Both of the books under review offer sophisticated contributions to our understanding of the theory and practice of democratic politics by focusing on some of the most fundamental questions of justice: What makes social and political relations justifiable, and how can the exercise of political power be rendered legitimate under conditions of deep pluralism? For Howard Schweber, the answer to these questions, at least within Western liberal democracies, depends on understanding the necessary connections between the acceptance of a general liberal consensus (i.e., commitments to individual freedom, basic legal equality, and a limited state) and the willing adoption of discursive constraints on the public justification of coercive government powers. For Rainer Forst, the answer to these questions does not depend upon a prior commitment to liberal principles but can be addressed in reliable ways once all human beings gain insight into the unconditional ground of morality. According to Forst, this ground is supplied by “the principle of justification”: All persons have a fundamental right to justification and a corresponding duty to justify morally relevant actions to others.
These books are welcome if also dense and challenging additions to the scholarship on public justification, repaying careful study in the form of insights into contemporary debates about the fairness, consequences, and epistemic demands of justificatory constraint (Schweber) and the moral grounds of transnational justice and human rights (Forst).
Democracy and Authenticity is a defense of a liberal theory of public constraint against various forces of “tribalism” and “perfectionism” that Schweber detects (often in surprising places) within contemporary liberal societies. For the author, previous attempts to specify the kinds of reasons that provide acceptable bases for the exercise of government power have either been too inclusive—by virtue of serving the demands of authenticity or sincerity—or not sufficiently narrow politically—by pursuing a demanding form of internal character transformation. He enters into this controversial terrain with full appreciation for the fact that any meaningful account of public reason must provide criteria in accordance with which standards of “accessibility” can be judged. Contrasting his account with the well-known arguments of Robert Audi, John Rawls, and Charles Larmore (among others), Schweber argues for an “objective listener-oriented” standard of accessibility (Chapter 3). The central idea here is that in offering justifications for policies that will employ coercive state force, citizens of liberal democratic societies are “to consider the effects that the act of offering a particular justification in the context of public political dialogue should be expected to have on others” (p. 71).
Schweber makes a judicious case for a “thin” and neutralist version of liberal constraint across multiple chapters that critically (and often delightfully) engage an amazingly diverse array of thinkers. He writes with a strong sense of moral clarity about the constraints that citizens ought to respect in offering public justifications for those policies that will coercively bind everyone within a polity. His objective listener-oriented approach is provided as a way of avoiding objectionable forms of “perfectionism” and moving liberalism past a concern for authenticity/sincerity. In accordance with this approach, Schweber forthrightly emphasizes the degree of artifice in political relations and calls on citizens to be “fully aware of the differences between their roles as craftsmen of the polity and the identities that they enact in other parts of their lives” (p. 393). Yet even if he is right in arguing that previous theories of public reason have been too focused on the subjective state of speakers, it is unclear whether he has successfully distinguished between subjective and objective standards in his own account (including a subjective condition of sincerity [p. 386]), and whether public reasoning is something that citizens do in a process of actual political struggle or whether it occurs inside the imagination of a speaker (p. 78) in reference to criteria that “can be articulated prior to and separate from the experiences and reactions of the parties involved in a particular situation” (p. 70; see also p. 377).
This is a complex issue (and the author rightly notes the degree of underdetermination in his own preferred standards), but the pursuit of objective standards that are “in principle” accessible to citizens may be at odds with a listener-oriented approach more attuned to what diverse citizens find accessible in fact. At the very least, this is a tension for Schweber and anyone else who wants to prescribe “constitutive rules” (p. 26) for a diverse liberal society.
Like Schweber, Forst wants to direct our attention to those who are affected in morally relevant ways by the exercise of power as the primary concern driving the philosophical investigation of what can (and cannot) be morally justified through practical reason. But instead of anchoring his account in accordance with the discursive entailments of a liberal consensus, Forst develops the validity criteria for the standards of justification in accordance with a universal right of justification that is owed to all persons as moral beings. In order for a moral claim to have normative validity, it must be capable of being upheld reciprocally (i.e., no one may refuse the particular demands of others that one raises for oneself) and generally (i.e., without excluding the objections of anyone affected) (pp. 6, 20). For Forst, these standards not only accord with the respect that is owed to persons as Kantian “ends in themselves,” but they also equip vulnerable and finite persons everywhere with a persistent “veto” right against those policies, norms, and structures that are not reciprocally and generally justifiable. For Schweber, public justification is a moral and epistemic supplement to the articulation of rights claims (p. 188); for Forst, the right to justification is the basic moral right and the basis for all other human rights (p. 210).
One of the impressive things about The Right to Justification is how much Forst builds (philosophically and politically speaking) from the edifice of the right to justification and its two basic criteria of reciprocity and generality. Political liberty, toleration, deliberative democracy, human rights, transnational justice, and morality itself are all ultimately grounded in the right to justification. One of the consequences of this parsimonious Kantian architecture is that autonomy, both moral and political, is accorded philosophical priority; and as an extension of this priority, Forst is committed to moral and political constructivism as the only route available for the generation of justifiable moral norms and political arrangements. In this setting, the central task of political philosophy is to work out the validity criteria for justifying principles of justice in the absence of metaphysical foundations and amid diverse conceptions of the good (Chapter 4), leaving open (at the level of political constructivism) the various concrete ways that legal and political structures might fulfill the rights and duties of justification.
This will be interpreted as a virtue for scholars who consider themselves members of the Kant-Rawls-Habermas “family quarrel,” and a vice for those who reject or want to move beyond this way of construing the terms of and the relationship between theory and politics. Yet Forst also seeks to point modestly beyond John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas by offering some suggestions about the parameters of a critical theory of justice. This latter feature entails the application of the right of justification as the core element in a critique of those social and political relations that are not reciprocally or generally justifiable or are “falsely” taken as legitimate. In this setting, political philosophy can play a facilitating role in the emancipatory pursuit of justice and human rights by revealing those policies and norms that are not “sharable” by all affected, and are thus not legitimate exercises of political power.
Forst is philosophically convincing at the level of moral constructivism and in making a case for the normative core of a critical theory of justice and human rights; but like much of the public reason/public justification scholarship, there is often a nagging feeling of disjunction at the level of the political concretization of these moral principles. In many political contexts, the notion of justification does not carry Kantian resonances of respecting the equal moral worth of persons, but instead designates the enterprise of rationalizing actions and policies through the manipulation of language and other symbols in a manner more beholden to passions and interests, for which reasons are the slaves (Hume), than to an expression of respect and reasonableness as such. To his credit, Forst takes up one part of this challenge in a discussion of neo-Humean accounts of reason and motivation (Chapter 1), but in addressing the question concerning how the moral conception of reciprocal and general justification can be “practically anchored” (31), the answer—and with it the possibility for realizing reciprocal justice in various contexts—seems to come down to having the (Kantian) “insight” into the principle of moral justification and already accepting the unconditional duty of justification to which that principle corresponds (p. 35).
This is structurally similar to Schweber's reliance upon the Western liberal consensus to supply the sufficient motivation to adopt the attitudes of restraint and forbearance upon which the practice of public justification depends. Yet in the absence of a universal acceptance of this Kantian insight, and in the face of powerful (and well-funded) actors who do not freely adopt speaking habits that are internally consistent with consensus liberalism, a pertinent and pressing question for both Schweber and Forst, and perhaps for all scholars working in this tradition, is this: Even if citizens within a bounded political community could agree on the necessary and sufficient moral standards of acceptability within an account of public justification, what will serve as the effective source of motivation to act in accordance with these norms under persistent (and worsening) conditions of asymmetrical power?
Whether their readers are ultimately convinced by the arguments that these talented thinkers make, Schweber and Forst are to be credited for taking seriously the recursive obligation of justifying the constraints on public political justification that they so vigorously defend. These books will surely help advance both liberal and critical philosophical orientations toward questions of democratic and transnational justice, and given the moral impulses within and the exemplary execution of their arguments, this bodes well for the entire field.
