I am very grateful to David Traven for his insightful review of my book. He touches on four very important questions that the book, at best, only partially answers. Given the space provided, I focus on a subset of these questions. First, what is the value of violence in responding to humiliation, and what affects whether people have violent or more pacific reactions to humiliating events? As these questions imply, individuals and states can respond to humiliation in a variety of ways, some of which might involve physical aggression but some of which might not. Models of humiliation at the individual level describe a pathway to violence by which the pain of humiliation decreases self-regulation and increases self-defeating behavior, thereby increasing the chance of violence (Linda Hartling, “Humiliation: Real Pain, a Pathway to Violence,” RBSE 6, 2007). Although there is still much to learn about why humiliated actors select one response over another, this may be an area of difference between individuals and states. Within the international sphere, expectations of how states are supposed to behave given their status—and how they are able to behave—do seem to play a role in shaping how they respond to humiliating events. Great powers, which distinguish themselves in part by their material capacity, may be more inclined to respond with the use of force than non-great power states. The latter are not only less militarily capable but are also able to assert their international status through demonstrations of their moral authority; for example, by contributing to global common goods or assuming leadership positions within international institutions. Such a model of self-defeating behavior can likely explain intractable cycles of violent conflict among middle and small states. But states in such conflicts seem less concerned about restoring international status and more intent on punishing those which they believe to be otherwise beyond correction.

This relates to another of Traven’s questions about the value of using force against weaker third-party states. Though the individual-level model outlined earlier poses a connection between humiliation and rashness, there is little evidence of this connection with respect to the humiliation of great powers, which tend to engage in aggressive acts of revenge immediately after a humiliating event at much lower rates than their non-great power counterparts. This suggests that the fear of further humiliation constrains humiliated great powers in important ways. The infrequency of revenge among great powers may also be explained by the range of options available to them. Great powers are further distinguished by their ability to project power abroad. Demonstrating this capacity at the expense of a weak third-party state avoids the fate of repeated humiliation at the hands of a rival while also reminding the general public and the world that the state will continue to expect great power status. When compared with the fate of being humiliated twice by a rival if an act of revenge goes wrong, reconfirming national identity through doing what only great powers can do seems like a far less irrational act.