How is international law made? There is a formal answer to this based on Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the way treaties are drawn up and concluded, and the processes for the development of rules of customary international law and general principles of law. Fundamentally, it involves the interaction of states.
The work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the identification of customary international lawFootnote 1 has sought to bring greater light to the question of what constitutes customary international law and, at least indirectly, how it is made. But the ILC takes a fairly narrow view of what fits within the rubric of customary international law, asserting that rules of customary international law are developed through the practice of states and to some extent the practice of intergovernmental organizations. According to the ILC, nongovernmental entities can assist in providing evidence of customary international law, but they cannot participate in its creation.Footnote 2
While this may be doctrinally correct, is it an adequate description of how normativity arises under international law? Are there other ways practices are followed and obligations assumed, and do they involve only states and intergovernmental organizations? Terence C. Halliday, of the American Bar Foundation, and Gregory Shaffer, of the University of California, Irvine School of Law, argue in their book, Transnational Legal Orders, that there is much more lawmaking, formal and informal, going on across borders than is traditionally perceived, and that it does not just involve states.
Transnational Legal Orders is a collection of essays built around a common theme. Social ordering begets legal ordering and thus the way in which “legal norms are developed, conveyed and settled transnationally” is a more appropriate focus than the traditional international law/national law dichotomy (p. 3). The editors view this process in terms of “transnational legal orders,” which are collections of “formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions” (p. 5).
The approach of the work is interdisciplinary, drawing from political science, sociology, and law. The book draws specifically from regime theory, world polity theory, and global and transnational legal pluralism. It breaks down the traditional conceptual categories of public and private international law and goes beyond them to include national and local lawmaking. In doing so, the book diversifies the actors involved in authoritative decision-making processes and emphasizes how these processes lead to “institutionalization.”
A key element of the editors’ approach is what is termed “recursive theory,” which looks at the production and implementation of law within a single frame and sees the impetus for change as coming from either or both “above” and “below.” Further, in addition to the interactions involved in bottom-up or top-down recursivity, there are interactions between different transnational legal orders—horizontal as well as vertical recursivity.
The key to the success of transnational legal orders, in the view of the editors, is their institutionalization. This involves a process of “norm settling,” a concept derived from sociolegal scholarship whereby over time stakeholders know what norms apply because meaning is relatively stable (p. 89), and there is a degree of “alignment” of a transnational legal order (TLO) with a particular issue area. Ultimately, institutionalization of a TLO occurs “when actors behave according to a set of legal norms that they simply take for granted as being appropriate in a particular situation” (p. 42).
Transnational legal orders are not static, nor are they necessarily permanent. They grow, they adapt, and they may be displaced. This is illustrated in the self-contained analyses of particular issue areas that make up the bulk of the book. These studies are broadly grouped into the categories of business law, regulatory law, and human rights law. All show, often in different ways, through either bottom-up or top-down approaches, how formal and informal regimes or legal orders develop, interact, compete, and sometimes decay.
The overall application of the transnational legal order approach is well illustrated by reference to the transportation of goods by sea, which Susan Block-Lieb, of Fordham Law School, and Terence Halliday discuss in their chapter, “Settling and Concordance: Two Cases in Global Commercial Law.” What regime determines issues of liability between shippers and carriers? These are matters governed by the domestic law of each state, but since shipping moves around the world and crosses the borders of states, uniformity between states is necessary. And this uniformity results in principle from the so-called Hague Rules or what are known as the Hague-Visby Rules, which are based on an International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading.
This does not sound like an uncommon process, but the story does not stop there. Desire for change to the Hague-Visby Rules to reflect the needs of developing countries or of landlocked countries has led to negotiations in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and then work in the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to develop alternative approaches—the Hamburg Rules and rules on multimodal transport—incorporating shipping and land-based transportation. The result is that competing regimes are emerging, involving the interrelationship of traditional treaty regimes, the actions of international organizations, both interstate (UNCTAD) and mixed (UNCITRAL), together with that of NGOs—principally the Comité Maritime International (CMI). The result is what the authors term an incipient transnational legal order—and in fact competing transnational legal orders because Hague-Visby is being challenged by the alternative Hamburg Rules. Under this approach nothing is truly national or truly international, and the traditional categories of public and private international law rapidly become inadequate.
The other chapters, often in different ways, demonstrate various aspects of the theory and practice of transnational legal orders. Recursivity between the international, the state, and the local is illustrated in numerous chapters. The late Roderick A. Macdonald, of the Faculty of Law, McGill University, in his chapter, “When Lenders Have Too Much Cash and Borrowers Have Too Little Law: The Emergence of Secured Transactions Legal Orders,” describes the sometimes competing actions of, among others, the IMF, the World Bank, UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, and the Hague Conference on Private International Law toward unifying approaches to secured transactions law, and the regional initiatives that have developed in Africa through the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa and in Latin America through the Organization of American States. Sometimes the developments reflect responses to particular industries—mobile equipment financing, international factoring and financial leasing, and receivables in international trade. Alongside of this there are many initiatives for a global secured transactions regime.
MacDonald sees no overall TLO having developed in the field of secured transactions law, but does see a number of incipient TLOs in existence or emerging—varying in both geographic and substantive scope and with different levels of normativity. However, differences of approach and objectives at the nation-state level make uniformity hard to achieve.
The field of climate change illustrates the importance of governmental engagement in the development of TLOs. Daniel Bodansky, of the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University, in his chapter, “Climate Change: Transnational Legal Order or Disorder,” focuses on the notion of a “legal order” in assessing whether a TLO could be said to emerge out of the “multitudinous” transnational activities in the field of climate change. He sees limited “normative settling” in that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol did not result in uniformity of approach. Both of these instruments have been characterized by divergences between developed and developing states. These divergent views of state actors hinder the development of TLOs. (It remains to be seen whether the 2016 Paris Accords will lead to greater normative settling than has been achieved in the past.)
Nevertheless, as Bodanksy points out, there are micro-TLOs that can be identified in the field of climate change, although again with mixed success. The global carbon market remains fragmented, particularly in relation to emissions trading, although “the rules regarding carbon credits reflect a higher degree of order” (p. 294). Climate change is also characterized by a lack of alignment between key issues and institutions, with several institutions with broad mandates competing with one another. Again, the problem is that states are the key actors in this area and fundamental differences between them inhibit the development of transnational legal orders. However, as Bodansky points out as well, there are bottom-up developments involving cities adopting common objectives and developments in specific sectors, such as maritime transport and forestry, where elements of normative systems at the micro level can be seen.
An approach to understanding how TLOs develop is found in the chapter by Sally Engel Merry, of New York University School of Law, “Firming Up Soft Law: The Impact of Indicators on Transnational Human Rights Orders.” She looks at the way in which soft law norms of human rights are translated into “quantitative indicators.” This involves a reformulation of what are designated as guidelines, standards, declarations, and recommendations—the imprimatur of soft law—into measurable targets and goals. She looks at the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in monitoring human rights treaty compliance and a project to assess the success of countries in controlling human trafficking and shows how the production of indicators can play an important part in the recursive process whereby “proposals are debated, contested, revised and represented” resulting in normative settling over time (p. 278). The production of indicators therefore contributes to “normative settling” and hence is an important step in the institutionalization of TLOs.
In his chapter, “‘Rule of Law’ as Transnational Legal Order,” Jothie Rajah, of the American Bar Foundation, views the concept of the rule of law as itself constituting an incipient TLO. This perspective faces difficulties, as Rajah himself admits, in part because of the “shifting meanings of rule of law” (p. 342). To him, transnational rule of law discourse is the TLO and transnational rule of law texts are simply “episodes” within that discourse as different organizations seek to assert their own authority. What Rajah is talking about here is the process of normative settling, and “the complexities related to settling” (p. 343) are illustrated by comparisons of the approaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (a humanist rule of law), the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Index (a market-driven rule of law), and the World Justice Project Index (an ideologically ambivalent rule of law). Rajah suggests that the WJP Index is an approach that avoids some of the domination/subordination problems of the Universal Declaration and the WGI approaches. What this chapter shows is that there are competing claims to authority in the field of the rule of law, which is a classic problem in the “settling” of TLOs.
The problems of developing TLOs because of competing policy issues are well illustrated by Philipp Genschel, of the European University Institute, and Thomas Riven, of the University of Bamberg, in their chapter, “Settling and Unsettling the Transnational Legal Order of International Taxation.” The avoidance of double taxation with respect to cross-border activity is important in encouraging efficient cross-border investment. But, at the same time, this can result in international tax competition, as cross-border activity is used to avoid the consequences of taxes in a higher-taxed jurisdiction. Added to this is what the authors term “tax sovereignty.” States assert the exclusive right to tax, leading to double taxation, which has to be ameliorated through double-taxation treaties. As a result, TLOs concerning double taxation tend to compete with TLOs concerning tax competition.
The TLO concerned with avoiding double taxation tended to revolve around the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and its principal promoters have been developed countries. But success in moving ahead on limiting double taxation led to increased activity in “strategic tax setting” (p. 179) that would attract inward capital flows. Moreover, new entities, such as the G7, the G20, and the WTO, are entering the international taxation field, creating more complexity in maintaining a single TLO.
The interaction of the international trade regime through the WTO and the international monetary regime of the IMF with respect to balance of payments imbalances, exchange rates, and capital controls are explored by Gregory Schaffer and Michael Waibel, of the Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge, in “The (Mis)Alignment of the Trade and Monetary Legal Orders,” where they demonstrate problems of alignment between TLOs. While there is close alignment with respect to balance of payments issues, there is misalignment of institutions with respect to exchange rates and competition with respect to capital controls.
The lack of defined normative content has inhibited the development of a transnational financial legal order, as Eric Helleiner, of the Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo, points out in “Regulating the Regulators: The Emergence and the Limits of the Transnational Financial Legal Order” (p. 231). In this area states have tended to function on an explicit soft law basis, which poses implementation problems where compliance is in the hands of domestic regulators. Networking, which is at the heart of transnational activity in this area, has been promoted through a “motley collection of relatively powerless international institutions” (p. 235), such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the latter of which later became the Financial Stability Board (FSB), rather than through the larger institutions such as IMF and the World Bank (p. 235). The result has been an ad hoc and improvised way of responding to international financial crises and a transnational financial legal order remains fragile.
An interesting contrast with the development of a single TLO is seen in the development of TLOs in the area of food safety. Tim Büthe, of Duke University, in “Institutionalization and Its Consequences: The TLO(s) for Food Safety,” traces the institutionalization of food safety TLOs and how the creation of the WTO's Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures was an important step in giving the Codex Alimentarius a status that it did not previously have (p. 276), indeed leading to its becoming the predominant TLO with respect to food safety. Yet, the future of such an institutionalized TLO is not secure, as developing countries are raising questions about the burden of SPS standards on them given the limited resources that they can devote to developing the scientific certainty that that regime requires. Again, it illustrates that institutionalization does not lead to a final static conclusion. As other studies show as well, it is a process that moves, changes, and develops.
Laurence R. Helfer, of Duke University, in “Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The Contested Evolution of the Transnational Legal Order on Access to Medicines,” explores the complex interaction of intellectual property (IP) law and human rights law in the development of a TLO on access to medicines. The story starts with separate TLOs for intellectual property and human rights and their isolation ends with the expansion of the intellectual property TLO through the development of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and a consequent “regime shift” from the World Intellectual Property Organization to the WTO (p. 321). While this resulted in increased normative settling for the IP TLO, a backlash from public health NGOs and developing countries focusing on a right to health halted that settling and led to flexibilities in the application of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The policy clash between higher patent protection and the human right to health has been at the core of TLO development and change in this area.
That TLOs can institutionalize relatively quickly, even though the problem is one of long standing, is illustrated in the chapter by Paulette Lloyd, of the U.S. Department of State, and Beth A. Simmons, of Harvard University, “Framing for a New Transnational Legal Order: The Case of Human Trafficking,” by reference to the field of human trafficking. They show that “anti-trafficking norms and ideas about appropriate responses originated outside of nation-states themselves” (p. 402). The problem has been well known for it has been the subject of international action going back to 1902, but it was not until 2000 that concerted action emerged. Lloyd and Simmons describe the efforts made by states, within international organizations and NGOs, as well as within states through domestic legislation and private initiatives. But, as other studies show, competing policy objectives, in this instance between criminal law and human rights, affect the way in which the TLO is able to institutionalize, although framing the activities surrounding human trafficking as transnational crimes was important in making progress in developing a human trafficking TLO.
An “accountability TLO” is identified by Leigh A. Payne, of the University of Oxford, in her study of accountability for atrocities committed in the past, “The Justice Paradox? Transnational Legal Orders and Accountability for Past Human Rights Violations.” Settling of such a TLO involves actions at the international and regional levels, including the response to genocide and other gross human rights violations and the Rome Statute, but also development within states of national legislation to criminalize “such conduct.” Slowness in developing national prosecutorial capacity with respect to past human rights atrocities limits the pace of the development of the TLO. The authors identify a paradox where settling at the international level can be accompanied by a degree of discord at the national and local levels, thereby contributing to unsettling.
What do Halliday and Schaffer conclude from this exploration of TLOs across a wide range of issue areas? To a large extent, they see this work as opening opportunities and avenues for further research. This has both a broad and a narrower implication. At the broader level the authors envisage both empirical and theoretical research “regarding law and legal orders” (p. 475). At a narrower level, the authors are interested in understanding what the studies can show about the creation and operation of TLOs as a distinct empirical phenomenon. What are the formal properties of a TLO? What is the role of hegemony in the identification and emergence of TLOs?
The authors develop a series of hypotheses about TLOs, from their framing, triggering, and propagating through to their institutionalization, failing, and decline. These hypotheses are drawn from the studies in the book and they provide a basis for predicting how TLOs will function as well as a basis for further research. Indeed, the authors see as essential for advancing TLO theory empirical evidence that “global norms and local legal norms bear a resemblance to each other and subsequently have an influence on behavior through the TLO” (p. 517).
There is much in this book that contributes to understanding of how TLOs grow, how they function, why they come into existence, what sustains them, and why they decline. In this respect alone the book is a major contribution to understanding transnational behavior at both the public and private levels. But, at a deeper level, the book is a much more radical contribution and opens up new ways of thinking about international law. The very notion of a transnational “legal order,” beyond just transnational law, raises questions regarding our assumptions about the nature of law and the nature of normativity. If legal orders can exist independently of, although implicating, formal treaty regimes and independently of a determination of the existence of customary rules of international law, then do we have to rethink traditional ideas of the formal sources of international law?
One cannot, of course, take this thought too far. As the authors themselves admit, in many TLOs the primary “norm entrepreneurs” are states themselves, and when they are the sole actors within a TLO, the process has not really changed. It has simply been renamed. Indeed, the authors state that in only one study has the primary mover in the development of the TLO been a nonstate entity, although the studies show that nonstate entities are active in the development and functioning of TLOs generally.
Moreover, in some instances, although the language may be different, the phenomenon being referred to is well known. Many chapters in the book focus on the problem of “settling,” which at heart is the process whereby norms emerge from practice into law—the process for the development of customary international law. But, thinking in terms of “settling” has the added value of indicating that this is not a simple, static, or easily described process. The notion of recursivity, whereby there is an interactive flow in which “proposals are debated, contested, revised and represented” (p. 278), gives a far better insight into what is happening in fact than the elliptical and mystical idea that practice, with the addition of opinio juris, somehow catapults from nonlaw to law. The authors are right in seeing as unproductive a rigid focus on the hard law/soft law dichotomy. The notion of “settling” emphasizes that that the move from practice to law is a process that involves movement, backward as well as forward, with gains and losses, until ultimately “actors behave according to a set of legal norms that they simply take for granted as being appropriate” (p. 42).
What the authors are saying is that when behavior is based on legal norms that are taken for granted, one could conclude that a TLO has become institutionalized. This of course is not saying that the norms around which a TLO has coalesced are rules of customary international law, although in some cases they may be. But it shows that if one wants to look to see how particular cross-border issues are regulated in fact, it will not be sufficient to look at what states have agreed to by treaty or what constitutes customary international law.
Transnational Legal Orders can be read as an important intellectual contribution to the notion of formal and informal legal orders that transcend borders—a rich interdisciplinary work that provides a framework for understanding how the formal and the informal interact and that shows the importance of focusing on behavior in order to understand law. But, it goes further than that. It questions assumptions about normativity and indicates that normativity is a spectrum and not an either/or proposition, as the labels of hard law and soft law would suggest. The relative normativity that Prosper Weil warned against some forty years agoFootnote 3 is a reality. Transnational Legal Orders also questions notions of fragmentation and demonstrates that regulation comes and goes in different issue areas, rather than indicating the fracturing of a coherent legal order. Fragmentation or disintegration, the authors warn, may be the result of seeking to deal with globalization through single, universal TLOs. Needs may be better met through multiple and competing TLOs.
Transnational legal orders stand alongside, or are integrated with, treaty regimes. They develop, they settle, they become institutionalized, they ebb and wane and regrow. Traditional ways of thinking about international law that do not readily accommodate such ideas run the danger that they will lose touch with what is happening in fact. Focusing on what states, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and national and local institutions are doing in creating frameworks for ordering of behavior across borders may be a more productive way of understanding both social and legal regulation in the international sphere than thinking just in terms of the formal sources of law.
