What is the role of the philosopher in relation to their community? Having identified a lack of scholarship that considers the relevant cultural, literary and philosophical aspects all together, Dross undertakes a comprehensive examination of the idea of otium in Seneca to answer this question. By considering the Stoic philosopher’s engagement with his predecessors and contemporaries, from Plato and Aristotle to Cicero and Musonius Rufus, D. demonstrates Seneca’s development of a so-called ‘ethics of otium’ that overturns the simplistic opposition between ‘good’ negotium and ‘bad’ otium as inherited from late republican literature and early imperial elegy. In doing so, D. argues for Seneca’s engagement with and development of Stoic philosophical theory and practice.
The book is divided into four lengthy chapters, framed by introduction, conclusion and backmatter. The introduction focuses on the various ups and downs of Seneca’s life, from his exile and tutorship of Nero to his death by suicide, asking if and how they represent actions grounded in Stoicism. Central to this question is the concept of lifestyles: what does an appropriate and ethical life look like for a(n advanced) student of Stoicism such as Seneca, when the sage dogmatically has a social duty to their city? Is it possible to serve the community through otium, and if so, what might such otium look like? To examine the tensions that arise in this early imperial conflation of Stoic philosophical thinking and Roman cultural specificities, D. analyses Seneca’s four major works on otium: De brevitate vitae, De tranquillitate animi, De otio, and the Epistulae (D. justifies the omission of De constantia sapientis by pointing to its limited comments on otium among other, more formal, concerns).
Ch. 1 examines the terminology that Seneca uses in his discussions of otium to demonstrate that the conventional opposition between negotium and otium does not hold. Instead, D. argues, Seneca makes a distinction between occupationes (useless activities that rule the lives of the stulti, and that are located in negotium and otium alike) and vita (a contemplative life dedicated to the philosophical study of sapientia). This vita approximates a ‘true’ otium in which the philosopher makes themselves useful to their community — utility that Seneca defines as commune negotium. This definition, D. suggests, does not indicate terminological inconsistency. Rather, it indicates the absence of a conceptual boundary between otium and negotium. If a contemplative life is a form of praxis, then this opposition becomes obsolete: neither concept has intrinsic value, and both concepts should be considered indifferents. What matters, then, is not the choice between these concepts, but the intention with which this choice is made. Thus, the inner disposition of an individual and the end (τέλος) that guides them determine the moral value of their choice.
D. therefore dedicates ch. 2 to a discussion of Senecan otium in light of the Stoic doctrine of τέλος and (non-)preferable indifferents. This chapter sees D. at her best. Particularly insightful are her analyses of Seneca’s philosophical terminology, which examine — among other things — Cicero’s translations and Romanisation of Greek philosophical thought and their subsequent adoption, correction and development by Seneca. These analyses allow D. to demonstrate Seneca’s innovations in Stoic dogma, including but not limited to his adaptation of impracticable precepts to an early imperial Roman context.
Ch. 3 then relates Seneca’s otium-thinking to philosophical debates on lifestyles. To this end, D. examines Seneca’s only doxographical discussion of the topic (De Otio 7), suggesting that he advocates for a ‘mixed life’ that unites action and contemplation and that most resembles the middle-Stoic and Antiochean βίος σύνθετος. The chapter also includes an analysis of verbs of withdrawal (latere, abscondere, secedere and variants). Perhaps surprisingly, these verbs do not differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ types of retreat. As section 1.2.3.1 (on quies and otium) shows, however, word choice may convey other nuances, such as a connection between Epicureanism and the misuse of otium. Thus, D.’s examinations bring a great deal of nuance to the otium-lexicon across schools of philosophical thought.
Finally, ch. 4 covers overly well-trodden ground in its discussion of the social, political and material conditions associated with philosophical otium. D. emphasises that the philosopher’s withdrawal is not characterised by social isolation: their retreat is internal only, and their otium-activities, from reading and meditatio to conversation and writing, both require social interaction and represent a union of theory and action. Writing in particular is the ultimate philosophical exercise, since it necessitates the clear communication of complex matters while fulfilling the philosopher’s social responsibility to contemporary and future readers. Thus literary immortality can be ethical (as D. notes elsewhere, there is humour to be found in Seneca).
D.’s discussions are meticulous and methodological throughout. Occasionally, topics are (re)visited in excessive detail and, despite extensive signposting, the reader might find themselves thankful for the extended table of contents (479–83). But this detail also contributes to the monograph’s cogency. D.’s argumentation is admirably thorough and transparent: D. never shies away from textual difficulties and consistently works out the consequences of emendations for different interpretations. The monograph’s indices will surely prove a valuable resource: I am particularly grateful for the index that lists Latin philosophical terminology alongside its Greek equivalents. In short, this monograph on Seneca’s redefinition of otium forms a welcome contribution not only to the fields of Senecan studies and Stoicism, but also to studies of the philosophical dimensions of early imperial literature more broadly.
