INTRODUCTION
The Land Use Act (the Act) is a major and radical piece of legislation that governs title, ownership and enjoyment of land in Nigeria.Footnote 1 Before the Act, different tenurial systems operated in different parts of Nigeria: for instance, state control based on the certificate of occupancy system in northern Nigeria, and the received English estate system and customary land law in southern Nigeria. The Act supplanted these systems and established a unitary tenure for the whole country based on the statutory right of occupancy system. A previous article by the author examined the history, nature and provisions of the Act.Footnote 2 While that article considered the various forms of alienation under the Act and the comparative superiority of the mechanism of declarations of trust, this article explores the applicability of equitable principles in the interpretation of the Act. Particularly, it suggests that the principles of resulting and constructive trusts could beneficially be used to interpret the provisions of the Act.
TRUSTS BY OPERATION OF LAW WITHIN THE SCHEME OF THE LAND USE ACT
Before exploring the details of the rules of constructive and resulting trusts within the context of the Act, it must first be ascertained whether such trusts are compatible with the scheme of the Act.
Constructive and resulting trusts arise by operation of law, compared with express trusts which are intentionally created by the parties.Footnote 3 In other words, constructive and resulting trusts are not necessarily dependent on the deliberate (and express) intentions of the partiesFootnote 4 and would be considered by law to have arisen in certain recognizable circumstances.Footnote 5 While resulting trusts are the instruments through which equity evinces its suspicion of gifts, constructive trusts offer a tainted conscience an opportunity for moral regeneration.Footnote 6 But the question is whether these flexible and special creatures of equity are incompatible with the scheme of the Land Use Act. Can Nigerian judges use the principles of constructive and resulting trusts to interpret the provisions of the Act? If the Act expressly or impliedly excluded trusts that arise by operation of law, then that would be the end of the matter; the principles of these trusts would not be deployed in interpreting the Act, however beneficial it would have been to do so. However, the Act neither expressly deals with nor excludes the application of trusts that arise by operation of law. Consequently, the only question is whether such trusts are impliedly excluded by the legislation. An important consideration in the analysis is the presumptive rule that the legislature does not intend to repeal a rule of common law or equity except by express provisions. This means that a clear intention and express words are required for the abrogation of rules of common law and equity.Footnote 7 Nigerian courts have embraced this common law rule of construction.Footnote 8 Accordingly, since the Act does not expressly exclude trusts that arise by operation of law, the legislature cannot be presumed to have intended to abrogate the doctrines of constructive and resulting trusts in relation to the Act. Put differently, the Act cannot be said to be incompatible with constructive and resulting trusts.
Interpretation apart, there are provisions in the Act that are consistent with the recognition of trusts that arise by operation of law. For instance, while section 7 prohibits the grant or transfer of a statutory right of occupancy to a minor, it nevertheless permits such rights to be held in trust for the minor. Although section 7 contemplates an express (rather than an implied) trust, the minor can direct the trustee to hold on other trusts (a sort of sub-trust). Assuming such (sub-) trusts failed there would be a resulting trust for the minor. It is generally accepted that a resulting trust can arise from a failed express trust.Footnote 9 Of course, section 7 is not specifically concerned with a sub-trust by a minor, nor does it expressly say that a failure of such a sub-trust will lead to a resulting trust; however, the sub-trust hypothesis and its potential for a resulting trust (upon the failure of the sub-trust) certainly arise from the section's anticipation of an express trust for the benefit of a minor child. In other words, any sub-trust and resulting trust (as hypothesized above) would arise by operation of law. The result would be the same even in the absence of a sub-trust. For instance, a minor could pay the purchase price of land which is conveyed (with the governor's consent) to a trustee on (express) trust for the minor absolutely. In this case, the minor is both the settlor and the beneficiary. If the express trust failed, there can be no doubt that equity would interpose a resulting trust in favour of the minor. Similarly, the Act does not prohibit the alienation of land; it merely makes the consent of an appropriate authority a condition precedent to a valid alienation.Footnote 10 Therefore, provided there is proper consent, the Act does not prohibit express trust settlements that might lead to a resulting trust. This may occur as a result of the non-exhaustion of declared beneficial interests.Footnote 11 Nor does the Act prohibit the imposition of a constructive trust where it would be unconscionable for the owner of a right of occupancy to retain his or her beneficial interest in the grant. The point therefore is not only that the Act lacks express provisions excluding the operation of resulting and constructive trusts, but that some of its provisions are actually consistent with the application of these trusts.
Bucknor-Maclean v Inlaks Ltd (Bucknor-Maclean)Footnote 12 supports the proposition that the Act should be construed consistently with equitable principles. Although the case was decided under the Registration of Titles Act, Idigbe JSC responded to an important and relevant observation of the Supreme Court in the earlier case of Jaffar v Ladipo (Jaffar)Footnote 13 as to the applicability of equitable principles to real property statutes. In Jaffar the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that, since the Registration of Titles Act did not mention equitable interests but retained the registered owner as the proprietor until the registration of a transferee, the Registration of Titles Act failed to convert the interest of a transferee whose transfer was in the process of registration into an equitable interest. Regarding this proposition in Jaffar, Idigbe JSC observed in Bucknor-Maclean that, although the Registration of Titles Act “does not expressly convert the interest of a transferee whose transfer is in the process of registration (ie not registered) into an equitable interest, it nevertheless does not exclude the application of general principles (and, in particular, the doctrine of Walsh v Lonsdale) to such transactions”.Footnote 14 The decision in Jaffar was, thus, overruled by the Supreme Court in Bucknor-Maclean. By analogy, Idigbe JSC's reasoning is applicable to the interpretation of the Land Use Act. Thus, general principles of equity, including the doctrines of constructive and resulting trusts, can be used to interpret the provisions of the Act. More recently in Kotoye v Saraki (Kotoye)Footnote 15 the Supreme Court considered whether resulting and constructive trusts were excluded by the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 1991 (BOFI). In that case, there was a voluntary transfer of shares (without intending a gift) to a transferee who was subsequently registered as the owner of the shares. The transferor alleged that the transferee held the shares on (a resulting) trust for the transferor. The question was whether section 11 of BOFI precluded the transferor from alleging a resulting trust. That section provides: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or in any contract or instrument, no suit or other proceedings shall be maintained against any person registered as the holder of a share in a bank on the ground that the title to the said shares vests in any person other than the registered holder.”
The majority judgment delivered by Kutigi JSC opined that the transferor's claim for a declaration of beneficial entitlement to the shares was not caught by the provisions of BOFI. As suggested by the majority, BOFI was not applicable as the transferor did not challenge the transferee's legal title to the shares. Rather, the transferor relied upon his beneficial interests in the shares that arose in equity as a result of the voluntary transfer. The majority observed that the transferor's beneficial (or equitable) interest through a resulting trust was not excluded by BOFI: “We must not forget that a constructive trust, as in this case,Footnote 16 is imposed by equity on the ground of conscience and it is not based on the prior or presumed intention of the parties. I would like to believe that the parties herein are conscionable people. A constructive trust is to be made out of the circumstances.”Footnote 17
Kotoye, therefore, seems to galvanize the Nigerian Supreme Court's resistance to the statutory exclusion of trusts that arise by operation of law. An argument that equitable principles, particularly those relating to constructive and resulting trusts, are not consistent with the provisions of the Act would be remarkable and likely to fail.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
A constructive trust is an instrument through which equity relieves an overburdened conscience. As famously declared by Cardozo J in Beatty v Cupperhein Exploration Co, a “constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression”.Footnote 18 Consequently, it is neither ideal nor practicable to define exhaustively the situations under which equity intervenes on the basis of a constructive trust. Commentators, however, traditionally analyse constructive trusts under certain categories. These include improper gains made by fiduciaries, mutual wills, ownership of shared homes (common intention constructive trust), acquisition of property by killing, enforcement of licences against third parties, knowing receipt of trust property and (probably) dishonest assistance to a breach of trust.Footnote 19 These categories are just emanations of the principle broadly stated by Millet LJ in Paragon Finance v Thakerar: “A constructive trust arises by operation of law whenever the circumstances are such that it would be unconscionable for the owner of property … to assert his own beneficial interest in the property and deny the beneficial interest of another”.Footnote 20 This broad and flexible scope for intervention resonates with Sir Robert Megarry V-C's earlier observation in In re Montagu's Settlement Trusts that the liability of a constructive trustee was based on the defendant's want of probity.Footnote 21 In other words, the question in each case is “whether a man's conscience is sufficiently affected for it to be right to bind him by the obligations of a constructive trustee”.Footnote 22 The House of Lords affirmed these propositions in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (Westdeutsche) where Lord Browne-Wilkinson observed: “Equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal estate. In the case of trust, the conscience of the legal owner requires him to carry out the purposes for which the property was vested in him (express or implied trust) or which the law imposes on him by reason of his unconscionable conduct (constructive trust)”.Footnote 23 While it is possible to fit some transactions under the Act into one or more of the traditional categories for analysing constructive trusts, this article proceeds on the basis of the application of the broad principles of constructive trusts to the interpretation of the Act. Consequently, the immediate question that arises is whether or not constructive trusts apply to transactions that are declared null and void by the Act.
Null and void transactions under the Land Use Act
Critical to the question above are sections 21 (for land in non-urban areas), 22 (for land in urban areas) and 26 of the Act. The first two sections are similar, but they apply in different geographical areas. Section 22 (1) may be used as an example: “It shall not be lawful for the holder of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor to alienate his right of occupancy or any part thereof by assignment, mortgage, transfer of possession, sublease or otherwise howsoever without the consent of the Governor first had and obtained.” In addition, section 26, apparently a residual provision, provides: “Any transaction or any instrument which purports to confer on or vest in any person any interest or right over land other than in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall be null and void.”
It has been suggested that, with the exception of settlor-as-trustee type of declarations of trust, sections 21, 22 and 26 of the Act require prior consent for land transactions effected through an agreement to sell, deed, mortgage, partition or judicial sale; it has also been suggested that, even though a power of attorney is not caught by the consent provisions of the Act, it offers only a precarious title to the donee.Footnote 24 But the question here is whether transactions or instruments that infringe sections 21, 22 or 26 of the Act could nevertheless trigger equitable intervention through constructive trusts. Savannah Bank Ltd v Ajilo (Ajilo)Footnote 25 is illustrative. In that case, the apex court accepted a defaulting mortgagor's argument that his failure to obtain the governor's consent to the mortgage deed rendered it null and void so that the mortgagee's power of sale under the mortgage became unrealizable. It would have been thought that no mature legal system would countenance the argument posited by the mortgagor in Ajilo, but the Supreme Court did. As argued below, Ajilo should have been approached on the basis that equity does not allow a statute to be used as a cloak for fraud. Nothing burdens the conscience more than a mortgagor's reliance upon formal statutory rules to defeat obligations arising from a mortgage. It is clearly unconscionable for a mortgagor to insist on retaining the beneficial ownership after obtaining an advance based on the security of the mortgaged property. In such circumstances, equity would consider the mortgagor's conscience to be overburdened and in need of moral regeneration. A constructive trust usually offers a medium for this type of moral purgation. Thus, equity would consider the mortgagor to be holding the mortgaged property (void for lack of consent) on constructive trust for the mortgagee. Regrettably, the Supreme Court failed to take this line of analysis. Obaseki JSC even suggested that the terms of the Act exclude equitable intervention.Footnote 26 The court's refusal in Ajilo to rely on equity, despite the mortgagor's want of probity, is utterly indefensible. It is reminiscent of the (remedial) deficiencies in the old common law courts that led to the development of an equitable jurisdiction in England.Footnote 27Ajilo represents the low water mark of Nigerian equity jurisprudence.
Contrasts between Ajilo and Bucknor-Maclean
Ajilo shows interesting parallels with the earlier Supreme Court decision in Bucknor-Maclean. Footnote 28 Through a testamentary bequest, the claimants in Bucknor-Maclean became successors-in-title to the original owner of registered land. As in Ajilo, the claimants in Bucknor-Maclean sought a declaration that a deed of lease over the registered land made in favour of the defendant by their predecessor-in-title was null and void for non-compliance with the forms prescribed by the Registration of Titles Act. In addition, they sought the deletion of the defendant's name from the title register as the registered owner of the impugned lease. Unlike in Ajilo, however, the Supreme Court in Bucknor-Maclean was faced with three (obstructive) prior decisions that supported the claimants' argument.Footnote 29 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court was able to rise to the equitable challenge by not only overruling the obstructive prior precedents, but holding that substantial compliance with the prescribed (statutory) forms was sufficient. Thus, since the form of conveyance used by the defendant in that case complied substantially with the Registration of Titles Act, the claimants' claims were dismissed. More importantly, in Bucknor-Maclean the Supreme Court suggested that its decision would not have been different even if it had held that substantial compliance with the prescribed forms was not enough. Accordingly, Idigbe JSC observed that an ineffective instrument under the Registration of Titles Act would trigger an underlying agreement between the parties. In other words, an ineffective instrument under the Registration of Titles Act would be construed as an agreement to sell.Footnote 30 Thus, equity would indirectly enforce an ineffective instrument by giving effect to its underlying agreement (to sell) under the doctrine of Walsh v Lonsdale.Footnote 31
Had Idigbe JSC stopped there, the case would not have been that relevant to the Act since the author has already argued that an agreement to sell requires the prior consent of a governor under the Act.Footnote 32 This means that the most favourable effect of Walsh v Lonsdale on the interpretation of the Act is that an infringing (un-consented) deed would be construed as an agreement to sell. As suggested above however, this does not go far enough since an agreement to sell is presumably caught within the consent provisions of the Act. In Bucknor-Maclean, however, Idigbe JSC was able to stretch the bases of equitable intervention to include a claimant's unconscionable conduct: “In addition, to allow parties to a deed (and in particular, the grantor of a lease) to challenge their own documents and resile from them … does not appear to me to accord with justice. Such astonishing and alarming consequences could not have been intended by the Legislature”.Footnote 33 This is a quintessential application of constructive trust to the facts of Bucknor-Maclean, though Idigbe JSC did not use the phrase “constructive trust”. Consequently, the claimants in Bucknor-Maclean would still have failed on equitable grounds even if the form of conveyance in that case did not comply sufficiently with the prescribed forms under the Registration of Titles Act. In Ajilo, the Supreme Court not only failed to deepen the equity jurisprudence it developed in Bucknor-Maclean; it also abdicated its equitable duty to render justice between the parties.
Can it be argued that the utility of Bucknor-Maclean's jurisprudence is limited in relation to the Act since, unlike the Registration of Titles Act, the Land Use Act renders offending instruments and transactions null and void?Footnote 34 The Registration of Titles Act allows the transferor to remain the legal owner until the transferee is registered in the land register. Consequently, offending instruments under the Registration of Titles Act are not null and void: the registrar of titles could simply refuse to accept them for registration. This distinction is deceptive. An approach based on a distinction between transactions that are null and void and those that are not ignores the fundamental basis for equitable intervention in unconscionable dealings. In other words, equitable intervention through a constructive trust is not necessarily dependent on the nature of the transaction or instrument involved; it depends on the conscience of a defendant. Should equity permit a defendant with a tainted conscience to exploit the nullity of a transaction in order to defeat a claimant's beneficial interest? Put differently, should a defendant be allowed to retain his or her beneficial interest in property to the detriment of a claimant? Null and void transactions of the Ajilo-type cry out for equitable intervention. Such transactions are within the remedial zone of equity delineated by Idigbe JSC in Bucknor-Maclean. The Ajilo court ought to have intervened on the basis of a constructive trust.
Public policy and the enforceability of void transactions under the Land Use Act
It could be objected that the use of constructive trusts to enforce Ajilo-type transactions is tantamount to an indirect enforcement of instruments and transactions declared null and void by the legislature (through the Act). Furthermore, it is arguable that using equity to enforce null and void transactions is contrary to public policy.Footnote 35 This line of objection is reminiscent of the difficulty faced by the House of Lords in Sinclair v Brougham (Sinclair),Footnote 36 where one issue was whether money paid in an ultra vires transaction could be recovered on the theory of quasi contract. The law of unjust enrichment was still at the embryonic stage and the concept of quasi contract provided the explanatory model for actions on money had and received.Footnote 37 The House of Lords held that it would be contrary to public policy to enforce an ultra vires transaction (which thereby became void) indirectly through the doctrine of quasi contract.Footnote 38 Analogically, therefore, it is arguable that it would be contrary to public policy to enforce indirectly (through constructive trusts) a transaction that is declared null and void by the Act. However, whatever support Sinclair is capable of generating is diminished by the overruling of that decision in the majority judgment of the House of Lords in Westdeutsche.Footnote 39 A similar argument was recently rejected by the Court of Appeal in Yaxley v Gotts (Yaxley).Footnote 40 In Yaxley, the claimant claimed a beneficial share in property belonging to one of the defendants on the basis of an oral agreement or informal arrangement relating to the property. The claimant alleged that the informal arrangement created a proprietary interest in his favour through the application of proprietary estoppel and constructive trust. For the defendants, it was argued that enforcement of the informal arrangement or oral agreement on the property based on proprietary estoppel or constructive trust would subvert section 2 of the UK Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. Under that section, an oral agreement relating to the disposition of an interest in land is void unless it is in writing. Accordingly, the defendants contended that public policy would not permit an indirect enforcement of a void transaction through the use of equitable doctrines.
On the basis that Yaxley exemplified those situations where proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts overlap, Walker LJ had “no hesitation in agreeing … that the doctrine of estoppel may operate to modify (and sometimes perhaps even counteract) the effect of section 2 of the Act of 1989 … the scope of the doctrine of estoppel is so flexible that any general assertion that section 2 is a ‘no-go-area’ for estoppel would be unsustainable”.Footnote 41 Moreover, Walker LJ observed that the resistance of equitable intervention over void contracts on the basis of public policy must take into account the nature and aims of the statute involved. Consequently, the more a statute has no obvious social aims and is mainly intended to achieve legal certainty in the regulated field, the less public policy will have a role to play in equitable intervention.Footnote 42 Accordingly, Walker LJ observed that on the facts of Yaxley “there is room for a constructive trust to operate so as to avoid injustice”.Footnote 43 Even though Lord Scott of Foscote observed in Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd that “proprietary estoppel cannot be prayed in aid in order to render enforceable an agreement that statute has declared to be void”, his Lordship was quick to restate the immunity of constructive trusts to the operation of that principle.Footnote 44 The approach in Yaxley is highly recommended regarding the Act. The flexibility of equity is historical.Footnote 45 It gives courts the manoeuvrability to confer substantial justice between parties in a case. As shown by Yaxley, equity is not hindered by null and void transactions or instruments. It requires clear and express statutory provisions to mark out constructive trusts in situations where it would be otherwise applicable. Interestingly, the Act does not have such provisions. Furthermore, the social aims of the Act do not include the contractual protection of illiterates and minors, for instance, against moneylenders. Rather, the Act aims to check land speculation in Nigeria, as well as to improve legal certainty in title relating to land. In addition, the Act does not prohibit the sale of land in Nigeria; it only requires the prior consent of the appropriate authority. Therefore, enforcement of Ajilo-type transactions through constructive trusts would not subvert the purpose of the Act.Footnote 46 The point is that the hand of equity is not too short to reach null and void transactions through constructive trusts.
Using the Land Use Act as an instrument of fraud
The constructive trust argument above permits a further extension. This relates to using a statute as an instrument of fraud. Equity abhors fraud; that abhorrence is not undermined by the fraudster's resort to statutory justifications. Accordingly, it has become an inveterate doctrine of equity that it would not allow a statute to be used as an engine of fraud. Consequently, where it would be fraudulent for a legal owner to deny another's beneficial interest by setting up the formal requirements of a statute, equity would respond by declaring the legal owner a constructive trustee for that other person.Footnote 47
Equity's objection to the fraudulent use of formal statutory requirements to defeat a claimant's beneficial interest was firmly established in the leading case of Rochefoucauld v Boustead (Rochefoucauld).Footnote 48 In that case, the defendant denied an express oral trust to hold land (conveyed to him absolutely) on trust for the claimant. The trust was subject to repayment of money and other legitimate expenses incurred by the defendant in respect of the land. On behalf of the defendant, it was argued that the alleged trust was not enforceable for want of writing under the Statute of Frauds. However, Lindley LJ observed that “the statute of frauds does not prevent the proof of fraud; and … it is a fraud on the part of a person to whom land is conveyed as a trustee, and who knows it was so conveyed, to deny the trust and claim the land himself”.Footnote 49 The old West African Court of Appeal arrived at a similar conclusion in Akwei v Akwei (Akwei)Footnote 50 where a husband and wife orally agreed to buy and develop a piece of land for their children. With the help of her parents and uncle, the wife provided money needed for the project, but the conveyance was taken in the name of the husband. The building permit was obtained in the name of their children. On the husband's death intestate, the wife's sister-in-law claimed a one-third share of the house as the property of her deceased brother. Both the lower court and the West African Court of Appeal accepted that the transaction created a trust for the children. The lower court, however, held that, since the trust did not satisfy the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds,Footnote 51 it was not enforceable and title in the house was thus vested in the deceased husband by virtue of the conveyance in his name. The injustice of the lower court's position is obvious. If alive, it would have been unconscionable for the husband to claim a beneficial interest in the house. Why should his position be improved by his death?
The West African Court of Appeal responded to this injustice in two ways. First, it held that the Statute of Frauds was not applicable because it was not pleaded. Secondly, and more importantly, it observed: “Even if the provisions of the Statute of Frauds could be relied on, the absence of writing would not enable a person who knows that land is conveyed to him as trustee to claim it as his own … there can be no doubt that on the facts disclosed there was a constructive or implied trust”.Footnote 52 In Solanke v Abed (Solanke),Footnote 53 the claimant / tenant brought an action for damages for trespass against his landlord. In defence, the landlord argued that, since the tenancy agreement was void and unenforceable for want of the governor's consent under section 11 of the Land and Native Rights Act (Northern Nigeria) 1948, the trespass suit was bound to fail.Footnote 54 It is notable that it was the landlord's duty to obtain the required consent but he failed to do so. In response to the landlord's argument, Unsworth FJ asked: “Was the defendant entitled to take advantage of his own wrong as against the plaintiff in this action for trespass and allege that the agreement was null and void?”Footnote 55 In returning a negative answer, Unsworth FJ observed: “In my view the defendant in this case cannot be heard, as against the plaintiff, to put forward his own wrongful act and say that the agreement was unenforceable because he himself had failed to get the necessary consent under s 11 of the Land and Native Rights Act”.Footnote 56 In essence, what was done by the claimant in Akwei and the defendants in Solanke and Rochefoucauld was similar to what the mortgagor did in Ajilo. By pleading the consent provisions of the Act to avoid his obligations under a mortgage for which he had already enjoyed money advanced to him (by the mortgagee) on the security of the mortgaged property, the mortgagor in Ajilo simply used the Act as an instrument to defraud the mortgagee. Nothing could be more fraudulent under the Act than a transferor's denial of a transferee's beneficial interest on account of the transferor's failure to obtain the governor's consent to a transaction.Footnote 57 Before Ajilo, no-one could have thought that such a grossly unconscionable attitude would be ignored by the Nigerian Supreme Court, but it did. Regrettably, the Supreme Court allowed the Act to be used as an engine of fraud. Ajilo has unquestionably overstayed its welcome; it should be overruled without delay. It is certainly a blight on Nigerian property jurisprudence.
The recent equitable approach of the Supreme Court in Int Textile Ind (Nig) Ltd v Aderemi (Aderemi),Footnote 58 however, offers some reassurance. In Aderemi, the first to fourth defendants sold their property to the fifth defendant after they had agreed to sublease the same property to the claimant. The sale to the fifth defendant was in total disregard of the sublease agreement with the claimant. It was contended on behalf of the defendants that the sublease agreement was not enforceable because it was made subject to contract and that there had not been an exchange of contracts between the parties. More interestingly, the defendants argued that the claimant's sublease was void and unenforceable for want of the governor's consent under the Act. In response, Uwaifo JSC observed:
“I think it ought to be said with due emphasis that it was not, in any event, open to the landlords to plead on the one hand that there was no valid contract in the circumstances of this case when on the other hand they were receiving benefits from it and committing the appellant to some expenditure arrangement. They had received in advance the full rent for five years. They had put the appellant into possession of the property and had encouraged and permitted it to spend money towards the redevelopment of it. Equity will not permit them to go back on that and get away with what would be regarded a fraud practised on the appellant.”Footnote 59
Uwaifo JSC further observed that the claimant / appellant's act of possession was evidence of part performance which was not prohibited by section 22 of the Act, and that section 22 could not apply in the circumstances “lest it be used as an instrument of fraud which it certainly is not meant for”.Footnote 60
Purchaser's constructive trust
Yet again, a constructive trust might arise in favour of a purchaser under an enforceable contract or agreement to buy and sell land in Nigeria.Footnote 61 The nature and scope of a purchaser's constructive trust within the scheme of the Act have already been explored.Footnote 62 It suffices to say that an estate contract under the Act is capable of giving rise to a constructive trust enforceable against a vendor in favour of a purchaser. Nigerian cases exempting agreements to buy land from the consent provisions of the Act can be explained on the basis of a purchaser's constructive trust.
RESULTING TRUST
General principles
Resulting trusts arise in situations where the law returns a beneficial interest to the settlor or transferor. In other words, the beneficial interest “springs back” to the transferor.Footnote 63 Situations in which a resulting trust is said to have arisen include a voluntary transfer of property to a recipient, provision of purchase money for property conveyed in the name of another, contribution to the purchase of property (whether or not the conveyance was taken in the name of one or more of the contributors), transfer of property for a purpose which subsequently failed, and non-exhaustion of a beneficial interest under an express trust.Footnote 64
Resulting trusts are gap fillers. They help in locating the beneficial ownership of property whenever there is doubt. As Lord Wilberforce observed in Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commissioners, “the equitable, or beneficial interest, cannot remain in the air: the consequence in law must be that it remains in the settler”.Footnote 65 In In Re Vandervell's Trusts (No 2) (Vandervell No 2), Megarry J famously categorized resulting trusts into presumed and automatic resulting trusts.Footnote 66 Presumed resulting trusts arise, for instance, in voluntary transfers (or provision of purchase money) where there is no evidence as to whether a gift or trust was intended by the grantor. Absent such evidence, the law presumes that the recipient was intended to hold on a resulting trust for the grantor, but it is only a rebuttable presumption of law.Footnote 67 In other words, the presumption of (resulting) trust can be rebutted by evidence of contrary intention.Footnote 68 For instance, the counter-presumption of advancement can be used to off-set the presumption of resulting trust.Footnote 69 The presumption of advancement is taken to evince a gift. It applies within some narrowly defined relationships, such as father and child, and husband and wife. For instance, a purchase by a father in the name of his child, or by a husband in the name of his wife, or by any person who stands in loco parentis to the recipient, would be deemed to raise a presumption of advancement in favour of the recipient. However, the presumption of advancement does not apply beyond these categories of relationships, nor does it apply in reverse order within those relationships. Consequently, a purchase by a wife in the name of her husband and by a man in the name of his mistress do not raise a presumption of advancement.Footnote 70
In contrast to presumed resulting trusts, so-called automatic resulting trusts do not depend on any intention at all. They arise from a dispositive failure under an express trust. Accordingly, if T transfers land to X on trust for Y for life and nothing is said about the remainder, the beneficial interest will revert to T (or T's estate) after Y's death, whether or not T wanted the land back. However, the usefulness of Megarry J's classification to understanding the role of intention in resulting trusts is doubtful. For instance, in Westdeutsche Lord Browne-Wilkinson disagreed with Megarry J in Vandervell No 2 by observing: “Both types of resulting trusts are traditionally regarded as examples of trusts giving effect to the common intention of the parties”.Footnote 71 In other words, resulting trusts respond to the intention of the parties. Even then, Lord Browne-Wilkinson's proposition is problematic as it does not explain cases where (very) young children were considered to hold property on resulting trusts.Footnote 72 Another view on the role of intention in resulting trusts was expressed by the Privy Council (per Lord Millett) in Air Jamaica Ltd v Charlton. The Privy Council opined that intention plays a negative role in resulting trusts; in other words, what is relevant is the intention not to benefit the recipient.Footnote 73
In view of the confusion that surrounds the judicial application of resulting trusts in Nigeria (as shown below), it is necessary to set out Lord Browne-Wilkinson's summary of the principles of resulting trusts:
“Under existing law a resulting trust arises in two sets of circumstances: (A) where A makes a voluntary payment to B or pays (wholly or in part) for the purchase of property which is vested either in B alone or in the joint names of A and B, there is a presumption that A did not intend to make a gift to B: the money or property is held on trust for A (if he is the sole provider of the money) or in the case of a joint purchase by A and B in shares proportionate to their contributions. It is important to stress that this is only a presumption, which presumption is easily rebutted either by the counter-presumption of advancement or by direct evidence of A's intention to make an outright transfer … (B) Where A transfers property to B on express trusts, but the trusts declared do not exhaust the whole beneficial interest.”Footnote 74
The task, therefore, is to see how courts in Nigeria have applied these fundamental principles of resulting trusts, especially in the context of the Act.
Judicial application of resulting trusts in Nigeria
Discharge of a mortgage debt by a third party should create a resulting trust: Onamade v ACB
If Onamade v ACB (Onamade)Footnote 75 is anything to go by, there is still a long way for the law of trust to go to exercise its rightful influence on cases decided under the Act. In Onamade, a mortgagee refused to sign an agreement to transfer the benefit of a mortgage to a third party who paid off the mortgage debt with the consent of the mortgagor. The mortgagee argued that a transfer of the mortgage without the statutory consent would offend the relevant provisions of the Act. The mortgagee was, however, prepared to reconvey the land to the mortgagor. Counsel for the mortgagor and the third party argued that the mortgagee became a trustee for the third party by accepting total repayment under the mortgage, knowing that the money was supplied by the third party. As a trustee, the mortgagee was bound to transfer the property to the beneficiary, the third party. Such transfers (between trustee and beneficiary) are presumably not caught within the confines of the Act. The Supreme Court gave short shrift to this argument by simply observing that “the trusteeship issue … [is] irrelevant for the purpose of the appeal as it did not advance the appellants' case in any way”.Footnote 76 It is difficult to rationalize this conclusion.
In the first place, assuming that Awojugbagbe Light Industries v Chinukwe Footnote 77 bears the affect ascribed to it by subsequent Nigerian cases (ie, that an agreement to sell is outside the provisions of the Act), then an agreement to transfer the benefits of a mortgage to a third party should equally be consistent with the provisions of the Act. Secondly, a trust of the benefits of the mortgage certainly resulted in favour of the third party (in the circumstances of that case).Footnote 78 Let us look at it this way: if the mortgagee had completed a valid transfer of the mortgage to the third party, no question of trust would have arisen, as the third party would simply have stepped into the shoes (or title) of the mortgagee (this would have the same effect as subrogation, which is not the focus here). In other words, the third party would have become a sort of replacement mortgagee.Footnote 79 If, instead of a valid and formal transfer of the benefits of the mortgage to the third party, the mortgagee reconveyed the land to the mortgagor (as the mortgagee insisted on doing in Onamade), there is no doubt that the mortgagor would hold the benefits of the reconveyance on trust for the third party (who provided the redemption money). This resonates with trusts resulting from the provision of purchase money for property conveyed in the name of another. But where, as in Onamade, there was a total discharge of the mortgage debt by a third party with the knowledge of the mortgagee and consent of the mortgagor, but without a direct transfer of the mortgage to the third party or reconveyance to the mortgagor, a resulting trust should arise in favour of the third party. It is sensible that, pending a transfer to the third party or reconveyance to the mortgagor, the mortgagee should hold the benefits of the mortgage on trust for the third party.
By analogy, the mortgagee is in the position of a transferee who was not intended to benefit from a voluntary transfer.Footnote 80 It is generally accepted that voluntary transfers raise the presumption of a resulting trust. By further analogy, the mortgagee's position is similar to cases of trusts that result from the provision of purchase money. In substance there is no difference between T providing money for the purchase of land vested in X, and T (with the consent of the mortgagor and knowledge of the mortgagee) discharging a mortgage debt over property vested in the mortgagee. Both cases are capable of raising, at least, the presumption of a resulting trust. There may be further support in some English cases where it was held that a resulting trust occurs in favour of a party who discharges a debt or obligation that was incurred by another or who pays for a benefit that inured to another with the consent of the parties.Footnote 81 Finally, if we accept that the mortgagee became a (resulting) trustee for the third party, then a transfer to the third party would only be nominal and outside the provisions of the Act.Footnote 82 Since a transfer between trustees and beneficiaries does not involve an alienation or assignment, it was incorrect to suggest that the proposed transfer in Onamade was prohibited by the Act. Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not correctly characterize the trust (resulting trust) that arose in Onamade as irrelevant. On the contrary, the trust issue was absolutely important. Failure to analyse it was a sorely missed opportunity.
Provision of purchase money for land in the name of a girl-friend should create a resulting trust: Ezeanah v Atta
Ezeanah v Atta (Atta)Footnote 83 further underscores the acute judicial struggle with the principles of trust law in Nigeria. It was a story of love gone sour. In contemplation of marriage to the claimant, the defendant provided (purchase) money for the allocation of a piece of land in Abuja to the claimant by the Federal Capital Authority. The certificate of occupancy in respect of that allocation was issued in the name of the claimant. The defendant also sponsored the claimant's education abroad and started developing the property. Eventually, the claimant married another man and sought a declaration that she was the beneficial owner of the property in dispute. She relied heavily on the certificate of occupancy in her own name. To provide a context for the criticism later in this article of the decision of Supreme Court in this case, it is apt to set out the findings of the trial court. Kusherki J found as a fact that “the defendant … paid the money when the form [for the certificate of occupancy] was … submitted in the name of the plaintiff … The defendant went through all the processes by paying the fees and charges as they accrued till the certificate of occupancy was finally obtained”.Footnote 84 The trial judge also found as a fact that “the defendant was doing what he did to the plaintiff in furtherance of the marriage agreement between them”.Footnote 85 The claimant's cross-appeal against these crucial findings of fact to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. Musdapher JCA (as he then was) accepted the trial judge's findings of fact and observed that “the finding of fact by the learned trial judge that the appellant procured the land in the name of the respondent in furtherance of their marriage cannot be faulted”.Footnote 86 Notwithstanding the important factual findings by the trial court, it held that the claimant was entitled to a declaration of ownership because the certificate of occupancy was issued in her name. At the Court of Appeal, the defendant / appellant contended that the facts as found by the trial court raised a presumption of resulting trust in his favour and that he was, therefore, entitled to judgment on his counter-claim for a declaration of ownership. In a resounding exposition of the principles of resulting trust,Footnote 87 the Court of Appeal accepted that a resulting trust arose in the circumstances of that case in favour of the defendant / appellant. His counter-claim was therefore upheld.
Bases of resulting trust in Ezeanah v Atta
Pausing here for a moment, one can gauge the strength of the argument for a resulting trust based on the trial court's findings of fact which were accepted by the Court of Appeal. It is clear that either one or two categories of resulting trusts inured to the benefit of the defendant. First is the purchase money resulting trust:Footnote 88 the defendant financed the entire acquisition of the property in dispute. With the vesting of the property in the claimant's name it became unclear whether the claimant was intended to hold beneficially or on trust for the defendant. Consequently, equity would presume that the parties intended the claimant to hold the property on trust for the defendant. Put differently, the claimant held on trust since there was no intention to benefit her. A presumed trust having arisen in favour of the defendant, the claimant had the onus of displacing that presumption. The second category of resulting trust engaged by the facts of this case is the Quistclose resulting trust.Footnote 89 A Quistclose (resulting) trust arises where transfers are made specifically for a purpose which fails, such as giving a loan for the specific purpose of paying the borrower's creditors. If the debt is not paid, the lender regains beneficial ownership of the money through a resulting trust.Footnote 90 Thus, since the purchase in Atta was impliedly conditioned on the parties going through a form of marriage, the failure of that condition triggered a beneficial interest in the property in favour of the defendant who provided the purchase money.Footnote 91 Whether one considers that Atta falls within the category of a purchase money (or presumed) resulting trust or a Quistclose trust, it is obvious that the Court of Appeal's analysis and conclusion in favour of the existence of a resulting trust cannot be faulted. This context makes the decision of the Supreme Court in Atta very interesting.
Supreme Court's decision in Ezeanah v Atta
The lead judgment of Tobi JSC is rather difficult to follow. While he accepted that the claimant / appellant could not properly challenge the judgment of the trial court in her favour without the necessary (cross) appeal,Footnote 92 he went on to conclude that, since the “finding of the learned trial judge which was acceptable by the Court of Appeal on the issue of agreement to marry is not borne out from the record, I regard it as perverse and I accordingly interfere [with it]. The result of my interference is to reject that finding”.Footnote 93 Notice that the rejection only affected the lower court's finding on the less critical issue of the existence of an agreement to marry. The crucial finding that the defendant / respondent provided purchase money for the property in dispute was left intact. At worst, the Supreme Court's limited interference with the finding of facts only affected the applicability of a Quistclose trust. It simply means that a Quistclose trust ceased to be available on the facts to the defendant / respondent because it could no longer be said that the defendant / respondent financed the acquisition of the property in dispute in contemplation of marriage. This, however, does not (and should not) affect the inference of a purchase money resulting trust. Saying that there was no marriage condition (as the Supreme Court did) is not the same thing as saying that the purchase money was not provided by the defendant. This distinction seemed to have been lost by the apex court.
Confusion compounded: Breach of promise of marriage
For some inscrutable reason, Tobi JSC felt that the defendant's claim based on a (purchase money) resulting trust could not succeed unless he proved that the claimant promised to marry him: “The fulcrum of this appeal is the contention of the respondent [defendant] that he did all he did for the appellant because there was an agreement between the appellant and himself to marry. Let me go a bit into the law of contract or agreement of parties to marry”.Footnote 94 Tobi JSC then embarked upon a lengthy discourse, spanning four pages, on the constituent elements of an action for breach of a promise of marriage and concluded that “it is difficult to come to the conclusion that there was really an agreement to marry”Footnote 95 and, more importantly, that the “law could not have availed the respondent particularly in the absence of proof of an agreement of marriage between the appellant and the respondent”.Footnote 96 This is a very remarkable turn of analysis for a case based on resulting trust. One reads in vain to discover the connection between the existence of a promise of marriage and the creation of a resulting trust. As observed above, the only possible relevance is that, without a marriage agreement, there was no room for the interposition of a Quistclose trust. Considering the Court of Appeal's accurate observation that the defendant's counter-claim was not founded on the breach of a promise of marriage,Footnote 97 it is difficult to understand how Tobi JSC considered the existence of a marriage agreement to be crucial for the defendant's success when he only made a claim based on a (presumed intention) resulting trust. A marriage agreement is not necessary for the creation of the two classes of resulting trusts mentioned by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche. In any event, since the parties were not legally married, the presumption of advancement was totally out of the picture.Footnote 98 In the end, the principles of resulting trusts were severely bruised by the Supreme Court in Atta. The Court of Appeal's judgment is preferable by far.
Conflating claims in resulting trust with claims for legal title: Madu v Madu
A redemptive opportunity was presented to the Supreme Court in Madu v Madu (Madu),Footnote 99 another case of love gone sour but this time involving a divorced couple. It also involved land in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, managed on behalf of the Nigerian federal government by the minister of the Federal Capital Territory.Footnote 100 In Madu, a certificate of occupancy over the land in dispute was issued in the name of the wife / claimant. She claimed to have applied and paid for the allocation with her own money, but was assisted by her husband in processing the transaction. The husband, on the other hand, alleged that, although the certificate of occupancy and other documents relating to the land were in the name of his wife, he actually paid for all the expenses relating to the transaction on the understanding that his wife was merely a front for the allocation. In the wife's suit for a declaration of ownership to the disputed land, the husband's defence was that she held the land (and certificate of occupancy) on trust for him. In other words, the husband expressly relied on a resulting trust to support his claim of beneficial ownership.
Resulting trust not excluded by proof of legal title: Idundun v Okumagba confusion
In Madu, the Supreme Court's analysis of the husband's defence (based on resulting trust) suffered from an undue focus on the five ways of proving title to land famously enunciated by the Supreme Court in Idundun v Okumagba (Idundun).Footnote 101 Analysis in Aderemi JSC's lead judgment started with a re-affirmation of the Idundun principle: “As rightly submitted by the appellant in her brief of argument, it has now become firmly established that there are five ways of establishing title to land”.Footnote 102 As will be seen, this approach detrimentally affected the evaluation of resulting trust raised by the husband / respondent. But what are those five ways of proving title to land? According to Idundun, ownership or title to land in Nigeria can be proved in any one or more of the following ways: (a) traditional evidence; (b) documents of title; (c) various acts of ownership and possession, sufficiently numerous and positive to warrant an inference of ownership; (d) acts of long possession and enjoyment of land; and (e) possession of adjacent land to the land in dispute in circumstances making it probable that the owner of the adjacent land is the owner of the land in dispute.
Although a detailed criticism of Idundun can wait for another day, it is clearly a wrong decision despite its ancient origin and contemporary support. It wrongly influences the judicial analysis of trust in Nigeria. In focusing almost completely on the proof of legal ownership, Idundun presumably feigned ignorance of equitable interests and the various ways of proving them. For instance, Idundun does not contemplate the numerous ways of proving equitable interests that arise under various categories of resulting trusts and the almost inexhaustible categories of constructive trusts. Nor does it contemplate equitable interests that arise from the payment of purchase money coupled with transfer of possession.Footnote 103 The Idundun list would have more than doubled if it had taken equitable ownership into consideration. More importantly however, Nigerian judges tend to think that any ownership claim that does not fit within the Idundun itemization is bound to fail. Madu was no different. The resulting trust asserted by the husband in that case is not easily found on the Idundun list; that was the beginning of his difficulty. The Supreme Court almost waxed lyrical on the wife's success in producing a certificate of occupancy and other related documents that brought her within the second category on the Idundun list. In applying Idundun to Madu, Aderemi JSC observed:
“The appellant [wife] predicated her title to the land on certificate of occupancy which bears her name although in the possession of the defendant / respondent. The application which she completed also bears her name. The written approval to her application form together with the letter of acceptance signed by her … also carry her name. Once a person is granted a certificate of occupancy over a parcel of land, he is entitled to hold same to the exclusion of any other person unless and until the certificate of occupancy is set aside … And documents of title are clear evidence of transaction between the parties thereto … This court in its decisions … held that a certificate of occupancy properly issued as in the instant case where there is no dispute that the document was properly issued by a competent authority raised [a presumption] that the holder is the owner in exclusive possession of the land.”Footnote 104
But the husband / respondent never quarrelled with any of the issues in the quotation above. On the contrary, he agreed that the certificate of occupancy was validly issued and was in the name of the wife. He did not challenge the wife's legal ownership, nor did he contend that the wife failed to prove her ownership under Idundun. He only asserted that the wife held the property on trust for him. Idundun was totally irrelevant to that claim; and it was a mistake to suppose that the wife's success in coming within the confines of Idundun automatically diminished the husband's claim. Proving legal ownership as the wife did is not the same thing as proving equitable ownership which is what the husband claimed.
Nevertheless, Aderemi JSC (in Madu) was able to consider the husband's defence of resulting trust and he fairly accurately restated the principles of presumed intention resulting trust.Footnote 105 He observed: “Although, the respondent in his evidence before the trial court said he paid all the money required for the land; but contrary to this assertion, all the receipts are in the name of the appellant”.Footnote 106 Once the prejudicial impact of Idundun is disregarded, this is probably the strongest basis for the decision in Madu. It means that, even though the husband asserted a purchase money resulting trust, he failed to prove the alleged payments.
Concurring judgments in Madu
Snippets of the prejudicial influence of Idundun can also be seen in the concurring judgments. For instance, after observing that the wife's case was supported by proper documents of title in her name, Onu JSC opined that “without an allocation or grant by the Hon Minister of the FCT [Federal Capital Territory], there is no way any person including the respondent [husband] could acquire land in the FCT”.Footnote 107 Thus, Onu JSC did not consider that a certificate of occupancy could be held on trust. In short, he never contemplated that there could be an interposition of resulting trusts in land tenure marked by the certificate of occupancy system. It was precisely that type of judicial attitude that undermined a proper analysis of the husband's trust claim. Accordingly, Onu JSC suggested that the only way the wife's certificate of occupancy could be dislodged was not by establishing a resulting trust but by the husband showing “that he had an earlier legal title over the land before the certificate was issued in favour of the appellant but this the respondent failed woefully to do”.Footnote 108 It is not therefore surprising that Onu JSC discussed resulting trust only in one long sentence;Footnote 109 Musdapher JSC did not write a detailed opinion;Footnote 110 and Oguntade JSC wrote a short opinion emphasizing the superiority of the wife's documentary title, again thanks to Idundun.Footnote 111 The concurring judgment of Muhammad JSC ended with a more puzzling observation:
“I think I should observe that this case, as I see it should be an eye-opener to many people … I fail to appreciate the wisdom behind the concealment of name or identity of a person who, in actual sense is the owner of a thing but would prefer to use the name of another person … So it is a dangerous practice where people prefer to hide their identities and resort to using the identities of others in transactions which are from the bottom of their minds meant to be beneficial to them.”Footnote 112
With respect, this alarmist observation is utterly unnecessary and is likely to create a judicial bias against claimants alleging trusts (especially resulting trusts). Moreover, it belies the very essence of trust: that legal ownership and the beneficial enjoyment of property (or equitable ownership for short) are not always in the same person. In addition, Muhammad JSC failed to consider numerous commercial transactions (for instance share transactions) which are not only conducted on the basis of trust, but can only be advantageously and conveniently done so. In holding that the husband failed to prove payments for the land in dispute, Aderemi JSC provided an impregnable fulcrum for the decision in Madu. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continued to struggle with the concept of trusts in that case.
CONCLUSION
By abolishing pre-existing rights of property over land and replacing them with limited statutory grants, the Act has proved to be an extraordinary piece of legislation and, therefore, requires extraordinary scrutiny. In this regard, the principles of equity shed significant light. As argued above, the Act does not contradict the application of equity in transactions over land in Nigeria. Though Bucknor-Maclean was decided in the context of another property statute, it provides a sound basis for deepening the process of equitable intervention in unconscionable land transactions in Nigeria. Similar equitable principles outlined by the Supreme Court in Solanke are even more forceful in terms of the similarity of the property statute in that case to the Act. Despite these shining precedents, the Supreme Court took a retrogressive step in Ajilo by giving a free pass to the unconscionable mortgagor who brandished the Act in defence of a fraud that he perpetrated against the mortgagee. Ajilo was a major set-back for Nigerian equity jurisprudence and should be overruled. Ajilo cannot be defended on the grounds of public policy. Trusts by operation of law are clear exceptions to the rule that public policy militates against the enforcement of null and void transactions by other means (for example, proprietary estoppel). Recent Supreme Court cases on resulting trusts (Onamade, Atta and Madu) show an interesting judicial struggle with the principles of trust law in Nigeria. By focusing on the five ways of proving legal title to land in Nigeria, Idundun complicates the judicial appreciation and application of resulting trusts to cases concerning land in Nigeria. The list in Idundun neglects terribly the equitable ways of proving beneficial ownership, including resulting and constructive trusts. In short, resulting and constructive trusts are equitable concepts that could be used advantageously to expound the provisions of the Act and avoid injustice in cases like Ajilo.
