To those of us who fear for liberal democracy in view of the onslaught of fake news and the resurgence of right-wing populism, Linda Zerilli gives an Arendt for our time. This Arendt cares more about the question of “what it means to have a world in common” than she does about the problem of relativism (267). She sparks a “Copernican revolution in political theorizing” by establishing that democratic politics orbits around judging rather than willing (190). And by this revolution, she substitutes a grounded freedom premised on sovereignty with a practiced freedom, one that we realize by allowing “plural opinions” to open our minds and senses to new aspects of our common world (141).
In this collection of closely interrelated essays, Zerilli mounts a counterhegemonic struggle against the “rationalist (neo-Kantian) approaches” that “dominate contemporary political thinking” about democratic citizenship, and which cast a long shadow on Arendt's account of judgment (240). By reading Arendt's work in light of ordinary-language philosophy, Zerilli turns Jürgen Habermas's famous charge decisively against him. Rather than lacking “the normative criteria” by which to differentiate between the legitimate and coercive exercise of a collective will, Zerilli shows that Arendt's account of judgment makes a “far more radical” break with the “entire modern philosophy of the will” than “anything” Habermas proposed (187, 189).
Zerilli sets Arendt up to vanquish Hume and Kant by showing how they posed a dilemma from which they could not extricate themselves: How to “claim normativity for our judgments” (77)? How is it that in judging a decision, an event, a demonstration, a regime, I can be understood not merely to express a preference or aversion but to make a claim that I can reasonably expect others to agree with? And if they disagree, how can I give reasons that court their agreement without compelling it, as an “exchange of proofs” would do (59)?
From a theoretical perspective, the possibility of democratic politics stands or falls on resolving this dilemma. For, at its most urgent, judging politically—as opposed to morally or legally—involves neither being true to your own conscience nor following the law but trying to change your world in concert with others whom you hope to inspire, but may not command, to join with you. Neither Kant nor Hume could break free from the “intellectualist” disposition that made them assimilate political judgment to moral (Kant) or empirical (Hume) judgment (75). But Kant left behind a “promissory note,” in his notion of the indeterminate concept, which has enticed Arendt along with many others (72). Zerilli builds her democratic theory of judgment on the elaboration of this notion by Wittgenstein, who “philosophically radicalize[d]” it, and by Arendt, who “politicize[d]” it (71).
From Wittgenstein's late philosophy (which she reads with Stanley Cavell and Richard Schusterman), Zerilli draws a “perceptualist account of persuasion and aesthetic argument” (71, 79). This account holds that in arguing over matters of taste, our claims function not “as premises” but as perceptual insights—“light[ing] up an aspect” of an object to spark an interlocutor to see and respond to it differently (77, 80). Zerilli elaborates by drawing on Wittgenstein's “reflections on the phenomenon of aspect dawning,” the perceptual experience of a gestalt shift, when it suddenly occurs to us that the figure we have seen “all along as a rabbit” is a duck. The shift is “entirely unmediated” (252). One does not decide to apply the concept “duck” to the figure but, rather, suddenly sees a duck by focusing on aspects that went unnoticed, so long as the rabbit concept prevailed. Zerilli reads Wittgenstein's aspect dawning with Stephen Mulhall, as bringing out the “irreducibly conceptual character of all embodied experience” (252–53). This, presumably, is the radicalization of Kant. Showing that we can and do use concepts “other than … as rules or decision procedures,” Wittgenstein redeems a normativity that inheres in experience, that need not be posited above or below it (71).
Zerilli suggests that in political argumentation, as in arguments over taste, I do not introduce “new facts” as evidence to prove that I am right but, rather, persuade you to alter your “style of thinking” so as to make “meaningful the facts we already know” (78, emphasis added). Zerilli makes this transition from aesthetics to politics by a quick shift—from seeing to thinking, from perceiving figures to finding meaning in facts—that I struggled to follow. It does not seem to me that we apprehend facts in the way that we see a duck/rabbit figure, even if we English speakers do use “seeing” as a metaphor for understanding. Even less so when political facts are at stake. One can neither “see” a revolution nor shift perceptually to seeing as revolutionary action what one had seen as terror.
Nonetheless, reading Arendt in light of the late Wittgenstein enables Zerilli to reveal how she succeeds where Hume and Kant failed. They were so captivated by an intellectual problem—to adjudicate “among competing claims about existing objects of judgment in the absence of universally shared standards”—that they failed to pose the “prior question”: How is it that “citizens get certain objects into view as objects of judgment at all” (267, 9, emphasis original)? This, according to Zerilli, is Arendt's unique—and, today, uniquely urgent—concern: to shift our attention from the problem of adjudication to the “question of what it means to have a world in common” (267). Zerilli suggests that, in arguing about politics (on Arendt's account), as in arguing about matters of taste (on Wittgenstein's account), we aim to “light up” as political facts and events that are known but not yet public in Arendt's sense—shared and disputed in a “context of plural opinions” (6, 140).
If we set this “theoretical obsession” with adjudication aside, we see an Arendt who cares deeply about truth, although she does not define it “in the manner of validity thinkers” (xi–xiii). This Arendt proposes a distinctively “political conception of objectivity” that poses a problem unique to political—not moral or legal—judgment: that there are “things we may ‘know’ but fail to acknowledge or accord value in any politically significant sense” (29, 132; emphasis original). In democratic politics, it is necessary not just to establish the truth of facts but to accord them political objectivity by disputing what, if anything, they call upon us to do. Arendt's political objectivity, read alongside ordinary-language philosophy, offers a critical insight into democratic agency: that it is not rules but we who decide “what will and will not belong to the common world” (21).
Zerilli's vibrant interpretation brings to light a parallel between Arendt's work and that of such new materialists as Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and Noortje Marres: the shared recognition that politics—not science—decides what counts as a matter of “concern.” But these scholars counter Arendt's phenomenological account in an important respect. Their work emphasizes that things do not “become public” given a sufficiently plural public “space,” as Zerilli—following Arendt—maintains (160; emphasis original). They must be made public by techniques and apparatuses of measurement, representations (both pictorial and narrative), diffusion by social and broadcast media, dramatization through popular protest, and more. Can we take up Arendt's central concern, the “creation and maintenance of the common world” (9), without attending to the politics of things?
