This volume consists of a series of weekly lectures that the late Professor Gilles Veinstein (1945–2013) delivered at the Collège de France in Paris in winter 2009 and winter 2010. Although the volume's title refers to “slaves of the sultan,” the real subject of these lectures is the evolution of military slavery and slave recruitment under the Ottoman Empire. Veinstein seeks to demonstrate how elite military slavery developed in the Islamic world, culminating in the devshirme, the distinctive Ottoman system of enslaving certain of the empire's rural Christian subjects in the Balkans and Anatolia, converting them to Islam, and training them for military and related forms of service.
The 2009 lectures concentrate on the status of slaves under Islamic law, and on pre-Ottoman forms of military servitude, before shifting to an overview of the various Ottoman military forces, whether enslaved or otherwise. Veinstein's overarching argument is that slave soldiers always complemented free troops; they were never used exclusively. Even in Abbasid Samarra, which the caliph al-Muʿtasim (r. 833–42 C.E.) ostensibly founded as a new capital for himself and the Turkish mamluks whom he acquired from Central Asia, the mamluks coexisted with non-mamluk troops from other regions. While the conventional wisdom holds that al-Muʿtasim systematized the use of Central Asian Turks as mamluks, Veinstein adopts Étienne de la Vaissière's revisionist argument that widespread use of Turkish mamluks did not occur before the late 9th century. With Abbasid decentralization, beginning in the 10th century, the focus of mamluk acquisition and training likewise shifted to autonomous regional strongholds, notably Transoxiana under the Samanids, Egypt under the Tulunids, and Anatolia under the Seljuks of Rum, all of whom employed Turkish and other mamluks alongside non-slave troops of other backgrounds. The culmination of this “mamluk paradigm” was, naturally, the Mamluk Sultanate, which ruled Egypt, Greater Syria, and southeastern Anatolia from 1250 to 1517; in this regime, the sultans themselves, at least from the late 14th century, were usually former mamluks.
Veinstein's firm grasp of the economic underpinnings of these forms of military slavery is evident throughout these early lectures. Since virtually all these medieval regimes employed mamluks as cavalry forces, they compensated them with usufruct rights over landed territory or, alternatively, with one or another form of tax farm. Though there may be tiny gaps in coverage or misplaced emphases here and there, this deep context for Ottoman developments is welcome. Veinstein devoted his February and March 2009 lectures to the growth and elaboration of the Ottoman military, with a particular focus on non-slave elements—in keeping with his argument that slave troops always supplemented non-slave troops. Unlike earlier Islamic empires, the Ottomans never employed slave cavalry, except at the imperial palace. The provincial sipahi cavalry, who formed the backbone of the Ottoman armies until the 17th century, were free Turcophone Muslims who held grants of landed revenue known as timars. Yet even very early on, they were supplemented by non-slave infantry forces of various kinds, which he catalogues. Early modern changes in military technology enhanced the importance of infantry, making recruitment of Janissaries a priority.
Winter 2010's lectures turn to the Janissaries, the Ottoman Empire's elite infantry, who initially consisted largely of celibate slaves, and the recruitment systems associated with them. Veinstein adroitly unpacks the various myths and scholarly debates concerning the Janissaries’ origins, ultimately concurring with the opinion that they originated under Murad I (r. 1362–89). Everyone who studies the Janissaries even cursorily knows that raw recruits initially spent several years in a preparatory corps known as the acemi oğlan (literally, “foreign boys”). In the most thorough discussion of the acemi oğlan that I have ever read, Veinstein explains that they functioned as a flexible slave labor force for the state, doing everything from gardening to transporting troops by sea to building prisons. Nor was promotion to the Janissary corps assured: numerous imperial orders from the 16th and 17th centuries complain of acemi oğlan whose beards turned gray while they waited for promotions that never came.
Discussion of recruitment for the Janissary corps centers on the pencik, the ruler's one-fifth share of any prisoners of war, and the devshirme. Veinstein demonstrates that while the pencik preceded the devshirme, the two coexisted at least briefly in the 15th century. His discussion of the numbers enslaved in a given year and the proportions taken per village exhibits a rare understanding of the challenges facing the Ottoman government: how to derive sufficient military manpower from a rural source while not disrupting agriculture and taxation. At the same time, he does not disguise the fact that the devshirme entailed forcibly separating boys from their families and forcibly converting them to Islam. These were not small children, however. His research shows that by the 17th century, in any case, roughly half of recruits were between eighteen and twenty years of age. Thus they could hardly have forgotten their families and former lives, and indeed, examples abound of successful devshirme recruits who brought family members to Istanbul or channeled aid to their hometowns. In the final sentence of his final lecture, Veinstein concludes that for all the pain it caused and its dubious status under Islamic law, the devshirme helped to integrate the disparate parts of the Ottoman Empire.
Dr. Elisabetta Borromeo, Veinstein's former student and the editor of this volume, has undertaken a staggering amount of work, checking Veinstein's written texts against the audio recordings of the lectures and filling in hundreds of footnotes. In edited form, the lectures provide a lucid and highly readable overview of Ottoman military slavery, and of Islamic military slavery more broadly, that would be of great use to graduate students and instructors.
The presentation retains the original format of the lectures, thus capturing the respectful, friendly tone of a scholar who wore his formidable erudition lightly and easily drew people into the subject of his curiosity. Reading these lectures makes me wish that I had attended, and makes me acutely aware, once again, of the loss to the Ottoman field occasioned by Veinstein's premature death.
