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Apophatic Strategies in Allogenes (NHC XI, 3)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2010

Dylan Burns
Dylan Burns*
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Extract

Despite decades of research, it remains surprisingly difficult to identify the origins of the works preserved in the hoard of Coptic manuscripts discovered at Nag Hammadi in 1945. Even as unearthed “Gnostic” gospels continue to make headlines, many academics repent intoning these old, fiery heretics, and some have even called for an all-out dispensation of the term “Gnosticism.”2 Yet a felicitous piece of external evidence seems to offer a more stable foundation for identifying the date and sectarian provenance of several of the most difficult works discovered at Nag Hammadi, the so-called “Platonizing” treatises of the “Sethian school” of Gnosticism.3 Porphyry, the top pupil of the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus (third century C.E.), remarks that,

there were in his [Plotinus's] time Christians of many kinds, and especially certain heretics who based their teachings on the ancient philosophy. They were followers of Adelphius and Aculinus, who possessed a lot of writings by Alexander the Libyan, Philocomus, Demostratus and Lydus, and also brandished apocalyptic works of Zoroaster, Zostrianus, Nicotheus, Allogenes, Messus and others of that kind.4

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Harvard Theological Review , Volume 103 , Issue 2 , April 2010 , pp. 161 - 179
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Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 2010

If one does not find doing negative theology a fairly agonizing business, one is not really doing negative theology at all. Footnote 1

Plotinus, Porphyry, Zostrianos, and The Foreigner(s)

Despite decades of research, it remains surprisingly difficult to identify the origins of the works preserved in the hoard of Coptic manuscripts discovered at Nag Hammadi in 1945. Even as unearthed “Gnostic” gospels continue to make headlines, many academics repent intoning these old, fiery heretics, and some have even called for an all-out dispensation of the term “Gnosticism.”Footnote 2 Yet a felicitous piece of external evidence seems to offer a more stable foundation for identifying the date and sectarian provenance of several of the most difficult works discovered at Nag Hammadi, the so-called “Platonizing” treatises of the “Sethian school” of Gnosticism.Footnote 3 Porphyry, the top pupil of the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus (third century C.E.), remarks that,

there were in his [Plotinus's] time Christians of many kinds, and especially certain heretics who based their teachings on the ancient philosophy. They were followers of Adelphius and Aculinus, who possessed a lot of writings by Alexander the Libyan, Philocomus, Demostratus and Lydus, and also brandished apocalyptic works of Zoroaster, Zostrianus, Nicotheus, Allogenes, Messus and others of that kind.Footnote 4

The Nag Hammadi codices contain treatises which bear the titles of some of these “apocalyptic works”: “Zostrianos” and “Allogenes” (Greek for “foreigner,” or “stranger”). The texts feature distinctively Sethian mythologoumena, such as the titles of the various entities encountered in the story.Footnote 5 They are visionary ascent narratives catalyzed by the visit of a divine intermediary to a seer, in these two cases the eponymous protagonists.Footnote 6 Their genre notwithstanding, however, these works are replete with Neoplatonic jargon. They are contemplative texts, describing the voyage of philosophers into heaven towards ultimate being and beyond.

Porphyry's evidence is necessary but not sufficient for scholars attempting to date these treatises. Analysis of the texts' contents has led Abramowski and Majercik to propose that Allogenes and Zostrianos are post-Plotinian works of the second half of the third century C.E., reflecting the metaphysics of Porphyry.Footnote 7 The works known by Plotinus under the same names would not, then, be those we have discovered at Nag Hammadi. Those works were Coptic translations of Greek versions composed around the turn of the fourth century.Footnote 8 Turner and Corrigan respond that the characteristics of the Sethian treatises identified by Majercik as Porphyrian are simply Middle-Platonic.Footnote 9 Corrigan, followed by Turner, further argues that the Sethian treatises are dependent on the anonymous Turin commentary on Plato's Parmenides, which is actually pre-Porphyrian.Footnote 10 Corrigan assumes Plotinus's knowledge of Nag Hammadi's Allogenes; Turner suggests that it is a response to Plotinus's critique of Zostrianos, made circa 240 C.E.Footnote 11 For both, as for Layton and Tardieu,Footnote 12 Porphyry's evidence functions as a terminus ante quem for the Nag Hammadi documents themselves.

Yet as Edwards has observed, “while all or most [Nag Hammadi texts] presup-pose a Greek original, there is no presumption that this would be in every case an ancient one… . Even when the original is likely to have been of some antiquity, the vagaries of redaction and translation may have produced a work of quite a different character.”Footnote 13 The confluence of titles and names of the sages invoked in the books of Plotinus's opponents does not denote a coincidence of text but textual tradition. The assumption that these traditions are stable between the Greek versions known in 260s Rome and the Coptic versions in 350s Egypt needs to be validated by investigation of the texts' content. A stable textual tradition for much of Zostrianos has been validated in just this way, for its doctrines seem to be very similar to those Plotinus attacks in Enn. II.9, “Against the Gnostics.”Footnote 14

Can the same be said for Allogenes? The apparent absence of a direct response by a Neoplatonist forces its readers to begin with the text itself in an effort to contextualize its content in light of contemporary Platonic currents. A good start is the treatise's most distinctive feature, its negative theology, long noted by scholars as resembling later Neoplatonic ideas.Footnote 15 In Allogenes, the author describes the depths of reality,Footnote 16 but then is visited by the angel Youel,Footnote 17 who guides him further into the aeon of Barbelo. “Luminaries” intervene and tell the seer his ascent must end, but they will describe, as much as possible, what the ultimate divinity above is like.Footnote 18 What follows is some of the most startling Neoplatonic negative theology of the Nag Hammadi discoveries, yet, as King notes, “the precise logical status of negation in Allogenes remains undetermined.”Footnote 19

In the following I will attempt to clarify the logic, epistemology, and praxis of negation in Allogenes. The text's mysticism is distinct from that of Middle Platonism and Plotinus, employing jargon and techniques more reminiscent of theurgic Neoplatonists like Iamblichus and Proclus, and, at times, the Chaldean Oracles, the anonymous commentary on the Parmenides, and Porphyry.Footnote 20 This distinctively theurgic Neoplatonism invites a re-consideration of the dating of the redaction of the text preserved at Nag Hammadi. While it seems that the Coptic version of Zostrianos known today was similar to, if not a direct translation of, the Greek version mentioned by Porphyry (as Corrigan and Turner argue), the same cannot be said for Allogenes. Rather, the text bears the marks of a post-Plotinian redaction and should be dated to the turn of the fourth century.Footnote 21

Apophatic Strategy in Allogenes

Let us begin with the logic of negation in Allogenes. After Youel initiates Allo-genes's ascent into heaven, the seeker falls into a suprarational cognitive state. That is, knowledge is explicitly acquired, but only of a paradoxical sort that cannot be rationally apprehended: “I became full of revelation, through a primary revelation of unknowing (). Because I did not apprehend it, I apprehended it () and received power from it.”Footnote 22 He continues as follows: “through a primary revelation of the first thing unknown to all I saw the deity elevated beyond perfection and the triple power that exists in them [all beings]. I was seeking the ineffable and unknowable God.”Footnote 23

What follows is classic negative theology. As King points out, the text (61.32b–62.24a) asks if existence can be predicated of the first principle; the answer is no, for it does not possess mind, life, or substance (); nor can one predicate its existence with reference to its products.Footnote 24 As the “powers of the luminaries” say, “neither does it have need of mind or life or indeed anything at all, since it is superior to () the entiretiesFootnote 25 by virtue of its privationFootnote 26 and its incomprehensibility; that is, its substance is not subject to becoming ()”.Footnote 27

The next section (62.27b–63.28a) combines a series of negations ( … … … [“it is not … nor …”] constructions) and paradoxes quite similar to a section of the Apocryphon of John, with whom Allogenes here likely shares a source:Footnote 28 “Neither is it boundless nor is it bounded by any other thing, but rather it is something which is superior. It is not corporeal; it is not incorporeal. It is not great; it is not small; it is not quantity; it is not quality.”Footnote 29 The text goes on to discuss other categories of Platonic provenance, all of them inadequate: number, time, eternity, etc.Footnote 30; extensive use of the appellation “superior to,” () is made.Footnote 31 However, the basic pattern—the Unknowable is neither this, nor that, but is greater—is the same.Footnote 32 This pattern is clear enough to compare to contemporary Platonic currents.

The Platonists of Late Antiquity followed Aristotle in holding that negation can be conceived of in three general ways:Footnote 33 flat-out denial of an attribute (ἀπόϕασιϛ), abstraction of a particular by removal of accidental attributes (ἀνάλυσιϛ or ἀϕαίρεσιϛ), and privation (στέρησιϛ). Bare ἀπόϕασιϛ is a clumsy tool: The statement that “it is not a horse” is true of everything but horses.Footnote 34 Meanwhile, privation was of little service to metaphysicians outside of Aristotelian commen-tators.Footnote 35 Abstraction, however, dominated Middle PlatonicFootnote 36 and PlotinianFootnote 37 negative theology. Plotinus likes to say that “since he (the One) is none of these things, one can only say that he is beyond them ἐπέκεινα τούτων,”Footnote 38 charging his reader to abandon the necessarily dualistic operation of intellect by stripping away its thoughts, like an initiate disrobing for the mysteries.Footnote 39 In Plotinus, “the normal use of intellect involves predication, which introduces plurality since the logic of predication involves the multiple structures of the subject and the predicated quality.Footnote 40 Abstraction has an opposite logic, since it involves subtracting from the subject rather than adding to it.”Footnote 41 Abstraction is productive: to use the common Middle Platonic geometric analogy, negating a line means “not-line”; abstracting from a line gives a point.

Allogenes does share with Plotinus a pattern of “neither/nor/but beyond,”Footnote 42 but it is hardly significant that a standard Platonic expression was common to these texts. Moreover, Allogenes delights in paradox far more than Plotinus, as, for example, at 47.19–32: “for this one is One who is situated as a cause of Being and a source and an immaterial matter and a numberless number and a formless form and a shapeless shape and a powerless one with power and a nonsubstantial substance … and an inactive activity, also being a provider of provisions and a divinity of divinity.”Footnote 43 The relentless piling of negations, specifically of opposite qualities, is not characteristic of Plotinus, Porphyry, or the anonymous commentary.Footnote 44 It can be found, however, in post-Plotinian Neoplatonism.

The treatises where Iamblichus most likely discussed negative theology are lost to us,Footnote 45 but his approach is probably preserved by Proclus, who usually replicates Iamblichaean thought in matters theurgic.Footnote 46 In his commentary on Plato's Parmenides, Proclus formulates a second-order apophasis, a “negatio negationis,” or “negation of negation.” Proclus wrestles with how to interpret Parmenides' lemma at the end of the discourse about the first hypothesis (Parm. 142A); he thinks Plato means that the paradoxical negations of the One themselves are negated.Footnote 47 This approach to Parmenides interpretation falls under the rubric of “faith,” the “theurgic” virtue,Footnote 48 and so is a kind of verbal, or discursive, theurgy (for more on which see below). Our copy of his commentary, like Parmenides at the end of the first hypothesis, famously culminates in silence, the negatio negationis.Footnote 49 Plotinus, too, ends his discourse on the One with silence,Footnote 50 but, as noted above, he has taken a different route there.

There is no formal “negation of negation” at Nag Hammadi; but given Proclus's susual reliance on Iamblichus, something like it was probably available around the turn of the fourth century C.E., likely in the form of verbal theurgy.Footnote 51Allogenes seems to employ the kind of systematic, apophatic paradox emblematic of Proclus (and his most famous reader, Pseudo-Denys), eschewing the more conventionally Middle Platonic and Plotinian ἀϕαίρεσιϛ. Moreover, Plotinus's strategy ultimately terminates in, as Rist says, waiting for “grace.”Footnote 52 Proclus's strategy climaxes in an explicitly articulated supra-rational cognitive state, “faith.” Allogenes does too, for its apophatic strategy culminates in the acquisition of knowledge—unknowable knowledge, that is.

Self-Reflexive “Unknowable Knowledge”

The (variously framed) paradoxical jargon of “unknowable knowledge” describes what the text's negative theology produces.Footnote 53 The “primary revelation of the Unknowable One” continues, as the luminaries describe it as epistemological faculty and object:

Neither is it anything that exists such that it is possible for one to know it, but rather it is something else that is superior, something that is impossible for someone to know, a first revelation and gnosis which knows () itself.Footnote 54

Is this unknowable knowledge not that thing in whose respect it exists? And it is joined to that unknowability which sees it. How is it unknowable? Or, is there anyone who sees it as it exists in its entirety? If one would say that it exists as a form of gnosis, that one has been impious and has been judged as having not known God.Footnote 55

Of course this doctrine of “unknowable knowledge” is nowhere to be found in Plotinus,Footnote 56 who discusses supra-noetic contemplation of the One but assigns no such systematic, paradoxical epistemological category to it.Footnote 57 But Porphyry, the anonymous commentary on the Parmenides, and the Chaldean Oracles do,Footnote 58 anticipating Iamblichus's and Proclus's plumbing of contemplation of the One through speculation on the Chaldean a [.Footnote 59Allogenes's epistemology, then, does have parallels in pre-Plotinian mysticism—the Oracles, and (depending on how one dates it) the anonymous commentary.Footnote 60

However, Allogenes's epistemology of “unknowable knowledge” differs in several key ways. First, the Sethian text uses the vocabulary more often than do the Oracles and the Parmenides commentary, where its presence is interesting but not central. Secondly, the Oracles and Parmenides commentary do not develop it into a consistent practice, much less one couched in repetition of apophatic paradox (as described above) that leads to Lesemysterium (as described below). Third, Allogenes transforms the doctrine by assigning it self-reflexivity:Footnote 61 “for it is a comprehension of itself, since it is something unknowable of this sort, and since it is in its unknowability superior to those which are good.”Footnote 62 Knowledge of the Invisible Spirit is therefore the Invisible Spirit's knowledge of itself, and the Invisible Spirit's knowledge of itself is unknowable knowledge.Footnote 63 The collapsing of epistemology, ontology, and soteriology ultimately derives from Aristotle's well-known principle of assimilation of the subject and object of thought.Footnote 64 This self-reflexivity also, however, extends to discourse. If knower and known are one and the same (like the Invisible Spirit) then so are an accurate description of Youel's revelation as recorded for Messos (the text of Allogenes) and the revelation itself (Allogenes's subject). Or, as Gersh has put it, “both the enactment and the description are of negative theology itself.”Footnote 65 It follows that the description of this disintegration is a disintegration, this time between the reader and book. Reading the revelation in Allogenes is itself the revelation, whose content is ontological assimilation to the Invisible Spirit.Footnote 66 This is a jump that is not made by the anonymous commentary, the Chaldean Oracles, or Plotinus. In the former cases, the vocabulary of “unknowable knowledge” is not self-reflexive, as it is in Allogenes. In the latter, the supra-rational cognitive state is described, but not enacted.

Lesemysterium

Allogenes—s negative theology ascends from apophatic negation to an outright dissolution of the boundaries between seeker, “unknowable knowledge,” and First Principle—between the reader and the text. The result is an absence of discourse, a “stillness” or “calmness,” as the text intones.Footnote 67 With respect to practice, Allogenes parts ways with Middle Platonism, Zostrianos, and Plotinus, who employed abstraction not to elicit mystical experience but to prepare oneself for it. The latter opined that after a mystical experience one could talk about it rationally, but it was pointless to try to describe it, much less play esoteric, discursive games in hopes of generating it.Footnote 68

Allogenes, on the other hand, does not simply describe mystical ascent, but performs it. Once the distinction between reader and text breaks down, the text has become the reader's performative (perlocutionary) speech-act, i.e., a mode of discourse whose purpose is to accomplish a task (as, for example, the phrase “I thee wed”).Footnote 69 In Allogenes this performance is the acquisition of self-reflexive “unknowable knowledge,” assimilation to the Invisible Spirit, by describing the “primary revelation” of it. Nearly a century ago (1912), Reitzenstein coined the term “Lesemysterium” to describe the “textual initiation” of Hermetic literature.Footnote 70 The term can be aptly applied to Allogenes, which is a “reading-mystery” that attempts to swallow and transform the reader.Footnote 71 As is well-known, Platonizing Sethians, inspired by the baptismal rites of their forebears (the so-called rite of the “five seals”), created Platonic manuals for eliciting visionary ascent.Footnote 72Allogenes takes the Sethian internalization of ritual one step further by abandoning the baptismal context and rendering the description and reading of visionary exercise a performance itself.

Yet again, Allogenes is in line with later developments in Neoplatonic mystic-ism. As Rappe, van den Berg, and others have demonstrated, Proclus, following Iamblichus,Footnote 73 developed a kind of “verbal theurgy” whereby the initiate interacted with discourse as “internal συνθήματα.”Footnote 74 As mentioned above, apophatic theology, exemplified in Parmenides interpretation, had a theurgic context.Footnote 75 This internal theurgy, associated with the Chaldean “flower of the whole soul,” seems to have taken place at the level of the noetic monad, also known as “the One-Being,”Footnote 76 or, in Barbeloite jargon, the “triply-powered.”Footnote 77 Naturally, Allogenes's negative theology is described by luminaries of the aeon of Barbelo.Footnote 78 They describe what takes place at the level of the “triply-powered” in the ascent to the One, the Invisible Spirit. The text's mystical praxis employs similar performative speech-acts and deals with the same ontological depths as does Neoplatonic verbal theurgy.

Conclusion

In the above, I have tried to contextualize Allogenes's negative theology in the greater history of Platonism. The text's apophatic approach to the One, its self-reflexive epistemology of the unknowable, and its performative mystical praxis is reminiscent of techniques associated with Iamblichus's famous “theurgic turn” around the turn of the fourth century C.E.Footnote 79 On several occasions Turner has loosely described the astrological theory and practices of Marsanes (NHC X,1) as “Sethian theurgy”;Footnote 80 in the case of Allogenes's, the word can be used more concretely to describe the text's negative theology and Lesemysterium.

The question is then whether Allogenes's redactor developed these practices independently of and prior to “mainstream” Platonists (dating the text as pre-Plotinian) or picked up on the nascent theurgic movement emerging around Iamblichus (dating the text as post-Plotinian). Hitherto, Allogenes's fate has been tied to that of its sister Sethian textual tradition known in Plotinus's school, Zostrianos. Abramowski and Majercik notwithstanding, a stable textual tradition between Plotinus's school and Nag Hammadi has been defended for the latter treatise, on the grounds of great similarity to the doctrines attacked by Plotinus himself in Ennead II.9 and its shared theological source with Marius Victorinus.Footnote 81

On the other hand, Allogenes's paradoxical apophasis does not appear in Plotinus, but the later Neoplatonists. Its Lesemysterium operates on the same metaphysical levels and textual interface as later Neoplatonic theurgy. Like Zostrianos, it may share a Platonic theological source with Marius Victorinus's Adversus Arium,Footnote 82 but unlike Zostrianos, its source is systematically mixed in with un-Middle Platonic apophatic paradox.Footnote 83 Finally, Allogenes is already known to have a complex textual tradition, for Epiphanius mentions “books of Allogenes” in the plural in the hands of both Sethians and Archontics.Footnote 84 In fact, we possess another one of these books in Codex Tchacos, whose version of Allogenes is an apocalyptic discourse apparently bereft of Platonic influence.Footnote 85 It is possible, then, that there were at least three “books of Allogenes” in Late Antiquity: first, the Allogenes of Codex Tchacos (un-Platonic); second, that known in Plotinus's seminar ([Middle] Platonic enough to merit his ire); third, the Allogenes of NHC XI (theurgic Neoplatonism; possibly a revision of Plotinus's).Footnote 86

By assigning Allogenes's negative theology to a post-Plotinian provenance I do not seek to minimize Gnosticism's impact on the Platonic tradition.Footnote 87 In fact, recent research has emphasized Sethian influence on Plotinus, especially in his early years.Footnote 88 It does not seem, however, that this influence is evident in the negative theology of NHC XI,3. Rather, it appears that at least one Sethian contemplative chose to stay abreast of developments in Neoplatonic mysticism. Allogenes is a witness to Sethianism's persistent involvement in and contribution to Neoplaton-ism through the turn of the fourth century. Nor is NHC XI,3 merely an adoption of theurgic ideas. It is a refinement; the sophistication of its systematic, ritualized negative theology is unparalleled in extant sources until Proclus in the mid-fifth century. Second, its subtle Lesemysterium anticipates the shape of internalized, text-based apophatic praxis that, via the dissemination of the Corpus Dionysiacum, would dominate the mystical tradition of medieval ChristendomFootnote 89 and is currently experiencing a revival through Deconstruction's encounter with negative theology.Footnote 90 Third, ideologically speaking, little could be farther from the Hellenic παιδεία prized by the theurgists than Allogenes's apocalyptic visionary narrative. Allogenes engages Neoplatonism on the common ground of metaphysics and mysticism. Apparently, for the author of Allogenes, the genre, idiom, and colour of Barbeloite Sethianism were too precious to concede.Footnote 91Footnote *

References

1 Arthur H. Armstrong, “Negative Theology,” DRev 95 (1973) 176–89, esp. 184.

2 Michael A. Williams, Rethinking Gnosticism: Arguments for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) esp. 51–53, 265. Karen King (What is Gnosticism? [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003] 168–69) offers a deconstruction of the category and its discursive baggage, without dismissing it altogether. Bentley Layton defends use of the category to designate ancients who called themselves “Gnostics” (“knowers”) and the coherent body of myths associated with them. (“Prolegomena to the Study of Ancient Gnosticism,” in The Social World of the First Christians: Essays in Honor of Wayne Meeks [ed. L. Michael White and Larry O. Yarbrough; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995] 334–50; for criticism, see King, Gnosticism?, 166–69).

3 These were famously identified by Hans-Martin Schenke as texts dealing with a complex of ideas including (but not limited to) the following: the identification of the pneumatic seed of Seth with the savior; the divine trinity of Father, Mother, and Son; the division of the aeon of Barbelo (the Mother) into the triad of Kalyptos, Protophanes, and Autogenes; the appearance of the “Four Luminaries”; dwelling places for Adam, Seth, and his seed; and the idea of a rite of “Five Seals.” See Hans-Martin Schenke, “Das sethianische System nach Nag-Hammadi-Handschriften,” in Studia Coptica (ed. Peter Nagel; Berlin: Akademie, 1974) 165–72; idem, “The Phenomenon and Significance of Gnostic Sethianism,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism (ed. Bentley Layton; Suppl. Numen 41; Leiden: Brill, 1981) 588–616. Schenke's “Sethian” texts are: Ap. John (NHC II,1; III,1; IV,1; BG,2), Hyp. Arch. (NHC II,4), Gos. Eg. (NHC III,2; IV,2), Apoc. Adam (NHC V,5) Steles Seth (NHC VII,5), Zost. (NHC VIII,1), Melch. (NHC IX,1), Norea (NHC IX,2), Marsanes (NHC X), Allogenes (NHC XI,3), Trim. Prot. (NHC XIII,1), Cod. Bruc. Untitled, and the individuals mentioned in Irenaeus, Haer. 1.29, Epiphanius, Pan. (trans. Frank Williams; 2 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 1987–1994) chs. 26, 39, and 40. Scholarship on Sethianism is voluminous, but see esp. Rediscovery (ed. Layton; vol. 2) and the criticism of Schenke within (Frederik Wisse, “Stalking Those Elusive Sethians”); John D. Turner, “The Gnostic Threefold Path to Enlightenment: The Ascent of Mind and the Descent of Wisdom,” NovT 22 (1980) 324–51, and other articles discussed below; for comprehensive survey of Sethianism's relationship with Platonism, see idem, Sethian Gnosticism and the Platonic Tradition (BCNH Études 6; Louvain: Peeters, 2001). The category is discussed (but not exactly dispatched) in Williams (Gnosticism, 90–93), and King (Gnosticism?, 154–62, who notes the coherence of the category [or the categorizing approach itself, ibid., 158]). For recent re-evaluation of the category see Tuomas Rasimus, “Paradise Reconsidered: A Study of the Ophite Myth and Ritual and their Relationship to Sethianism” (Ph.D. diss., University of Helsinki, 2006) esp. 27–39, 51–56. Here I follow Rasimus in separating the Ophite materials—i.e., texts focusing on the serpent's role in Paradise as revealer—from Sethian and Barbeloite texts. NHC XI's Allogenes has apparently no Ophite features (but see below, n. 86, for complications ensuing with heresiological evidence) and so would still fall under the Sethian-Barbeloite rubric, featuring the usual mythologoumena.

4 Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, ch. 16, in Neoplatonic Saints: The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by their Students (trans. Mark J. Edwards; Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000). For precise analysis of the language of the passage see, inter alii, Howard M. Jackson, “The Seer Nikotheos and His Lost Apocalypse in the Light of Sethian Apocalypses from Nag Hammadi and the Apocalypse of Elchasai,” NovT 32 (1990) 250–77, esp. 250–58; Christos Evangeliou, “Plotinus's Anti-Gnostic Polemic and Porphyry's Against the Christians,” in Neoplatonism and Gnosticism (ed. Richard T. Wallis; SNAM 6; Albany: SUNY University Press, 1992) 112–16; but esp. Michel Tardieu, “Les gnostiques dans La vie de Plotin,” in La vie de Plotin (ed. Luc Brisson; 2 vols.; Paris: Vrin, 1982–1992) 2:503–63; Ruth Majercik, “Porphyry and Gnosticism,” CQ 55 (2005) 277–92, esp. 277–78.

5 As discussed for example in Turner, Platonic Tradition, 108–25.

6 See John J. Collins, “Morphology of a Genre,” Semeia 14 (1979) 1–19, 9: “‘Apocalypse— is a genre of revelatory literature with a narrative framework, in which a revelation is mediated by an otherworldly being to a human recipient, disclosing a transcendent reality which is both temporal, insofar as it envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves another, supernatural world.” See also idem, The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) 1–42; for survey of scholarship on Gnostic apocalypses, see Harold W. Attridge, “Valentinian and Sethian Apocalyptic Traditions,” JECS 8 (1999) 173–211.

7 Probably through a lost commentary on the Chaldean Oracles 1:482–85. See Pierre Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (2 vols.; Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1968), henceforth cited as Anon. Comm. Parm. (Hadot); idem, “La métaphysique de Porphyre,” Entretiens de la Fondation Hardt 12: Porphyre (Vandœuvres-Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1966) 127–63; John M. Rist, “Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism,” Hermes 92 (1964) 213–25, esp. 220; Luise Abramowski, “Marius Victorinus, Porphyrius und die römischen Gnostiker,” ZNW 74 (1983) 108–28, esp. 124–26; Majercik, “Gnosticism,” 280. Proclus's testimony, located in In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii (ed. Ernst Diehl; 3 vols.; Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–1906) 3:64.8–65.8, is crucial, but see Mark. J. Edwards's cautionary remarks in “Porphyry and the Intelligible Triad,” JHS 110 (1990) 14–25, esp. 15–19. Also of some importance is the anonymous commentary on the Parmenides, which also was a source for Victorinus and Synesius, as mentioned above. Ruth Majercik highlights the use of ὕπαρξιϛ for the Chaldean existence-vitality-mentality triad and the shared affinity with Marius Victorinus's Porphyrian metaphysics (“The Being-Life-Mind Triad in Gnosticism and Neoplatonism,” CQ 42 (1992) 475–88, esp. 478–79, 482–87. Abramowski looks at the doctrine of the “triple-powered,” and the use of paronymy (ibid., 113 esp. n. 32). In an important later article (“Gnosticism,” 282–84) Majercik adds possible references to Porphyry's propaedeutic language in Ad Marcellam and his theory of categories; unfortunately, space does not allow full engagement with these arguments here, but the author finds them compelling new evidence in the debate.

8 Majercik, “Triad,” 486–88; idem, “Gnosticism,” 278; Abramowski, “Marius Victorinus,” 123–24; see also Andrew Smith, “Porphyrian Studies since 1913,” ANRW II:36.2:717–73, esp. 763 n. 282.

9 John D. Turner, “Typologies of the Sethian Gnostic Literature from Nag Hammadi,” in Colloque internationale sur les textes de Nag Hammadi, Université Laval, 15–22 Septembre, 1993 (Louvain: Peeters, 1994) 206; see also idem, “Gnosticism and Platonism: The Platonizing Sethian Texts from Nag Hammadi and their Relation to Later Platonic Literature,” in Wallis, Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, 433–36; Kevin Corrigan, “Platonism and Gnosticism: The Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides: Middle or Neoplatonic?” in Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts (ed. John D. Turner and Ruth Majercik; SBL Symposium Series 12; Atlanta: SBL, 2001) 168–71.

10 Corrigan, “Platonism and Gnosticism,” 142–44; John D. Turner, “Setting of the Platonizing Sethian Treatises in Middle Platonism,” in Turner and Majercik, Gnosticism, 204–5. Scholarship attempting to date the Turin commentary remains at an impasse; Majercik, Wallis, and Dillon tentatively accept Hadot's evaluation of the anonymous commentary as at least Porphyrian, if not Porphyry himself, as he claims. See Majercik, “Triad,” 477; idem, “Chaldean Triads in Neoplatonic Exegesis: Some Reconsiderations,” in CQ 51 [2001] 265–96; idem, “Porphyry and Gnosticism,” 278 n. 9; Richard T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995) 114–17; John M. Dillon, “Introduction,” in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides (trans. G. Morrow and J. M. Dillon; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) xxx; Pierre Hadot, “Fragments d—un commentaire de Porphyre sur le Parménide,” REG 74 (1961) 410–38; Hadot, Porphyre; followed by Henri-Dominique Saffrey, “Connaissance et inconnaissance de Dieu. Porphyre et la Théosophie de Tübingen,” in Saffrey, Recherches sur le Néoplatonisme aprés Plotin (Paris: Vrin, 1990) 14; for handy summaries of which see Smith, “Porphyry,” 728–29, 737–41; Corrigan, “Platonism and Gnosticism,” 161–65. Corrigan, Turner, and Bechtle respond that the commentary is pre-Plotinian. See Corrigan, ibid., 144–56; John D. Turner “Introduction: Allogenes,” in L—allogéne (ed. and trans. Wolf-Peter Funk, Paul-Hubert Poirier, Madeline Scopello, and John D. Turner; Québec: Les Presses de l—Université Laval, 2004) 161; Gerald Bechtle, The Anonymous Commentary on Plato's “Parmenides” (ed. and trans. Gerard Bechtle; Bern: Paul Haupt, 1999) 90–91, 221–22). For a critique of Bechtle, see now Marco Zambon, Porphyre et le moyen-platonisme (Paris, 2002) 40 n. 2; Edwards, “Intelligible Triad,” 21–25, both of whom argue that the text is post-Iamblichean.

11 Corrigan, “Positive and Negative Matter in Later Platonism: The Uncovering of Plotinus's Dialogue with the Gnostics,” in Turner and Majercik, Gnosticism, 44 n. 77; Turner, Platonic Tradition, 721; idem, “Setting,” 199–201; idem, “Introduction: Marsanés,” in Marsanés, (ed. and trans. Wolf-Peter Funk, Paul-Hubert Poirier and John D. Turner; Louvain: Peeters, 2000) 169–72; Turner, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” in Zostrien (ed. and trans. Catharine Barry, Wolf-Peter Funk, Paul-Hubert Poirier and John D. Turner; Québec: Les Presses de l—Université Laval, 2000) 145–49; Turner, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 3, 113–16, 161; idem, “The Gnostic Sethians and Middle Platonism: Interpretations of the Timaeus and Parmenides,” VC 60 (2006) 9–64, esp. 26–27, 52; idem, “Victorinus, Parmenides Commentaries, and the Platonizing Sethian Treatises,” in Platonisms: Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern (ed. Kevin Corrigan and John D. Turner; AMMTC: SPNPT 4; Leiden: Brill, 2007) 79–80. The argument retracts his earlier thesis that the Steles Seth, Zostrianos, and Marsanes are dependent on Allogenes; see Turner, “Gnosticism and Platonism,” 430, 455. Karen King (Revelation of the Unknowable God [Santa Rosa: Polebridge Press, 1995] 48, 60) essentially repeats Turner's claim that Allogenes presumes Plotinian critique of Sethian metaphysics but elsewhere stresses that Plotinus probably knew the text. See ibid., 47–48, 50; Turner, “Introduction: Marsanés,” 172; idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 3. The chronology here is unclear: The Gnostic controversy broke out shortly after Porphyry's arrival at Plotinus's seminar in 263 C.E. for which see Michel Tardieu, “Recherches sur la formation de l—Apocalypse de Zostrien et les sources de Marius Victorinus,” ResOr 9 [1996] 7–114, 112), so how could Allogenes have been composed (240 C.E.) as a response to Plotinus twenty years prior to Plotinus's Against the Gnostics? The end of the Groβschrift was composed between 263 and 269 according to Porphyry, Vit. Plot., ch. 6]) To support a dating of Allogenes to the 240s, we must assume (reasonably, but beyond Porphyry's evidence) that Plotinus was in debate with Gnostic ideas before Porphyry's arrival at the school.

12 Bentley Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures (ABRL; New York: Doubleday, 1987) 122, 142; Tardieu, “Formation” 113.

13 Mark J. Edwards, “The Epistle to Rheginus: Valentinianism in the Fourth Century,” NovT 37 (1995) 76–91, esp. 77. Other fourth-century reminisces have been discovered in the Nag Hammadi Library: For references to the Arian Controversy and Julian the Apostate, see Raoul Mortley, “The Name of the Father is the Son,” in Wallis, Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, 239–52, and Francis E. Williams, Mental Perception, A Commentary on NHC VI, 4: The Concept of Our Great Power (NHMS 51; Leiden: Brill, 2001) lxii, respectively. For the importance of considering potential differences between the discovered Coptic treatises and their Greek antecedents, see Stephen Emmel, “Religious Tradition, Textual Transmission, and the Nag Hammadi Codices,” in The Nag Hammadi Library after Fifty Years (ed. John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; Leiden: Brill, 1997) 34–43; idem, “The Coptic Gnostic Texts as Witnesses to the Production and Transmission of Gnostic (and Other) Traditions,” in Das Thomasevangelium. Entstehung–Rezeption–Theologie (ed. Jörg Frey, Enno Edzard Popkes, and Jens Schröter BZNW 157; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008) 33–50.

14 Generally, see Tardieu, “Les gnostiques,” 538–43; Turner, “Victorinus,” 56–57 n. 2. Plotinus knew and attacked Zostrianos for its partition of intellect (Enn. II.9 [33] 1.6). Turner earlier thought (“Gnosticism and Platonism,” 432) Plotinus here targeted Allogenes. Plotinus also attacks Zostrianos's doctrine of Sophia and her relationship with the demiurge (Enn. II.9 [33] 2, 10; 3.8 [30] 4; 5.8 [31] 3–5; NHC VIII,1.9.16–19). Corrigan (“Platonism and Gnosticism,” 44 n. 77) points out how the partition of intellect, “image of an image,” and incantations all have counterparts in the Enneads which are possible echoes of Gnostic influence. However, cf. Majercik, “Gnosticism,” as noted above.

15 Curtis L. Hancock observes that, as in the thought of Iamblichus, Allogenes extends ineffability (and hence apophasis) beyond the One to the intermediary principle of the thrice-powered (“Negative Theology in Gnosticism and Neoplatonism,” in Wallis, Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, 174–76, 180). He points out that Gnostic texts use negation all over the hierarchy of the cosmos, while Plotinus limits it to the One. Wallis (“The Spiritual Importance of Not Knowing,” in Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, Roman [ed. Arthur H. Armstrong; New York: Crossroad, 1986] 475–76) points out that Iamblichus and Proclus are more in line with the Gnostics than Plotinus on this point since they extend ineffability beyond the One to levels of the intelligible realm (as for example those above the “flower of intellect”). See also Michael A. Williams, “Negative Theologies and Demiurgical Myths in Late Antiquity,” in Turner and Majercik, Gnosticism, 301.

16 NHC XI,3.45.6–57.24b. Below I have generally followed the most recent edition of the text, L—allogéne (Funk/Scopello) noting a few discrepancies with King (Revelation) and Layton (text: Coptic Gnostic Chrestomathy [Louvain: Peeters, 2003]; translation: Scriptures) and occasionally modifying the translation.

17 Maddalena Scopello, “Youel et Barbélo dans le Traité de l—Allogéne,” in Colloque international sur les textes de Nag Hammadi (ed. Bernard Barc; Louvain: Peeters, 1981) esp. 374–76. The figure seems to be derived from speculation about Metatron in intertestamental Jewish apocalyptic literature (ibid., 377–80).

18 NHC XI,3.59.7b.

19 King, Revelation, 19.

20 Williams (“Negative Theologies,” 290), observes that Allogenes uses language reminiscent of much later Western mysticism. See also Turner, “Gnosticism and Platonism,” 448; Saffrey, “Connaissance et inconnaissance,” 20; Wallis, “Spiritual Importance,” 470. King (Revelation, 12, 49) considers that Allogenes's approach to ritual and revelation is much more in line with theurgic Neoplatonism than Plotinus's mysticism. John Finamore gives a careful and fruitful comparison of ontology (“Iamblichus, the Sethians, and Marsanes,” in Turner's and Majercik's Gnosticism, 232–38).

21 See also Finamore, “Iamblichus, the Sethians, and Marsanes, 238 n. 37, on the topic of ontological generation; Puech, too, assigns Nag Hammadi's Zostrianos to that encountered by Plotinus, but is not sure about Allogenes; see Henri-Charles Puech, “Plotin et les Gnostiques,” in idem, En quête de la Gnose, vol. 1. La Gnose et le temps et autres essais (Paris: Gallimard, 1978) 116.

22 NHC XI,3.60.37–61.1.

23 NHC XI,3.61.11–14.

24 This is an interesting departure from Plotinus, who says “we have it [i.e., the One] in such a way that we speak about it, but do not speak it. For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it” (Enn. V.3 [49] 14.5–8). See also for its relative utility to kataphasis and silence, VI.8 [39] 18.1–2: “And you when you seek, seek nothing outside him, but seek within all things which come after him; but leave himself alone.”)

25 With Layton, Scriptures, pace King, Unknowable God, 160: “all of them”; Turner, “Intro-duction: Allogenes,” 185: “the Totality”; Scopello, ibid., 225: “aux Touts.”

26 with King (Unknowable God) and Turner (L—allogéne, 185) pace (Layton, Chrestomathy, 126; idem, Scriptures, 146; Funk L—allogéne, 224).

27 NHC XI,3.62.18–24.

28 BG 24.6–25.10; NHC II,3.17–36, 5.2–6.3; NHC IV,4.28–5.23. Antoinette Wire sees a direct literary dependence (“Introduction,” in Nag Hammadi Codices XI, XII, XIII [ed. Charles Hedrick; Leiden: Brill, 1990] 177). Michel Tardieu thinks both refer to Plato, Parm. 137C–142A (Écrits gnostiques [Paris: Cerf, 1984] 249–51). Raoul Mortley agrees and points out further that the “neither x nor y” construction is particularly reminiscent of the sixth hypothesis (“the One is not”), Parm. 163B–164A (From Word to Silence: The Way of Negation, Christian and Greek [2 vols.; Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1986] 2:30). See also Turner, “Introduction: Marsanés,” 87–88; idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 78–79; idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 52–56, 117–18. I accept Tardieu's (Écrits gnostiques, 251) argument that translates a corruption of ποιητόν.

29 NHC XI,3.63.1–8.

30 Ibid., 63.8–27. “The presentation of the Unknowable in 61.32–67.38 is based on a denial that any of the Platonic and Aristotelian attributes or categories given for anything which exists or is intelligible can be applied to the Unknowable” (King, Unknowable God, 18). By this she refers to the five attributes for existents in Sophist 254D–255E (being, movement, rest, identity, and diversity) and Aristotle's ten categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection). Allogenes thus knows Plotinus's attack (Enn. VI.1 [42] 2.13–16) on use of the categories to describe intelligible (King, Unknowable God, 18).

31 NHC XI,3.62.33; 63.4–5, 12, 19. King translates as “exquisite”; Turner, “superlative” (Platonic Tradition, 686; idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 186). See also the use of (NHC XI,3.66.33–38).

32 See also the detailed account of Turner, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 120–21.

33 For privation vs. negation in Aristotle see Metaphysics 1022b 33; John Whittaker “Neo-pythagoreanism and Negative Theology,” SO 44 (1969) 109–25, 119) who sees στέρεσιϛ as a subdivision of ἀποϕασιϛ, pointing to Meta. 1056a 24, 1011b 19. Sometimes they mean the same thing (ibid., 120–21). For Aristotle, “Privation should be understood as the absence of a quality from a given substratum or entity, and that it be perceivable as an absence.” Hence “a vegetable has no eyes” is a privation because it is an intelligible statement, unlike “a vegetable has no infinity” (unintelligible, for nothing can have infinity). See Raoul Mortley, “The Fundamentals of the Via Negativa,” AJP 103 (1982) 429–39, 434. But cf. the account of Stephen Gersh, Neoplatonism after Derrida: Parallelograms (Leiden: Brill, 2006) 52–54 n. 85, who adds ἐτερότηϛ, διαϕορά, and ἐναντιότηϛ and describes similar, if more complex, models.

34 As Mortley, “Via Negativa,” 436.

35 Such as Syrianus (Mortley, Silence, 85–89).

36 Mortley, “Via Negativa,” 435–38; John P. Kenney, “Ancient Apophatic Theology,” in Turner's and Majercik's Gnosticism, 268–69. The mathematical negative theology of abstraction, meanwhile, is also in Alcinous (Didaskalos, X.5, 7), perhaps thinking of Aristotle, Meta. 1061a 28. See further Plutarch (Quest. plat. 1001e–1002a), Celsus (apud Origen, Cels. 7.42), and Clemens Alexandrinus (Strom. V.71.2); cit. Whittaker, “Negative Theology”; see also Turner, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 118–19). ἀνάλυσιϛ and ἀϕαίρεσιϛ mean the same thing in Middle Platonic sources; see Whittaker, “Negative Theology,” 113; Henny F. Hägg, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism (OECS; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 223.

37 Harry H. Wolfson (“Albinus and Plotinus,” HTR 45 [1952] 115–130, esp. 119–22) argues that Plotinus follows Alcinous (Enn. VI.7 [38] 36.7). For them both, the process of saying what something is not without saying what it is—ἀϕαίρεσιϛ—is tantamount to ἀπόϕασιϛ, negation, in its Aristotelian sense. Whittaker (“Negative Theology,” 122–23) disagrees concerning Alcinous but does see the strategy in Plotinus (e.g., Enn. VI.8 [39] 21). He is followed by John Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus (Philos. Antiq. 49; Leiden: Brill, 1988) 114–15, who rejects Mortley's sharp distinction between abstraction and negation (ibid., 195). See Mortley, Silence, 2:20–24, 56–57 for the relationship of ἀϕαίρεσιϛ to contemporary mathematical currents. Deirdre Carabine thinks, contra Mortley, that νοῦϛ does not predicate anything beyond νοῦϛ and is more of a via remotionis than a via negativa; mystical knowledge only emerges in Numenius and Plotinus (The Unknown God. Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena [LTPM 19; Peeters: Louvain, 1995], 80, 83). Zlatko Pleše agrees (Poetics of the Gnostic Universe. Narrative and Cosmology in the Apocryphon of John [NHMS 52; Leiden: Brill, 2006] 82–91).

38 Enn. V.5 [32] 6.9. “It is certainly none of the things of which it is origin; it is of such a kind, though nothing can be predicated of it, not being, not substance, not life, as to be above all of these things” (τὸ ὐπὲρ πάντα αὐτῶν). Enn. III.8 [30] 10.27–31; see also VI.7 [38] 32; VI.9 [9] 3.41–55; VI.9 [9] 6 passim; see also the anonymous Turin commentary—Anon. Comm. Parm (Hadot) XIII.23, 2:108–109, XIV.1–4, 2:108–109.

39 Enn. I.6 [1] 1.7; see also his injunction, ἄϕελε πάντα, at the conclusion of V.3 [49]; see also I.6 [1] 8.25–26; VI.3 [44] 19; VI.7 [38] 34–35, 38; VI.8 [39] 8.13–16, 20–22; for its relative utility to kataphasis and silence, VI.8 [39] 11.34–36; see Whittaker, “Negative Theology,” 123. Plotinus's negative theology is largely epistemological. References to alienation and otherness (I.6 [1] 5, I.8 [51] 14, etc.) are not concerned with the One. Raoul Mortley, “Negative Theology and Abstraction in Plotinus,” AJP 96 (1975) 363–77, esp. 375; Whittaker, “Negative Theology,” 123–24. However, Bussanich points out that the process is no less “existential” than negation (Plotinus, 195).

40 As for example Enn. VI.7 [38] 41.12–17; VI.8 [39] 15; VI.9 [9] 2.36–39.

41 Mortley, “Plotinus,” 377; idem, From Word to Silence, 2:19, where the process is contrasted with Proclus's more apophatic approach; also ibid., 48–56. In ibid., 27, Plotinus is charged with eschewing “systematic stage-by-stage deconstruction of entities.” Carlos Steel is in full agreement (“Beyond the Principle of Contradiction? Proclus's Parmenides and the Origin of Negative Theology,” in Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag [ed. Martin Pickavé; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003] 585).

42 Turner focuses on the “but” clause always being positive: “but it is something else above, beyond, superior to the previously negated predications” (“Setting,” 185). See idem, “Gnosticism and Platonism,” 450–51, with reference to Enn. VI.9 [9] 3; see also idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 204; idem, Platonic Tradition, 668; idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 120–22.

43 See also NHC XI,3.47.9–48.2, 48.8–32, 63.17–21, 65.30–33; Anon. Comm. Parm. (Hadot) XIV.26–34, 2:112–113; Plotinus does occasionally experiment with paradoxical language (Enn. V.5 [32] 7.36: ἔνδον ἄρα ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἔνδον αὖ [not negative theology but a description of the “oscillation between within and without” prior too union. See Bussanich, Plotinus, 139]; Enn. V.5 [32] 7.29–30). See also Finamore, “Iamblichus,” 236–38; Turner, “Gnosticism and Platonism,” 431–32.

44 King (Revelation, 97–98) recalls Plotinus (Enn. V.1 [10] 7.18-27, VI.7 [38] 17—“formless form”; one should add Iamblichus, On the Mysteries [ed. and trans. Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon, and Jackson P. Hershbell; WGW 4; Atlanta: SBL, 2003] I.7.21.15: divine nature is “formless [ἀνείδεον] so as to not be bounded by form” and Whittaker (“Transcendent Absolute,” 77), notes that Plotinus's One transcends opposites (transcendence #2) without combining them (transcendence #1), since the predicates listed are not really opposites but privative qualities. However, such expressions are not terribly common in Plotinus, even when he discusses abstraction, and King elsewhere (Revelation, 165) recognizes Allogenes's synthesis of opposites as extreme. Porphyry does discuss ἀϕαίρεσιϛ, but in contexts outside of negative theology. See, for example, Sententiae (ed. Erich Lamberz; Teubner: Leipzig, 1975) chs. 32, 43. As Bechtle observes, the negative theology of the anonymous commentary resembles that of the Alcinous more than Plotinus's or Proclus's (Anonymous Commentary, 242–47); see also the more general discussion of Saffrey, “Connaissance et inconnaissance,” 8–9. Finally, Zostrianos also occasionally uses paradox, yet neither in a systematic fashion (NHC VIII,1. 65.21-66.7, 118.4; on 74.16–8, see below, n. 83) or even a negative theological context (21.5–7, on the omnipresence of souls).

45 These would include his treatises On the Gods, The Chaldean Theology, and so forth. See John Dillon in Iamblichus, Iamblichi Chalcidensis. In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta (ed. and trans. J. Dillon; Leiden: Brill, 1973) 23–25. Given Iamblichus's proclivity for discussing supra-rational faculties and techniques in ritual contexts (e.g., de Mysteriis.; see for example, Gregory Shaw, “After Aporia: Theurgy in Later Platonism,” in Turner and Majercik, 74–82), it is difficult to imagine that he showed no interest in the negative theology of his predecessors, or that Proclus's apophatic advances beyond Plotinus are entirely unique to him. “The emphasis on not-knowing in theurgy suggests that it was integrally related to negative theology.” (idem, “Theurgy: Rituals of Unification in the Neoplatonism of Iamblichus,” Traditio 41 [1985] 1–28, 18)

46 See for example Eric. R. Dodds in Proclus, Elements of Theology (ed. and trans. Eric R. Dodds; Oxford: Clarendon, 1963) xxii–xxiii; Wallis, Neoplatonism, 142, 145, 153–55. Proclus does engage—and disagree with—Iamblichus's Parmenides commentary at length, but on the generation of gods, not negative theology. See Carlos Steel, “Iamblichus and the Theological Interpretation of the Parmenides,” SyllClass 8 (1997) 15–30; John Dillon, “Porphyry and Iamblichus in Proclus' Commentary on the Parmenides,” in Gonimos: Neoplatonic and Byzantine Studies presented to Leendert G. Westerink at 75 (ed. John Duffy and John Peradotto; Buffalo: Arethusa, 1988).

47 See his notion of “hyper-negation,” as mentioned at Comm. Parm. 1172.35. Morrow and Dillon (ibid., 523 n. 33) note that the ὐπεραπόϕασιϛ is of Stoic provenance and simply results in an affirmation (∼P = P), while for Proclus it reflects the transcendence of opposites. See also Steel, “Negatio Negationis,” 362–63; Wallis, Neoplatonism, 150–51; Proclus, Comm. Parm. 1172.35, 1076.10–12; idem, Théologie platonicienne (ed. and trans. Henri-Dominique Saffrey and Leendert G. Westerink; 6 vols.; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1967–1997) 1:12, 57.21–24; ibid., 2:10–12, 61–73, but esp. 2:10, 63.18–64.5 [trans. mine]:

the manner of negations (άποϕασέων) in question is thus transcendent, primordial, having exceeded the whole universe by an unknowable and ineffable superiority of simplicity. And it is necessary, having attributed to the first God the aforementioned manner, to next sort out the negations themselves; for it could have no “name or description,” says the Parmenides [142a3]. But if there is no proposition of this sort, it is clear that there is not a negation (for everything is posterior to the One, not only the objects of knowledge but knowledges and the instruments of knowledge themselves) and an impossibility appears, so to speak, at the end of the hypothesis. For if there is no single discourse on the subject of the One, the present discourse itself, which submits these theses is not germane to the One. Furthermore, it's no surprise if someone, wanting to make the ineffable known by means of a discourse, leads the discourse into an impossibility, since all knowledge which is applied to an object of knowledge with which it is not really concerned, dissolves its own force.

48 The language of πίστιϛ is used to describe reading the Parmenides in the context of union with the One at idem, Comm. Parm. VI.1241.42K; for the “theurgic virtue,” see idem, Plat. Theo. 1:25. For analysis, see Rist, “Mysticism and Transcendence,” 224; idem, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 231–46; Dylan Burns, “Proclus and the Theurgic Liturgy of Pseudo-Dionysius,” Dionysius 22 (2004) 111–32, 118–21.

49 “It is with silence, then, that he [the negative theologian or theurgist] brings to completion the study of the One” (Proclus, Comm. Parm. VII.1242.76K).

50 As at Enn. VI.8 [39] 11.1–5 and the conclusion of VI.9 [9].

51 Iamblichus's defense of theurgy “results in a kind of positive theology, but one based on henological ineffability rather than ontological perfection” (Shaw, “Rituals of Unification,” 18). For dating of Iamblichus's “Porphyrian” period to 280–305 C.E. (i.e., after De myst., ca. 280) see Dillon in Iamblichus, Iamb. Chal., 18–19; he dates De myst. later (early fourth century?) in “Iamblichus of Chalcis,” ANRW II:36.2 (1986) 862–909, esp. 875.

52 Rist, “Mysticism,” 219; Armstrong, “Plotinus,” in Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (ed. Arthur H. Armstrong; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 259–60; idem, in Plotinus, Enn. V p. 135 n. 1. Plotinus admits that even the greatest philosophers can only prepare themselves for the vision of the One, a preparation that culminates in passivity. See Enn. V.5 [32] 8.3–6; V.8. [31] 11.2; but cf. V.5 [32] 12.33–35; Pierre Hadot, Plotinus. Or the Simplicity of Vision (trans. Michael Chase; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998] 57; Zeke Mazur, “Unio Magica: Part II: Plotinus, Theurgy, and the Question of Ritual,” Dionysius 22 (2004) 29–56, 40–42, esp. n. 43.

53 This jargon is, as far as I can tell, unsystematic; : NHC XI,3.59.31–32, 61.2, 61.17-19; : 59.29–32, 61.16, 63.30, 67.26; 64.10–11.

54 Ibid., 63.9–16. “Invisible Spirit” seems to designate “the Unknowable” (ibid., 66.16 and 66.30–38, cited in King, Unknowable God, 19) in terms of its relationship to the generation of the plurality. See also Turner “Introduction: Allogenes,” 52–56.

55 NHC XI,3.64.10–23. Turner (Platonic Tradition, 688; “Introduction: Allogenes,” 99, 187; fol-lowed by Scopello, L—allogéne, 229) inserts “whether one sees” (a “solution problématique d—une difficulté qui persiste”—Funk [ibid., 228]) before , concluding that “to equate him with either knowledge or non-knowledge is to miss the goal of ones' quest.” King (Revelation, 169) and Layton (Scriptures, 147) translate the statement as questions: “how is it unknowable …?”

56 With Corrigan, “Platonism and Gnosticism,” 159, esp. n. 65.

57 Turner (Platonic Tradition, 689) recalls Enn. III.8 [30] 11 (see also Corrigan, “Matter,” 44 n. 77), VI.9 [9] 6.43–45, V.3 [49] 12–13, cited by Turner, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 208–9). All three passages refer not to a supracognitive contemplative faculty but the Good's lack of need of Intellect (or anything else), contra, probably, Origen the Platonist (for whose doctrine of an intelligible demiurge as First Principle see Proclus, Comm. Tim. 1:303.27–29; idem, Comm. Parm. I.635–638 [per Morrow and Dillon in ibid., xxvi–xxvii]; Proclus, Plat. Theo. 2:4; Saffrey and Westerink, x–xii). See also the debate between Anthony C. Lloyd (“Non-Propositional Thought—an Enigma of Greek Philosophy,” PAS 70 [1969–1970] 261–74; idem, “Non-Propositional Thought in Plotinus,” Phronesis 31 [1986] 258–65) and Richard Sorabji (“Myths about Non-Propositional Thought,” in idem, Time, Creation, and the Continuum. Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983]) on the “non-propositional” thought in Plotinus's conception of νοῦϛ, which, according to Lloyd (“Plotinus,” 264; see also idem, “Enigma,” 286), implies “thought without language.” Sorabji (“Non-Propositional Thought,” 152–54) responds that it is not a kind of thought at all. Either way, the noetic faculty in question is not ineffable but tautological. We do find Plotinus using language not entirely alien to “learned ignorance”: the One is known by “simple intuition (ἐπιβολῇ ἀθρόᾳ),” which is akin, “if not identical to, the One's self-directed activity” (Enn. III.8 [30] 9.21. For discussion see Rist, Plotinus, 47–51; Bussanich, Plotinus, 94–95, for Epicurean provenance, Plotinian parallels, and reception). See also προσβολή (III.8 [30] 10.33), ἀπομαντεύσασθαι (VI.7 [38] 29.22), and ὐπερνόησιϛ (VI.8 [39] 16.33), a property of the One, not a mystic. The intellect attempting to conceive “that which is beyond” continually draws itself back into multiplicity (V.3 [49] 11.1–4), so it must “let go of learning” (VI.7 [38] 36.15–16; see also III.8 [30] 9.28–32) and is “filled with wonder” if it practices ἀϕαίρεσιϛ (III. 8 [30] 10.31). See also above, n. 39, 40. In toto, Plotinus sees contemplation of the One as taking place beyond intellect, and in this he is in agreement with Allogenes (and many other contemporary Platonists); he differs on terminology, both in his refusal to systematize it and to embrace paradoxical expression, and this is a significant difference.

58 Porphyry, Sent. ch. 10, line 4; ch. 25, line 15 (“While a great deal can be said after the fashion of Intellect concerning that which is beyond Intellect, nonetheless it is better contemplated by means of a certain absence of Intellect than by intellection”[trans. mine]), ch. 26, line 15; Porphyry in Theosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta (ed. Harmut Erbse; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1995) ch. 65, line 183, cited in Saffrey, “Connaissance et inconnaissance,” 16; Anon. Comm. Parm. (Hadot) 2:27–31; 2:70; V.7–15, 2:78; VI.10–12, 2:82; IX.24–26, 2:94; Chaldean Oracles (ed. and trans. Ruth Majercik; SGRR 5; Leiden: Brill, 1989) fr. 1; see also Wallis, Neoplatonism, 114–16; Turner “Introduction: Allogenes,” 99–102, 155–60; Turner, Platonic Tradition, 689; Turner, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 209–10; Majercik, “Gnosticism,” 283–86.

59 Iamblichus, De myst. II.11.96, II.11.98.6–10; idem, Comm. Parm (Dillon) frgs. 2A, 2B; Proclus, Comm. Tim. 3:296; idem, Comm. Chald. (in Oracles Chaldaïques [ed. Édouard des Places; Paris: Les belles lettres, 1971]) IV.153.20, IV.156.23, IV.157.28; Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (SPP 8; Leiden: Brill, 1978) 119–21 n. 200; idem, Parallelograms, 192 n. 36; Christian Guérard, “L—hyparxis de l—âme et la fleur et l—intellect dans la mystagogie de Proclus,” in Proclus, Lecteur et Interpréte des Anciens (ed. Jean Pépin and Henri-Dominique Saffrey; Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1987) 336–40, 344; Sarah Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: Non-Discursive Thinking in the Thought of Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 178–80; Anne Sheppard, “Proclus' Attitude to Theurgy,” CQ 32 (1982) 212–24, esp. 221; Majercik, “Reconsiderations,” 284–85.

60 For a late second-century dating of the Oracles, see Iamblichus in Chald. Or., 1–2; des Places in Or. Chald., 7–11. For a status quaestionis on (and rejection of) the Oracles— influence on Plotinus, see Ruth Majercik, “The Chaldean Oracles and the School of Plotinus,” Anc W 29 (1998) 91–105; for a response asserting Plotinian knowledge of the oracles, see John Finamore, “Plotinus, Psellus, and the Chaldean Oracles: A Reply to Majercik,” Anc W 29 (1998) 107–10. For the debate over dating the Turin commentary, see above, n. 10.

61 For which see Anon. Comm. Parm. (Hadot) V.34, II:82. See Turner, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 155, who highlights the similarities between the doctrines of learned ignorance in these two texts and speculates that “the author of Allogenes had consulted the anonymous Parmenides Commentary (or one similar to it) not only in matters of his triadic metaphysics, but also for his epistemological doctrine.”

62 NHC XI,3.63.28–31b [italics mine]. Turner (Platonic Tradition, 686) here recalls Anon. Comm. Parm. (Hadot) IX.20–26, 2:94–95, X.25–29, 2:96–97.

63 Although the luminaries warn the seeker not to conceive of it as knowledge at all. But see also King (Revelation, 170), who holds that NHC XI,3.64.16–21 precludes the possibility of any knowledge about God whatsoever. Thus, the primary revelation of the unknowable can only be privative. The problem depends on whether Allogenes's author considers in this passage to include .

64 Self-reflexive unknowable knowledge is predicated of the Unknowable One as part of the greater negative theological “primary revelation” beginning at ibid., 60.37–61.14. For the identification of subject and object of thought, see Aristotle, De Anima 3.2 425b–426a26, 3.8 431b28–432a1, working from Physics 3.3; following the discussion of Sorabji, ”Non-Propositional Thought,” 144–47. Indeed, following this onto-epistemological breakdown Allogenes shifts back to kataphatic statements with privative value: the Invisible Spirit is “a breathless and boundless place,” (NHC XI,3.66.23–25) “it receives all, tranquil, standing still” (ibid., 66.28–30). Indeed, “it is from that one who stands still forever that eternal life appeared” (ibid., 66.30b-33). See also Williams, Immovable Race, 86–96. The phrases about “standing still” and “the immovable race” may both refer to internal, contemplative practices stemming from the Jewish apocalyptic motif of standing still in a court before God.

65 Gersh, Parallelograms, 193.

66 Turner, Platonic Tradition, 662, with reference to Plotinus, Enn. III.8 [30] 8, V.4 [7] 2.46; Porphyry, Sent. chs. 40, 51–56: “the contemplation of entities on ever higher ontological levels is characterized as a form of the contemplator's self-knowledge, suggesting that the consciousness of the knowing subject is actually assimilated to the ontological character of the level that one intelligizes at any given point. Having becomes inactive, still, and silent, indeed incognizant even of himself, he has taken on the character of the Unknowable One, and is one with the object of his vision.” See also Turner, Platonic Tradition, 664; idem, “Setting,” 214; idem, “Gnosticism and Platonism,” 448; idem, “Introduction: Marsanés,” 147–48; idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 119–31; idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 97; with focus on the textual aspect of the assimilation, see King, Unknowable God, 56.

67 NHC XI,3.59.37, 60.24, 66.22 passim; see also Plotinus, Enn. V.5 [32] 4.8–11.

68 During union, “it is absolutely impossible, nor has it (intellect) time, to speak; but it is afterwards that it is able to reason (συλλογίζεσθαι) about it” (Enn. V.3 [49] 17.26–28). This of course is exactly what he does at VI.9 [9] 11; see also VI.8 [39] 19.

69 Uttering a performative “is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it; it is to do it.” (John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962] 6) See also Catherine Bell, Ritual (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 68–70; Roy A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (CSSCA 110; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 113–14; cf. the caution of Jonathan Z. Smith, “Great Scott! Thought and Action One More Time,” in Magic and Ritual in the Ancient World (ed. P. Mirecki and M. Meyer; RGRW 141; Leiden: Brill, 2002) 90.

70 Specifically, Corpus Hermeticum XIII. See Richard Reitzenstein, Hellenischen Mysterienreligionen. Nach ihren Grundgedanken und Wirkungen (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1956) 51–52, 64. See also Turner, who recalls Reitzenstein in the context of the diagrams of the Book of Jeu and Marsanes (“Ritual in Gnosticism,” in Turner and Majercik's Gnosticism, 124; idem “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 74, respectively).

71 Particularly striking, on this reading, is Allogenes's appropriation of the apocalyptic cliché of book-burial. See Francis T. Fallon, “The Gnostic Apocalypses,” Semeia 14 (1979) 123–58, 125; examples include but are not limited to 1 Enoch 81, 93, 106, 2 Enoch 54, 4 Ezra 12:35-39. At the end of the text, the protagonist is told to write down the revelation (i.e., the text we have just read) and store it in a mountain: “[It] said [to] me, ‘write down [whatever] I shall tell you and remind you about, for the sake of those who will, after you, be worthy.’ And you shall place this book upon a mountain, and you shall invoke the guardian of death, Phriktos (‘dreadful one’)” (NHC XI,3.68.16–23). See NHC II,1.31.28–34 (Ap. John), NHC IV,2.80 (Gos. Eg.), NHC V,5.85 (Apoc. Adam), NHC VI,6.68 (Og. and Enn.). How better to finish a book-mystery than describe the fate of the book being read? The motif is re-constellated to describe, perhaps, the safeguarding of our own self-reflexive text. However, any reading of this section of the document can only be provisional, given the mutilated state of the manuscript.

72 Although baptismal language in the ascent texts is often retained, esp. in Zostrianos. See John D. Turner, “Sethian Gnosticism: A Literary History,” in Nag Hammadi, Gnosticism, and Early Christianity (ed. Charles W. Hedrick and Robert Hodgson, Jr.; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1986) 59; idem, “Ritual,” esp. 96–97, 128–31; idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 71–75; idem, “Introduction: Marsanés,” 49–54, 164–68; idem, Platonic Tradition, 64, 80–84, 238–47; more generally on the five seals, see Schenke, “Phenomenon,” 599–607; Rasimus, “Paradise,” 242–45; Alastair H.B. Logan, “The Mystery of the Five Seals: Gnostic Initiation Reconsidered,” VC 51 (1997) 188–206. The standard work on Sethian ritual in general is Jean-Marie Sevrin, Le dossier baptismal séthien. Études sur la sacramentaire gnostique (BCNH Études 2; Québec, Laval University Press, 1986).

73 Verbal theurgy for Iamblichus deals primarily with the names of the Gods as anagogically efficacious συνθήματα. (Iamblichus, De myst. I.12.42.5–13, VII.4.254.9–256.2; see also Shaw, Theurgy, 175–77, 189–215).

74 See esp. Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 173–81; for verbal συνθήματα see Proclus, Comm. Chald. I.148.16–19, V.159.8–11. More generally, see Sheppard, “Theurgy,” 223–24; Robert M. van den Berg, Proclus' Hymns: Essays, Translation, Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 2001) 79–81; Werner Beierwaltes, Proklos: Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik (Leiden: Brill, 1965) 327; Carine van Lieferringe, La Théurgie. Des Oracles Chaldaïques à Proclus (Kernos Supplément 9; Liége: Centre international d—étude de la religion grecque antique, 1999) 263–64 (emphasizing the break with Plotinus). See also Proclus, Plat. Theo. 4:11.19–20 on the συνθήματα νόητα through which the hypercosmic gods are known.

75 With Gersh, Parallelograms, 192, n. 236: “one is tempted to speculate further on the relation between the performative and negative theology in the context of Neoplatonic theurgy.”

76 Iamblichus, Comm. Parm. (Dillon) frgs. 2A, 2B; Proclus, Comm. Chald. IV.153.20, IV.156.23, IV.157.28; Rist, “Mysticism and Transcendence,” 215–18, 224; Dillon in Iamblichus, in Plat. Dia. 389–92. For possible Plotinian antecedents, see Mazur, “Unio Magica: Part II,” 47–51.

77 King, Unknowable God, 29; “The Triply Powered One of Zostrianos and Allogenes corres-ponds almost precisely to the prefigurative existence of the (anonymous) commentary's ‘Second One’ in the First” (Turner, Platonic Tradition, 725; for more see idem, “Introduction: Marsanés,” 90–102; idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 81–94). The term seems to have been of Gnostic coinage, used in Platonic circles only rarely and late (Majercik, “Triad,” 480–81).

78 NHC XI,3.59.4–9.

79 See the oft-quoted remark of Damascius, Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo II (ed. Leendert G. West-erink; Amsterdam, 1977) 105.

80 See Turner, “Introduction: Marsanés,” 231–34; idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 72–75; idem, Platonic Tradition, 614–33.

81 For the shared source (a Parmenides commentary) of Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1.13–66.11; 66.14–68.13; 75.12–21) and Marius Victorinus Adversus Arium (Marius Victorinus: Traités théologiques sur la Trinité [ed. Paul Henry; trans. Pierre Hadot; Sources Chrétiennes 68–69; Paris, 1960] 1:49.9–40; 50.10–6, 50.7–10, 50.5–8; I:50.18–21, respectively), see Tardieu, “Formation”; Pierre Hadot, “Porphyre et Victorinus: Questions et hypothéses,” ResOr 9 (1996) 117–25; Turner, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 76–77; “Commentary: Zostrianos,” in Zostrien, 579–608 (ed. Barry et al.); idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 141–54; idem, “Gnostic Sethians,” 42–51; idem, “Victorinus,” 72–79. Tardieu (“Formation,” 100–1) and Saffrey (“Connaissance et inconnaissance,” 4–5) point out that the Turin commentary has a line (IX.1–4, 2:90–93) which draws from Chald. Or. fr. 3 and the source (Adv. Ar. 1:50.10; NHC VIII,1.66.14–20) common to Marius Victorinus and Zostrianos (for which see Tardieu, “Formation.”). Perhaps it was written by Numenius, as argued by Tardieu (ibid., 112) and Luc Brisson, “The Platonic Background of the Apocalypse of Zostrianos,” in Traditions of Platonism (ed. John J. Cleary; Aldershot: Ashgate, 1990) 179–82; Corrigan (“Platonism and Gnosticism,” 156) suggests Cronius. See also Bechtle, Anonymous Commentary, 237–42.

82 Turner (“Gnostic Sethians and Middle Platonism,” 48) points out that Adversus Arium and Allogenes both hold that the One is “without existence, life, or intellect” (1:49.17–18; NHC XI,3.61.36–37), and that the One's power of existence contains the “powers of life and blessedness” (1:50.12–15; NHC XI,3.49.26–37). Thus “a similar—if not identical'source may have been available also the author of Allogenes” (“Gnostic Sethians and Middle Platonism,” 48–49; see also idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 149–54; idem, “Victorinus,” 76–79).

83 Adversus Arium, 1:50.16–17 (“non-existent existence”), an interesting example because it crops up among the epithets for the transcendent drawn from the shared source with Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1.75.13–25; as Turner, “Gnostic Sethians,” 45, and Brisson, “Apocalypse of Zostrianos,” 176, observe, the text is distinctively Middle Platonic). Whether the paradoxical epithet belongs to Victorinus himself or the source he shares with Allogenes cannot be determined, since lines following the source in the latter (NHC XI,3.50.1–5) are badly mutilated; however the narrative turn in the text (49.38–39) seems to depart from a context where such an epithet would be appropriate. Regardless, it clearly does not come from the source shared with Zostrianos.

84 Epiphanius, Panarion ch. 39.5.1, assigned to Sethians; ibid., ch. 40.2.2, assigned to Archontics; see also the Archontic books named for the “foreigners,” the sons of Seth. (ibid., ch. 40.7.4–5)

85 For commentary and translation see Turner, “Allogenes the Stranger”; for text see The Gospel of Judas: Critical Edition (ed. and trans. R. Kasser et al.; Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2007).

86 Which of these—if any—are those known to Epiphanius and, perhaps, Theodore bar Konai (who knows a “Book of the Foreigners” [Kt āv ā d—nukroye] and an “Apocalypse of the Foreigners” [Gelyoneh d—nukroye] Text: Librum Scholiorum [ed. Addai Scher; Louvain: Impr. orientaliste L. Durbecq, 1954] ch. LXIII, 319.29-320.26; trans.: Livre des scolies [recension de Se’ert] [trans. Robert Hespel and René Draguet; CSCO 431–32; Louvain: Peeters, 1981–1982] LXIII, 238–39; cit. Henri-Charles Puech, “Fragments retrouvés de l—Apocalypse d—Allogéne,” in idem, La Gnose]) is hard to say. Puech (ibid., 284, 294) suggests that Plotinus, Epiphanius, and bar Konai were all dealing with the same body of texts, originating among the Sethians and Archontics and ending up in the hands of the Audiani (for whom see idem, “Audianer,” in RAC 1 [1950] cols. 910–15). After the Nag Hammadi discovery, Puech indicated (“Plotin,” 92) a shared text between one of Theodore's fragments and NHC II,3.89.3–4, Reality of the Rulers (in Nag Hammadi codex II, 2–7 : together with XIII, 2*, Brit. Lib. Or.4926(1), and P.OXY. 1, 654, 655 [ed. Bentley Layton: Leiden: BNNS 20; Brill, 1989]), namely, the archon's suggestion to rape Eve: “come, let us sow our seed in her.” As Rasimus (“Paradise,” 116 n. 57) notes, bar Konai (II.79) mentions snake-worshippers (i.e., Ophites) who deal with typically Ophite theriomorphic archons. The complex of Sethian (bar Konai's Apocalypse of the Foreigners, and, more widely, the tradition of writing books ascribed to Allogenes), Archontic (Epiphanius's testimony that Seth and his sons are called “foreigners” with eponymously titled books), Ophite (bar Konai's snake-worshippers), and, in Rasimus's nomenclature, Barbeloite-Ophite (Reality of the Rulers) “mythologoumena,”of interest, awaits further study.

87 As do Edwards, “Intelligible Triad,” 25; Majercik, “Triad,” 488.

88 See for example Corrigan, “Matter,” 44 n. 77; Mazur, “Unio Magica: Part II”; Theo G. Sinnige, “Gnostic influence in the Early Works of Plotinus and in Augustine,” in Plotinus amid Gnostics and Christians: Papers presented at the Plotinus Symposium Held at the Free University, Amsterdam on 25 January 1984 (ed. David Runia; Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1984).

89 With Williams, “Negative Theologies,” 290. For surveys see Bernard McGinn, The Found-ations of Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1991); Carabine, Unknown God.

90 Important texts include Jacques Derrida, On The Name (ed. Thomas Dutoit; trans. David Wood, John P. Leavy, Jr., and Ian McLeod; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); idem, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Derrida and Negative Theology (ed. H. Coward and T. Foshay; Albany: SUNY Press, 1992); John Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (ISPR; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); Jean-Luc Marion, “In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of ‘Negative Theology’,” in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism (ed. John Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon; ISPR; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric, and Truth (ed. Wayne J. Hankey and Douglas Hedley; Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999). For analysis from the Neoplatonic angle, see Gersh, Parallelograms.

91 See Alan B. Scott, “Churches or Books?: Sethian Social Organization,” JECS 3 (1995) 109–22. The importance of genre for determining the social character of Sethianism in its Neoplatonic context remains to be determined.

* This article is a revision of “Apophatic Strategies in Allogenes (NHC XI,3),” delivered to the Society of Biblical Literature in San Diego, California, 17 November 2007. The author is indebted to the criticisms and suggestions of the SBL panel and audience, the anonymous reviewers of HTR, and discussions with Harold Attridge, Bentley Layton, John D. Turner, and Tuomas Rasimus.