The task that M. took upon himself, the reconstruction of Aristotle's lost Homeric Problems, is far from congenial. To begin with, even the titles and subtitles of Aristotle's lost work on Homer are a source of problems, since it is not always clear whether they refer to the same text. Add to this the usual problems of reconstructing an ancient text on the basis of extremely fragmentary evidence, most of which has already been collected by V. Rose, in volume 3 of his Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta (1886), and by O. Gigon, in his volume 3 of Aristotle's work, entitled Librorum Deperditorum Fragmenta (1987). What might be considered as at least partially new are some bits and pieces gleaned from the works that did reach us, first and foremost the Poetics, mainly Chapter 25 (dedicated to the discussion of various objections to Homer and their possible solutions) and Chapter 21 (dealing with questions of language). There are also some direct references to Homer in Aristotle's History of Animals and Rhetoric. Taken together, this material can hardly be regarded as a promising goldmine for researchers.

Not surprisingly, nobody is more aware of the daunting prospects of the project than M. himself, whose meticulous research might be regarded as an absolute rejection of any possibility whatsoever to add a significant fragment to the reconstruction of the lost text, let alone a substantial section. Time and again M. points out the speculative nature of his own suggestions. Thus, for example: ‘There are no examples among the fragments of the Homeric Problems of Aristotle discussing lengthened or shortened forms, or using them to solve problems or answer criticisms. Nevertheless, there are discussions among ancient critics about [this topic]. … I think it possible (if not probable) that Aristotle took part in such discussions and debates, or addressed such issues’ (pp. 112–13). Or, in another, subtler formulation: ‘Why did Homer sometimes refer to a bull of five years, but elsewhere to one of nine seasons? If Aristotle did discuss this in his Homeric Problems, it would seem that his solution was that this was no contradiction at all’ (p. 59) In the case of his usage of the Rhetoric, M. is the first to admit how problematic the evidence is and how uncertain its connection with the Homeric Problems is: ‘I examine what I believe are the most promising of these references [from the Rhetoric] and argue that they likely provide additional evidence about the content of the Homeric Problems. Or at the very least, they give us a better idea of how Aristotle would have approached some of the debates engaged in by Homeric scholars in antiquity’ (p. 75). And on another occasion he frankly confesses ignorance: ‘If this was a problem that Aristotle discussed in his Homeric Problems (e.g. Why did Homer call the Scamander Xanthus? …), what might his solution have been? This is unclear’ (p. 54, original emphasis).

And yet, paradoxically, it is precisely this avowal of the problematic that gives M.’s book its strength and consequently its value. For although we cannot learn much more than we already know about Aristotle's lost book, we do learn a lot about Aristotle's conception of Homer. A good example is the in-depth analysis of Aristotle's dealing with the problem of the meaning of the word τάλαντον in Iliad 23.262–70. In this passage δύο τάλαντα are the prize Achilles nominates for the fourth place in the chariot race in the funeral games in honour of Patroclus, a prize that seems, at first sight, to be much greater than the prizes nominated for the first and second places. M. disentangles the convoluted presentation of this problem and the solution in the Scholia, a result of either a conflation or a compression of two possible solutions, both probably offered by Aristotle: (1) that the value of the talent was different during the time of Homer than it was during the time of Aristotle, and (2) that in Homer's epics the talent designates a somewhat vague conception of measure (of either weight or worth), rather than a concrete one. Also very illuminating are the comments on the meaning of Iliad 11.385, where the word κέρας (literally ‘horn’) can mean, metaphorically, either ‘hair’, ‘bow’ or ‘penis’. Another interesting point is the dialogical nature of Aristotle's criticism of Homer: his own (implicit) dialogue with his contemporaries and the explicit dialogue with Aristotle as formulated by later critics of Homer, ancient critics such as Aristarchus and Eustathius as well as modern interpreters of Homer.

No doubt, all the above important contributions to the specific topics under discussion enhance our understanding of both Homer and Aristotle. Yet, additionally, they shed an interesting light on the fruitful interchange between literature and philosophy in ancient times. Not only does M.’s book indicate, once again, the importance of poetry, in general, and Homer's poetry, in particular, to the famous ancient philosopher, but it also points out the role of poetry and poets in shaping the range, and, even more significantly, the nature of the philosophical field. The mere fact that the task of an ancient philosopher included a thorough consideration of the two pillars of poetry, poetics and rhetoric, had been a truth universally acknowledged already at the dawn of Greek thought. But what is less perceptible, and becomes more and more so as one goes along M.’s text, is the fact that poetics and rhetoric, as perceived and realized by a great poet, is indispensable for the work of a great philosopher. And the reason for that is not confined to the historical limits of the beginning of the debate between the two disciplines, namely, to that ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, where the former, which preceded the latter, was one of the main branches of ancient education. Rather, it is the nature of philosophy itself, being a field of research absolutely dependent on language, and not just as an unavoidable and obligatory means for the expression of philosophical ideas and ideals, but, and much more important, as the core of the essence of philosophy, of its very being as a vehicle conveying truth and Truth. It was precisely for that reason that Plato, always the hysterical, prescribed banishment to the poets from his ideal state. The rational Aristotle, in contrast, sought a different venue. Unlike his former teacher, he did not reject poetry, but tried to recruit it for his own needs, and therefore probably – for even after M.’s extensive study we cannot know for sure – Homeric Problems was one of the most impressive manifestations of Aristotle's efforts to go along with this line of thought.