A decade ago, Beijing's relations with Moscow were of marginal interest to China scholars. Topics such as growing Sino-American interdependence-cum-rivalry, engagement with East Asia or relations with the developing world overshadowed China's relationship with its northern neighbour. Scholars preoccupied with Russia's foreign policy did not pay much attention either, regarding the Kremlin's policy towards China as part and parcel of Russia's grand strategy directed towards the West. The main dividing line among those few who took a closer look ran between sceptics and alarmists. The former interpreted the post-Cold War rapprochement as superficial and envisioned an imminent clash of interests between the two states. The latter, a minority, saw the prospect of an anti-Western alliance.
Today, Sino-Russian relations have returned to the top of research agenda in international politics. A sharp political conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine, Sino-American tensions as well a recent backlash against China in the West rekindled interest in the “strategic partnership” that had been publicized by Moscow and Beijing since the late-1990s. The question of whether China and Russia might become allies began to loom large.
Leading European and American think-tanks have produced a number of reports in recent years, with the aim of explaining the post-2014 surge in Sino-Russian cooperation.Footnote 1 Journal articles explored distinct aspects of the relationship, such as security and defence cooperation,Footnote 2 energy and economy,Footnote 3 as well as competition and cooperation in adjacent regions.Footnote 4 Scholars drew from the IR theory repertoire, reaching out to realist,Footnote 5 constructivistFootnote 6 and domestic-level explanationsFootnote 7 in order to determine the causes and implications of closer ties between Moscow and Beijing. They interpreted Sino-Russian cooperation not only in terms of balancing the US, but also as an expression of status anxiety and national identity.Footnote 8
The books discussed in this essay promise to add to this body of literature and shed new light on the Sino-Russian relationship from several viewpoints – West and Central European, American and Russian. This review essay starts by briefly introducing key arguments of each volume. It proceeds by analysing how the four books address several fundamental questions concerning contemporary Sino-Russian relations: (i) how to interpret contemporary Russia–China relations; (ii) what are the key drivers that bring both states closer together; (iii) what are the limitations and obstacles to deeper cooperation; and (iv) what the relationship means for the West and the liberal international order. I conclude by exploring the broader relevance of these works for China studies and international relations.
Interpreting Russia–China Relations Today
All four authors agree that the Sino-Russian relationship does not constitute a fully-fledged political–military alliance. Neither Beijing nor Moscow are ready to take on extra obligations and support one another in case of a conflict with a third party. Preferring flexibility and willing to retain room for manoeuvre, Russia and China avoid getting involved in the other side's rivalry with the West, be it over influence in Eastern and Central Europe or territorial claims in the South or East China Seas. However, if no Sino-Russian alliance has materialized, how to define the relationship? The answers that the four volumes provide are located along a spectrum: from a “partnership of convenience driven by concrete priorities and interests” (Lo, xiv–xv) and a “complicated, ambiguous, yet truly successful relationship” (Lubina, p. 283) to a “useful partnership with strong momentum that shapes international politics” (Bolt and Cross, p. 2) and a “close strategic partnership” (Lukin p. 54).
In A Wary Embrace. What the China–Russia Relationship Means for the World, Bobo Lo is the most sceptical about Sino-Russian partnership. Lo argues that incremental changes in the relationship, observed for the last decade, have not had a transformative effect and the bilateral relationship remains subordinated to each state's policy towards the West. At the same time, inequality between the two parties has increased significantly, making their relations more difficult to manage.
In Michał Lubina's Russia and China. A Political Marriage of Convenience – Stable and Successful, the asymmetry of the relationship becomes the central point of analysis. Lubina argues that in its relations with Moscow, Beijing aims to build a stable long-term asymmetric relationship where both sides gain but China benefits more. Lubina speaks of a “positive asymmetry,” by which he means that Russia accepts China's growing power. He describes the current state of Sino-Russian relations as a “return to the past,” a modern version of the 17th–18th centuries’ model of modus vivendi. At that time, Qing China had the upper hand but Russia derived political and economic benefits without complete subordination.
In China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics Paul Bolt and Sharyl Cross point to the growing scope of common interests between the two states and emphasize the gradual broadening of the relationship. But they also identify a number of limitations that persist and prevent the two states from building a genuine alliance.
In China and Russia: The New Rapprochement, Alexander Lukin presents the most optimistic assessment of the relationship. Lukin dismisses the growing power gap between Russia and China and portrays the relationship as pragmatic and shaped by what he sees as objective developments in global politics. Lukin prioritizes geopolitical and strategic aspects, while considering other dimensions of the relationship, including the economic one, as secondary.
The analyses of Lo and Lukin are located at the opposite ends of the spectrum with regard to how they assess the depth of Sino-Russian relations. What links their interpretations is the emphasis on continuity. Both authors argue that the general ramifications of the Sino-Russian relations have not changed much for the last two decades. The building blocks of today's ties were laid down in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with Gorbachev's attempt at normalization and Yeltsin's official embrace of “strategic partnership.”
The two other volumes pay more attention to changes in the relationship that have been taking place since the early 2000s. Their authors see the renewal of Vladimir Putin's presidential mandate (2012), the emergence of Xi Jinping as China's new leader (2012), and the Russian–Western conflict in the aftermath of Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea as having generated new impulses for Sino-Russian relations and resulting in accelerating cooperation.
Key Drivers of the Relationship
Interpretations proposed by the four volumes emphasise that the contemporary Sino-Russian relationship is driven by common interests, as opposed to ideologies, emotions, sentiments or values. From this perspective, cooperation is first and foremost pragmatic. It is a way for Moscow and Beijing to achieve their respective goals in the international realm.
All four volumes identify the United States as the fundamental driver behind the Sino-Russian rapprochement in the post-Cold War period. Russia's and China's key shared objective is to limit the American primacy in international politics. Geopolitical and strategic considerations are of vital importance for decision-makers in Moscow and Beijing. The elites in the two states understand that mutual cooperation “holds the potential to serve as a counterbalance to the United States on specific global and regional issue areas” (Bolt and Cross, p. 155).
The West influences Sino-Russian relations in two ways. Firstly, all four authors recognize the role of structural factors. It has been US material domination and the “unipolar moment” that paved the way for Sino-Russian rapprochement after the end of the Cold War and continues to serve as a glue for the relationship. Even if Western predominance has diminished over the last decade, it continues to push Russia and China closer together (Lukin, pp. 175–76). Secondly, particular policies of the West have the potential to reinforce or slow down Sino-Russian collaboration. Every time tensions between Russia or China and the US emerge, Russian–Chinese cooperation deepens. “Playing the Chinese card” is as useful for Moscow in its bargaining with Washington, as “playing the Russian card” is for Beijing. Alexander Lukin argues that, without Western pressure on Russia in the form of sanctions, Moscow would be a bit more cautious towards Beijing, but it would still take “no commands from the Euro-Atlantic political center” (Lukin, pp. 92–93).
Even though Moscow and Beijing reject US primacy in global politics, the authors of the discussed volumes vary in their assessments of the extent to which both states remain dissatisfied with the liberal international order. Lubina interprets their shared worldview in terms of embracing multipolarity, which leads him to the conclusion that both states envision a future global concert of great powers (Lubina, p. 284). Lo, in turn, argues that Russia and China differ significantly in their attitudes towards the post-Cold War order, their understandings of multipolarity and related policies towards the US (Lo, xx). Both states have “contrasting visions of their respective places in the twenty-first century global order” (Lo, xv–xvi). While Russia is on the “losing” end, China has vested interests in the preservation of at least some part of the international system. Bolt and Cross speak of “common views on most major world issues” (p. 1), but notice that Russia's and China's dissatisfaction with the liberal order is selective and differentiated (Bolt and Cross, pp. 154–55).
Common interests that bring Russia and China closer together cannot be reduced to power-political and strategic considerations. The factors of regime security and regime survival have gained on importance as a driving force behind the Sino-Russian relationship. Bolt and Cross emphasize that both states strive to establish the “legitimacy of authoritarianism” (Bolt and Cross, p. 290) and attempt to prevent what they regard as Western interference in their domestic politics. Russian and Chinese ruling elites have similar views on what constitutes national security and recognize the link between internal and external threats. They portray colour revolutions as coups sponsored by the West. Lubina recognizes shared interests in regime survival but argues that Russia and China represent two distinct types of authoritarianism. The Russian version gives citizens more freedom and less economic efficiency, while the Chinese – more economic and less freedom (Lubina, p. 284). Lo remains most critical of alleged authoritarian convergence. In his view, such interpretation of the motives behind Sino-Russian cooperation “overstates the degree of like-mindedness and policy coordination” between the two states (Lo, pp. 98–99).
Trying to explain the recent surge in cooperation between Russia and China, the authors point to the role of two states' leaders, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Bolt and Cross draw attention to Putin's and Xi's strong-leadership styles and nationalistic credentials, while Lubina stresses their “Bismarckian style.” The two statesmen's close personal ties have propelled the relationship to a new level. Only Alexander Lukin emphasizes the “objective” continuity in Russian–Chinese relations and claims that the relations are independent from personalities.
While both states struggle to overcome what they regard as humiliation inflicted by the West, the role of status as a factor reinforcing cooperation remains ambiguous. Lukin makes an explicit link between Russia's dissatisfaction with the West and the failure to gain what Moscow perceives as an equal standing on the one hand, and closer cooperation with China on the other (Lukin, p. 175). Lo, in turn, recognizes China's skilful approach to Russia and Beijing's ability to respect Russian great-power ambitions as an element that facilitates cooperation. He does, however, see China as exploiting symbolism to achieve concrete results in dealings with Russia (Lo, pp. 21–22).
Durability of Current Cooperation, Its Prospects and Limitations
The discussed books identify numerous flaws in Sino-Russian relations and obstacles to their transformation towards a fully fledged alliance. Each of the authors indicates different challenges to the relationship. When we analyse them together, a long catalogue of weaknesses permeating the Russian–Chinese relationship appears. This list illustrates potential difficulties Moscow and Beijing face when attempting to forge closer cooperation. These weaknesses include: the legacy of past mistrust, Russia's relations with other Asian states, China's growing assertiveness, Beijing's increasing foothold in Central Asia, lingering threat perceptions, the situation in the Russian Far East, unbalanced trade, economic openness of China versus Russia's protection of domestic industries, the competition for foreign investments, mutual ignorance, poor understanding of each other's culture and the lack of true empathy, the absence of reciprocity in particular spheres, and the unwillingness to support each other's territorial claims.
The most serious in the long-term perspective is the growing asymmetry between two states. Bobo Lo pays considerable attention to this issue: “one of the biggest tests facing Beijing and Moscow is to square notions of their strategic convergence and “equality” with the reality of an increasingly unequal interaction” (Lo, xiv–xv). Still, he does not envision a scenario leading to an open clash of interests: “the Sino-Russian relationship seems set fair for continued cooperation” (Lo, xxi). Bolt and Cross mention the power gap repeatedly (Bolt and Cross, pp. 26, 42–43) but they also do not see it as sufficient to derail the relationship. For Lubina, the asymmetry has turned into an essential feature of the relationship. Lukin, in turn, argues that the asymmetry refers only to the economic realm, whereas Russia enjoys primacy in the military sector and “global political influence” (Lukin, x). In his view, the relationship is much more balanced than one might expect comparing both states' economic indicators.
Despite having identified so many weaknesses of the Sino-Russian relationship, all five authors regard it as more resilient today than during the 2000s. None of the authors sees conflict as plausible in the short- to mid-term perspective. Both states have more to lose from rivalry and remain conscious of the fate of the 20th-century failure of relations between communist “brothers.” As a result, Moscow and Beijing take intentional steps to dissolve potential conflict in advance, as was the case of the Eurasian Economic Union and the New Silk Road. Even if solutions they propose might be deemed superficial and do not engage with the essence of the problem, Russia and China are still able to reduce potential tensions.
Should the West be Worried?
Close ties between China and Russia have gradually turned into a growing headache for Western observers and policy-makers, especially in the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia and China have managed to limit the West's domination in international politics, sometimes coordinating their actions, more often giving each other indirect support. In the case of Syria and Ukraine, China provided Russia with “strategic background,” which allowed Moscow to successfully undermine “the major tenets of the liberal international order” (Bolt and Cross, p. 202). Both states checked US hegemony, “thus advancing a vision of an international system that would legitimize authoritarian sovereignty over concerns with values of the liberal world order, including promoting democracy and human rights” (Bolt and Cross, p. 204).
All four books discussed in this essay warn against alarmism with regard to the Sino-Russian relationship. The authors agree that it would be difficult to speak of an anti-Western alliance in the making and point to a number of obstacles to closer cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. While “Moscow realizes that … China is a more reliable partner than the West,” a formal alliance remains unlikely (Lukin, pp. 190–92). Any such alliance would limit both states' freedom of manoeuvre. It would not sit easily with their different policy styles and the desire to retain flexibility with regard to the US.
At the same time, there is not much the West can do to weaken Sino-Russian ties. As long as the US remains the only superpower, Beijing and Moscow will strive to maintain close ties. Western states have some potential to slow down Sino-Russian cooperation with specifically tailored policies, but it does not seem plausible that they are able to reverse the existing alignments and to drive a wedge between Russia and China. Furthermore, Bolt and Cross welcome the relationship as inducing a certain degree of stability into international politics, if only by diminishing the plausibility of a conflict between two major non-Western powers. They also claim there is room for cooperation between Russia, China and the West (Bolt and Cross, p. 275). While Moscow and Beijing have potential for counter-balancing the West, they remain critical to addressing transnational security challenges (Bolt and Cross, p. 291). Lukin subscribes to this view and argues that the Sino-Russian partnership remains “one of the pillars of the emerging multipolar world order and a linchpin of global and regional stability” (Lukin, p. 193).
Conclusions
The books discussed in this essay explore Sino-Russian relations in great detail and offer differing interpretations. At the same time, their authors share important assumptions about international politics that influence their assessments of the relationship.
First, all authors regard Russia and China as strategic and rational actors, fully conscious of and able to clearly define their national interests and to cooperate on the basis of those. As a result, the volumes pay scarce attention to domestic factors that may influence foreign policy. While top leaders in Beijing and Moscow retain control over the strategic directions of their respective foreign policies, implementation depends on a number of domestic actors.Footnote 9 While discussing developments in Russian–Chinese relations in the 1990s, Lukin's book pays a lot of attention to different domestic players and the role of their parochial interests. When analysing developments in the Putin' era, Lukin portrays Russia's policy towards China as a purely rational and strategic undertaking.
Secondly, the Sino-Russian relationship appears to be predetermined by structural factors, leaving little place for both states' agency. The US primacy binds them together but there are insurmountable obstacles that prevent Moscow and Beijing from forming a fully fledged alliance. This creates the impression that regardless of particular steps taken by Russia or China, both states remain stuck in the early-1990s model, in which cooperation keeps expanding but they are unable to transform it into an alliance. Such an approach implies that the Russian–Chinese relationship has turned into a structural element of global international politics. As a result, we should expect continuity rather than change.
Biographical note
Marcin Kaczmarski is a lecturer at the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow. His research interests include Russia–China relations, Russia's foreign policy, great-power regionalism and the role of domestic politics in foreign policy. He is the author of Russia–China Relations in the Post-Crisis International Order (Routledge, 2015) and he recently published in International Affairs and Europe-Asia Studies. He blogs on current developments in Russia–China relations at www.RussiaChinaRelations.com.
