I was especially happy to have the opportunity to review these two books, as I have long puzzled over the roles of teleology in ancient sciences on the one hand (a topic covered in both volumes, if differently), and, on the other hand, I have never – never – been able to figure out what on earth the Timaeus was trying to do or why it was even being read into late antiquity and beyond. After reading T. K. Johansen's refreshingly clear and well-written book, I can now happily see where I can get hooks in to have a fresh look at the Timaeus. Monte Ransome Johnson's Aristotle book, for its part, does not so much illuminate me as illuminate my confusion. This is to say that on reading it I am clearer on many aspects of Aristotle's teleology, but I do not discern a single coherent interpretative framework that I can use to shed light on the whole project. It is more that I now have a much better understanding of where the complexities are.
Johnson's book is one where it matters to some extent how you read. If you are an introduction/conclusion reader and in-between skimmer you will come away with the impression that very large questions about teleology, causation and scientific method have been thoughtfully taken apart and newly and sensibly reassembled in these pages. This is not an incorrect impression, not at all, but the reader who ploughs through the book page by page may well lose this forest for the trees by the end of the second chapter. It is not that the details of the argument are uninteresting (they are not) but they are devilish, and the larger threads easily get lost as the grain and the texture get magnified. This fact matters considerably less for an ancient-philosophy audience than it does for a history-of-science one, insofar as students of ancient philosophy as a whole – and Aristotle scholars particularly – will be reading for a particular set of purposes that will be enriched and challenged by Johnson's careful study. But historians and philosophers of science, I fear, may come away not entirely sure exactly what it is that has hit them. This is too bad, as the accounts of teleology that tend to float around in HPS circles (outside a limited and generally underappreciated set of debates in the philosophy of biology) really need cleaning up. This applies to accounts of teleology as an explanatory structure generally, but also and especially to the pat versions of Aristotle that get paraded in even otherwise good rethinkings of the scientific revolution. Here we need to be very clear on what teleology is and what it is not, and we also need to distinguish between Aristotle and the various caricatures of him floating around. Not to pick on John Henry, whose excellent The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science (Basingstoke, 1997) is easily my favourite survey of that period, but look at the (unfortunately typical) definition of teleology he offers: a teleological account is one ‘in which the behaviour of something [is] explained by reference to its supposed purpose: why does an acorn grow? because its purpose is to become an oak to supply mankind with wood’ (p. 57). To be sure, the example he offers is indeed teleological, but it is hardly exemplary. It is defining a genus by pointing to an atypical species: mammals are things like dugongs, for example. Acorns and oaks are one of the paradigmatic loci for Aristotelian teleology, but Aristotle certainly does not handle them like this (see e.g. Johnson, pp. 229 ff.).
More accessible – but that certainly does not mean more superficial – is Johansen's book on Plato. The Timaeus is historically perhaps Plato's most important dialogue, and one of the main sources for late antique and early medieval cosmology. What is odd about this fact is that the dialogue itself looks on the face of it to be singularly disjunct with the main models of cosmology that we find being discussed in antiquity. Johansen makes sense of this by putting the Timaeus and its sister dialogue the Critias into a more clearly ethical context, which helps us understand both the Timaeus itself and how it was being read in the Hellenistic period and after. Perhaps when Cicero saw it as important enough to translate into Latin he did so for its models of the good, not for its strange stories about the births of the gods, cosmic mixing bowls, geometrical atoms and (my favourite) the ‘wet-nurse of becoming’, to use Zeyl's translation. Johansen accomplishes his task by going to some length to show how the cosmology Timaeus outlines in the dialogue is meant to stand in a particular kind of likeness-relation to the actual cosmos. Work from a previous chapter on the nature of the truth claims in Critias' account of Atlantis here sets the stage for our accepting accounts as true or as true likenesses, even when they are not exactly factually true in the way that an eyewitness report is supposed to be, for example. Why should we care to tell stories that are not factually true in this sense? To make a point, of course. In the case of the Atlantis story, it is to show how ideal citizens (those of Athens) should act, and in the case of the Timaeus cosmology, to set up the cosmos itself as the willed model of an eternal good. Here teleology is central to the story Johansen wants to tell, and many of the chapters are dedicated to fleshing out the teleological skeleton he erects in the first three chapters of the book. Much interesting material is covered, though occasionally one gets the sense of an artificial tightening-up of Plato's own argument, as when Johansen pushes a reading of the creation story in the Timaeus as ongoing and continual rather than as the once-upon-a-time story it is clearly framed as in the dialogue.
Towards the end of the book Johansen offers a compelling and novel reading of the role of sense perception in knowledge in the Timaeus. Where Plato has often been read as a rationalist of the most extreme type, where the body and the senses merely impede the soul in its quest for truth, the Timaeus account gets construed by Johansen to be saying that the senses play an important role in the soul's acquisition and pursuit of knowledge. In particular, when the Demiurge created the planets, he purposely gave them ordered motions and made them perceivable by our eyes (which were specially created for the purpose, by the way). The reason for doing so was teleological: by making these ordered motions perceptible, the Demiurge could bring about in us a knowledge of number. That is, our knowledge of number comes in the first instance from sense perception of regular motions. Of course, the full richness of our understanding of number can only come about as the product of reason, so the role of perception in this account could in the end be seen by an empiricist as not very significant. But as Johansen points out, it is still something, and that something is crucial.
