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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2004
A specter is haunting the Trilateral Democracies—this specter is called civic malaise. It has visited these countries before; rearing its head for the first time a quarter-century ago, proclaiming the demise of democracy due to the inability of governments to respond to the onslaught of waves of new forms of participatory democracy and political action. (Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, 1975). Too much democracy, as it were, may be too much of a good thing. Fortunately many of these dire predictions have not materialized, perhaps partly because they were highlighted a quarter-century ago. The sequel, Disaffected Democracies, celebrates the silver anniversary of the original Crisis of Democracy. This successor volume is similarly concerned with the fate of democracy in rich countries. These democracies are “troubled” (p. 7), so the argument goes, because their public institutions are undermined by declining confidence in government and sagging interpersonal social trust. The authors of this edited volume situate the sources of these “disturbing” (p.13) developments squarely in the political sphere. In other words, the origins of the decline in confidence in political institutions is not explained by a frail social fabric but, rather, by failures of government and politics themselves. Despite a tight focus on the temporal (the last 25 years) and spatial (the Trilateral countries) parameters of this edited volume, it is refreshing to see so many diverse and innovative diagnoses as to what is ailing the rich democracies.
Of the 13 essays that compose the text (bracketed by a foreword by Samuel Huntington and an afterword by Ralf Dahrendorf), three are single country studies: two on Japan, by Hideo Otake and Susan J. Pharr, and one on the United States, by Anthony King. Even though King's contribution is entitled “Distrust of Government: Explaining American Exceptionalism,” what all three of these essays have in common is that they locate the sources of civic erosion firmly in the untrustworthiness of politicians, for once making the United States NOT exceptional. Similarly, Donatella della Porta's three-country comparison of Italy, France, and Germany finds that confidence in government was highest in Germany and lowest in Italy, where the lowest and highest levels of corruption were found, respectively. France took a medium position. The contributions by Alberto Alesina and Romain Wacziarg and by Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris take a wider view, each looking at a larger number of countries. Both research teams conclude that the culprit of low public confidence may have to be found in the subpar performance of government policies and the institutions designed to implement these policies. The somewhat more “philosophical” contributions by Russell Hardin and Fritz Scharpf speculate on the decreased need for the state in modern societies leading to reduced trust in the state (Hardin) and on the quality of discourse between elites and masses: A more realistic discourse between these groups should prevent wishful thinking and bring the desires of the electorate closer to the actual capacities of governments (Scharpf). Pippa Norris' essay on the effect of watching television on social capital does not unequivocally find that the former undermines the latter, thereby reducing confidence and trust in government. It simply depends on what you watch. Peter Katzenstein looks at the lessons from smaller democracies and finds that neither the end of the Cold War nor internationalization is a valid predictor of the already much less accentuated civic malaise that has befallen the smaller countries of Europe. They are characterized by well-developed welfare states and inclusionary political structures that cushion their citizens from exogenous shocks, with the effect of creating a less polarized society with a citizenry that is not turned off by government.
Just when the reader's sense of impending doom in the rich democracies is becoming unbearable, along come the two essays by Russell Dalton and Sidney Tarrow, both of which put a more cheerful spin on this dire topic. Dalton argues, refreshingly, that value change is an ongoing process, driven by changes in the skills and knowledge of citizens in postmaterial societies, that institutions and political parties are constantly challenged, and that democratic regimes simply must adapt to these processes. For Tarrow, new forms of political activism have arisen, leading to short-lived and shifting coalitions with little likelihood of sustaining high levels of confidence in government.
As this description of the individual essays indicates, there is a rich diversity in explanations regarding the origins of the decline of public trust and confidence in government. This very diversity, however, has the effect of connecting the various essays rather tenuously with one another and, while they are superbly written and argued, encourages even more speculation as to what is actually disquieting the democracies of the world. Perhaps the liberal democracies have advanced “too far,” i.e., the toxic mix of radical individualism, hyperconsumerism, and economic individualism makes “public” institutions look anachronistic. Perhaps people today are simply more educated, so they criticize more. Perhaps their lack of trust and confidence in governmental institutions can be interpreted as a maturation process, or a process of emancipation in which citizens take a more alert and cautionary stance against political institutions—indeed if this were the case, there would be no need to be “troubled.” Or perhaps the reasons for the civic malaise are to be found in the decreasing capacity of the state to integrate ever more atomized, detached, and fragmented citizens? Is it conceivable that rising inequality, particularly in the United States, is reducing the pool of people who still trust government and have confidence in their political institutions? This book will certainly leave you with a strong desire to explore these fascinating topics further.
However, perhaps the most crucial question of all is, how seriously should we take these observations that seem to show that citizens are upset? With the advantage of hindsight we can say that the original message of Crisis of Democracy was unnecessarily alarmist. The democracies have adapted and become even stronger. Today's concern with the troubled democracies may again turn out to be nothing but a tempest in a teapot, 25 years hence. After getting closer to the substance, we may realize that this specter was nothing but a mirage after all.
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