The status of shariʿa in the modern state has emerged as one of the foremost debates in Islamic legal history and Islamic studies more broadly. The outward incommensurability of the ideal-type “jurists’ law” with contemporary shariʿa-based state legislation has produced a flurry of scholarship attempting to account for the difference. These analyses have identified vexing questions that continue to linger: Can the Islamic legal tradition persist as codified state legislation? How does the “modern state” impact religious content in law? Who has the authority to make these determinations? To date, such questions largely have been defined by voices diagnosing the shariʿa's “transformation,” “rupture,” or, perhaps most famously, “impossible” existence in the modern nation state. These characterizations vary in contextual precision and historical grounding, often wavering between history and polemics. In most cases, they have raised more questions than provided answers about the status of contemporary shariʿa law.
It is within this complex of questions that Rachel Scott intervenes with her refreshingly lucid and compellingly argued book, Recasting Islamic Law. Scott anchors her intervention in the analysis of Egyptian “constitutional commitments” to Islamic law, “articles in the constitution that specifically mention the sharia and those that are seen as implicitly related to the sharia” (5). In the shadow of the post-revolution Egyptian constitutions of 2012 and 2014, Scott situates this endeavor as a means to transcend two prevailing yet flawed approaches: (1) the ahistorical “rupture” narratives of contemporary shariʿa, and (2) binary analyses of Islamist-secularist opposition in modern state legislation. She posits instead that constitutional commitments to Islam are neither a rupture with nor revival of the “premodern” shariʿa, rather, they should be seen as both perpetuating and departing from it. On this premise, Scott proposes the book's titular metaphor: recasting. Specifically, “when articles relating to the sharia are inserted into the constitution, the result is that much of the material and substance of the sharia is reused, while that substance is molded into a new form” (5). Scott calls this new form “modern Islamic state law” (hereafter MISL), a “recalibration of the sharia” (7) shaped foremost by the political-cum-cultural priorities of the Egyptian nation. In accounting for this process, Scott sets forth an impressively multidisciplinary account of religion's evolving manifestation in Egyptian state law.
Scott methodically builds her argument in two distinct parts: a first three chapters (Part 1) that set the historical and conceptual background, followed by four chapters (Part 2) with respective “case studies” illustrating the claims of the first three. Part 1 engages the vast secondary literature on modern Egypt to establish the primary frameworks of discussion: religion in the modern state, Islamic legal history, and Egyptian constitutional history. Part 2 interweaves secondary literature, primary texts, and the author's own interviews to explore four paradigms of constitutional commitments that demonstrate Islamic legal “recasting:” the role of al-Azhar's scholars in the Egyptian state; legal recognition of “divinely revealed religions” (namely Coptic Christians, to the exclusion of Bahais); women's rights and the family; and evolving judicial autonomy for non-Muslim communities.
In Part 1, Scott's intervention is particularly compelling in parsing and qualifying scholarly approaches to religion (and Islamism) in the modern state. The author engages deeply with prevailing voices of the field—Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, Hussein Agrama (anthropologists concerned with modern Egypt), and Wael Hallaq—who interrogate modern state power and critique notions of “secular.” Scott embraces secularism as “managing religion” (24) to cut through Islamist and secularist rhetoric and analyze them as two sides of the same process. That is, regardless of revivalist rhetoric, Scott shows that both constituencies target the same modern state legislative power to delineate the legal domain of religion. Scott also is highly effective at establishing the significance of constitutions beyond simply their statutory content. Her analysis of Ottoman and Egyptian constitutions shows how they were increasingly sites of ideological signification, most relevantly in projecting the role of Islam and religious difference in national identity. Egyptian constitutional commitments to Islam since at least 1971 (the first explicit commitment to shariʿa) indeed provide a premier lens into “statist sharia” (79) and its inextricable connection to national political priorities.
Scott's case studies concretize the importance of this framing for advancing existing analyses of religion in Egyptian law, especially since the 2012 and 2014 constitutions. For instance, Scott reframes al-Azhar's “consultative” role to show how it remains ambiguously relegated to determining the sphere of religion, whereas it is ultimately the Supreme Constitutional Council that interprets shariʿa-based legislation. In Chapters 5 and 7, Scott deftly transcends seductive claims of Islamic “revival” (120) or “tolerance” (123) to locate constitutional commitments to minorities in visions of Egyptian national unity. In ostensible contrast to the premodern dhimma (legal protection of certain non-Muslim groups), Scott contends that minority judicial autonomy today only occurs through state approval and in limited legal domains (e.g., inheritance). To that end, Scott also invokes these case studies to show the “recasting” of premodern shariʿa attributable to MISL. The limited constitutional autonomy guaranteed to “heavenly religions” ostensibly perpetuates Islamic legal acceptance of non-Muslims while divergently centralizing the concept in state political prerogatives. For the cases of al-Azhar and women's rights, Scott argues that the much-discussed principle of siyāsa sharʿiyya (the ruler's discretionary authority in conformity with shariʿa) becomes recast as the state's authority to predetermine Islamic legal stipulations. In each case, Scott emphasizes that statist notions of religion remained consistent across the 2012 and 2014 constitutions more than their alleged Islamist-secularist differences imply.
Throughout the book, Scott constantly calls for readers to view religion-state relations as multivalent, historically contingent, and subject to renegotiation. Scott's specific call for stronger historical context is much needed: the focus on modern secular state power has too often occluded the mechanisms of Islamic legal development in practice. However, it is not always clear that Scott's rich narratives of constitutional commitments historicize Islamic legal continuities in a way that dispels rupture narratives. Much of the ambiguity comes from the author's continuous reference to “the sharia” as a “premodern” phenomenon while at other times elaborating more periodized structural and conceptual evolutions. Does continuity with late-Ottoman conceptual developments—versus the other distinct periods of Islamic legal history—represent continuity with “the sharia” writ large? In Chapter 7, Scott also asserts that contemporary attempts for non-Muslim judicial recognition “resonate” (176) with the Ottoman millet system but do not revive it. Might historical resonance with shariʿa—rather than conceptual continuity—represent a more fundamental attribute of MISL? Scott clearly does not view premodern as an essentialized category, yet it would have been helpful to establish a more explicit spectrum of criteria constituting the pre-MISL tradition. The terminology otherwise risks insinuating that the pre-MISL tradition cannot be called Islamic law—a topic that remains hotly debated. In any case, the heuristic hardly detracts from Scott's trenchant analysis of constitutional commitments themselves. It does, however, generatively point to a broader need to explicitly periodize pre-state Islamic legal history if we are to complete Scott's rightful call to transcend rupture narratives.
Recasting Islamic Law is an exemplary analysis of religion and state law, a topic that Scott credibly predicts will only continue to be renegotiated by its stakeholders. Even in such a well-trodden scholarly domain as contemporary Egypt, Scott distinguishes herself both for qualifying the vast array of existing literature and concise up-to-date evaluation of specific constitutional commitments. I strongly recommend it for all scholars interested in matters of the modern state and religion as well as researchers from all fields interested in the political and social dynamics of contemporary Egypt (especially for the case studies). The author's sophisticated yet clear arguments and avoidance of excessive jargon likewise make its individual chapters ideal teaching material on contemporary Islam and politics, religion in state law, and constitutionalism.
