No one who reads this brief but vigorous polemic can have any doubt about the author's sentiments concerning the House of Saud and its dominion over Saudi Arabia. “It is a government that should be overthrown,” Asءad AbuKhalil writes, “A brutal dictatorship wed to an ideology of religious fanaticism should not be allowed to continue in this century” (p. 23).
That is the prism through which AbuKhalil examines the entire history of the kingdom, from its origins in the 18th century through the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. He regards the Saudi regime as an illegitimate and corrupt lackey of Western—mostly American—imperialism and depicts the kings and princes as semiliterate brutes who hold their subjects in thrall by buying them off when possible and jailing or exiling them when not. In his view, all the well-established forums by which the people of Saudi Arabia interact with the rulers and make their views known, such as the traditional majlis and the Consultative Assembly created a decade ago, are shams, and the only permitted form of behavior is unquestioning submission.
This approach is not surprising, considering that the author, a Lebanese-born academic who teaches at California State University, Stanislaus, is the self-styled “Angry Arab” who fills his blog with tirades and cynicism. His language evokes the left-wing rhetoric of the nationalists—he calls them “progressives” (p. 103)—who dominated Arab politics a generation ago. He writes that Saudi Arabia “certainly succeeded in fighting a promising movement that emerged from the left” (p. 23), and even now Nasser is his hero—which inevitably means the House of Saud is the enemy.
It is, of course, perfectly legitimate to criticize the Saudi regime. The corruption, human rights abuses, bigotry, and manipulation of Islam that have characterized the House of Saud's rule for decades are well known. AbuKhalil, to his credit, covers this ground in clear, robust prose that is often persuasive. The least that can be said for his book is that it is much more credible than a similar screed from 1994 by Said K. Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud (St. Martin's Press).
Saudi Arabia provides abundant material for its critics to work with, and AbuKhalil makes good use of a lot of it. The concentration of power in royal hands, the discrimination against the Shiעite minority, the venality of some senior princes, the arbitrary cruelty of Saudi justice—all are reviewed in outrage. The author's scornful analysis of the “Basic Law of Government” promulgated by King Fahd in 1992 points out, correctly, that it lists at length the duties of the citizenry, including obedience to the king, but mentions no duties required of the monarch. AbuKhalil rightly dismisses as “bogus” the claim in the law's Article 7 that the Saudi government “derives power from the Holy Qurءan and the Prophet's tradition” (p. 127). Nowhere, he argues, “does the Qurءan urge believers to obey and submit to the king—any king” (p. 127).
Many of the issues raised by AbuKhalil are old news, but he does offer some new material from Arab archives. Especially interesting is his brief account of the Saudi Communist Party and other indigenous leftist groups, which are barely mentioned in standard histories of the kingdom. He is especially good in explaining how and why Saudi Arabia became the wellspring of extremism throughout the Muslim world.
Yet the passion of AbuKhalil's writing is also the weakness of his book: its onesidedness diminishes its credibility. He gives the Saudi rulers no credit for anything and ignores that the people of Saudi Arabia are incomparably better off today in terms of housing, education, medical care, and economic opportunity than they were when King Abdul Aziz created the kingdom in 1932. That Saudi Arabia has largely avoided the violence that has plagued other Arab countries he attributes to unrelenting repression by the House of Saud, not to adroit maneuvering in the treacherous waters of Arab politics. There is no indication that AbuKhalil has ever visited Saudi Arabia and seen its people enjoying themselves in the comfort that oil money has brought them.
In fact, AbuKhalil's antipathy to the House of Saud repeatedly leads him into error. He asserts, for example, that Saudi Arabia created the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to “coordinate Gulf security arrangements with the American protector,” (p. 115) but the GCC was never intended to be a security organization, as its charter makes clear. Its mission is economic and regulatory only. He says King Faisal and his “American protectors,” in their zeal to stymie Nasser, created “the international Islamic fundamentalist movement” (p. 99), a claim that ignores the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood many years earlier. Contrary to his assertion here, there is no evidence that any princes watched pornographic movies aboard the American destroyer ferrying Abdul Aziz to his famous meeting with President Roosevelt (p. 95). In addition, it is untrue that Ahmed Zaki Yamani, as oil minister, undertook to “eradicate any thoughts of pro-Arab nationalism in the energy policy of the kingdom” (p. 192). Yamani orchestrated the Arab oil embargo of 1973–74, of which the United States was the primary target, and forced the American owners of Aramco to accept nationalization of the company.
In sum, readers who want a brief assessment of the political, social, and religious situation in Saudi Arabia will find this book useful, but they should be wary of accepting the author's arguments at face value.
