Simon describes this book as “the middle rung of a trilogy” dealing with minority rights in political philosophy and international law (Simon 2012: x). The book aims to find a conceptual link between his earlier work on justice and his attempt to provide a philosophically appealing account of the international framework to prevent genocide. The book itself is divided into six parts. The first part provides an account of concrete instances of injustice, setting the stage for the development of a theory of minority rights in later chapters. The second and the fourth parts carry out the heavy-lifting and provide the most original arguments.
The central thesis of this book, developed in the second part, is that political theory should begin with a theory of injustice. Simon argues, first, that it is easier to provide a theory of injustice than a theory of justice and second, for what he calls the priority thesis—the priority of a theory of injustice over a theory of justice. A theory of injustice, he suggests, will accomplish a great deal of what we expect from political theory, without getting bogged down in issues of distributive justice, which Simon labels the central theme of contemporary Anglo-American political theory.
He argues that to be germane to the problems of the contemporary world, a theory of injustice must focus on race and ethnicity. The warrant for this claim is less than clear: surely extreme deprivation must count as injustice in some regard. Those living in extreme poverty as defined by the World Bank, it would seem, should be recognized as facing injustice, even if their poverty is not a product of race or ethnicity. Nevertheless, after problematizing previous definitions of race and ethnicity, Simon proposes his own solution to the problem of classification as it affects minority groups (69). Simon’s argument is quite simple: minorities are those groups of people on whom harm is perpetuated (81). Rather than adopting the definition offered of minorities from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which defines minorities in terms of size, and ethnic, linguistic, or religious composition (Article 27), he argues that the relevant question is a functional one: who is oppressed and how (61)?
Simon uses this definition in the particularly interesting and original fourth section of the book, where he argues that law offers the best solution to the problem of minority protection. In domestic politics, different branches of government incorporate minority protections into their constituent statutes: the executive (as in Lebanon, where Christians find protection through a political compromise which grants them the right to hold the presidency), the legislative (as in Columbia, Croatia, Jordan, etc., where minorities are guaranteed a fixed number of seats) and through the judiciary (where, as in Canada, courts have been increasingly aggressive in protecting minority rights). Simon argues that executive and legislative solutions to minority discrimination are imperfect at best (119). Instead, it would be preferable for minorities to be protected through the legal system at the municipal and regional levels (e.g., through the European human rights systems). Simon’s argument runs as follows. First, the judiciary is preferable both because its decisions will by definition be less general and less blunt, and because it prioritizes fighting injustice over creating the conditions for the flourishing of minorities. Second, the judiciary, by its very nature, is more accessible to the powerless. Third, the judiciary is immune to the essentializing nature of group representations in legislatures (e.g., the tendency to treat members of group as a homogenous whole). This argument is less than convincing however. For the judiciary to play the role Simon envisages, certain rights must be guaranteed by the political system. In order words, the division of labor the author proposes is less clear cut than he makes it seem.
Next, Simon argues that, beyond the judiciary, the United Nations can play an important role in protecting minority rights, though not necessarily in its current form. Here the author is on the strongest ground. Against the rights-based model contained in the various covenants (viz. the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), he argues, repurposing his argument from previous sections, for a model of minority protection based on the prevention of group-based wrongs. Such a system begins with the Genocide Convention (141) and continues through the work of the Committee on the Eradication of Racial Discrimination at the United Nations. These legal institutions are at their most successful—and least pernicious—when they focus on preventing group harm, rather than defining group identities or granting them positive rights (170).
Simon concludes the fourth section by developing a theory of secession, as a remedial right against group harm, from the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (2010). Developing such a right from the much-criticized Kosovo Opinion is no easy task. That opinion—which basically side-stepped the question of whether Kosovo enjoyed a right to independence by ruling merely that Kosovo’s parliament violated no laws by declaring independence—would seem to offer little of use for political theory. Simon argues that underneath the limited answer provided by the ICJ is a more robust theoretical framework for the discussion of minority rights. In assessing a unilateral declaration of independence, a court must consider the following questions: 1) is there a state-like territory able to claim independence from the parent state, 2) has the claimant state attempted to (and been thwarted in) exercising independence, and 3) has the claimant state or a group therein been subject to violations of peremptory norms (181)? Simon argues that Kosovo’s declaration of independence is distinguishable, as a matter of international law, from other such declarations—first, because Kosovo was never legally integrated into Serbia but enjoyed, at least on paper, autonomous status, second, because Serbia, following the break-up of Yugoslavia, attempted to deny the inhabitants of Kosovo internal self-determination, and third, because there had been violations of jus cogens norms. On this reconstruction of the ICJ’s decision, international law provides a right to remedial secession. Simon concludes the book with a series of case studies in the fifth and six parts to illustrate how the theory might best be applied.
Overall, there is much to recommend in this book, even though it does not present a complete theory of injustice, because the examples Simon gives suggest that there is something to be gained by prioritizing gross injustices in our discussions. However, this is not to say that the book does not raise concerns. Simon sets up a strong, mostly undeserved, opposition between contemporary political philosophy and his own work. This opposition comes at least in part from the author’s problematic reading of Rawlsian and post-Rawlsian political theory—and what he purports to be his opposition thereto. For instance, Simon writes: “Rawls characterizes the least advantaged in economic terms, as the impoverished” (21), quoting Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (98). However, for a just political arrangement to get to the point of concerning itself with economic justice, it must be, at a minimum, at least in principle capable of being sufficiently well-ordered to satisfy both Rawlsian principles of justice, which must count as unlikely if a society is guilty of manifest injustice.
Nevertheless, I believe that Simon’s thesis could be reformulated to avoid these concerns. The book must surely count as an important contribution to a discussion of law’s responses to international crimes.
