In recent years, methods pioneered by cultural historians have reinvigorated the notoriously staid subdiscipline of diplomatic history. Rather than merely tracing the interrelationships among states and the activities of statesmen and diplomats, “new diplomatic historians,” as many of their practitioners refer to themselves, investigate the cultural environment of those statesmen and diplomats and how their assumptions have evolved over time and affected questions of war and peace. In Middle East historiography, the new diplomatic history, a good portion of which is the work of scholars from other disciplines, has provided innovative answers to such well-worn questions as, “why did the Ottoman Empire enter World War I on the side of the central powers?” (Mustafa Aksakal) and, “what, at long last, were the real reasons behind the Balfour Declaration?” (Maryanne A. Rhett). Invariably, the answers provided by the long lens of new diplomatic historians are far more satisfying than the narrow and contingent answers provided by their predecessors.
Laura Robson's excellent States of Separation explores the invention of the concept of “minorities” and how ethnonationalism became the gold standard for European statesmen involved in state building in the Middle East after World War I. Her book fits squarely into the paradigm of the new diplomatic historians. It is not only a welcome addition to the literature, but an important and necessary corrective.
According to Robson, three prewar phenomena informed the decisions made by the British and French governments and the League of Nations on the fate of select minority populations who inhabited (or, in the case of Zionist Jews, came to inhabit) former Ottoman territory. First, there was the nineteenth-century “Jewish question” in Europe and the reformulation of a religious community as an ethnonational community for the first time by the Zionist movement; second, the colonial experience and the reification of communal boundaries and communal territorialization to facilitate imperial control in such places as India and Algeria; and third, the various prewar ethnonationalist struggles in the Balkans, which resulted in population transfers among the belligerents. Following the war, further population exchanges, along with so-called “minority treaties” in central Europe, which accorded internationally recognized rights to defined minority communities, provided statesmen with a template to be applied in the Middle East.
Europeans did not endow all ethnic and religious groups in the Middle East with ethnonational rights, but only those whom they had bestowed a proto-nationalist consciousness during the nineteenth century. Not coincidentally, these were groups whose purported national awakening might further European goals in the region. Robson identifies Armenians, Assyrians, and Jews as three such groups and explores the ramifications of their newly ascribed status. Viewing them as integral social groupings and potential collaborators in the postwar order, the British, the French, and the League dealt with their protégés through what Robson calls “ethnic engineering.” First, there were attempts at resettlement in “historic” homelands. If that failed, there was always the option of resettlement elsewhere (the British even concocted a plan to resettle Assyrians in Brazil and British Guiana). Finally, there was the possibility of creating separate administrative jurisdictions for avowed ethnonational groups, as the 1937 Peel Commission proposed for the Yishuv in Palestine. The engineers of such schemes faced resistance from the “majority” populations and the ungrateful recipients of Great Power beneficence, many of whom just wanted to be left alone or to assimilate into their new homes, while Armenian, Assyrian, and Jewish diasporas found increased social status in their recognition as members of embryonic nations.
The idea that national and sectarian identities are “imagined” rather than “awakened” has been the dominant tendency in nationalist studies for more than a quarter century. Robson's book presents a set of historical case studies supporting what has thus come to be called “constructivism” among those engaged in debates about nationalism. Rather than focusing on the role played by homegrown nationalist entrepreneurs as most scholars have done, however, Robson's focus is on the role played by an increasingly powerful international system and the imperial motive in conjuring up ethnonationalist identities – and on the subsequent efforts of the great powers to restrain the monsters they had unleashed. As western states once again confront a region whose violent fragmentation is partly of their own making, this book offers a cautionary warning about the consequences of ethnic engineering.
