There is a growing and important literature in sociology and socio-legal studies on the lives of lesbians and gay men. As Jeffrey Weeks (Reference Weeks2007) has argued, these lives (in Britain at least) have undergone an astonishing transformation over the last half century, thus placing lesbians and gay men in the centre of a fulcrum of change. Law has been one of the main elements in these changes, and one which, as Harding documents, has included a role in the criminalisation, marginalisation, normalisation and even the celebration of gay lives. Law of course, in its various guises, plays important roles in all lives, yet for lesbian and gay lives its part has been particularly visible because it has been utilised so extensively to regulate and govern in a negative and exclusionary way. It is little wonder therefore that law has come to be an important part of the political and cultural imaginations of lesbians and gay men, and it is this sphere that Harding seeks to explore here.
What is particularly striking about the book is Harding's attempt to bring together a number of contemporary strands of thinking in fields of both theory and methodology. The first strand is an emphasis on the ‘everyday’ through which she takes as a starting point what matters to people in the context of ordinary lives and relationships as well as routine aspirations, hopes and expectations. The second is her reconfiguration of how to understand the mundane operation of legal consciousness. She does this by revisiting the ideas of key socio-legal thinkers in order to challenge the boundaries of their typologies of legal consciousness on the basis of her own empirical research. The third important strand is the engagement with Foucault's theory of power through which Harding seeks to expand the neglected concept of resistance to create a tool better equipped to comprehend the complex ways in which lesbians and gay men engage with law. What is particularly important about this approach is the way that Harding provides a conceptual route out of the old impasse over whether legal reforms offer only the narrow alternatives of legitimation or normalisation. Based on her empirical research she is able to challenge this two-dimensional conceptualisation of the meaning of law in everyday lives. The final strand is concerned with methodological innovation and this, as I shall argue below, is both a strength and a weakness in the book. First, however, I shall address the more theoretical strands.
One of the main conceptual contributions that Harding brings to this field is her exploration of power and resistance. In Chapter 3 she seeks to create a new ‘lexicon of resistance’. Taking as her starting point Foucault's insistence that wherever there is power there is resistance, Harding argues that we need to comprehend how this resistance can take different forms. Thus she identifies three types, namely stabilising resistance, moderating resistance and fracturing resistance. The first of these is perhaps, to put it simply, the most radical because it is to adopt a position diametrically opposed to the goal of power. It is called ‘stabilising’ because it acts as a constant resistance to governance, creating a counter-force which maintains the stability of oppositional power. The second type is ‘moderating resistance’, which as the name suggests can sometimes amend the force of governmental power and create change, even if only in small ways. The third type is ‘fracturing resistance’, which is a term that recognises how the force of power can actually be broken by the resistance it meets. But the important caveats that Harding includes here are that the fracturing of power can produce unexpected outcomes, and also that what is fractured can ‘mend’. In other words, resisting power may have effects, but not necessarily the ones desired, and also, notably, power can regroup and reassert itself, albeit probably in slightly different ways. Through the development of these types of resistance Harding does two important things. First, she retains the core Foucaultian idea that power is endless and is never simply overcome, and second she provides a conceptual space for acknowledging the complexities of different forms of resistance. This means she goes beyond the idea that resistance is pointless since power is endless, and is able to give a better appreciation of how different responses to law may have different effects.
The second half of the book moves onto a discussion of Harding's empirical research. Here she seeks to match the innovative elements of the conceptual half of the book with equally novel approaches to method. Thus she elects to pursue her ideas through four different routes. Chapter 4 is based on an analysis of a subset of responses to a large-scale international Web-based online survey of the perceptions and attitudes of lesbians and gay men to the introduction of civil partnership or same-sex marriage. The section of this survey utilised in this chapter is the analysis of the written comments of 318 respondents. These respondents are mainly seen to be supportive of full legal equality, utilising a human rights discourse to argue for nothing less. Chapter 5 then turns to an analysis of a small selection of written ‘real life’ stories which appeared in print in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s in predominantly the UK and USA. These stories were written in order to promote understanding of the problems of living outside the law, particularly when relationships go wrong and there are few protections for the parties. Chapter 6 then reports on the in-depth interviews that Harding carried out with four gay men and six lesbians, and the final empirical chapter seeks to analyse two examples of utopian fiction (one book and one film) which envisage a life lived beyond the law. Each of these chapters presents evidence for the different forms of resistance outlined in the first part of the book, and also points to the complex array of legal consciousnesses possessed by respondents and writers alike.
The strength of this part of the book lies in the attempt to capture the different dimensions of legal consciousness through various routes. The idea that such a complex phenomenon as legal consciousness cannot be reached through a single method is a good one, and taking different methods to try to grasp diverse facets of a given problematic seems worthwhile, indeed even essential. The question is, however, whether Harding pulls this difficult task off. In my judgement she does not quite succeed in this very difficult undertaking. This is because she offers no convincing methodological rationale for taking up and then mixing together the specific methods she uses. Indeed, one gets the sense that she embarks on the enterprise of adding methods together out of a sense of methodological weakness rather than strength. Throughout her tone is apologetic, suggesting that the qualitative methods she uses cannot live up to the real (?) measure of statistical generalisability which is implicitly accepted as the gold standard for research. This gives the impression that different methods are added sequentially to try to patch up problems which would otherwise be too visible. As I read these sections (which contain some very interesting material), I found myself wanting to understand what the epistemological logic of this particular multi-method approach was. I wanted to comprehend how the approaches could be brought together to create a complex but whole understanding. However what the reader was given were four discrete chapters which did not articulate with each other. Moreover, the major disadvantage of this approach was that each of these chapters had to be introduced with sections outlining and justifying the separate methodologies. These sections were of course vital but the detrimental effect was twofold. First, they interrupted the flow of the argument of the book because the reader had to put the core ideas on hold while grasping anew the details of each individual study. But at the same time, these introductions were not sufficiently detailed to satisfy the deep methodological questions they raised in the reader. This produced the effect that a very innovative approach which really demanded weighty substantiation became superficial and disjointed because of the need to provide space for the essential discussion of the empirical findings.
In offering these criticisms it may seem that Harding's innovative work and her willingness to take risks is being unfairly treated since work that strives to be path-breaking is so often vulnerable to dismal and ungenerous comment. But I think it would be a defeat for socio-legal research if we all retreated to conventional, tried and tested, methods alone and forsook more imaginative approaches. Harding's approach simply raises many methodological questions which are not answered in this book, and that is far from unusual. But equally the book has many strengths which operate at a conceptual level as well as through the exploration of different ways of understanding how law works in everyday life. In these respects the book remains a most important contribution to the fields of sexuality and legal consciousness.
