safest, for Russia cannot with any decency object, especially after the Gortshakow contradiction.
What do you say?
538
Salisbury to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50019, fo. 64
[?7] February 1878Footnote 388
20 Arlington Street
I am quite of your mind. I strongly pressed the sending up of the fleet at once on the Chief last night.
539
Salisbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 92/4, fo. 53Footnote 389
10 February 1878
I hesitate to trouble you with an expression of opinion knowing the difficulties under which you labour; but the very grave news this evening compels me to write.Footnote 390 It is the most critical moment we have yet passed through.Footnote 391
I cannot help fearing that efforts will be made in Cabinet to prevent the fleet being ordered to force its way in. Yet, if, after all that has been said, the fleet once more returns to Besika Bay, our position will be utterly ridiculous. We shall disgust our friends in the country, & lose all weight in Europe. [. . .]
540
Derby to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50022, fos 166–167
28 February 1878
Foreign Office
I am sorry that drafts on important foreign questions are sent round and read at dinners where necessarily others besides our colleagues are present.Footnote 392 If they are there talked over, it is easy to understand how so little of what we do or say is kept secret. — As to the subject of your note, I certainly think that the seizure of a Turkish island, in time of peace, without explanation or justification except that it may be a convenient port for us to hold in the event of war, would be an act so violent, and so entirely disturbing our existing relations with other countries concerned in the eastern question, that the Russian government might not unreasonably treat it as absolving them from the Gallipoli engagement. That they would treat it so is nearly certain: and I am not prepared to say that they would be wrong.
541
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
28 February 1878
10 Downing Street
I must point out to you how insufficient, in my opinion, is the manner in wh: F.O. has expressed the resolutions of the Cabinet about the preliminaries of peace.
The enclosed tel: means, that H.M. Govt. wish to know, as soon as possible, the terms of the peace made between Russia & Turkey. [. . .]
What the Cabinet wanted to know was, what are the terms, wh: Russia proposes to Turkey, & as to wh: Turkey hesitates to accept. It is very likely, that Russia will refuse to tell us, & will not allow Turkey to tell. But we can, then, say, we have asked, & have been refused.
I don't think we are justified, in the present crisis, to be sending to Russia civil messages ‘We shall be obliged to you, as soon as you have made your terms with Turkey, to let us know what they are.’
I am very anxious about this matter, as the Cabinet counts, when it meets again, on a reply from Russia, on wh: they wd. be prepared to shape their course.
Depend upon it, the uneasiness & dissatisfaction of the country on this head are great, & parliamentary action, from our own side, will be the disastrous consequence.
542
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fos 98–99
1 March 1878
I have your note, which it is not now necessary to discuss, further than to say that I pressed Schou. as strongly as courtesy allowed, not to keep us in the dark. But we cannot demand as a right, according to any rule or custom of international law known to me, to be made acquainted with the terms of a treaty not yet negociated.
You will however have seen Layard's telegram just come in, in which he announces the abandonment of the demand for the Turkish fleet and other concessions. I hope this will go far to satisfy public feeling.
I did not understand that it was the desire of the Cabinet to shape their enquiry so as to bring about a refusal to answer it: nor does that seem to me good diplomacy.
543
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
11 March 1878
10 Downing Street
I think, besides distinctly stating, that we require the treaty between the belligerents to be submitted to the consideration of Congress, we ought, at the same time, to invite the opinions of the Powers on the subject.Footnote 393
If Russia will not agree to the proposal, she will fill Europe with suspicion — [. . .]
544
Northcote to Salisbury, SP, fo. 112
16 March 1878
11 Downing Street
I tried to get Derby to call a Cabinet today, but he would not. I inclose his note. I think it very unfortunate; but there seems no help. I don't like this appearance of slackness on our part.
545
Disraeli to Salisbury, SP, fos 277–278
18 March 1878
Schou: has got the answer, but keeps it in his pocket. It is a refusal, &, according to him, the English proposal will never be accepted. A counter proposal will be offered: ‘that every power shall enter the Congress free & disengaged’ – whatever that may be.Footnote 394
Russia does not believe there will be any Congress.
Schou: said to my informant, that he shd. call on Ld. Derby today, but didn't think he shd. give him the Russian answer – but feel his way a little.
I shd. like to talk over these affairs together, if you happen to be disengaged at three o'cl[ock].
546
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fos 114–116
19 March 1878
I am compelled against my will to bring to your notice a disagreeable circumstance. Read the enclosed cutting from the Telegraph, and you will see that the decision of the Cabinet of yesterday is announced, under the obviously fictitious assumption that the news comes from Constantinople.
Now it was a condition insisted upon and agreed to in Cabinet that whatever communication we made to Russia should be kept entirely secret, in order that it might retain the character of a friendly warning, and not assume that of a public defiance.
It is certain that the D[aily]. Tel[egraph]. can only have got its information from the Cabinet. No one in the F.O. except Tenterden and Sanderson, both of them perfectly discreet, knows anything of what passed.Footnote 395
I wish I could think that the disclosure was the result only of accident or indiscretion. But the facts point to a different conclusion. — A step is taken which if made public increases the chances of a quarrel between England and Russia: and it is at once communicated, by somebody, to a journal which though friendly does not conceal its desire that such a quarrel should take place.
What can one infer?
What I have said does not point to any one [sic] personally, for in truth I have no reason to suspect one person more than another. But you will agree that business cannot be carried on where promises of secrecy are not to be relied on.
I think I ought to bring this subject before the Cabinet when it meets: but I mention it to you, as head of the government in the first instance.
547
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
19 March 1878
10 Downing Street
[. . .]
[P.S.] I can throw no light on the parag[raph]: in D[aily]. Tel[egraph].
My people are perfectly innocent of newspaper acquaintance, [and] personally, I never see, or hear from, themFootnote 396 — And I don't know, now that Carnarvon has gone, any member of the Cab[ine]t. who has such weaknesses.
I always thought D.T. was devoted to you, but I suppose that's over.
548
Salisbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 113/2, fo. 118
19 March 1878
I was struck by the D[aily].T[elegraph]. extract myself. Personally I can only say that I do not know by sight any of the D.T. people – & that I tell nothing of what passes in Cabinet to my private secretary. Why should Sanderson know?
The occasion might be a fair one for protesting against the system of taking notes in Cabinet. You are never certain that they will not fall into hands for which they are not intended.Footnote 397
549
Disraeli to Salisbury, SP, fos 279–280
21 March 1878
10 Downing Street
I wish the Cabinet on Saturday to consider the treatyFootnote 398 – not to be put off by treaty not having arrived, or having arrived only that morning.
There is no doubt we are, substantially, in possession of the text, & might thus be prepared to decide at once on the authentic version when before us.
Lord Lyons ought to attend the Cabinet.
550
Salisbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 92/4, fos 55–58
21 March 1878
I see no difficulty about considering the treaty on Saturday as you suggest. We ought to prepare ourselves, in case there is no congress, to state which are the articles of the treaty to which we specially object.
Of course, we have a right to object to all, as all are contrary to existing treaties. But it would be doubtful policy to do so, in view of English opinion. At all events I think we should put in the forefront of our objection[:]
1. Those articles which menace the balance of power in the Egean [sic]:
2. Those which threaten the Greek race in the Balkan peninsula with extinction:
And that we should indicate the necessity of either cancelling, or meeting with compensatory provisions, the portions of the treaty which, by reducing Turkey to vassalage, threaten the free passage of the Straits, & also menace English interests in other places where the exercise of Turkish authority affects them.
I am, as you know, not a believer in the possibility of setting the Turkish Government on its legs again, as a genuine reliable power: & unless you have a distinct belief the other way, I think you should be cautious about adopting any line of policy which may stake England's security in those seas on Turkish efficiency. I should be disposed to be satisfied with war or negotiations which ended in these results:
1. Driving back the Slav State to the Balkans – & substituting a Greek province, politically, but not administratively, under the Porte.
2. Effective securities for the free passage of the Straits at all times, as if they were open sea.
3. Two naval stations for England – say Lemnos & Cyprus, with an occupation, at least temporary, of some place like ScanderoonFootnote 399 for the sake of moral effect:
4.Perhaps I would add reduction of indemnity to amount which there would be reasonable prospect of Turkey paying without giving further pretext for fresh encroachments. [. . .]
551
Derby to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50022, fos 168–169
27 March 1878
Foreign Office
You were fully authorised to say what you have said, with the one slight exception that I should not commit myself to declare that ‘entry into the conference had become impossible’ since one does not know what solutions might be suggested; but I am quite ready to state that in this business of the conditions of going into congress I am agreed with my colleagues, and that we could not do otherwise than maintain our objections.
As it is desirable to put on record conclusions come to, I will now ask you to place my resignation in the Prime Minister's hands:Footnote 400 and to ask him to arrange for my being able to announce the fact tomorrow in the H[ouse]. of Lords. — I shall say as little as possible, reserving all explanation till the measures are announced.
552
Northcote to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 107/1, fo. 203
28 March 1878
11 Downing Street
I will tell Derby what you have told me; but I venture to think it would be better that you should yourself write to him.
553
Derby to Northcote, IP, BL Add. MS 50022, fos 170–171
28 March 1878
Foreign Office
Thanks for your letter, which makes all clear. I shall say the very little that it is necessary or desirable to say, in the Lords, this afternoon.
I hope the Premier understands that my sole reason for treating this matter through you was the desire to avoid what can never be otherwise than a painful interchange of communications with a very old friend, to whom I owe much, and of whom I shall never think otherwise than with kindness.
It is needless to speak of personal regrets; but one cannot break through political ties of long standing (even temporarily) without so much of pain and annoyance as far to outweigh whatever satisfaction there may be in freedom from anxiety and responsibility.
My wish is to rest for the present, and take no more part in public business than is forced upon me.
If I can be of any use to my successor I am at his orders. [. . .]
554
Disraeli to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 16/2/3
28 March 1878
10 Downing Street
I have avoided writing on matters which infinitely distress me – & I thought a dragoman might have done, but to prevent misunderstandings, I send this to say, I have received the Queen's acceptance of yr resignation & H.M's permission for yr making, as a privy councillor, such statement as you, in your discretion, in which the Queen has entire confidence, may think fit.
