The Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, a highly secularized society in the 1960s and 1970s, in which the Communist ideology left its mark on the political, as well as on the cultural, national, and religious levels, suddenly faced, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a massive ethno-mobilization, the ghost of nationalism and the politically imposed identification of religion and nation. As a result of this “cultural shock,” one quasi-religious system (communism) gave way to another (nationalism). At the same time, the secular Serbian society under Serbian President Slobodan Milošević faced its own semi-literacy regarding religious matters, providing, thus, a secure refuge for an ecclesiastical nationalism and nationalist populism. Thus, in conditions of war and the long-lasting politicization of religion, one witnessed a consequent, secondary “sacralization” of politics and interethnic conflict. This, of course, gave rise to theories concerning the allegedly religious roots of the Balkan wars. These wars resulted, however, primarily from political and inter-ethnic conflicts, arising in conditions of economic deterioration and systemic crisis. Religion appeared as a significant element of ethnicity (even ethno-manipulation during the Milošević government), and this is probably the reason why these wars are sometimes labeled inter-religious conflicts.Footnote 1
However, in the perception of some churches (such as the Serbian Orthodox Church), the war was also experienced as involving a territorial issue. In such a perception, it gained legitimacy, because it was necessary to “defend,” as it were, sometimes at the cost of war-crimes, one's presence, one's physical and spiritual survival in the “fatherland.” In this context, the destruction of religious facilities was primarily a symbolic act of demonstrating political and military dominance: temples were not destroyed so much as religious objects, but as the national and ethnic symbols of a community's presence on a certain territory.
The first post-Milošević, democratic government of Serbia, headed by the late prime minister Zoran Djindjić,Footnote 2 attempted to create a sort of symbolic distance from the ideological heritage of the previous regime and thus secure the support of the electorate by referring to a set of traditional values and confirming a modern, democratic, pro-European orientation. Accordingly, his government introduced confessional religious education as an elective subject in public schools. Djindjić's vice-president, Čedomir Jovanović, admitted that the decision itself was completely pragmatic, stemming from the government's attempt to appease the Serbian Church after the extradition of Milośević to the Hague Tribunal. But this liberal government was never genuinely attached to the church, and the Serbian higher clergy knew that.
The current government, under its conservative prime minister, Vojislav Koštunica, is probably the best that the Serbian Church could have hoped for in many decades since the end of World War Two. Koštunica offered a real symphony with the church; so it seems that whatever his government decided, the church would accept, and vice versa. During the four years since he took office (in 2004), the Serbian Orthodox Church (hereinafter, SPCFootnote 3) has become a powerful player in political, cultural, and economic sense. Both the prime minister and the church have a very similar, conservative view of the Serbian society.
THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE STATE AFTER OCTOBER 5, 2005
In what context can we speak about the SPCFootnote 4 as a political subject after the fall of the Milošević regime in Serbia? The SPC is certainly not a political party in itself or an organization formally standing behind a party. Under Serbia's Constitution, religious communities are separate from the state, the SPC is not a state church, and the structures of political authority do not coincide with religious structures (as is the case, for example, in Iran). However, religious communities in the central and eastern European countries, many of which are already Eupopean Union (EU) members, have gained a new place and role for themselves in the post-socialist period, and become far more prominent in the public sphere.
Nevertheless, there is public discussion in Serbia about de-secularization of society and the state and even a process of clericalization (Djordjević Reference Djordjević2005a, 15–18), referring not just to an increased importance and influence of religion (particularly the SPC) in Serbian society, but also to greater participation of the church in political and state affairs. This impression is widespread not only among the local “civic intellectuals,” NGOs and independent thinkers in Serbia (who are traditionally critical of the SPC role in public life), but also among the foreign media, political figures and European institutions, such as the OSCE or the Council of Europe.Footnote 5
This study will focus on the place and role of the SPC in Serbian society, state, and political life after October 5, 2000, tackling also its pronounced symbolic and normative function. The church now offers a new ideological framework and value-system for state institutions such as the armed forces and public education.
The state and the church in Serbia established an unprecedented relationship almost overnight. Dealing with a young and fragile democratic society is a completely new experience for the SPC, after a decade of authoritarianism in the Milošević era, and another four decades in which a single party and ideology held a structural monopoly over state and society. Before the Second World War, the SPC co-existed with the then monarchy in a relatively “symphonic” relationship in which the SPC was the “first among equals” among the recognized religious communities. A multitude of open issues and problems concerning democracy, the character of a democratic state, and church-state relations enter the agenda under new circumstances.Footnote 6
For example, which social problems are within the jurisdiction of the church and its constitutional frameworks and ramifications? How capable are religious organizations of dealing with those problems and what is their capacity to solve them? How relevant are the religious communities' responses to the contemporary political and social issues?Footnote 7 What is the church's vision of the modern world? What is its relationship with civil society: do religious communities see themselves as an integral part of civil society?
During the socialist period, the state one-sidedly determined the character of its relationship with religious communities from a position of total political and ideological supremacy. In the post-socialist era, however, religious rights and freedoms have been considerably extended, but this immediately brought into play the question of their increased responsibility in many areas. In Serbia, there is still a great deal of arbitrariness in this respect, even completely partial interpretations of the church-state relations, on both sides. Already in 2001, the controversy and inconsistencies became apparent when religious education was introduced in the public school system as a regular subject.
Religious Education as a Litmus Test for the Future Church-State Relations
Direct contact between the SPC and state institutions was established in November 2000 when the Bishops' Assembly requested that religious education become part of standard state school programs. The introduction of religious education in schools and the permission (later that year) that clergymen could enjoy access to members of the armed forces were the demands indicating other, more important problems. Religious education in public schools (both primary and secondary) was not just an issue of the model of religious education proposed for a new and liberated society in which religious communities have much more room and a much better relationship with the state; this immediately highlighted numerous other questions in connection with religious rights and freedoms in a more general sense.
Before a new Constitution could be passed, and also before the adoption of a law on religious organizations, a government regulation became effective, defining, already in its preamble, the status of the seven traditional religious communities; in this regard, the authors of the law obviously sought to assert legal continuity with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.Footnote 8 This introduced bias into the area of religious freedoms and church-state relations: for example, if only seven religious communities are entitled to organize religious education in public schools, how can we speak about equality of religious communities before the law and the Constitution? If they are truly equal, why can only some of them exercise these rights?Footnote 9 Is this discrimination or even injustice against some, and, more importantly, how will their status be regulated in the future?
Another problem was the attitude toward lay state institutions, such as public schools: is school in Serbia still a lay institution? Is the public school space still “inviolable,” non-confessional, does it still enjoy some autonomy, so that religious communities cannot participate in the education process and the possible recruitment of new young believers without major changes in legislation?
Not surprisingly, the religious education decision of 2001, subsequently confirmed by a Government regulation, very soon found itself before the Constitutional Court of Serbia: several NGOs and private law firmsFootnote 10 challenged its constitutionality. The hearing in the Court, held on June 24, 2003, featured a synthesis of the arguments which had preceded the July 2001 regulation and attended its issuance.Footnote 11 According to its critics, the regulation did not comply with the Constitution of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and international conventions because the introduction of religious instruction and an alternative subject placed national minorities and small religious communities in an unequal position as only the “traditional” religions were allowed to conduct those classes. As a result, education in primary and secondary schools is not accessible to everyone under the same conditions (Popović and Vitorović-Umićević Reference Popović and Vitorović-Umićević2003, 1). The second principal objection dealt with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Article 41, § 2): given that only religious communities can organize religious instruction, the state cannot participate in those activities. The third complaint challenged the right of religious communities to perform their mission in public schools: although religions may recruit believers, they may not do so in public schools. A further problem was the descriptive grading system, as the existing law on secondary-school education did not provide for this form of evaluation.
These and some other objections voiced during the hearing led to the following Court assessments: (1) a possible violation of the constitutional separation of church and state; (2) equality of religious communities before the law and the Constitution; (3) a possible violation of laws on primary and secondary school education; (4) a threat against the freedom of religious confession of schoolchildren's parents and guardians, who had to choose between the two offered school subjects; (5) a possible violation of religious freedoms and the equality of religious communities before the law in those cases where the seven traditional religious communities, along with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religions, draw up religious education plans and programs.
The final outcome of the debate was that on November 4, 2003, the Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of the Government regulation.Footnote 12 In any case, the Serbian Government chose an optional, confessional, multi-denominational model of religious education. The reasons for such a decision were most likely political and pragmatic. The then Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjić, consulted only the religious communities, completely bypassing the most competent republican authority, the Ministry of Education, while the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which had from the outset unreservedly protected the interests of the SPC, welcomed the Prime Minister's decision, thereby contributing to an unusual division in Djindjić's Government. Čedomir Jovanović, a Deputy Prime Minister at the time, admitted later that the decision had been pragmatic and a result of efforts to placate the SPC after the extradition of Slobodan Milošević to the Hague Tribunal.Footnote 13 Regardless of the political and pragmatic character of the entire process, some believe that the parallel introduction of religious and civic education in the 2001 educational reform could also be seen as part of the then Government's political strategy to make a kind of “symbolic deflection” from the ideological heritage of the preceding regime and thereby win support from the electorate by opting for “traditional” values as well as confirming their modern, democratic, and pro-European orientation. When the Government regulation took effect in July 2001, two deputy ministers of education offered their resignations. At that moment no one could say for certain whether there would be a sufficient number of trained religious instructors at the beginning of the school year in September, or whether the Government would be able to secure the necessary funds (in, or outside, the budget) to pay them, notwithstanding the level of training and experience of the teachers needed for work in public schools.
The SPC has, therefore, succeeded in becoming an equal partner of the state in the educational process. The subsequent restoration of the status of the Theological Faculty of the SPC as a faculty of the University of Belgrade was also problematic with respect to the academic criteria and the autonomy of the university, but even more so in regard to the observance of human rights in its enrolment policy, as it only admits Orthodox Christian students who receive a bishop's blessing.
Legal and Political Aspects: The New Law
The political commitment of the new Serbian Government, headed by Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, to further strengthen ties with the SPC (this time far more on ideological than pragmatic grounds), reached its full expression in the Preliminary draft of the Law on the Freedom of Religion, Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Associations (released in July 2004) in which the state makes major concessions to the church, including immunity of the clergy from civil authorities.Footnote 14 However, after numerous objections were voiced in public, the first preliminary draft was thoroughly revised. In this draft law, the SPC was euphemistically defined as primus inter pares in relation to the other religious communities, but it was clear that in practice, the SPC would, with the logistical assistance of the state, be granted far more extensive powers than any other religious community. The new Ministry of Religious Affairs of Serbia assumed a role of an external state “service” of the SPC. For the first time since October 5, 2000, the structures of political power were beginning to adjust to religious structures, and vice versa.
Interestingly, the law's discriminatory intent was evident from the preliminary draft, in which religious communities were classified into three categories, which, as was clear from the text, would be treated differently in the registration procedure. Moreover, the text even included theological phraseology, so completely alien to contemporary legislation.Footnote 15 According to the document, the state had an obligation to secure or guarantee to churches a number of guarantees (e.g., religious instruction in public schools), whereas the religious communities and their officials were relieved of the obligation to pay tax and afforded immunity from civil authorities.Footnote 16 Even in the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia churches hardly enjoyed so much autonomy and so many privileges.
Since 2004, the Serbian Ministry of Religious Affairs has worked on a number of other legislative projects — the drafting of which was accompanied by a similar amount of silence concerning the identities of their authors and their competence, and they were completely inaccessible to the professional public. Although the Ministry had done nothing to stimulate a debate of any significance, strong reactions came from independent intellectuals and NGOs who claimed that the SPC would be granted far more privileges than other institutions. This time the state made a series of concessions to the church, which the latter apparently had not even sought, in particular with regard to the immunity of the clergy, which has no precedent in similar legislation. This also applies to other issues dealing with newly-established rights of the church. Suddenly, the church became a public institution financed from the state budget; one provision of the draft law even obliged local self-administrations to organize referenda if so requested by a church or religious community. It seemed as if the difference between the church and state institutions was diminishing.
The 2005 interview of the Minister of Religions, Milan Radulović, published in Pravoslavlje (Radulović Reference Radulović2005), shows clearly that the biggest dilemma of his ministry was how to reconcile the modern principle of the equality of religious communities before the law and the parallel efforts to give the SPC a special status and primacy.Footnote 17 In the meantime, the law proposal was revised a few times, and Radulović announced that the full Draft Law would be “submitted” to the competent Government committees in January 2006.Footnote 18
The Law on the Churches and Religious Communities was indeed adopted in the Serbian parliament in April 2006. This was the first such law after 1993, when the previous, socialist law was abolished by the Milošević government. In its Articles 10–15, this new law defines the status of the traditional churches and religious communities as religious organizations with the centuries-long historical continuity, whose legal subjectivity was acquired through special laws adopted in the period between 1914 and 1930 (i.e., in the Kingdoms of Serbia and Yugoslavia). Thus, the traditional churches and religious communities are as follows: the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church (of the Augsburg Confession — A.C.), Reformed Christian Church, Evangelical Christian Church (A.C.), the Islamic Community, and the Jewish Community.
On the other hand, Article 16 of the same law defines the status of the so-called “religious communities” (konfesionalne zajednice), registered by the socialist laws in the period between 1953 and 1977. They are not explicitly mentioned in this article, but from the Law Proposal we learn that they are: the Christian Baptist Church, the Christian Adventist Church, the Evangelical Methodist Church, the Pentecostal Church, the Evangelical Christian Churches and “other religious organizations,” registered between 1953 and 1977. The Law Proposal does not specify those “other religious organizations” and we may only speculate about their identity. But this is only one of the numerous ambiguities of this Law.
The most important rights given to the first group of religious communities is that they may organize confessional religious education in public schools and that they are to be registered automatically, on the basis of their legal continuity with previous laws. The members of the second group, however, are not allowed to administer religious education in public schools, and have a separate and more complicated registration procedure. At the same time, the new constitution of Serbia, adopted in October 2006, stipulates freedom of religion, equality of all citizens based on their religious persuasion, and forbids any discrimination whatsoever (Articles 21, 43, and 44).
Aware of those inconsistencies, several non-governmental organizations in Serbia launched their objections to various drafts of the Serbian “Law on the Churches and Religious Communities.” We have noted that the first draft appeared in the summer of 2004 and, since then, six different versions had been drafted before the Proposal of the Law found itself in the Parliament. However, even the last draft, which evolved into an official proposal of the Law, was sharply criticized by a group of NGOs, including the Belgrade the Center for Human Rights, the Center for Peace and Democracy, the Center for the Advancement of Legal Studies, Youth Initiative for Human Rights, the Center for Peace and Democracy, and many others. In their joint statement issued in April 2006, the month when the Law Proposal was passed in the Parliament, they stated that this Law would “heavily compromise Serbia.” They asked the members of the Parliament to boycott the debate on this “unconstitutional, uncivilized and worthless text.” These organizations also objected that the Law Proposal entered the Parliament without any public discussion. Hence, the process of “clericalization” has continued in Serbia, while the state allowed the SPC to become not only a political organization participating in the executive power, but one of the most powerful economic institutions as well.Footnote 19
The Law, thus, contains some discriminatory aspects, preventing the registration of a religious organization the name of which includes at least part of the name of another religious organization that has already been registered. This practically prevents the registration of all denominations with alternative names and epithets such as Orthodox, Baptist, Adventist, etc. Applied to political parties, this would mean that no new political party could be labeled as “democratic,” “liberal,” “civic,” etc. — which is absurd. It is even more absurd when it comes to churches and religious communities that frequently create new denominations. Even more so, if we take into account the Article 6 of the Law stating: “Churches and religious communities are free and autonomous in determining their own religious identity.”
The Law does not clarify whether an organization, which has not been registered with the state body, still maintains its legal status, including its right to religious organization and practice. Considering the registration requirements, it seems that they were denied this right. Finally, the Law leaves too much discretionary power to the state executive institutions in making decisions on many aspects of religious organization, which is contrary to the constitution and basic religious rights and freedoms. For example, the so-called “confessional” and “other religious organizations” (we may only guess that the law-maker is thinking of Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Hare Krishna, Buddhists, Sai Baba, Unification Church, etc.) should submit a load of documents to the Ministry of Religious Affairs in order to be considered for registration. Those documents include: their establishment act; the statute explaining many details regarding their way of organization, list of organizational units, way of administration, etc.; a summary of their religious teachings, rituals, goals and basic activities; and the information on their sources of funding and income (Article 18).
On the level of general objections to the new Law, I would be inclined to submit several other arguments. In its Article 31, the new Law protects the religious services in public institutions, such as the public schools, but does not protect the inviolability of the autonomous and non-denominational character of a public school. One may rightfully ask: Where are the priorities — in the school autonomy, or protection of religious service in a public school? Why should the public school refrain from its own inviolability and non-denominational character, in order to protect the inviolability of the school church service?
My additional objections against this Law could be formulated as follows: (1) A complete non-transparency of the drafting process (including the credentials of the legislators themselves); (2) A complete lack of the public debate; (3) An obvious partiality of the Minister of Religious Affairs of Serbia who, albeit a state official, publicly advocated the interests of the majority religious organization — the SPC. The Minister himself, in his interviews, speaks about four branches of authority: the legislative, executive, judicial, and spiritual branch.Footnote 20
In practice, this Law led to an “etatization” of the Serbian Church, with an apparent partiality of the state executive power in favor of this church, even within the group of “traditional” religious communities, not to speak of the non-traditional ones.Footnote 21
The SPC's Experiences with Democracy
We mentioned earlier that the SPC's first true experience with democracy began after October 5, 2005, since when diverging views in this respect have been voiced by high-ranking church figures and Orthodox youth organizations. In the words of renowned theologian Radovan Bigović: “In the Serbian Orthodox Church there are various political ideas and opinions on democracy. Some reject it out of hand, some accept it without reservation, and others favor democratization, but with conditions attached” (Bigović Reference Bigović2000, 262).
This diversity is also visible in the official line taken by the SPC. On the one hand, there are theologians and archbishops like Amfilohije Radović, who oppose western liberal democracy and favor “theo-democracy” and “Christian democracy” (Bigović Reference Bigović2000, 264). Accordingly, the SPC's Information Service stated: “The lethal consequences of democracy are already being felt on the corpus of the Serb people.” The Proposed National Program of the Serb Youth for the 21st Century Footnote 22 also states that “genuine democracy is practically at death's door. The Serbs do not accept pseudo-democratic politicians who do not respect morality (point 11)” (Anastasijević Reference Anastasijević2004). Soon after the October 2000 changes, the Office for Religious Education of the SPC's Patriarchate said that “the state must protect its essence and its nation, to which end it must proclaim Orthodoxy as the national religion — our state must verify itself as an Orthodox state” (Brkić Reference Brkić2000, 8).
On the other hand, there are far more sober and better-founded views about the church and democracy put forth by modern theologians. In his book Crkva i društvo (The Church and Society), Radovan Bigović says that “Orthodoxy is neither monarchist nor republican, neither democratic nor republican. Orthodoxy is the Church. The church cannot be identified with any type of state. But if we speak about principles and forms, it is quite certain that the principles and the form of a democratic state — be it a monarchy or a republic — are far closer to the Orthodox Church than the principles of any other state. If a state is truly law-based, free and democratic, then the Church in it also enjoys freedom of mission and action” (Bigović Reference Bigović2000, 270).
In a purely practical and political sense, SPC clergy have not refrained from occasionally interfering directly with democratic procedures at the state level; one example was the election held in Kosovo in the fall of 2004, when the Synod publicly urged “all political factors in Serbia” to “refrain from calling Serbs living in Kosovo and Metohija to take part in elections for the authorities there.” In October 2004, Patriarch Pavle issued a personal written appeal to the Serbian President, Boris Tadić, and Prime Minister, Vojislav Koštunica, “not to call the remnants of the persecuted and tormented Serb people in Kosovo and Metohija to take part in elections for the authorities there.” Koštunica replied positively, but Tadić did urge the Kosovo Serbs to vote on October 5, 2004. On the same day, Bishop of Raška and Prizren Artemije sent out an open letter describing Tadić's call as “shameful” (Nosov Reference Nosov2005, 510).Footnote 23
Interference by the church in state affairs on this scale had not been seen since the establishment of democracy in Serbia. The SPC is now one of the main political protagonists on the Serb side in Kosovo. The SPC Assembly said in a message about the negotiations on the future of Kosovo held in November 2005 that “the act of seizing Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia, however well concealed, would be essentially tantamount to occupation.”Footnote 24 Moreover, during this period Bishop Artemije aimed unusually strongly-worded and insulting words at UNMIK chief in Kosovo Søren Jessen-Petersen.Footnote 25 For the time being, the Serbian Government does not appear to see anything wrong in the SPC's active and partial interference in state policies.
The Church and “Foreign Affairs”: The SPC and Orthodoxy in Macedonia and Montenegro
In spite of the outspoken opposition to Europe, the West, and the international community voiced by numerous SPC bishops, mainly in a local context, the highest level of interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in affairs of the state and politics in the past few years took place in connection with numerous inter-church and inter-state (inter-republican) incidents in neighboring Macedonia and Montenegro; this is all the more puzzling as both are former Yugoslav republics with Orthodox majorities in their populations.
Let us first look at Macedonia, where we are dealing with extremely complex inter-church relations with the canonically unrecognized Macedonian Orthodox Church (MPCFootnote 26), including the infusion of the ecclesiastic problems and state politics in Macedonia and Serbia. Details of the conflict can be fully understood only by experts who have investigated it thoroughly — OSCE and Council of Europe representatives have usually remained silent or ill-informed about the matter.Footnote 27
Soon after the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia within the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, the Orthodox clerics of the church in Macedonia made their first steps toward the formation of an Independent Macedonian Orthodox Church. At the church-national council in Ohrid in 1958, three bishoprics seceded from the Serbian Church. The following year, the SPC granted the use of Macedonian language in church service and the election of the local, Macedonian bishops. However, the Serbian patriarch remained the head of the church. Discontent with the reactions of the SPC and contrary to the Orthodox ecclesiastical canons, the MPC unilaterally proclaimed its autocephaly in July 1967. Not surprisingly, both the SPC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate refused to recognize this non-canonical autocephaly. The problem was still unresolved in the early 1990s, when the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was established as an independent state. In 1995, the negotiations between the SPC and MPC were resumed. At its own archbishops' synod, the SPC confirmed the 1967 decision to break liturgical and ecclesiastical ties with the MPC. In 1998, negotiations between the two churches continued, this time through the mediation of the Greek Metropolitan Hristodulos. In early 2000, Macedonian Prime Minister Georgijevski appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeios to recognize the autocephaly of the MPC, and it seems that the Greek Orthodox Church was willing to acknowledge the MPC as the Archbishopric of Ohrid in exchange for altering the name of the Macedonian state, which had been the major obstacle in the diplomatic relations between Greece and Macedonia. On the other hand, the tensions between the SPC and MPC remained.Footnote 28
The essence of the current conflict between the SPC and the MPC was aptly defined by religious analyst Mirko Djordjević, who has described the situation as paradoxical in many ways: “There are two churches in Macedonia and the canonical status of neither has been resolved, while the status of the newly-established archbishopric in the state of Macedonia also remains undefined. The paradox may be illustrated by the following case: Archbishop Jovan, appointed from Belgrade, has been arrested by the Macedonian authorities, his activities have been curbed, he has no canonical territory, he has no churches and no clergy, is not registered with the state and does not collect regular revenue in the form of the so-called “parochial,” or tax. On the other hand, “the canonically unrecognized MPC has a canonical territory on which it is active, clergy, churches and church structure, its Synod and Assembly …” (Djordjević Reference Djordjević2005, 9).
The unrecognized MPC is, therefore, seeking autocephaly — a full canonical split from the SPC — while all the SPC is prepared to offer it is autonomy. When the Macedonians refused this offer, Serbian Patriarch Pavle issued a tomos Footnote 29 from the Assembly granting autonomy to the Orthodox Archbishopric in Ohrid,Footnote 30 while the SPC suspended communication with the MPC and “liturgical communication” with those in Macedonia who support the MPC. After Archbishop Jovan, who is a Macedonian citizen, was arrested again this year, a storm of protest came from the state authorities in Serbia, which went so far that at the request of Minister for Capital Investment, Velimir Ilić, JAT Airlines grounded two planes leased out to Macedonia over “unpaid debts.” By this action, Ilić assumed the authority to “implement unilateral international sanctions” in the name of Serbia and for the SPC (Bogdanović Reference Bogdanović2005, 12). At the same time, when they arrested the archbishop, the Macedonian authorities, even according to an independent arbitration of the Council of Europe, violated the Constitution and grossly breached religious freedoms.Footnote 31
It would perhaps be too easy to say that the Serbian church should, recognizing reality, by a more sober ecclesiastical policy (which would take account of the fact that in Macedonia, the SPC does not enjoy the support of the people, the state, believers, or the church) offer the MPC autocephaly in exchange for a legal provision under which other Orthodox churches (including the SPC) may be active in Macedonia. But what then would be the reaction of the Russian church, which has a similar canonical dispute in the Ukraine, and how would this affect not only the SPC and the MPC, but also Russia's relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which would have to confirm this canonical division? It is clear that things do not depend entirely on the SPC.
What was, however, within the purview of the SPC and for no good reason turned into an international incident was the prevention of a Macedonian state delegation, as well as Serbian state representatives, from organizing a gathering in the Monastery of Prohor Pčinjski on August 2, 2003, the anniversary of Macedonian statehood. A group of Serbian Radical Party members, headed by Archbishops Irinej and Pahomije, blocked access to the monastery and violated a bilateral agreement concluded by Macedonia and Serbia.Footnote 32 Relations with the state of Macedonia improved somewhat in 2004 when (in a letter to Macedonian President Crvenkovski) Patriarch Pavle officially authorized a Macedonian delegation visit to Prohor Pčinjski. Especially encouraging were the Patriarch's words: “We open the gates to this holy place and to our hearts,” but the very fact that the Serbian Patriarch had to give his permission for a state visit, and that Koštunica's government saw nothing amiss in this meddling by the SPC in state affairs, speaks volumes about the degree of involvement of the church in state policy.
The case with the also unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church (CPCFootnote 33) is a little different. In Macedonia, the SPC has little overall support, but in Montenegro, it has a powerful Metropolitanate and backing among the people and in the political establishment. Both the SPC and CPC enjoy significant political support, except that the former also gets it from Serbia, while the latter is backed by the ruling political structures. Those structures, in fact, legalized the activity of the CPC in January 2000, after this church was officially registered by the police in the historic town of Cetinje. This was a culmination of the process which had started already in 1993, by the establishment of the Council for the Renewal of Autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church. Again, with the political support of the Montenegrin pro-independence Liberal Party, the Council proclaimed the autocephaly of the CPC, electing an SPC priest from Canada as the bishop of the Montenegrin Church. However, in mid-1995, this Council ceased to exist. The new head of the CPC, priest Miraš Dedeić (who was enthroned as Metropolitan Mihailo in 1998) is also a problematic church figure, because only a year before he had been excommunicated by the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople.Footnote 34
Needless to say, the SPC never accepted the formation of the new, Montenegrin Church. The SPC Archbishops Synod and Patriarch Pavle repeatedly condemned this “non-canonical,” “political” entity, whereas Metropolitan Mihailo was condemned and excluded from the Serbian Church at the Synod session in May 1998. The SPC's most prominent voice in Montenegro is Metropolitan Amfilohije, outspoken just as much against those causing divisions among Orthodox believers in Montenegro and the local politicians. The situation was made even more complex by the Army of Serbia and Montenegro,Footnote 35 which provided logistical as well as political support for the SPC's Metropolitanate. The Montenegrin authorities, who were advocating full independence for the republic, also improperly interfered in church matters and instrumentalized the CPC and its non-canonically elected head, Metropolitan Mihailo (Miraš Dedeić).Footnote 36
Metropolitan Amfilohije certainly did not remain beholden to anyone when he said that Serbia and Montenegro could separate from each other only “against the will of the people, through violence, theft, blackmail and threats. For this reason the SPC will ignore any independence decision in Montenegro” (Večernje novosti, January 10, 2002). Amfilohije openly demanded religious instruction in Montenegrin schools, against the will of the Ministry of Education, and called Montenegrin Parliament Speaker Krivokapić a “pseudo-brainiac” (Amfilohije Reference Amfilohije2005, 13). He accused him of “turning the Parliament into the private preserve of his party and creating new divisions among the people, disgracing Montenegro before Europe and the world” (Večernje novosti, November 7, 2003).
In this rather unusual debate between church and state authorities, Krivokapić replied that the SPC no longer had the privilege of deciding who would be invited to the Parliament, and that “he [Amfilohije] is coming from the civilizationally defeated side, both in the Second World War and the latest Balkan war which is now on trial at The Hague” (Danas, November 10, 2003).Footnote 37 The Montenegrin media also described the Serbian metropolitan as the “informal leader of the Serb opposition in Montenegro and even of the People's Party. United with the tribal assemblies, headed by Amfilohije, the parties of the Serbian bloc are turning Montenegro into Iran. Amfilohije is nothing else but the Ayatollah of the Serbian Montenegro” (Monitor, January 21, 2005).
The situation in Montenegro is additionally complicated by unofficial tribal “guards and corps,” such as Tapušković's “Serbian Corps,” allegedly made up of “brigades and battalions from Vasojevići, Kolašin, Durmitor, Boka, Zeta.” Facing them are the “Lovćen guards” of pro-independence author Jevrem Brković. If we add to this the very problematic nomination of nine priests from Pljevlja as martyrs of the SPC (at least two of them are claimed to have committed crimes during World War Two), one can well say that the SPC Metropolitanate in Montenegro was pouring fuel on the fire ahead of the 2006 referendum in that republic.
The role of the armed forces leadership is also problematic. The placement of a tin-plate church on top of Mt. Rumija with the help of an Air Force helicopter represents much more than the customary logistical assistance of the military to the church, while the reaction of former Minister of Defense Davinić that no sensationalistic importance should be attributed to the act was a political understatement, to say the least. How sensitive the Montenegrin authorities were to this incident can best be gauged from this statement by the Deputy Parliament Speaker, Dragan Kujović: “This is not any form of sensation-seeking, but direct and open interference in church-state relations in Montenegro. This is an instance of open siding of the armed forces openly siding with the political activity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro.”
The epilogue of this religious-political quandary was that the state of Montenegro proclaimed its independence in June 2006, while the Serbian government (Ministry of Religious Affairs) rejected the CPC application for registration in Serbia on December 22, 2007. The Ministry briefly explained that the non-canonical CPC is just an association of citizens, not a religious community, and as such it may not be registered as a religious organization in Serbia.Footnote 38 On the other hand, the CPC operates legally in Montenegro, side by side with the Serbian Church.
A NEW IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
The Program of De-Secularization
A fear that the “true faith” will come to ruin is quite evident in the SPC and is being manifested through open resistance to the secularization of the contemporary world, in particular, the western world. Instead of entering into a dialogue with that world, which it does only rarely, the SPC opts for condemning secularization. A program for de-secularizing Serbian society was recently announced from a high place in the SPC hierarchy — the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral. Moreover, in November 2000, the SPC Information Service said that “secularization has reduced Serbia and its people to poverty … and as far as the democratic system is concerned, the bruises it has inflicted to the body of the Serb people are still to be revealed.”Footnote 39 The problem is therefore not being seen so much in the destructive and suicidal policies of Serbia in the 1990s, which should also be investigated by the SPC. On the other hand, enforcement — with the help of the state — of some sort of program of de-secularization as a new political ideology is very reminiscent of the communist era and its utopian belief that secularization and atheism can be forced on people.
“Srpske dveri,” an organization acting with the blessing of the SPC Patriarchate and organizing regular panels at Belgrade University's Faculty of Mechanical Engineering with the support of the church periodical Pravoslavlje and the SPC Information Service, has been openly advocating the “formation of an Orthodox public opinion.”Footnote 40 Moreover, just like those of socialist realists before them, the views of the members of Srpske dveri on art are very much ideology-based: “In order for art to make sense it must have an Orthodox dimension” (Lazić Reference Lazić2005).
The late 1980s and early 1990s in Serbia could be described sociologically as a period of de-secularization, where the phenomenon was understood primarily as a social process. In this latest period under Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, a significant shift is also taking place in the direction of politicizing religion and sacralizing politics, if not even open clericalization.Footnote 41 The church is becoming increasingly visible in the domain of politics and affairs of the state. For its part, the state is far more cooperative toward the church than one would expect in a secular society.
There is now a close two-way political cooperation between church and state, although the people would perhaps expect the SPC to involve itself more in the numerous social issues and problems burdening Serbia. However, no coherent social thought is evident in the Serbian church. There is also the problem of unresolved relations with the criminalized state — the SPC does not, however, appear to see any major problem here, instead focusing its efforts on speaking out against secularization, democratization of society, the civil sector and NGOs. If we examine statements made by high-ranking SPC figures and those issued by the Information Service, it is clear that the church sees secularization as an evil which has befallen society. The statements are sometimes ambivalent and even contradictory. If, however, we look at their cumulative effect, we may observe a demonization of secular society and small religious communities, as well as a negative attitude toward democracy and secularization. All of this is present in the official phraseology of the SPC. It is, in fact, an orientation and direction which indicates the manner in which the church views this society and perceives the state.
The Church, the Military, the Media
It has already been mentioned that the Army of Serbia and Montenegro (and now — Army of Serbia) almost overnight embraced Orthodoxy, a new ideology and cultural and historical mission. It is clear that immediately after the October 2000 shift, a long-term link was established, while several events attracted the attention of the public, the media, and analysts. Late in December 2000, immediately after the SPC demanded that religious education be introduced in Serbian public schools as a mandatory subject, the Office for Morale of the General Staff of the then Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) organized a round-table gathering at which it called for Orthodox chaplains to be attached to VJ units. Speakers in the forum emphasized the importance of Orthodox Christianity for national culture and history, as well as the state-building role of the SPC. Soon after this formal VJ-SPC meeting, the church named Bishop Porfirije as its official representative for relations with the armed forces. In April 2002, Porfirije headed a group of fifty VJ officers visiting Mt. Athos (the Chilandar and Vatoped monasteries and Saint Sava's hermitage in Karyes).Footnote 42 Some activities of the military in this period are listed in a text entitled “The Army in Chilandar” published in the weekly Vojska after Christmas 2003:
“It will certainly remain on record that several organized visits of groups of VJ officers were made to Mount Athos and the Chilandar monastery. They also took part in welcoming the Patriarch of Alexandria Peter VII when he visited the Serbian Orthodox Church, in the Holy Savior's Day procession in Belgrade, in the reception of the icon of the Virgin in the monastery of Grgeteg on Mount Fruška Gora, the transfer to Kruševac of some of the relics of the Holy Prince Lazar from the Ravanica monastery, and in other church festivities. They unselfishly helped in the restoration of numerous churches and monasteries and the construction of roads or water-supply systems to them, and provided a major contribution to the marking of the 750th anniversary of the Morača monastery.”Footnote 43
Activities of this sort continued in 2004, in the Vavedenje monastery near Čačak, when the first official post-World War Two collective baptism of officers and soldiers of an army unit in Serbia took place. But the greatest public impact in this period was certainly that of the army officers present at the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the First Serbian Uprising against the Turks in Belgrade on February 14, 2004. One of the speakers at the so-called “spiritual commemoration,” hosted by the Srpski sabor Dveri organization, was Colonel Rade Rajić, Professor at the Military Academy.
Featuring much nationalist rhetoric, Colonel Rajić's address fit very well into the overall atmosphere of the gathering: “After the First World War … it is a fact that among the Slovenes, and especially among Croats and the then Serbs of Muhammadan faith, there never was any affinity or mutual military and historical assistance, but only waging war against the Serbs and Serb-hood as a whole … universal treason in the army above all by a majority of Croats, but also Slovenes, ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Albanians, and Serbs of Muslim faith, became a reality … During World War Two the foundations of a new Yugoslavia and a new social and political order were laid. As in the First World War period, there was a pronounced tendency to suppress and minimize the achievements of the Serbs in the fight against the enemy … We must also not forget the war events between 1991 and 1999, the officers and soldiers, volunteers who laid down their lives in the defense of their own people and their ancient hearths. These brilliant people, those who are known and those who are not, can proudly stand shoulder to shoulder with Karadjordje, Miloš, God and the people” (Anastasijević Reference Anastasijević2004).
Officers of the VJ, and later the Army of Serbia and Montenegro and still later the Army of Serbia, who until very recently served the idea of Yugoslavism and its ideology of brotherhood and unity and drew credit from an anti-fascist tradition, seem to be gradually changing their outlook on religion and nation. Instead of brotherhood and unity, now only the historical achievements of the Serbian people are being emphasized, and the contributions of the fascists and of the anti-fascists in World War Two are — quite in the spirit of the new state policy — now being viewed as equal. From looking toward the future as a classless society and communism, the army's ideology is gradually shifting toward religion and eschatology: toward the testament of Kosovo, the tradition of Saint Sava and the heavenly Serbia. But although a significant ideological transformation is taking place, an antagonistic terminology has been preserved and the difference between us and them is always emphasized. In this context, the SPC can offer an almost dualistic rhetoric which can often be heard at para-religious gatherings and spiritual commemorations. Like the “special war” that was constantly being waged against the then Yugoslavia during Tito's era, in some so-called “national” media and interviews with SPC elders, another “special war” is mentioned which new “anti-religion ideologues, atheists and New-Agers” are waging against the church and the army.Footnote 44
In the past year, the media also focused on the links between SPC clergymen and paramilitary groups which committed war crimes in Bosnia. The most controversial case was that of hieromonk Gavrilo, based in Šid, who had blessed members of the “Scorpions” group some time before the war crimes were committed near Srebrenica; that video footage was shown in the War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague as part of evidence against the “Scorpions” and the shots of the execution of young Bosnian Moslems were widely broadcast.
Members of the “Scorpions,” blessed by monk Gavrilo from the Privina glava monastery in the aforementioned footage, soon after executed a group of Moslems they had captured. Of additional concern was the fact that the church did not see any need to speak out in connection with the case immediately; it took more than ten days for the SPC to issue a statement entitled “Gospode, ne ponovilo se” (Lord, Let it Never Happen Again) which only partially eased the shock felt by those who had watched the horrific footage and asked themselves if the SPC had anything to do with the said crime. As a rule, the SPC never sees any need to make additional comments, or, for that matter, to interpret official communiqués issued after assemblies and its media statements, thereby placing the people of Serbia in a completely passive position.
Concerning the SPC's relations with the media, it is interesting to note that Bishop Porfirije liaises not only with the armed forces, but also with the media. The Bishop is a member of the Serbian Radio Broadcasting Council in charge of religious media, but is also empowered to participate in decision-making in connection with the lay media. In his capacity as a representative of the SPC, Bishop Porfirije also represents the other, non-Orthodox religious communities and, despite the church-state separation, he takes part in making decisions regarding the non-religious public media.
The SPC has its own Information Service, but, according to the influential Bishop of Bačka Irinej Bulović, it suffers from serious personnel problems preventing it from improving its relations with the media (Bulović Reference Bulović and Valić-Nedeljuović2004, 170). Well known for a relatively rigid stance toward journalists, Bishop Irinej has complained that “some domestic media are casual, even excessively free, in their approach to cooperation with the Church or other religious communities — as if there was no serious ontological or existential difference between any public organization and the Church as an institution sui generis… (Ibid).
Notwithstanding excessive sycophancy of the media and their journalists toward SPC clergy (far more pronounced than in the case of politicians, show business figures and sports celebrities), Bishop Bulović demands a special status for the church in the media. At the same time, at his initiative, the SPC has for some years barred a religious affairs correspondent of the daily Danas from attending its events, most probably because she had written a portrait of the Bishop he had not found especially flattering. At the same time, the Bishop does not find it necessary to reflect on the language of hatred and insults hurled out in public by some other SPC bishops from time to time.Footnote 45 But they are the ones who, much more than journalists, should protect the reputation of the SPC as an institution sui generis.
THE SPC AND SERBIAN SOCIETY
From the People to Society
In the aftermath of October 5, the SPC began increasingly offering a new ideological framework for state institutions such as the army and the education system, filling — at its own initiative, but also with the support of the state — the ideological void created after the fall of communism. But its more important, social role remains far from clear. A lot of public space available for religious communities (philanthropy, endowments, humanitarian and social work, etc.) remains unfilled, while both conservative politicians and church hierarchy are finding it easy to politicize or instrumentalize the church.
An even more serious problem is the lack of genuine contact between the SPC and society in Serbia, i.e., civil society of autonomous individuals with their rights, separate interests and diverse identities created by living in the contemporary plural world. Although the SPC has managed to establish very solid relations with the Serbian state since October 5, it still has no real contact with (civil) society, as for example, the Roman Catholic Church had in Poland before the fall of communism. SPC clergy do keep talking about the people, but this is an almost metaphysical category, an undifferentiated collective, a “mass,” which is a concept that apparently suits the current “tribal” character of the SPC very well (Rak Reference Rak, Lukić and Vuković2005), not to mention any sort of more positive perception of secular society and its organizations and initiatives that are often demonized in public.Footnote 46
But what are the real problems and interests of society in Serbia, what are the political, social, economic, and cultural proclivities of its citizens? No coherent debate has been voiced in the SPC on such issues, at least not an open debate. Official SPC documents make only scanty references to the citizens of Serbia, or, for that matter, to society, almost always referring to the people. On the one hand, this points to a certain level of inability within the SPC to cope with the new circumstances, but on the other, there is a visible and well-defined political philosophy and ideology which, for decades, stood far in the background while the church remained hidden from the public eye in socialism. What ideology are we talking about?
We have already mentioned the interview the Minister of Religious Affairs gave to Pravoslavlje. Besides its emphatically “patriotic” and “traditionalistic” tone, and the classical incomprehension of the contemporary concept of religious freedoms (in an institution which should have more knowledge of those freedoms than any other), the minister's organicistic perception of the church in the spirit of Nikolaj Velimirović's essays from the 1930s, is also of note:
“The problem is therefore to enact a law which will be modern, which will have to say that every normal democratic state today understands that the Church organization is more powerful, more profound and older than any other organization, because the Church has outlived numerous states and remained one and the same, while society changed all the time. There is now awareness that democratic society has to recognize the Church as a constant. It is an organism which is permanent and a guidepost for the state (emph. M.V.). In any case, although the state does not want to guide itself and organize relations according to the teachings of the Church, it may under no circumstances bring into question the organization of the Church” (Radulović Reference Radulović2005).
Several things may be of interest to an unbiased reader of this excerpt. The Minister — in his capacity as a civil servant in a democratic and secular Government in which the church is separate from the state — utters, from his official position, an entirely clerical view that the church is a guidepost for the state. The minister certainly referred mainly to the SPC when he said that “every normal democratic state today understands that the Church organization is more powerful, more profound and older than any other organization.”
Where is the source of such organicistic views about the church and the state that have found a place for themselves as guiding ideas in state institutions? In a lecture entitled “Saint Sava's nationalism” held in Belgrade in 1935, Nikolaj Velimirović (besides his most often cited panegyric to Hitler) presented a perception of the Church that has apparently deeply affected Minister Radulović. Here is an excerpt from the speech:
“This Saint Sava's nationalism encompasses the people's church, the people's dynasty, the people's state, the people's education, the people's culture and the people's defense. The foundation and centre of all of Saint Sava's nationalism is the people's church. It is like a spirit which revives the entire people's organism … History books say that nationalism in Europe awakened and became reality starting from the Hungarian uprising in 1848. If that is true, then Serbian nationalism is no less than 600 years older than European nationalism. Not only older, but more perfect, because it is evangelical and organic” (Djordjević Reference Djordjević2003, 57ff).
Just like modern SPC theologians and the Minister of Religious Affairs, Velimirović sees Serbian society as a people's organism encompassing the church and the state (monarchy), including state institutions like the armed forces and the education system, with the SPC as the center of that organism. As we have seen, not only some very important decisions of the authorities in Serbia, but the increasing involvement of the SPC in the sphere of education, culture and national defense are founded on the ideology of this leading theologian and recently canonized saint. Views of this kind are now often heard at Orthodox-national youth gatherings and in the rhetoric of SPC elders — Patriarch Pavle, Metropolitan Amfilohije, Bishop Atanasije and others.Footnote 47 In an interview to Danas given on the eve of Christmas 2002, Patriarch Pavle asked, in a similar spirit: “Are the parties sufficiently mature for social relations to be organic, like in a body where every organ performs its own function with which it is tasked for the overall benefit of the organism? And the organism as a whole has no other interest than the good of each of its organs … the Church has always favored such organic relationship in society” (Danas, January 5–7, 2002).
The Church and Civil Society
As we have seen, the SPC improved its contacts with the Serbian state and its institutions very soon after the democratic changes. But the complexity of the modern Serbian society was understood much less. Concepts like citizenry and civil society are almost completely absent from the speech of SPC clergy, its media and Information Service, and when they do appear they are almost always used in a negative context. Public statements of some NGOs about SPC activities are in a similar tone. One could in fact say that the gulf between the SPC and civil society organizations (especially NGOs involved in human rights) is bigger than that existing between the platforms of any two political parties in Serbia. At issue here is prejudice and distorted views on both sides, whereas a less biased debate about existing structural ties and similarities between religious institutions and civil society organizations could open up new room for cooperation and dialogue between these two important segments of society. In that context, we can also view the linkage between the concept of religion and the concept of civil society, as a collective concept based on the notion of a free and conscious individual, a citizen with inalienable human rights who participates together with other free and conscious individuals in initiating and realizing various civic initiatives (Molnar Reference Molnar, Vukadinović and Predrag2003, 48).
Let us first consider some parallels and overlaps which certainly exist between religious institutions and civil society organizations, both of whom are part of the “third” sector, the non-profit and non-governmental segments of society. Institutionally, both are independent from the state (except in the case of state religions and churches) and have an important place in local communities, where citizens, believers meet daily. Both are involved in different ways in social work, humanitarian activities, charity activities; both establish foundations and stimulate a philanthropic spirit. Where there is no political pluralism and the civil sector is weak, religious organizations can assume a more overt political role, for example, in Latin American dictatorships (e.g., liberation theology), or in Russia, where religious dissent was pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s. In both these cases, Christian churches assumed at least part of the burden shouldered in other countries by civil society organizations, especially those with a human rights agenda.
Religious freedoms and rights are part of the set of universal human rights (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), which means that churches and NGOs could also find common ground and cooperate here. The Enlightenment, at least where western civilization is concerned, certainly represented one of the turning points in the modern, and later also post-modern, perception of religious pluralism as a desirable framework in which the concept of religious freedoms and rights, including the legal distinction between the state and religious communities, comes into its full expression. By its nationalism, secularism and religious individualism, the Enlightenment certainly contributed to the expansion of the concept of religious tolerance and its more positive definition (in contrast to the minimalistic definition of tolerance as merely enduring the existence of others, including other religions). In modern liberal- democratic states and their religious freedoms legislations, inter-religious tolerance has that more positive and broader definition, implying a more active and dynamic attitude toward religious diversity in the state.
One should finally point out the importance of religious organizations and peace-building NGOs in the sphere of inter-religious dialogue and reconciliation. In the 1980s and 1990s, a significant change took place in the perception of religion as a factor of reconciliation and conflict. Three major factors are usually mentioned: the expansion of fundamentalist tendencies in world religions; the role of Christian churches in radical changes that took place in some central and eastern European countries (in particular Poland); and the expansion of ecumenical processes worldwide in the 1980s (Stobe Reference Stobe, Hrišćanstvo and politika1999, 29). The consequence today is that religious conflicts no longer have chiefly non-religious causes, but are also seen as an independent factor, emphasizing an increased importance of inter-religious dialogue.
CONCLUSION
Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, the Eastern Orthodox Church is not an independent political entity; historically, it has always been dependent on the state. And the state is a more powerful partner in that relationship. During the four years of Koštunica's rule in Serbia, the SPC has become a major player in Serbian politics. More importantly, Koštunica and the SPC have a very similar, conservative vision of the Serbian society. During the last four years, such conservatism has already resulted in slowing down the political and economic reforms in Serbia, worsening bilateral relations with the neighboring states and hindering the country's accession to the EU. In one of his recent statements, Metropolitan Amfilohije, the most powerful Serbian bishop, stated pretentiously, with much exaggeration, that “all that is healthy in Europe was born on the soil between Jerusalem, Athens and Constantinople, and that is what was translated into what we call Western Europe” (Amfilohije Reference Amfilohije2005, 14). Consequently, since Serbia was always in Europe and has had its place there, there is no reason to rush into the EU.Footnote 48
In political as well as ecclesiastical circles in Serbia, one may witness an open inclination toward the etatization of the SPC. Officially, it is not a state church, but de facto it enjoys all the privileges of such an institution. Within the SPC, there is a lot of resistance to democracy and Europe manifested through emphasizing the anti-European discourse of bishops-saints such as Nikolaj Velimirović. Today, some SPC bishops attack the so-called Serbian “Euro-whiners” (i.e., the ones that “thirst” for Europe) and receive ovations at the public panels. One may also observe fierce criticism of civil society and non-governmental organizations, as well as ordinary citizens who want to take part in European values and standards. The church opts for a monistic pattern that reminds one of Communism — notwithstanding the condemnation of the Communist heritage within the church circles: the same authoritarian pattern and model are visible there, it seems that only ideology is different.
According to this pattern of political philosophy, an authoritarian model (Communism and the Milośević regime) should be replaced by another — patriarchal, quasi-democratic model of sobornost (conciliarity, congregationalism). This ecclesiastical ideology has all the elements of a conservative, right-wing nationalism, with the elements of an ethnic and religious fundamentalism. The revival of the monistic testamentary model at the outset of the twenty-first century by returning to the ninteeth century Slavophile principle of sobornost, very much embraced by Prime Minister Koštunica's government,Footnote 49 is a consequence of abandoning the modern pluralistic concept of society which is the heritage of the European Enlightenment. No wonder, then, that the Serbian government and the SPC have recently oriented themselves heavily toward Putin's Russia.
In line with this pro-Russian, anti-Western policy, the greatest criticism is now reserved for Serbian educators, or “new ideologues,” “Euro-whiners,” “New-Agers,” independent intellectuals and activists in NGOs. In a completely new metaphysical and Manichean tone, the views of those “New-Agers” are rejected as non-Christian, anti-Christian, pro-globalization and pro-western, even pro-Communist.Footnote 50 The concept of pluralistic society, which is, contrary to the archaic concept of congregationalism, being advocated by those “anti-church ideologues,” implies, certainly, political, social, cultural and religious pluralism as the heritage of the Enlightenment and the modern liberal-democratic state.
Apart from its Euro-skepticism, the SPC expresses an anti-ecumenical stance toward inter-church and inter-religious dialogue. Roughly speaking, the SPC today is dominated by two attitudes toward ecumenism. The first of them is an extreme (and minority) view of ecumenism as a “pan-heresy,” while, in turn, heresy is everything that is not Orthodox. The second viewpoint opens some space for developing the ecumenical relations with the Roman Catholic Church, and perhaps some other traditional religious communities in Serbia (e.g., the Lutheran and Reformed Christian churches). However, it is difficult to observe any openness toward the new religious minorities even within the limited number of liberal church circles. This applies mainly to evangelical denominations that are publicly discriminated by both the church and the state and labeled as sects or even the Satanist influence of the West. Concerning the Muslims and Jews in Serbia, one could occasionally witness anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim discourse coming from the ranks of some extremist SPC priest or even bishops.
Altogether, such a conservative church position on political, social and cultural issues, wholeheartedly supported by Koštunica's government, has recently brought Serbia close to the edge of a new international isolation. In fact, the current government, in symphony with the SPC, seems to opt for its own political and cultural self-isolation. This post-communist church-state symbiosis entirely depends on the will of the current political structures. Much like the Milošević government during the last years of his reign, Koštunica's cabinet keeps itself alive through the reproduction of crises. After the political and diplomatic solution of the Kosovo stale-mate, Koštunica will have to take his “last stand”. And Serbia will have to choose, once again in its recent history, between the pro-Western, pro-European future and pointless isolation in the heart of the Balkans.
