East Asian community

Japan has long played an important role in the process of regional integration in East Asia. Building on the improvement in Sino-Japanese relations established by high level exchanges before the onset of financial crisis in 2008,Footnote ⁵ Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (Reference Fukuda2008) echoed Koizumi Junichiro's thoughts on East Asian Community and proposed the transformation of the Pacific Ocean into an ‘inland sea’. The New Fukuda Doctrine pledged to ‘emphatically support ASEAN's efforts to realize a Community’. It was clear that the APT remained at the center of Japan's regional community strategy. Succeeding Fukuda's call, in 2009, Hatoyama (Reference Hatoyama2009) endorsed the concept of fraternity (yuai), an idea that Hatoyama believed could serve as the foundation for greater regional integration among Japan, China, Korea, and ASEAN.

Nevertheless, Japan's intention to strengthen cooperation and dialogue in East Asia often fell short of realization as a result of instability in domestic politics and regional security. Since 2008, Japan has undergone five leadership changes, which creates immense challenges for the realization of foreign policy. Even though Japan continues to commit to the process of regional integration in East Asia, domestic politics often constrained the Japanese leadership from taking the initiative and making actual progress towards regional cooperation. For many observers, Japan's proposals were usually ‘exceedingly vague in its specifics’, which made them seem more rhetorical than otherwise (Searight, Reference Searight2010: 6).

Asia Pacific Community

In response to a rising China and Australia's exclusion from the integration process in East Asia, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd proposed the establishment of an ‘Asia Pacific Community’ (APC) a few months before the outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis. Regarding the APC, Rudd made a particular effort to stress that the proposal will not be a challenge to APEC, the EAS, and other regional bodies. Rather, the aim of the APC is to bring about a potentially new architecture for regional integration that builds on existing institutions or develops as a separate institution of its own (Frost, Reference Frost2009). With most of the current institutions excluding either one or more states with a vital interest in East Asia, the APC seeks to stimulate more discussion and cooperation by bringing together all regional members into a single forum (Frost, Reference Frost2009).

Despite the APC's intention to mitigate the effect of ‘forum shopping’ and contradictions among an array of overlapping regional institutions and put progress towards regional integration back on track again in East Asia, the initiative has not enjoyed wide support. Besides the advancement of more dialogue in the region, it is unclear what the APC seeks to achieve in the end. By emphasizing the US role in the region, the APC concept resembles APEC and merely adds to the growing competition between East Asianism and Asian Pacificism. On the other hand, the focus of the APC is unclear, as its proposed scope includes political and economic cooperation and security cooperation including non-traditional issues such as terrorism, natural disaster, disease, food, and energy.

ASEAN has remained cool to the APC proposal. Singapore has been a vocal critic of the idea, complaining that Australia failed to consult with the states of Southeast Asia and to give adequate recognition to ASEAN's central role in regional integration (He, Reference He2011: 271; Tan, Reference Tan2011: 59; Liou, Reference Liou2010: 17). China has dismissed the proposal as well, saying that ‘conditions are not ripe’ to pursue the APC (He, Reference He2012: 68).

Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership

In November 2009, at the annual APEC summit, the US Trade Representative (USTR) announced the participation of the US in the ‘Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership’ (TPP). The announcement brought instant global attention to the previously low profiled ‘P-4’ agreement. In the face of China's rise and Asia's economic prosperity, the Obama administration sought to assuage America's economic decline by improving relations with East Asia. In the Suntory Hall speech in Tokyo, US President Barack Obama (Reference Obama2009) expressed that ‘[the US] have a stake in the future of this region, because what happens here has a direct effect on our lives at home’. Building on the statement, Obama (Reference Obama2009) added that ‘as an Asia Pacific nation, the United States expects to be involved in the discussions that shape the future of this region, and to participate fully in appropriate organizations as they are established and evolve’.

In a certain sense, the TPP may be regarded as an extension of APEC or the US hub-and-spoke strategy in Asia. As Amy Searight (Reference Searight2010: 8) puts concisely, ‘TPP is very much a child of APEC.’ In terms of community building, the TPP is significant in that realization of the agreement would reconsolidate America's role in East Asia, a status that has been unsettled in recent years due to US exclusion from the ASEAN Plus process and the failure of APEC to achieve breakthroughs. By referring to the US as an ‘Asia Pacific nation’ and himself as ‘America's first Pacific President’, Obama essentially reiterated Washington's claim to influence in the Asia Pacific while hinting at a Pacific order or community that includes the US and centers on its leadership (Hung and Liu, Reference Hung and Liu2012). Regardless of whether the US can steer the development of regionalism in East Asia in the near future, TPP negotiations thus far have greatly altered the regional atmosphere for integration by encouraging Asia to hedge its support (Goh, Reference Goh2005; Chase, Reference Chase2011). As the US recommits itself to East Asia, ASEAN is no longer regarded as the best, or the only, route for regionalism.

ASEAN plus

Since the establishment of the APT in 1997, ASEAN has come to be recognized by the international community as a stabilizing force that plays an important mediating role among great powers. Despite the outgrowth of the EAVG and the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) from the APT,Footnote ⁶ great power competition in Southeast Asia has diverted ASEAN's attention away from community building towards institutional balancing and hedging among the powers. Over the years, the APT expanded twice, from plus three (China, Japan, Korea) to plus six (APT plus India, Australia, New Zealand) to plus eight (ASEAN plus Six plus the US and Russia). Unfortunately, for many observers, expansion of the ASEAN forum reinforces the argument for institutional balancing rather than progress towards regional integration. Sino-US competition in Southeast Asia is a good example of where ASEAN put a balancing strategy to work. Considering China's rise in recent years, by bringing the US into ASEAN forums, ASEAN essentially checks China's rise through US involvement in the region while maintaining strong economic relations with both countries.

Regarding ASEAN, many observers expressed anxiety over the organization's ability to continue in the driver's seat for regional integration in East Asia, especially under the pressure of growing competition between the major powers (Beeson, Reference Beeson2009). On the other hand, criticisms have been raised regarding the ‘ASEAN Way’ as a principle that leads to ‘process rather than progress’ (Narine, Reference Narine2009). Seng Tan (Reference Tan2011) further suggests that ASEAN-led regionalism is undermined by the challenges of ‘regionalism-lite, regionalism-elite and regionalism-polite’, which points to ASEAN's over emphasis in autonomous identity and form rather than advancements towards integration.

The US return to Asia put ASEAN in an awkward position, as Southeast Asia needs to react to Washington's call through the TPP while maintaining its relations with Beijing. Besides the possible impact of TPP on ASEAN–China relations, if a number of Southeast Asian states choose to enter the TPP, the tide of regionalism in East Asia may be changed in favor of Asia-Pacificism. Caught in great power competition, the future of ASEAN's role in regional integration could only diminish, a thought that has renewed the debate among Southeast Asian countries on the formation of an ASEAN community that could strengthen their identity.

Chinese pragmatism in historical perspective

As far back as Mao Zedong's Long March in 1934, pragmatism defined the foreign policy tradition of China. In the face of a much stronger Kuomintang (KMT) army at the time, Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) retreated to hinterlands of the mainland to regroup and wait for another opportunity to retaliate. Mao's low posture was eventually rewarded in 1949 when the CCP claimed the sovereignty of Mainland China and the KMT was forced to retreat to Taiwan. Besides good fortune and the twist of fate, what may be deduced from the Long March is Mao's willingness to maintain a low posture and rebuild the strength of the CCP before sallying forth again. In hindsight, history rewarded Mao's pragmatism handsomely.

Entailing more than just military strategy, lessons from the Long March carried over to Mao's strategic thinking and international outlook. In an attempt to remove China from the Cold War system dominated by the US and Soviet Union, Mao Zedong proposed the ‘middle ground’ theory that emphasized independent policy making. As Tung-Chieh Tsai (Reference Tsai2011: 22) points out, regardless of the usage of various titles to describe Mao's political rhetoric, the chairman's message was clear – China should become an independent and self-determining state within or without the bipolar system. By designating China as part of the Third World, Mao made China a part of the non-aligned group of developing states, a position that proved to be useful in the Deng Xiaoping era.

By achieving an independent position between the superpowers, China under Mao gained the policy flexibility to switch its support depending on the international atmosphere. Beijing's change in support from a common ideological front with Moscow in the post-war period to reconciliation with Washington in the 1970s is a good example of pragmatism at work. In retrospect, we can conclude that thanks to the influence of Mao, pragmatism became a deeply rooted tradition in Chinese foreign policy. However, as a fine line separated pragmatism and revolutionism, the irony is not lost if the chairman's revolutionary sentiments prevailed in Chinese foreign policy in the end. China might be a different country today.

Following the trail of Mao's policy, Deng Xiaoping introduced ‘independent’ (duli) and ‘autonomous’ (zizhu) as the guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy (Tsai, Reference Tsai2011: 22). In 1984, Deng established the direction of China's foreign policy as ‘independence, autonomy and no alliance’ (duli zizhu qie zhenzheng de bujiemeng). China's new policy direction was to be realized through the principle of ‘four not, one comprehensive’ (sibuyiquan): no alliance making, no isolation, no confrontation, no targeting of third countries, and the pursuit of foreign policy activities on all fronts (Tsai, Reference Tsai2011: 22).

Compared to Mao's strategy of playing off the superpowers to achieve China's policy space, Deng adopted a strategy that sought to keep both the US and Russia within arms length. In the 1980s, Deng made efforts towards the normalization of relations with both Washington and Moscow. Against the backdrop of détente between the US and Soviet Union, Deng's move reflected Beijing's recognition of a semi-permanent bipolar international structure that would be jointly managed by Washington and Moscow. Once again, China adjusted its policy in response to changes in the international environment. Yet Deng misjudged the situation, as the bipolar structure collapsed in 1989 and pushed China onto the world stage as the next rising star.

Chinese pragmatism and the shaping of regional community

Perhaps the strongest support for China's pragmatism in the new century is Beijing's treatment of Sino-US relations and the China threat theory. Despite arguments to the contrary, besides minor glitches in the relationship between China and the US, bilateral relations generally moved towards stability. Since the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995–96, Beijing and Washington have settled for a period of time without meeting at the brink of war. Sino-US relations began to change again after Washington's announcement to pivot towards Asia in 2009.Footnote ¹⁰

A widely accepted explanation for the temporary peace in Sino-US relations since the mid-1990s is that China has come to see sustained economic development as a national priority. In the new century, China's leadership repeatedly made open statements about the importance of ‘strategic opportunities’ for the development of China.Footnote ¹¹ With many domestic problems at its heels, China needs a peaceful surrounding environment that allows it to deal with the challenges. In other words, China needs an environment that does not give rise to external challenges that would exacerbate existing problems (Zhao, Reference Zhao2011).

In response to the general anxiety over China's potential threat, Beijing introduced the concepts of peaceful rise, harmonious worldview (hexie shijieguan), and good neighbor policy (mulin waijiao).Footnote ¹² A closer examination of these concepts reveals a pragmatic strategy at work.

Regardless of whether China's promotion of peaceful intentions created adverse effects to the contrary, by openly addressing the issue of motivations behind its increasing power, China is essentially confronting the skeptics while rallying for international support. Conversely, an alternative strategy to respond to doubts through denial or a rigid stance may cast China into the plot of a self-fulfilling prophecy in the making by confirming the skeptics.

China's pragmatism can be gleaned from the harmonious image it seeks to project. Despite economic growth, China continues to follow Deng Xiaoping's strategy of ‘bidding one's time and hiding one's light under a bushel’ (taoguangyanghui). If China's rise to great power status is only a matter of time, for Beijing, it is only logical that China hides its ambition and protects its development in the meantime. By using the imagery of harmony and calling forth the Chinese saying of ‘treasuring harmony’ (yiheweigui) through its various proposals, China succeeded in dismissing some qualms over its revisionism (Tsai et al., Reference Tsai, Ming-Te and Liu2011).

China has taken actions to support its ideas as something more than mere rhetoric. By entering into regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and ASEAN, Beijing has demonstrated itself as more willing to partake in multilateral negotiations.Footnote ¹³ As gestures of good will, Beijing has also exported large amounts of cultural products and foreign aid abroad.Footnote ¹⁴ In terms of community building, participation in regional cooperation and the export of cultural products and aid reinforce China's proposal for a harmonious world.

However, the concept of an harmonious worldview may be interpreted differently depending on the perception towards China. A benevolent perception of China may lead to the conclusion that Beijing is en route to the path towards the establishment of community, as ‘harmony’ is a collective concept that can only be realized by the group. On the other hand, a more critical perception of China may find linkage between the façade of harmony and a revisionist's real ambitions towards hegemony. History is rife with examples of political rhetoric and stories of the Trojan Horse. At the intersection of both interpretations lays China's pragmatism. By leaving space for alternative interpretations on China's foreign policy, Beijing achieves the flexibility to adjust its strategy depending on the changing environment while keeping the international community in a state of speculation.

Short-term strategy: caution and conservatism

Although China's foreign policy seems to be moving away from Deng Xiaoping's (1993) ‘bide our time and hide our light under a bushel’ (taoguangyanghui) strategy towards ‘accomplishment and making a difference’ (yousuozuowei), its regional policy continues to be relatively conservative. As China's Premier Wen Jiabao stated, ‘even though China's comprehensive capability has made sizeable increase and its international status continues to rise, China is still a developing country and a equal member of the big Asia family . . . with the greatest sincerity, determination and confidence, together with countries of East Asia, China will make relentless efforts towards the realization of common development, continued development and harmonious development’.Footnote ¹⁵ Regarding regional integration, China continues to support an ‘ASEAN centered’ approach. At the ASEAN summit meeting in 1997, China openly proclaimed its support for ASEAN's leading role in regional integration.

Mid-term strategy: strengthen subregional cooperation

In the mid-term, China's goal is to strengthen subregional cooperation. In Northeast Asia, China took advantage of the political détente at the turn of the century and agreed on the ‘progress report of trilateral cooperation’ and ‘action plan for trilateral cooperation’ with Japan and Korea in 2004.Footnote ¹⁶ Beijing hoped cooperation with Tokyo and Seoul could serve as a stepping stone towards the development of a regional consensus (Yang, Reference Yang2005: 128). In Southeast Asia, following the initiation of free trade negotiations in 2002 and the adoption of an early harvest plan and agreements on trade in goods and services afterwards, China's relations with the region reached a new level with the realization of the ACFTA in 2010.Footnote ¹⁷ Beijing currently holds ambitions to further integrate Asia through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Long-term strategy: soft powerFootnote ¹⁸

In the long term, China seemed to be keen on harnessing its soft power towards the realization of regional integration (Yang and Guo, Reference Yang and Guo2008; Tsai and Hung, Reference Tsai and Hung2008; Lu and Teng, Reference Lu and Teng2008). Particularly in the case of East Asia, in terms of cooperation, improving policy transparency and establishing related conflict management mechanisms have become important considerations to take into account for policy makers (Dosch, Reference Dosch, Liu and Regnier2003: 45). Traditional realpolitik strategies based on coercion have become poor policy choices for regional integration. The change in thinking towards international relations provides the reason for China's adoption of a good neighbor policy and a three neighbors (sanlin) policy of ‘be harmonious, pacify and enrich thy neighbor’ (mulin, anlin, fulin).

China's increasing soft power can be gauged from the cultural and language learning fever known as ‘zhongguore’ and the continued expansion of Confucius Institutes across the world. According to the Office of Chinese Language Council International (hanban), the official department in charge of the promotion of Chinese studies abroad, by 2010 China had established 322 Confucius Institutes and 369 Confucius Classrooms spanning 87 countries.Footnote ¹⁹ The use of soft power reinforces China's proposal for a harmonious world.

Sino-Japanese relations remain the main challenge

As East Asia's strongest economies, differences in strategic goals cannot dismiss the importance of China and Japan's role in regional integration (Ma and Liu, Reference Ma and Liu2004; Zhang, Reference Zhang2006; Ding, Reference Ding2006). Particularly in terms of the development of ‘Asianism’ or the basis of communal thought, from Sun Yat-sen's pan-Asianism to Yoshida Shoin, Okakura Tenshin and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, it is clear that both China and Japan played important intellectual roles in the past (Xu, Reference Xu2007). After the Democratic Party of Japan (minshu to) entered office in 2009, Sino-Japanese relations seemed to turn towards reconciliation, as Tokyo subsequently adopted a more friendly China policy and changed its previous policy of ‘pro America, exit Asia’ to ‘pro America, enter Asia’. However, the implications of China and Japan's leadership change in 2012 for bilateral relations remain to be observed. Shinzo Abe, the newly elected prime minister of Japan, has already expressed the country's will to regain its economic and political status in East Asia. China remains vigilant towards Japan.

Gradual participation under status quo (1991–1997)

In the post Cold War period, China took the initiative to normalize relations with East Asia and re-establish interactions with both Northeast and Southeast Asia (Qiao, Reference Qiao2006; Qin and Wei, Reference Qin, Wei, Zhu and Ross2008). In the process, China accepted the ASEAN model and its principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. On the other hand, China also participated in both track one and track two institutions of APEC and ARF and supported APEC and ASEAN's role as agenda setters. Beijing's gradual re-entry into East Asia generated the base for further interactions between China and ASEAN. In 1995, China and ASEAN commenced the first round of senior official meetings and, in 1996, ASEAN upgraded China's negotiating status from ‘partner’ to ‘comprehensive dialogue partner’. In Northeast Asia, despite Japan's participation in the ranks of criticism against China after the Tiananmen Square incident, exchange visits by high level military officials in 1995 reopened the gate of exchange between China and Japan.Footnote ²⁰ Keeping to the status quo helped to increase the confidence of East Asian states towards Beijing.

Active participation under status quo (1997–2002)

Regardless of debates, the 1997 Asian financial crisis greatly influenced the distribution of power in Asia and served as a critical turning point for the development of China–ASEAN relations (Chen, Reference Chen2001: 55–58). As a result of China's decision to uphold its currency during the crisis, Southeast Asian countries avoided further economic downturns. China–ASEAN relations moved forward in huge strides after the Asian financial crisis. As former ASEAN Secretary Rodolfo Severino points out, ‘China is emerging because of this kind of good will’ (Kurlantzick, Reference Kurlantzick2006: 7). In contrast, Southeast Asia began to inch away from the US Washington's unilateralist foreign policy style under the Bush administration, and financial conditionalities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) contributed in no small part to Southeast Asia's adjustment (Tsai, Reference Tsai2011: 86; Sutter, Reference Sutter, Goh and Simon2008). Washington's missteps provided Beijing with a window of opportunity to actively push forward relations with Southeast Asia.

Beginning in 1999, China and Southeast Asia made a number of agreements concerning a range of issues. In 2000, China suggested the ‘ten plus one’ proposal after ASEAN made the ‘ten plus three’ proposal. In 2002, following China and ASEAN's agreement to establish a free trade area, both parties signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. In 2003, China became the first major power outside Southeast Asia to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. However, while China's relationship with Southeast Asia warmed, Japan sought better relations with its neighbors as well. The Koizumi administration's active approach towards East Asia increased the level of competition and antagonism between China and Japan (Li, Reference Li2005: 236–238). Sino-Japanese competition gave ASEAN the opportunity to continue to play the unique role of manning the steering wheel of regional integration (Liu, Reference Liu2007).

Seeking the role of agenda setter (2003–2009)

Although many Chinese scholars do not entertain the idea of China increasing its interest in regional integration in a short period of time (Shao, Reference Shao2008), since 2003 not only has China increased the level of participation in regional cooperation, developments also suggest that China is moving towards the role of an agenda setter. Beijing had a clear goal: gradually integrate East Asia into an economic community structured around the mainland. An economic community centered on China could in turn serve as the foundation for endeavors towards regional leadership or global hegemony. The Boao Forum for Asia is a good example of China's changing role.

At the Reference He2004 Boao Forum, China's President Hu Jintao (Reference Jintao2004) proposed five points for cooperation and development with Asian states: advance friendship, trust and good neighborliness; expand and deepen bilateral economic cooperation; increase the speed of regional economic integration; promote cultural interaction and personnel exchange; and facilitate security dialogue and military-to-military exchange.Footnote ²¹ At the 2007 Boao Forum, Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, further proposed the concept of ‘New Asia’ (xinxing yazhou) grounded on ‘efforts to expand regional integration, protect the environment, encourage technical innovation and build a harmonious continent’.Footnote ²²

On the other hand, in Southeast Asia, Beijing also demonstrated a stronger interest in agenda setting. Besides raising a number of proposals at the APT meeting in 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao followed up in 2004 with several additional proposals for the establishment of a free trade area in East Asia. In 2005, China's Ministry of Commerce repeated China's desire for the establishment of a free trade area in East Asia.

Towards a balancer or potential candidate for regional hegemony (2010 –)

It is apparent from the previous description that increased economic power provided China with the energy and confidence to participate in the international community. The Asian financial crisis provided an opportunity for China to reshape regional order in East Asia and strengthen its own role in regional integration. Many observers have come to recognize China's development towards great power status as an inevitable phenomenon (Wang et al., Reference Wang, Xiong, Qiao, Wang and Tan2009; Men, Reference Men2009). Conclusion of numerous agreements for cooperation between China and ASEAN stimulated a wave of free trade negotiations from Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India, many of which sensed the danger of being left out of the race. Realization of the ACFTA in 2010 hints at the possibility for structural change in East Asia. The key lies in whether China passively exploits the opportunity by playing a balancing role among the US, Japan, and ASEAN, or actively pursues a strong leadership role in the region.