There are many passages in Machiavelli that are perplexing. As with the best writers, the more time one spends with him, while some matters become clearer, others perplex even more. Machiavelli famously advances examples that undermine, or run contrary to, or simply distract from the statements they should be illustrating. Some arguments appear awkwardly contrived; others contradict statements made elsewhere. There was once an Italian scholar who, like a mathematician discovering a mistake in a proof, gave his book the splendid title L'errore logico di Machiavelli. Scholars have advanced a good many hypotheses to account for what perplexes them. For some it is sufficient to say that Machiavelli was not systematic. A detailed understanding of Machiavelli's intellectual context has long been a desideratum as an avenue to explaining his texts. Garrett Mattingly famously argued that Machiavelli employed satire in The Prince. Leo Strauss believed that The Prince was written for two sets of readers: one that he addressed as tu, and one to which he gave the voi. Several writers have put Machiavelli on the couch and found “ambiguity” to be the key both to his character and his writings. Miguel Saralegui Benito sees inconsistencies in Machiavelli's work as reflecting powerful multidirectional currents in Renaissance philosophy. (See his Maquiavelo y la contradicción [Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2012]). In the heyday of 1980s-style literary theory, Machiavelli's possible lapses were taken to be symptomatic of diseases inherent in discourse itself.
Enter Erica Benner and her new book, praised on its back cover as a “must read” by both John Najemy and John McCormick. For Benner, Machiavelli's problematic passages have a purpose. They are the visible peaks of an iceberg of substantial ethical thought, intended to alert the reader to a thoroughgoing moralizing irony that characterized all of Machiavelli's writing. Applying a set of arguments previously developed in her Machiavelli's Ethics (which focused on the Discourses and the Florentine Histories), Benner attempts in her new study of The Prince to show how Machiavelli used irony—an irony modeled on Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon, and Plutarch—to advance a moral philosophy that was, and is, quite at odds with the one usually associated with Machiavelli. “The challenge for readers,” she argues, “is to see through the Prince’s carefully constructed sophistic appearances to the less striking, more powerfully reasoned undercurrents” (326). Contrary to what several centuries of Machiavelli's readers have found in him, these “undercurrents” lead to what nowadays passes for conventional morality. In Benner's upside-down reading, The Prince becomes a book that argues for “respect for other people's freedom . . . a concern for justice . . . [and] reciprocal trust” (326). This is every bit the “new” interpretation the title proclaims it to be. Although at times Benner states that she is working in the tradition of democratic readers of The Prince that included Alberico Gentili and Rousseau, it's really the categorical imperative that she has in mind, not resistance, revolution, and tyrannicide.
What is most original in Benner's interpretation is a programmatic emphasis on irony. Machiavelli was terrifically ironic, and in ways that, until recently, few political theorists, with the exception of Strauss, have appreciated. The Florentine Secretary was a writer for whom it was almost impossible to pen a sentence without its being double edged. Irony is everywhere in his work: in the dispatches, the personal letters, the poetry, and of course the political treatises. But irony is not everything; something more is needed to construct a philosophical system. Thus Socratic irony may be said to prepare the ground for Platonic doctrine, but to have something of substance Plato was necessary. Jankélévitch—the great twentieth-century theorist of irony and an author who escaped Benner's attention—stated matters well when he argued that although irony may instill a moral conscience, it inevitably reduces matters to the level of the individual and is thus insufficient for creating common ideals. Notwithstanding Voltaire's powerful social irony, his “cultivating one's own garden” represents only an attempted retreat to a personalized state of innocence. To make a philosophy of it is to make bricks without straw. Benner reminds us that irony belongs to an ancient rhetorical tradition, but in both The Prince and the Discourses Machiavelli announces that he is offering a plan for the political life that is new and original. The irony that is intrinsic to Machiavelli's style, a style he developed in his dispatches long before he wrote The Prince, is intended to draw the reader in by exciting his or her curiosity and by imparting a strong feeling of authorial presence. Irony prepares the reader for Machiavelli's radical new message in the manner of an artillery barrage before a charge. It awakens a moral sense in the reader to be sure; however, but the aim is not to affirm but to show how the world tramples on conventional morality.
The bulk of Benner's book is devoted to a chapter-by-chapter commentary on The Prince. She notes all of the instances where she sees irony at work, often discovering irony where others have not. There is an Italian word, “dietrologia”—which translates ad verbum as “behind-ology”—that refers to a passion for looking for causal connections that are not immediately apparent. Machiavelli, of course, was a consummate dietrologist, and so Benner undertakes to dietrologize the dietrologist. The commentary breaks new ground most when it delves into ancient Greek sources. Benner believes, correctly, that the influence on Machiavelli of Greek writers (apart from Aristotle and Xenophon) has been unjustly overlooked. It should be said that this is due in part to some doubtful challenges (by several Italian scholars) to Machiavelli's standing as a classically trained humanist, and in part to a perfectly reasonable emphasis (among English-speaking scholars) on Machiavelli's debts to the Latins, especially to Sallust and Cicero in addition to Livy. Benner's commentary does not aim to be critical or authoritative, but instead presents itself as a reading by an intelligent scholar who happens to have observed much and is eager to make interpretive suggestions. The commentary it most closely resembles is the one published by Harvey Mansfield on the Discourses in 1979. Philological issues rarely come into play; the knowledge of the classical world among Machiavelli's contemporaries is not considered; and the widely divergent accounts from Machiavelli's own time concerning the events mentioned in The Prince are beyond the author's purview. Benner's particular suggestions are usually interesting, sometimes provocative and on occasion enlightening. Her manner of writing is direct and decidedly unironical.
